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US-Russia relations high – Ukraine facilitates coop

The celebrations in Moscow on May 9th to commemorate the capitulation of Nazi Germany 70 years ago will speak volumes about today’s geopolitics. While Western leaders are staying away in protest against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine (and the first annexation of sovereign territory in Europe since the second world war), China’s president, Xi Jinping, will be the guest of honour of his friend, Vladimir Putin. Western sanctions over Ukraine, and what looks set to be a long-term chilling of relations with America and Europe, has given Russia no option other than to embrace China as tightly as it can.

Next week, in a further symbol of the growing strategic partnership between the two countries, three or four Chinese and six Russian naval vessels will meet up to conduct live-fire drills in the eastern Mediterranean. The exercise, which follows several similar ones in the Pacific since 2013, aims to send a clear message to America and its allies. For Russia the manoeuvres signal that it has a powerful friend and a military relationship with a growing geographic reach. For China even a small-scale exercise of this kind (its ships are coming from anti-piracy duty in the Gulf of Aden) speaks of increasing global ambition in line with Mr Xi’s slogan about a “Chinese dream”, which he says includes a “dream of a strong armed-forces”.

At a more practical level, the exercise provides a shop-window for China’s Type 054A guided-missile frigate, which it would like to sell to the Russians. It also offers operational experience in an unstable region in which it has an expanding economic presence. In 2011 China organised the evacuation of more than 38,000 Chinese from Libya during that country’s upheaval. Last month its navy pulled several hundred of its citizens out of Yemen, which is being torn apart by civil war. There are thought to be at least 40,000 Chinese working in Algeria and more than 1m across Africa.

But there have been occasional tensions. Russia played a key role during the 1990s in helping China to modernise its military forces. Russia was able to preserve a defence-industrial base that would otherwise have withered from lack of domestic orders. But since the middle of the last decade, irked by China’s theft of its military technology and its consequent emergence as a rival in the arms market, Russia’s weapons sales to its neighbour have slowed.

Russia is also wary of becoming little more than a supplier of natural resources to China’s industrial machine—a humiliating position for a country that until recently saw China as backward. As long as Russia could sell to Europe all the gas required to keep the Russian economy growing, it could put deals with China on hold. These included plans for two gas pipelines from Siberia into China that were announced in 2006 and then quietly dropped as the two sides bickered over prices.

All that has changed. The Ukrainian crisis is, as Russian media put it, forcing Russia to “pivot” its economy towards Asia in an effort to lessen the impact of Western sanctions by finding alternative markets and sources of capital. For China it is a golden opportunity to gain greater access to Russia’s natural resources, at favourable prices, as well as to secure access to big infrastructure contracts that might have gone to Western competitors and to provide financing for projects that will benefit Chinese firms.

In theory, Russia’s incursions into Ukraine and its seizure of Crimea violate two of China’s most consistently held foreign-policy tenets: non-interference in other states and separatism of any kind. But China abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolutions condemning Russia, while Chinese media have given Russia strong support. China has quietly welcomed a new cold war in Europe that might distract America from its declared “rebalancing” towards Asia.

Relations high – military and economic deals

Amid the fanfare and fireworks of Russia's Victory Day celebrations in May, President Vladimir Putin held a prolific round of talks with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, signing 32 deals aimed at further shoring up ties between two superpowers unimpressed with Western dominance in the international community.

So long as this deal proves capable of materializing beyond diplomatic rhetoric, it will have long-lasting consequences for international relations at large, analysts interviewed by The Moscow Times said. Furthermore, by agreeing to deal directly with the Eurasian Economic Union, China has moved to dispel speculation that Putin is interested only in restoring Russia's former Soviet glory, experts said. Finally, the deal reveals a lack of desire on behalf of both countries to create a Cold War-like atmosphere, wherein Moscow and Beijing would find themselves competing against one another for influence in Central Asia.

Both countries come into the deal with plenty to offer the other. China has an enormous construction industry and manpower to match. In view of a decrease in the number of large-scale projects at home, these resources could be used to help build up transportation links and infrastructure throughout Eurasia.

In turn, Russia brings to the table diplomatic experience and security expertise specific to Central Asia.

