Sps supplement Rough Draft-endi2011 Alpharetta 2011 / Boyce, Doshi, Hermansen, Ma, Pirani
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- China ASATs Justify US Development
Space Mil InevitableNo one agrees on space militarization in the status quo – means that weaponization is inevitable – takes out their impacts. Beljac, 08 - a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor, teaches at the University of Melbourne (Marko, “Arms Race in Space”, 4/1, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5113] When the United States recently shot apart a crippled spy satellite over the Pacific Ocean, it also tested an offensive anti-satellite weapon and the potential for ballistic missile defense. “The shot,” as the Pentagon called the $100 million operation conducted on February 20, came immediately after Russia and China put forward a detailed, but flawed, proposal for a treaty to ban space weapons at the United Nations. In response, the United States immediately reaffirmed its unwillingness to participate in any arms control accord covering space. These developments are just the latest wrinkles in a rapidly unfolding saga that underscores the fact that we’re entering a new strategic era characterized by the weaponization of space. It may sound exciting, but the potential consequences of space weaponization are cataclysmic. “The shot” has important implications for defense planners everywhere. To be sure, as Victoria Samson so eloquently explained, this was an orchestrated operation and didn’t in any way mimic the real-world conditions that would prevail if a missile defense system were to be used to “shield” the U.S. from an enemy-fired weapon. The satellite, after all, was very large and was moving along a predictable trajectory. Of course, all Ballistic Missile Defense tests carried out until now have been highly idealized and largely developmental in nature, as the Government Accountability Office noted in a recent report on the topic. Therefore, it would not be too far off the mark to even characterize this highly idealized action as a developmental weapons test. China ASATs Justify US DevelopmentWe secretly like China’s ASAT tests because it justifies U.S. space involvement. Beljac, 08 - a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor, teaches at the University of Melbourne (Marko, “Arms Race in Space”, 4/1, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5113] It’s important that we understand that the Bush administration’s stated reasons for “the shot” can’t be taken seriously. Given that the fuel tank was most likely not heat shielded it should not have survived re-entry. Even if by remote chance it were to survive re-entry, the pressure and heat of re-entry should have vaporized its hydrazine rocket fuel. Instead, the administration found a convenient way to do what China did last year: test an offensive anti-satellite weapon against its own redundant satellite. We now know that the United States knew that China was going to shoot down one of its own satellites beforehand, but the White House decided not to protest diplomatically before the Chinese test. This puts all the rhetoric directed at Beijing's way following China's anti-satellite test in perspective. The United States is not responding to Chinese space programs. It secretly welcomes them as public justification for its own drive to weaponize space. China ASAT test makes SB-BMD more popular. Kueter, 07 - is president of the George C. Marshall Institute, a nonprofit think tank dediicated to science and technology in public policy (Jeff, New Atlantis, “China's Space Ambitions -- And Ours,” Spring, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA16-Kueter.pdf) Ironically, the Chinese ASAT test could boost the prospects for spacebased missile defense. If the international community is truly worried about the debris-generating effects of ASAT weapons, then it ought to embrace—indeed demand—the development and deployment of boostphase missile defenses capable of intercepting missiles carrying ASATs long before they reach their satellite targets. A constellation of orbital interceptors could build upon capabilities developed in a precursor system of rapid-replenishment satellites. Combined with a new emphasis on satellite protection and replenishment capabilities, space-based missile defenses could frustrate any attempts to block the peaceful use of space by America and its allies. Despite the current U.S. lead in space activities, there are serious causes for concern about America’s ability to sustain the quantity and quality of its space activities. Nearly every U.S. space program faces budget overruns and schedule slippages. This is indicative of systemic management concerns, changing requirements, and the complexity of the tasks at hand. Two important indicators—federal R&D dollars spent on space activities and the size of the aerospace workforce and its related academic cohort—are flat or falling, suggesting a perceived lack of priority or faith in the future of these industries and activities. According to the National Science Foundation, federal support for space activities ranged between $7.1 billion and $8.5 billion per year in the 1990s, but fell to between $5.3 billion and $7.1 billion in 2000-2006. This drop ran counter to the overall trend: total federal R&D has jumped from $78 billion to $113 billion since 2000. (All figures are adjusted for inflation.) Meanwhile, the Aerospace Commission, the National Science Board, and many others have voiced concerns about the health of the human capital base of the aerospace industry. The workforce is aging, employment in missiles and space-related fields has dropped precipitously since the end of the Cold War, and the number of U.S. citizens pursuing advanced technical degrees in related fields is outpaced by their foreign colleagues. In a 2005 examination of U.S. space policy, George Abbey and Neal Lane, both of Rice University, concluded, “Over the past few years, the aerospace industry has been unable to develop the experienced workforce that they had dur ing the 1960s due to consolidations and the absence of new programs.” In short, there are questions about the innovative capacity of the U.S. to sustain its present advantages. Only leadership, commitment, prioritization, and investment can reverse those trends. The United States today is in a unique position to take steps to ensure the defense of its interests in space, and to ensure the basic principles of free passage and access for all. Such basic defensive actions are not incompatible with the maintenance of peace and stability; indeed, they are essential to it. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.84 Mb. Share with your friends:
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