1. Military Modernization does not trigger conflict
A. Cooperation checks – China’s rise is not zero sum
Zweig, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director, and Jianhai, Hong Kong University China Transnational Relations Center Director Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2005 [David, Bi, "China's Global Hunt for Energy," Foreign Affairs]
For now, Washington's views about China's possible militarization remain divided and in flux. In February, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that although the Pentagon was watching China's growing naval power, he could not confirm reports that in a decade the size of the Chinese fleet would surpass that of the U.S. Navy. But in May, Rumsfeld challenged Beijing to explain why it is increasing its military investments when China faces no major threat. Assistant Secretary of State Hill, for his part, does not perceive China as a serious threat to the United States; he has said that China's rise is not a zero-sum game for Washington. Others claim that China will need to expand more than its military capacity to remain secure. Bernard Cole of the National War College, for example, has argued that "Beijing will not be able to rely on its navy alone to protect its vital [sea-lanes], but will have to engage [in] a range of diplomatic and economic measures to ensure a steady supply of energy resources." Cui Tiankai, the director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Department, has confirmed the view that whatever Beijing's efforts to boost its navy, China will continue to rely heavily on diplomacy and cooperation. Speaking at a conference at Hong Kong University last February, he argued that countries along the Strait of Malacca have the main responsibility to protect the strait and that China is willing to cooperate with them. He also expressed the hope that China, Japan, and South Korea could work together to ensure the flow of energy to Northeast Asia. And although he said that he believes U.S. influence is expanding in the Strait of Malacca, he expressed no concern about it. Thus, although Beijing is trying to build its own capacity to secure sea-lanes, it clearly wishes to continue to cooperate with -- and sometimes free-ride on -- the United States, as well as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, to keep the straits open.
B. No intent
Pan, CFR staff writer, 6/2/2006 [Esther, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," http://www.cfr.org/publication/10824/scope_of_chinas_military_threat.html]
But some critics say the Pentagon is exaggerating the military threat from China, and accuse defense officials of "threat procurement," building up China as an enemy in order to justify massive military spending on new defense and weapons systems. "I'm not sure why the Pentagon always uses a worst-case scenario when assessing the military threat from China, but it does," says Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Richard C. Bush III, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, says, "Most experts would define 'threat' to mean a combination of capability and intentions. There's no question that China is building up its capabilities, but China has displayed no intentions of using those capabilities against the United States."
2. Military modernization inevitable – Taiwan tensions
Pan, CFR staff writer, 6/2/2006 [Esther, "The Scope of China's Military Threat," http://www.cfr.org/publication/10824/scope_of_chinas_military_threat.html]
Experts say much of China’s recent military buying—including of long- and short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, and advanced aircraft—is directed at Taiwan. “Most credible experts would agree that China’s capacity building is focused on a Taiwan contingency,” Bush says. “It’s primarily deterrence, persuading Taiwan not to do what China fears it will do: irreversibly and unilaterally change Taiwan’s legal status.” Beijing currently has from 700 to 800 short-range missiles pointed across the Taiwan Strait. “China is worried about the functional equivalent of a [Taiwanese] Declaration of Independence,” Bush says. The Pentagon report “expresses concern that China’s capability is shading beyond deterrence into coercion, trying to force Taiwan to negotiate on China’s terms,” he says. And a good deal of China’s military expansion is also “designed to deter a U.S. response to a Taiwan Straits crisis,” Segal says. Over the last decade, China has also invested in a new class of amphibious assault ships that would be critical for any invasions by sea.
China will never have the same military capabilities as the US
Blair and Hills 07 Dennis C. Blair, Former United States Director of National Intelligence, retired United States Navy Admiral. Carla A. Hills, former US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, former US Trade Representative, Co-Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chair of the National Commiittee on United States-China relations, primary negotiator of NAFTA, 2007. [Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Approach]
The principal area in which the mission sets of the United States and China currently come into potential conflict is Taiwan. China can damage Taiwan with missiles, but it can only take and hold Taiwan if it can win and sustain control of the space, air, and waters around Taiwan—a difficult task without U.S. intervention, and nearly impossible should the United States intervene in a China-Taiwan war. The Task Force finds that as a consequence of its military modernization, China is making progress toward being able to fight and win a war with Taiwan (absent U.S. intervention), and it is also beginning to build capabilities to safeguard its growing global interests. The mere existence of these capabilities—including anti-satellite systems—poses challenges for the United States. China does not need to surpass the United States, or even catch up with the United States, in order to complicate U.S. defense planning or influence U.S. decision-making in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere. Looking ahead as far as 2030, however, the Task Force finds no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United States. By virtue of its heritage and experience, its equipment and level of technology, its personnel, and the resources it spends, the United States enjoys space, air, and naval superiority over China. The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States and its allies.
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