"The logic of the Russia-China relationship has changed. A strategic partnership between the two has become a reality. Other states will have to learn how to deal with this new reality," said Alexander Gabuyev, chairman of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the respected Carnegie Moscow Center think tank.

Expert-Endorsed Move

Members of the Valdai International Discussion Club, who meet with Putin annually and enjoy direct access to the presidential administration, published a report in late April actively lobbying for Russia and China to forge closer ties.

According to one of its authors, Alexander Lukin, the report was received favorably by the Kremlin. "The fact that our leadership has agreed with experts is very positive. Both Russia and China are bound to obtain significant benefits from pooling their resources together," said Lukin, director of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations' Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies.

Lukin added that Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov has used ideas from the report in his speeches, and has been a leading proponent of the deal.

Dmitry Trenin, head of the Carnegie Moscow Center, authored his own report on the subject in May, arguing that while the old idea of a "greater Europe" spanning from Lisbon to Vladivostok has been abandoned, a new vision of a "greater Asia" from St. Petersburg to Shanghai has emerged as a more likely scenario for the region's future development.

"The epoch of post-Communist Russia's integration with the West is over," Trenin wrote in his report.

"All things considered, China turned out to be the biggest beneficiary of Russia's conflict with the West," he wrote. "Russia's confrontation with the United States will help mitigate Sino-Russian rivalries, mostly to China's advantage. But this doesn't mean Russia will be dominated by China; Moscow will likely find a way to craft a special relationship with its partner."

Immediate Implications

One of the earliest results to emerge from this new relationship will debut this week at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, when Russia and China are expected to sign an agreement to build Russia's first dedicated high-speed railway, which will link Moscow with Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan.

Before the Ukraine crisis unfolded a year and a half ago, this project had been on track to be constructed with the help of European companies.

Meanwhile, a joint Russian-Chinese leasing company will soon spend more than $3 billion to purchase 100 Russian Sukhoi Superjets, another lucrative outcome of Putin's talks with Xi in May.

Speaking at a press conference last week, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev went so far as to express gratitude for the Western sanctions that have been imposed against Russia in waves since the start of the Ukraine crisis. These sanctions served as an impetus in the strengthening of Moscow's relations with its Eastern neighbors, Medvedev said.

"I thank all the states that have adopted these sanctions, and I say this absolutely sincerely," Medvedev said at the conference.

High – Russia’s citizens pivoting away from the US

As Russia plays host this week to a critical summit of leaders of the emerging market nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), Russian President Vladimir Putin is especially keen on bolstering ties with the leading economic power of the group – China. And he likely won’t have much opposition from the Russian people, who now see China more favorably than at any point since 2002.

Our recent survey on the global balance of power between the U.S. and China included a number of questions about the world’s two most powerful countries, including a basic measure of favorability – whether Russians have a favorable or unfavorable view of China and the U.S. And on this simple question, the trend is clear: China is gaining popularity in Russia as attitudes toward the U.S. turn sharply negative.

In just the past two years, favorable views of China have jumped 17 percentage points among Russians, from 62% in 2013 to an all-time high of 79% today. Meanwhile, favorable views of the U.S. have taken a nosedive, falling from 51% in 2013, to 23% in 2014, to an all-time low of 15% today.

Little Confidence in Obama and Declining Views of Germany, EU & NATO in Russia

Relations Low Now

china-russia tensions rising even with increasing coop – China holds the upper hand

But problems ahead are discernible. One is that both countries are competing for influence in Central Asia, once Russia’s backyard (Mr Xi was due to head there before proceeding to Moscow). Mr Putin wants to establish his Eurasian Economic Union partly to counter growing Chinese economic power in Central Asia, through which China wants to develop what it calls a Silk Road Economic Belt. China is using the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), of which Russia and Central Asian nations are also members, to boost its security ties in the region as well: it often holds counter-terrorism exercises with its SCO partners. Another difficulty is Russia’s military and energy links with countries such as India and Vietnam, both of which are rivals of China. But the biggest problem of all may be Russia’s irritation with being forced into an increasingly subservient role in its relations with China. For Russia the partnership with China has become painfully necessary. For China it is nice to have, but far from essential.

