Sps supplement Rough Draft-endi2011 Alpharetta 2011 / Boyce, Doshi, Hermansen, Ma, Pirani
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- Space Weapons Bad – War
- Arms Control Doesn’t Solve
US Weaponizing NowUS weaponizing now. Beljac, 08 - a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor, teaches at the University of Melbourne (Marko, “Arms Race in Space”, 4/1, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5113] Space Weaponization The United States has been quietly working on implementing this vision. Space weaponization is a relatively long-term project that is expected to culminate by 2030. But the pace seems to be quickening. The Pentagon has produced a series of doctrinal documents that clarify what is meant by war in space and how it is to be properly waged. Hitherto, the program has emphasized improving situational awareness in space. It’s impossible to wage war in space without knowing precisely who has what where. However, in the 2008 budget, Congress appropriated $7 million dollars for “offensive counterspace” operations out of a $53 million dollar budget for “counterpace operations” which actually amounts to an increase in the level of funding sort by the White House. That suggests that the United States is moving up a gear on space weaponization and that this has both congressional and White House support which is critical for long-term strategic planning. In fact we have just learnt that the Air Force is working on plans to develop a “counter-ASAT” space weapon system by 2011. Reports suggest that most aspects of these plans are secret but some information has emerged in the public domain that sheds some interesting light on US space weapons planning. The system is known as the Rapid Attack Identification Detection Reporting System (Raidrs) Block 20. The rationale for this program is to develop information in a timely fashion to enable the Pentagon to intercept a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon, which are launched from the Earth, before it strikes its target in low earth orbit. But if the asset used to achieve this objective is space based then this may well enable BMD hawks to also obtain a space based BMD interception capability and there is no reason to suppose that a “counter-ASAT” weapon could not also function as an offensive space weapon. Space Weapons Bad – WarSpace weaponization leads to nuclear war and makes accidental wars a risk. Beljac, 08 - a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor, teaches at the University of Melbourne (Marko, “Arms Race in Space”, 4/1, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5113] Nascent Asian Space Race As noted, China has tested an anti satellite weapon and Russia has stated that it would not allow other states to control space and threaten its own space assets. In Asia a nascent space race seems to be developing between China, Japan and India. In the far future the large deposits of Helium-3 on the moon's surface could lead to a militarized race to colonize the moon to secure Helium-3 for nuclear fusion energy technologies based on anuetronic fusion reactions in the context of depleting hydro-carbons. Washington argues that it has too much commercially riding on space to allow others to have the potential capability of disrupting U.S. space assets. In 1998 the failure of one satellite, the Galaxy IV, made some 80% of pagers in the U.S. malfunction. Though the latest Russian and Chinese space arms control proposal is flawed, because of the clumsy definition of what constitutes a “space weapon,” this doesn’t mean that space arms control is not possible in principle. A global space arms control regime would protect U.S., Russian, Chinese, and even Australian space assets. An arms race in space will eventually lead other states to catch up with the United States and thereby placing Washington's commercial satellites at risk. Space weaponization may well have cataclysmic consequences given the link between space weapons and nuclear weapons strategy. This is because Russia, and the United States, to a certain extent rely on satellites for early warning of nuclear attack. As other space nations with nuclear weapons develop their space capacity it is expected that they will follow suit. The deployment of space weapons means that the first shot in a nuclear war would be fired against these early warning satellites. Currently strategic planners in Moscow have about 10 minutes between warning of an attack and the decision to launch nuclear weapons in response before they impact. Weapons in space would lower this in certain scenarios down to seconds. This would also apply for weapons placed in space that would be considered to be defensive such as say a space based BMD interceptor or a “counter-ASAT” weapon. On occasion, ground warning radars falsely show that a nuclear attack has been launched. In the 1990s a false alarm went all the way up to President Boris Yeltsin and was terminated after approximately eight minutes. We are still here, noted analysts believe, because warning satellites would have given Moscow real time information showing the alarm to be false. Should such a false alarm coincide with an accident involving an early warning satellite when space weapons are known to exist, an accidental nuclear exchange could result. The risk would increase if the false alarm occurred during a crisis. Space weapons could lead to itchy fingers on nuclear triggers. They would therefore significantly increase the importance nuclear weapon states place upon nuclear deterrence. Arms Control Doesn’t SolveArms control doesn’t solve space weapons. Tellis, 07 - Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Ashley, Survival, Autumn, “China’s Military Space Strategy”, ingenta) Concerns about an arms race in space ought to be taken seriously, as a threat to both American and global security, but there is, unfortunately, no arms-control solution to this problem. China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States, grounded in Beijing’s military weakness at a time when China considers war with the United States to be possible. The weapons China seeks to blunt through its emerging space-denial capability are not based in space: they are US naval and air forces that operate in China’s immediate or extended vicinity. What are in space are the sensory organs, which find and fix targets for these forces, and the nervous system, which connects the combatant elements and permits them to operate cohesively. These assets permit American forces to detect and identify different kinds of targets; exchange vast and diverse militarily relevant information and data streams; and contribute to the success of combat operations by providing everything from meteorological assessment, through navigation and guidance, to different platforms, weapon systems, and early warning and situational awareness. There is simply no way to ban or control the use of space for such military purposes. Beijing’s diplomats, who repeatedly call for negotiations to assure the peaceful use of space, clearly understand this. And the Chinese military appreciates better than most that its best chance of countering the massive conventional superiority of the United States lies in an ability to attack the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears and voice of American power. The lure of undermining America’s warfighting strengths in this way prompts Beijing to systematically pursue a variety of counterspace programmes even as it persists in histrionic calls for the demilitarisation of space. 22 China’s Janus-faced policy suggests it is driven less by bureaucratic accident or policy confusion than by a compelling and well-founded strategic judgement about how to counter the military superiority of its opponents, especially the United States The U.S. shouldn’t waste time looking at space control agreements. Tellis, 07 - Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Ashley, Survival, Autumn, “China’s Military Space Strategy”, ingenta) Because none of these conditions will be realised any time soon, Washington should not invest time, energy and resources in attempting to negotiate spacecontrol arrangements of the kind advocated by Markey and others. Such regimes are destined to be stillborn because the larger strategic logic conspires against them. This does not imply that the United States should not discuss space security with China and others. Far from it: Washington should seek a better understanding of China’s intentions and the details of its counterspace programmes through conversations with Beijing. It should also encourage other spacefaring nations in Asia – Russia, Japan and India – and elsewhere whose space assets are also at risk because of China’s evolving counterspace capabilities to enter into a dialogue with Beijing about its strategic direction. If the United States is ambitious, it could even contemplate negotiating informal ’rules of the road’ or ’codes of conduct’ governing activities in space, but these mechanisms ought to be appreciated for what they are. 85 They are, and will always be, primarily confidence-building measures, not verifiable agreements that would in any way limit China’s evolving space warfare programmes. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.84 Mb. 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