Sbsp affirmative- arl lab- ndi 2011


FF kills Rapid Response/Effectiveness



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FF kills Rapid Response/Effectiveness



Energy needs limit speed and maneuverability


MCEEO 10 (Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, “Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan,” March 9, 2010. )
Energy is an essential combat enabler and a critical vulnerability . The way we have brought the fight to the enemy has yielded success on the battlefield . It has also created unprecedented demands for fuel and sources located in volatile regions of the world . Over the last ten years, we have become more lethal, but we have become and water that tether Marines to long logistic tails and limit our ability to maneuver as an expeditionary force . At a strategic level, our dependence on fossil fuels exposes us to a supply chain with constantly fluctuating prices, and petroleum supply routes heavy . We have lost speed . To reset the balance, we must return to our Spartan roots—fast, lethal, and austere.

Logistics tails kill rapid response – the need for oil hobbles maneuverability


Karbuz 4/9 (Sohbet, research associate at the International Energy Agency in Paris, “The US Marine Corps and Energy,” Sohbet Karbuz, April 9, 2011. )
Fuel requirement limits range and freedom of maneuver. Tethered to fuel, Marines have lost speed. Marines in Afghanistan use more than 200,000 gallons of fuel a day. Of this 75% was consumed by ground forces, which includes use by vehicles, generators, and other sustainment equipment. Aircraft consumed approximately 25% of the total. Of the 75% consumed by ground forces, a significant portion is used to generate electricity. Each of the more than 100 forward operating bases in Afghanistan requires a daily minimum of 300 gallons of diesel fuel. The Marine Corps announced on 21 March 2011 its Expeditionary Energy Strategy. The strategy spans the full spectrum of Marine operations. Spanning Bases to Battlefield, the strategy centers on changing the way marines think about energy. Setting the course to move from paper to action, it also includes an Implementation Plan which sets goals, performance metrics for expeditionary and installations energy, and a plan for implementation by 2025. In the words of General James F. Amos “Our growing demand for liquid logistics comes at a price. By tethering our operations to vulnerable supply lines, it degrades our expeditionary capabilities and ultimately puts Marines at risk. To maintain our lethal edge, we must change the way we use energy. The current and future operating environment requires an expeditionary mindset geared toward increased efficiency and reduced consumption, which will make our forces lighter and faster. We will aggressively pursue innovative solutions to reduce energy demand in our platforms and systems, increase our self-sufficiency in our sustainment, and reduce our expeditionary foot print on the battlefield. Transforming the way we use energy is essential to rebalance our Corps and prepare it for the future.” Energy is an essential combat enabler and a critical vulnerability due to long logistic tails. Marines list the following key elements for success: (1) to aggressively pursue innovative solutions to reduce energy demand in platforms and systems, (2) to increase self-sufficiency in sustainment, and (3) to reduce expeditionary foot print on the battlefield.

Energy freedom is key to combat power – petroleum dependency limits command, control and communication


Brookings 7 (Brookings Institute, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,” 21st Century Defense Initiative, Foreign Policy Studies, August 2007. )
First, the DOD needs to recognize the problem from a military perspective: energy is the key enabler of US military combat power. With that comes huge consumption of mostly imported petroleum based fuels, a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) structure dependent on the civilian electrical grid, and rising costs to support the military’s energy needs. Despite those key elements, DOD has no comprehensive strategy for energy or organizational structure to implement an energy strategy. Second, the DOD must recognize that energy security makes the military vulnerable in several ways. DOD operations require assured access to large amounts of fuel for combat platforms and electricity for DOD installations from a vulnerable electrical grid. Recent cost increases and higher projected costs for energy take defense dollars away from other key budget areas. Energy requirements are directly related to combat effectiveness, and the infrastructure required to transport and distribute energy to the battlefield is extremely expensive and diverts resources away from combat. Combat forces are limited by a “tether of fuel” that needs to be lengthened. Third, energy must be managed like other combat enablers, such as intelligence, acquisition, and logistics. Present DOD fuel costs represent only a 2.5 – 3% fraction of the national defense budget. That may seem small, but in a fiscally constrained wartime environment where DOD and Service budgets have been cut again and again – every dollar is already committed. The forecast is for more of the same. An already huge national debt, federal budget deficits, a looming fiscal storm of rising national health care costs and a potential Social Security crisis make fiscally constrained times appear permanent for the US Government.

The fuel tether limits freedom of movement and rapid response – jacks mission execution


MCEEO 10 (Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Office, “Marine Corps Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan,” March 9, 2010. )
All of these warfighting assets have made our combat forces more lethal but with a grave unintended consequence – our logistics trains are at greater risk . [14] Fuel and water must be trucked into Afghanistan over long distances through difficult terrain and challenging weather conditions . Convoys, vulnerable to asymmetric and conventional attack and disruption, are exposed targets that increase mission risk and divert combat power for protection that could otherwise be employed in operations against the enemy . And, in paying for fuel transit, we run the risk of indirectly funding our adversaries . [15] [16] Furthermore, supplying the Marine Air-Ground Task Force’s (MAGTF) growing energy requirement strains sustainment planning and execution at all levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic . [17] Our fuel requirement limits our range and freedom of maneuver from the sea and on land . It constrains our tactical options for executing missions in complex battlespaces, across long distances, and against hybrid threats . Tethered to fuel, we have lost speed.


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