Tensions Inevitable

Tensions inevitable even despite economic ties

Schiavenza 15 (MATT SCHIAVENZA is a contributing writer for The Atlantic. He is a former global-affairs writer for the International Business Times and Atlantic senior associate editor. The Atlantic - "China and Russia Grow Even Closer," May 10, 2015. www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/china-and-russia-grow-even-closer/392882/) jsk

This week’s joint naval exercise between Russia and China in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, along with President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow last week, highlight the growing ties between Eurasia’s two great powers. Though they share key economic interests and oppose what they claim to be a U.S.-dominated world order, the two nations’ relationship over time promises to be uneven and tense.

One crucial source of discord is that China is a rising power and Russia is not. Moscow may not be willing to accept a junior partnership with China, nor is China likely to treat Russia with the respect Moscow would assume as its right.

There is no doubt, however, that Sino-Russian ties are growing. Trade between the two countries is about $100 billion a year (about one-tenth of Russia’s trade with the world, and one-fortieth of China’s). As part of China’s Silk Road initiative that Xi touted last week during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, China may invest in Russian infrastructure that could improve transport of Chinese goods across Russia to Europe and the Middle East. Moscow and Beijing have also agreed to pursue two huge projects that would bring Siberian gas to China, which would enable Beijing to supplant Europe as Russia’s largest natural-gas buyer.

But there are uncertainties: The projects will be costly, China is driving a hard bargain as Russia loses gas-market share in Europe and China sees Russia as a risky investment. Moscow no longer expects that Chinese financing will replace Western capital markets, which Russia has less access to since sanctions were imposed because of Russian-supported armed intervention in Ukraine.

Fearful of reverse engineering, Russia had been reluctant to sell advanced military technology to China. Now in tighter straits, Moscow has agreed to offer its most advanced air-defense system. The S-400 would enable China to strike targets over Taiwan and even key parts of India.

China and Russia are sponsoring new regional institutions that could help or hurt their future ties. The Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization seeks to counter terrorism, extremism and separatism, mainly across Central Asia. All its members, including Russia, fear infiltration of extremist fighters from Afghanistan and the Middle East.

The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union builds on a prior customs union and binds Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The group’s high external-tariff walls will concern China. With more Chinese industry moving to the interior, overland exports across the Eurasian union will become more important. The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a major attraction in Eurasia, and as a founding member, Russia will hope for major financing.

Beijing and Moscow are also linked by a commitment to authoritarian political systems, backed by increasingly shrill nationalist rhetoric. Putin and Xi are unhappy with Washington’s championing of more open political systems. This was reflected in Beijing’s angry reaction to student demonstrations in Hong Kong, and in Moscow’s claim that outside powers have manipulated Ukrainian politics to foster hostility toward Russia.

China's President Xi Jinping gestures as he meets Russia's President Vladimir Putin, in traditional Chinese-style outfit, during the APEC Welcome Banquet, at Beijing National Aquatics Center, or the Water Cube in Beijing

Despite their shared interests, long-term prospects for cooperation between Beijing and Moscow are less promising, as a quick look at history reveals. During the three decades of Sino-Soviet rift, from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s, ideological, political and leadership differences threatened serious hostilities. About 30 years ago, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had the shared wisdom to reverse those earlier trends.

But Russia’s diminished economic prospects weaken its ability to deal with China on an equal plane. China’s economy is more than four times larger than Russia’s, and the gap continues to widen. The collapse of energy prices, Western sanctions and statist control severely burden Russia’s economy.

Population trends in Russia’s far east also bode poorly for stable relations with China. Beijing long insisted that its border with Russia was unfairly delineated because of “unequal treaties” from the 19th century and earlier. The population inequity is evident in the presence of a few? million Chinese “guest workers” in Russia’s far east, backed by a population of hundreds of millions more in the northeast of China. Compare those numbers to the roughly six million Russians on Moscow’s side of the border.

China and Russia face a “middle-income trap.” To escape it, their economies must rely more on innovation and higher productivity and less on natural resources and inexpensive labor. If one or the other is unable to accommodate rising popular hopes that accompany higher income levels, the resulting unrest could spill across their border.

Both China and Russia are entering into less stable periods in dealing with their other neighbors. Putin has used force against Ukraine and Georgia, and is seeking to intimidate Europeans around the Baltic Sea. China is pushing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. These moves are causing a reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and are leading most of Asia to seek added U.S. military support.

