Sbsp affirmative- arl lab- ndi 2011


Fwd Deployments key to heg



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Fwd Deployments key to heg




Only forward deployed troops can ensure credibility—necessary trip wire to ensure commitment


Davis et al 9 (Jacquelyn, Ex. VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Pres. – IFPA and Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts U. and former DOD Consultant, Charles M. Perry , VP and Dir. Studies – IFPA, and James L. Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – IFPA, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes"”, February, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf, p. 7-8)

No such formula was put into place in Asia, which in any case lacked a multilateral framework comparable to that of NATO. Instead, for Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee was explicitly tied to the bilateral U.S. security relationships that were developed with each country and were made manifest in the forward deployment of American forces. As in NATO, these were regarded by their host governments as “trip-wire forces” necessary to ensure the steadfast nature of the U.S. commitment to come to their defense in a crisis, even one where nuclear escalation was possible.5 In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an at- tack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.



Now key time




Shifting away from Petroleum is NOW key to US heg-Readiness and Innovation


Parthemore & Nagl 10 (Christine Parthemore, Fellow at the Center for New American Security, John Nagl, President of the Center for New American Security, “Fueling the Future Force: Preparing the Department of Defense for a Post-Petroleum Era”, http://www.cnas.org/node/5023, September 2010) SV

Now is an opportune time to make this transition. As the services redeploy from current wars, the Army (and to a lesser extent the other services) have years of reset ahead of them. Acquisition reforms and personnel restructuring initiatives launched by Secretary Robert Gates in 2009 and 2010 will continue through the Obama administration and likely beyond. Together, these developments will present opportunities to procure new, more energy-efficient systems. A successful transition away from petroleum will produce financial, operational and strategic gains. Reducing dependence on petroleum will help ensure the long-term ability of the military to carry out its assigned missions — and help ensure the security of the nation. Though adopting nonpetroleum fuels will require an initial investment, it will likely be recouped in budget savings over the long term. Finally, moving beyond petroleum will allow DOD to lead in the development of innovative technologies that can benefit the nation more broadly, while signaling to the world that the United States has as innovative and adaptable force.

Now is key – fuel prices will tank military posture


Wald et al 9 (General Charles F Wald, Former Deputy Commander, Headquarters U.S. European Command, General Gordon R. Sullivan, Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and Former Chairman of the CNA MAB, Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, Former NASA Administrator, Shuttle Astronaut and the first Commander of the Naval Space Command, “Powering America’s Defense,” May 2009. )
While the current financial crisis provides enormous pressure to delay addressing these critical energy challenges, the MAB warns against delay. The economic risks of this energy posture are also security risks. The U.S. consumes 25 percent of the world’s oil production, yet controls less than 3 percent of an increasingly tight supply. Oil is traded on a world market, and the lack of excess global production makes that market volatile and vulnerable to manipulation by those who control the largest shares. Reliance on fossil fuels, and the impact it has on other economic instruments, affects our national security, largely because nations with strong economies tend to have the upper hand in foreign policy and global leadership. As economic cycles ebb and flow, the volatile cycle of fuel prices will become sharper and shorter, and without immediate action to address our nation’s long-term energy profile, the national security risks associated with the nation’s and the military’s current energy posture will worsen.

Must act to address dependence now.


Parthemore & Nagl 10 (Christine Parthemore, Fellow at the Center for New American Security, John Nagl, President of the Center for New American Security, “Fueling the Future Force: Preparing the Department of Defense for a Post-Petroleum Era”, http://www.cnas.org/node/5023, September 2010) SV

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) launched a project in September 2009 to examine DOD’s energy challenges and recommend a path forward. We convened DOD leaders and nongovernmental experts; researched current laws, requirements and projects; and visited military bases around the country to discuss DOD’s energy challenges and opportunities. From this research, we concluded that DOD needs a long-term strategy to adopt alternative fuels based on our reading of current trends in petroleum availability and use, as well as our identification of petroleum dependence as a long-term vulnerability for DOD. DOD officials increasingly understand this vulnerability. During the course of our project, the Navy appointed two-star officers to lead two task forces on energy and climate change. Their activities, which began quietly within the bureaucracy, are now well-known examples of leadership by the U.S. armed forces. The Air Force and Navy flight-tested camelina-based biofuel blends in the past year.3 The Air Force’s Air Mobility Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) are working to increase energy efficiency and maximize fuel savings in existing platforms and new acquisitions. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) presented instructions for integrating energy considerations into how DOD does business. Bases around the country are investing in solar, wind and geothermal projects. DOD is working to comply with federal energy mandates, and in particular those found in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, President Barack Obama’s October 2009 Executive Order on resource conservation by federal agencies and defense authorization acts. Though each of the services has admirably developed its own energy strategy to improve its near-term energy management, DOD must also develop a comprehensive long-term energy strategy. The strategies developed by individual services focus heavily on electricity usage at domestic installations, which accounts for a relatively small fraction of DOD’s energy needs, and most goals within these strategies do not look beyond 2015 or 2020 – a timeline that is too short to ensure DOD’s long-term energy security. Moreover, there is no single official who oversees DOD’s entire energy portfolio; authority within DOD is currently divided, which is likely to complicate implementation of the strategy. This report lays out the strategic necessity for DOD to find alternatives to petroleum over the next 30 years and then presents important steps in achieving that long-term goal.



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