Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File



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AT: China Rise



1. Rise is inevitable – by 2015, China will surpass the US as the world’s superpower

Dylan Kissane - professor at the University of South Australia - 2005 (“2015 and the Rise of China,” http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=dylankissane)



The United States peaked in its share of system power mid-century (1941) and has been in decline since. The accession of China and the European Union to the major power system has further assisted in the decline in the relative share of system power maintained by the world’s sole superpower. The decline remains slow but consistent, in stark contrast to the rising fortunes of China and even the relatively gentle rise in the Japanese power cycle. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this decline as evidence of the United States experiencing any significant decline in any specific capabilities. Indeed, between 1981 and 2001 the US saw actual increases in four of the six capability indicators.29 As Doran and Parsons note, it is not enough that a state experiences growth in the assessed capabilities in order to ‘grow’ their power cycle curve – the state must also ‘out-grow’ the rate of change of other states in the system under investigation.30 In effect, a state must be ‘running to stand still’ else it will face a decline in relative power as the United States has in the period post-1941. These somewhat superficial results, however, should not distract from the more integral and ultimately more significant implication which can be drawn from the power cycle curves of the United States, Japan and China. By extrapolating the polynomial power cycle curves over a longer time period, that is, continuing the current trend forward over time, the aforementioned critical points are seen to emerge within a short ‘window’ between 2015 and 2030. For strategists imagining future security challenges for Australia – and particularly those with an interest in Australia’s position in the Asia-Pacific – this is the most important of the results which can be gained from power cycle analysis of international power politics. According to power cycle analysis, it would seem that the year 2015 is the beginning of the end for US predominance in international power politics. Figure 5 (below) illustrates graphically the continuing rise and decline of the three Asia-Pacific powers in the coming decades. By the year 2015 China will have overtaken the United States as the predominant actor in the major power system. Between them, the US and China will account for more than 50% of the total major power systems relative power, with Japan accounting for almost another 20%. Thus, when Paul Krugman questions whether the United States can ‘stay on top’ of the world economically, the answer must be a clear ‘no’.31 Further, as the forecasts here are based upon a power cycle methodology that balances military and economic capabilities, it may not even be possible to claim that US military dominance will also continue. The reality is that a new ‘Asian Century’ will begin to emerge around 2015 with the West, including Europe and particularly the geographically close Australia, forced to realise that the centres of global politics will not be in London, Paris and New York but rather in Beijing, Tokyo and on the American west coast. The rise of China and the resultant – because in a relative system the rise of one is the fall of others – decline of the US will be the defining features of early twenty-first century power politics. The world will not turn to the West but rather the West will turn to the new heart of global politics: the Asia-Pacific.
2. Rise will be peaceful - China desires global preeminence and is currently engaging in peaceful means to achieve it

Zbigniew Brzezinski- national security affairs advisor to the Carter administration - 2/05 (“Make Money, Not War,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2740)

There will be inevitable frictions as China’s regional role increases and as a Chinese “sphere of influence” develops. U.S. power may recede gradually in the coming years, and the unavoidable decline in Japan’s influence will heighten the sense of China’s regional preeminence. But to have a real collision, China needs a military that is capable of going toe-to-toe with the United States. At the strategic level, China maintains a posture of minimum deterrence. Forty years after acquiring nuclear-weapons technology, China has just 24 ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States. Even beyond the realm of strategic warfare, a country must have the capacity to attain its political objectives before it will engage in limited war. It is hard to envisage how China could promote its objectives when it is acutely vulnerable to a blockade and isolation enforced by the United States. In a conflict, Chinese maritime trade would stop entirely. The flow of oil would cease, and the Chinese economy would be paralyzed. I have the sense that the Chinese are cautious about Taiwan, their fierce talk notwithstanding. Last March, a Communist Party magazine noted that “we have basically contained the overt threat of Taiwanese independence since [President] Chen [Shuibian] took office, avoiding a worst-case scenario and maintaining the status of Taiwan as part of China.” A public opinion poll taken in Beijing at the same time found that 58 percent thought military action was unnecessary. Only 15 percent supported military action to “liberate” Taiwan. Of course, stability today does not ensure peace tomorrow. If China were to succumb to internal violence, for example, all bets are off. If sociopolitical tensions or social inequality becomes unmanageable, the leadership might be tempted to exploit nationalist passions. But the small possibility of this type of catastrophe does not weaken my belief that we can avoid the negative consequences that often accompany the rise of new powers. China is clearly assimilating into the international system. Its leadership appears to realize that attempting to dislodge the United States would be futile, and that the cautious spread of Chinese influence is the surest path to global preeminence.
Chinese influence isn’t zero sum with the west --- shared regional values mitigate the risk of conflict

Bitzinger & Desker, 08 – senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf)

The argument that there is an emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the East and decline of the West, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian-values debate.7 However, like the earlier debate, the new one reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This emerging debate will highlight the shared identity and values of China and the other states in the region, even if conventional realist analysts join John Mearsheimer to suggest that it will result in ‘intense security competition with considerable potential for war’ in which most of China’s neighbours ‘will join with the United States to contain China’s power’.8 These shared values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation of and engagement with an emerging China, rather than confrontation.



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