Russia and China will seek to avoid impinging on each other’s strategic priorities, but there are risks. Beijing sees little benefit in injecting itself into the Ukraine conflict, though Russia’s actions contradict China’s self-interest in the inviolability of internationally recognized borders and noninterference in internal affairs. For China, these are pillars that underpin Beijing’s stances on Tibet, Taiwan and the Chinese region of Xinjiang. They are also the basis of the new nationalism that Xi is building under his “China Dream” rubric. Russia has fewer interests in the East and South China Seas and will give China a bye there.

Goal-based differentials means internal tension inevitable

Holodny 15 (Elena Holodny writes for Business Insider. "There's more to Russia-China relations than meets the eye," 6/5/2015. www.businessinsider.com/china-and-russia-are-engaged-in-a-contest-for-primacy-in-eurasia-2015-6) jsk

There's no question that the Ukraine conflict has led Russia to shift more toward China — but that doesn't mean that everything is smooth sailing for the two countries.

One of the major byproducts of Moscow pulling toward Beijing will be "expanded" cooperation in Central Asia, according to Alexander Gabuev, a senior associate and chair of the Russia in Asia-Pacific Program at Carnegie Moscow Center.

"It is Inner Asia — Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the five post-Soviet states of Central Asia — that is likely to see the most impact from the deepening of Sino-Russia integration," writes Dmitri Trenin, the director of Carnegie Moscow Center, in a paper on the Sino-Russo entente.

"What is likely to emerge is a trade and investment zone covering all of central, northern, and eastern Eurasia. With China as its powerhouse, this area can be called Greater Asia — from Shanghai, its business center, to St. Petersburg, its outpost at Europe's doorstep."

Already we've seen several Beijing-led and Moscow-endorsed notable initiatives such as the Silk Road Economic Belt, the development of the Northern Sea Route, a high-speed rail link that will connect Moscow to Beijing, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

"Putin’s vision of a 'greater Europe' from Lisbon to Vladivostok, made up of the European Union and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, is being replaced by a 'greater Asia' from Shanghai to St. Petersburg," writes Trenin.

However, despite the infrastructure projects and political cooperation, it's not all smiles in Central Asia.

"Mutually useful and apparently friendly with each other, the 'has-been superpower' and the 'wannabe great power' are engaged in a contest for primacy in Eurasia," writes Anita Inder Singh, a visiting professor at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi, in The Diplomat.

"As Russia turns its strategic axis eastwards it is struggling to maintain its influence in Central Asia – while China is moving westwards with the intent of becoming a great Eurasian power."

The tension arises out of the fact that China's become the main moneylender in Russia's backyard (which is composed of states that were formally in the Soviet Union that have been heavily integrated with Russia since the 1991 collapse.) At the same time, financially strained Russia can't offer the same "largesse and investment" as Beijing.

And China's investments in Kazakh energy "annoy Russia," according to Singh, and Turkmenistan (the fourth-largest holder of gas reserves) "seeks new report routes to minimize its dependence on oil pipeline in Russia."

Singh adds that the post-Soviet states "fear that Russia could use the EEU to bully them and make them dependent on a collapsing ruble," writes Singh. (Notably, we've already seen Kazakhstan reject Russia's single currency proposal.)

Nevertheless, "Russia, in particular, supports Chinese economic activities and Russian officials and analysts posit a distinct division of labor that both sides are comfortable with: China provides economic investment, while Russia provides security and exerts political influence." writes Alexander Cooley, a professor at Barnard College.

But this split between political and economic doesn't always line up nicely. As Cooley points out, Russia has "quietly opposed or dragged its feet on nearly every major economic initiative" that China's proposed within the SCO.

"Russia is reluctant to further empower China, even in a multilateral setting, as it prefers instead to promote its own regional economic architectures," such as the Eurasian Economic Union or the Russian-Kazakh Eurasian Development Bank, according to Cooley.

"Beijing in private has grown frustrated with this Russian reticence, but, undeterred, China has continued its economic activities bilaterally," he adds.

That being said, China knows that it has to publically present its relationship with Russia as a "friendship of equals" right now, as it will help it achieve its economic and political aims in the region and globally.

