Terror Defense No Al Qaida Terror
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- No nuclear attack – terrorists can’t get nuclear weapons.
- Multiple roadblocks prevent terrorist use of a dirty bomb – radiation sickness, complexity, operational capability.
- The risk of nuclear terrorism is low – no terrorist motivation due to lacking political value and fear of failure.
No Nuclear TerrorThere is no credible evidence that terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons, and over-exaggerated representations of the bomb lead to counterproductive policies.Iqbal 14 [Khalid Iqbal TI(M), consultant to IPRI on Policy and Strategic Response, “Nuclear Terrorism: Myth and Reality,” November 13, 2014, http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/nuclear-terrorism-myth-and-reality/]//JIH Despite a number of claims, there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb or the materials needed to make one. The nuclear intent and capability of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda has been “fundamentally exaggerated.” Almost all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had not been missed before it was seized. The likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small;” and Policymakers are guilty of an “atomic obsession” that has led to “substantively counterproductive” policies premised on “worst case fantasies”. Anxieties about terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons are essentially baseless: a host of practical and organizational difficulties make their likelihood of success almost vanishingly small”[xxxi]. John Mueller, a scholar of international relations at the Ohio State University, is a prominent nuclear skeptic. He makes three claims: (1) the nuclear intent and capability of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda has been “fundamentally exaggerated;” (2) “the likelihood a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small;” and (3) policymakers are guilty of an “atomic obsession” that has led to “substantively counterproductive” policies premised on “worst case fantasies.”[xxxii] In his book, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” he argues that, “anxieties about terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons are essentially baseless”.[xxxiii] Decades after Cheney’s forecast, how many nuclear weapons from the former Soviet arsenal have proliferated to rogue states or terrorists? Not the 250 Cheney predicted. Not 25. Miracle of miracles, not a single nuclear weapon has been discovered outside the control of Russia’s nuclear custodians[xxxiv]. After 9/11, it would seem prudent for nuclear power plants to be prepared for an attack by a large, well-armed terrorist group. But the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in revising its security rules, decided not to require that plants be able to defend themselves against groups carrying sophisticated weapons. According to a study by the Government Accountability Office, the NRC appeared to have based its revised rules “on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against rather than on an assessment of the terrorist threat itself”. The Federation of American Scientists have said that if nuclear power use is to expand significantly, nuclear facilities will have to be made extremely safe from attacks that could release massive quantities of radioactivity into the community. New reactor designs have features of passive safety, which may help. In the United States, the NRC carries out “Force on Force” (FOF) exercises at all Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) sites at least once every three year[xxxv]. Conventional wisdom suggests that domestic regulations, UN Security Council resolutions, G-8, NSS initiatives , IAEA look out and other voluntary efforts will prevent nuclear terrorism. No nuclear attack – terrorists can’t get nuclear weapons.Topychkanov 14 [Pyotr Topychkanov, PhD in History, Associate in the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, “Nuclear Terrorism: Bogeyman or Real Threat?” January 28, 2014, http://russiancouncisl.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3045#top-content]//JIH Obtaining fissile weapons grade materials is no easy matter for terrorists, chiefly for the following reasons. Enriching uranium or producing the necessary quantity of plutonium requires scientific and technological facilities that no terrorist organisation has. Acquiring the necessary quantities of fissile weapons-grade materials on the black market would require the relevant supply, which is not currently there (the IAEA receives about 150-200 reports from Member States each year of fissile materials that are lost, stolen or otherwise out of their control, but, first, most incidents are unrelated to weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and, secondly, in all reported incidents the fissile materials are returned under proper control). Should terrorists nevertheless succeed in obtaining the requisite quantity of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, as a study commissioned in 1977 by US Congress showed, a small group of people who had never had any access to classified information could develop and build a primitive nuclear explosive device [4]. To do so, according to estimates at that time, they would need up to US$ 1 million, a medium-size workshop, at least one specialist who is conversant with the relevant literature, and an engineer. Today, some solutions are within an easier reach for terrorists compared to the 1970s, largely thanks to information technologies. However, any active application of such technologies leads to higher risk of detection. Queries regarding nuclear weapons development made using internet browsers can be traced by intelligence services [5]. Importantly, nuclear devices built under such conditions can hardly be expected to be reliable, since given the lack of specialists, high-precision equipment, and testing capabilities, it would be difficult to avoid errors during the development or assembly of any such device. In addition, handling major amounts of cash or sourcing fissile weapons-grade materials in the required quantities would inevitably put the terrorist cell on the radars of the intelligence services of a number of countries. As a result, having risked substantial amounts of money and possible detection, an organisation planning to commit an act of nuclear terrorism would have to accept that the outcome is uncertain, at best. Multiple roadblocks prevent terrorist use of a dirty bomb – radiation sickness, complexity, operational capability.Meek 13 [James Gordon Meek, award-winning investigative journalist and former Senior Counterterrorism Advisor and Investigator for the House Committee on Homeland Security, “Nuke Material 'Widespread' But Not Easy For Terrorists to Unleash,” Dec. 4, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/nuke-material-widespread-easy-terrorists-unleash/story?id=21100717]//JIH In theory, a committed terrorist could break open the shielded containers of nuclear material inside larger medical devices and use it to make an improvised explosive device laden with radioactive ingredients, known as a "dirty bomb." But they might die trying -- from radiation sickness -- and that may be why a dirty bomb has never been used.
Another top expert said that while unprecedented, it is possible. "To me, it's a bit of a puzzle why it hasn't happened," Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, said in an interview. On Wednesday, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that a VW truck in Mexico transporting an old cancer therapy machine containing highly hazardous Cobalt-60 was hijacked by unknown gunmen. A U.S. official briefed on the Mexico theft told ABC News that it appears that the truck, not its contents, was targeted by the thieves. According to a 2007 U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics study, 515,000 tons of radioactive materials are transported in the U.S. per year. Most of that is by truck and the rest is by air and parcel. Ever since federal officials revealed a decade ago that since-convicted al Qaeda operative Jose Padilla had been sent by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to the U.S. to attempt to make and detonate a dirty bomb, counter-terrorism officials and government scientists have been on watch for unusual signs of radioactivity in cities, and they've also studied whether these are viable weapons. In Padilla's case, the KSM "plot" was not viable and he made no known effort toward carrying it out. In one demonstration for U.S. government officials of a radioactivity sniffer system in New York City last year, a commuter's vehicle was almost immediately flagged and pulled over. Inside the trunk was a laser drill – a harmless construction tool containing a small amount of radioactive material, according to a source who was there.
Even outside the U.S. homeland, where similar medical and construction devices are used in more lawless countries where extremist groups might steal one more easily and exploit its lethal innards, "nobody has ever attempted to use a dirty bomb," Bunn said. The problem for terrorists is that aspiration hasn't been matched with operational capability. "You don't need to hijack a truck in Mexico to make a dirty bomb in the U.S. There is so much equipment in the U.S. with Cobalt-60 or other radiation sources," Carlin said. "It's extremely widespread. It's in every hospital and even veterinary clinics." However, simply prying open a small device on Wall Street, for example, would likely pose minimal danger to anyone outside the immediate vicinity of the device. It also wouldn't have immediate health impact. Placing radioactive material within an IED would conceivably spread it over a larger area and contaminate it. "That's the appeal of a dirty bomb," Carlin said. The challenges of a terrorist personally handling or transferring any kind of radioactive material from a stolen medical machine to an IED and exploding it at a target site without exposing themselves to radiation in the process may in part explain why a dirty bomb has never been used, the experts agreed. It is virtually impossible for a terrorist group to acquire a nuclear weapon – too difficult to acquire, build, and transport.Chapman 12 [Stephen Chapman, column on national and international affairs, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, 2012, http://www.oaoa.com/editorial/columns/article_98c7211b-6093-5537-8a4f-3c0cefa77349.html]//JIH But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.”
Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. The risk of nuclear terrorism is low – no terrorist motivation due to lacking political value and fear of failure.Levi 2007 [Michael A. Levi, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?” April 20, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097] A nuclear weapon requires highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, materials that don't occur in nature and that terrorist groups cannot produce themselves. The ease of access to materials in state stockpiles is thus one of the main factors affecting the odds of a nuclear terrorist attack. The other big factor is motivation. Most terrorist groups have little incentive to pursue nuclear terrorism, since mass murder doesn't serve their political ends—but for some groups, indiscriminate killing is precisely the goal. Most analysts agree that the availability of nuclear weapons and materials, and the utility to terrorist groups of successful nuclear attacks, are the two most important factors in determining the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, even if they disagree over how hard acquiring materials would be or over how many groups might expect to benefit from nuclear terrorism. So let me flag another dimension of motivation that gets too little attention. Even groups that want to and possibly can execute nuclear attacks may decide against them. Why? Because many of the most dangerous terrorist groups hate to fail. Brian Jenkins wrote recently that for jihadists, "failure signals God's disapproval." That's a lot of pressure to succeed. This inevitably pushes the odds of nuclear terrorism down. When we look at our defenses against nuclear terrorism, we prudently notice the holes. When terrorists look at those same defenses, they may be fixating on whatever barriers, however limited, exist. If that's what's happening, nuclear terrorism may be much less likely than many expect. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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