"Within the SCO, Russia enjoys an informal co-leadership role alongside China. Beijing also respects Moscow's red-lines on establishing political alliances and military bases in the former Soviet space," Trenin writes in his paper on the Sino-Russo entente. "This contrasts starkly with the Western policies of NATO and the EU enlargement in the former Soviet borderlands in Eastern Europe.

"A submissive Russia will give China more resources to prepare itself for the ultimate struggle for great-power status in Asia-Pacific. Russia may become a space for Chinese 'pilot schemes' to test the global governance models (most notably in finance) that Beijing wants to promote."

In any case, there's always more than meets the eye when it comes to Russia and China's political partnerships.

No War

No China-Russia war—no incentive and domestic distractions

Murid 13 [Anatoly, political analyst and Middle East expert on the Itar-Tass site, “Why a war between China and Russia is unlikely”, Russia & India Report, July 21 2013, http://in.rbth.com/world/2013/07/21/why_a_war_between_china_and_russia_in_unlikely_27323.html] AW

There are two reasons why a nation might decide to go to war over natural resources: because it doesn't have enough of its own, or because it wants to block another country's access to such resources. In all other instances it is cheaper and easier to simply buy whatever you lack. War is a costly affair. Which resources exactly cannot China openly buy from Russia? The answer is none. And if we look at the going price of Russian crude for China, it is actually Moscow that should start a war on Beijing in order to free itself from the enslaving contract. But could it be so that China is wishing to stop someone else from accessing certain resources? Absolutely not. China's competitive point is in flooding the global markets with dirt-cheap commodities. Japan with its hi-tech industry has already stopped manufacturing hard drives, memory stocks and mobile phones locally: it's all made in China nowadays. The only possible reason remaining for a war would be a territorial claim. However, which is more important for China: occupying Russia's Maritime Territory or returning Taiwan? All of Beijing's post-World War II rhetoric has been centred around the idea of reuniting Taiwan with mainland China. Far from being a hidden agenda, this idea openly dominates the Chinese foreign policy. In this respect however it is the USA, not Russia, which stands between Beijing and its coveted goal. China won an important political victory in 1997 by returning Hong Kong; never mind that in order to achieve this, Beijing had to come up with the previously unheard-of "One country, two systems" formula. Only a blind person could fail to see this as a strategic stepping stone in China's plan to achieve similar reunification with Taiwan. In fact, immediately after the Hong Kong sovereignty transfer Beijing's relations with Taipei became much more tolerant and friendly, even though there are still certain problems at times. Another territorial thorn in China's side is the on-going dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) archipelago in the East China Sea. The islands themselves are of no worth to either side; what is more valuable is the 12-mile territorial waters and 200-mile exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, where hydrocarbon deposits have recently been found. One problem for Beijing, however, is that Japan is a close ally of the USA (not of Russia). Washington has recently reacted very nervously to Beijing's latest Diaoyu-related escapades. Russia for its part limited its reaction to the usual calls on the opposing parties to resolve the conflict peacefully. The USA is not going to stand down its Pacific presence; on the contrary, it is expanding that presence slowly but surely. Xinjiang is another headache for China: Uyghur separatism is raising its head in that region, and local terrorist groups are preparing for action. So far these militants are undergoing training at Islamist camps in Syria but they will be back, team-trained and ready. One more potential problem for Beijing to reckon with is the Taliban, which may again come to power in Afghanistan very soon. The Taliban already has a strong presence in Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan Region, which is situated uncomfortably close to Xinjiang. So is Russia backing the Taliban? Is it Russia that the Taliban is holding talks and consultations in Doha? On the contrary, we are again talking about the USA, represented by senior officials of the Department of State. China does have its share of problems and pressure points. Some of these may well merit a war in the future. But where does Russia come in here? What problems (real problems, not hypothetical ones) would China solve by attacking Russia? Does it really have interests worth fighting Russia for? Of course China can theoretically have issues with Russia, but only if the latter finds itself completely disintegrated as a nation for whatever reason. Only in that case will Beijing have to cross the Amur, and even then its aim would be not to conquer its neighbour but to create a buffer zone against millions of potential Russian refugees. Even then, such a scenario could hardly be described as a full-blown war. On the other hand, it does have at least some relevance as distinct from the numerous role-playing horror stories.

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