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U.S.-China relations improving now – meetings occurred throughout 2014 and will continue.
Alt causes – deeply engrained negative perceptions from the Cold War mean that political partnerships are too goal-driven to reform relations.
No US-China War
No risk of U.S.-China conflict – too economically dangerous, and China knows it won’t win.
No great power war with China – Xi Jinping recognizes U.S. capabilities to rebound.
No war – Xi Jinping recognizes value in politically collaboration with the U.S.
Despite Chinese military growth, there’s no risk of conflict – economic interdependency.

US-China

High Now

U.S.-China relations will remain stable – cooperation over South China Sea disputes occurring now.

Brunnstrom 5/17 (David Brunnstrom, U.S. Asia Policy Correspondent at Thomson Reuters, “Despite tension, Xi says U.S.-China relations are stable,” Reuters, 17 May 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/17/us-usa-kerry-china-idUSKBN0O203J20150517, *fc)

China's ties with the United States remain stable, Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Sunday, as he sought to defuse tension over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea that has raised fears of confrontation between them.

"I look forward to continuing to develop this relationship with President Obama and to bring China-U.S. relations to a new height along a track of a new model of major country relationship," Xi told U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the end of Kerry's two-day trip to China.

Kerry's trip has been dominated by deepening security concerns about Beijing's maritime ambitions in the South China Sea. China's rapid reclamation effort around seven reefs in the Spratly archipelago of the South China Sea has alarmed claimants such as the Philippines and Vietnam.

Xi told Kerry that China and the United States should handle disputes in a way that would not damage bilateral ties.

On Saturday, Kerry urged China to take action to reduce tension in the South China Sea. His call was rebuffed by China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who said Beijing's determination to protect its interests in the area is "as hard as a rock".

Kerry's trip is intended to prepare for the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue next month in Washington and Xi's expected visit to Washington in September, a trip that Xi said he looked forward to.

Xi has repeatedly told Obama of his desire for a "new model of major country relationship," in which China would be viewed as an equal global player.

But the model also outlines a respect for "each other's sovereign and territorial integrity as well as political system and development path".

"In my view the China-U.S. relationship has remained stable," Xi told Kerry at Beijing's Great Hall of the People at a session partially open to reporters.

U.S.-China relations improving now – meetings occurred throughout 2014 and will continue.

Clark 1/21 (Trevor Clark, Supports AmCham Shanghai’s GR programs and provides policy support on research, policy analysis, and strategic engagements, “U.S.-China Relationship Strong and Improving, U.S. Official Says,” Insight, 21 January 2015, http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/u-s-china-relationship-strong-improving-u-s-official-says/, *fc)

The U.S.-China relationship is strong and improving, U.S. Economic Minister Counselor Jonathan Fritz told a roundtable of American businesses at AmCham Shanghai on January 20, 2015. Mr. Fritz, spent the morning at AmCham Shanghai discussing the current U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, the focus of the U.S. government’s China team in 2015, and upcoming hot topics and major economic issues with AmCham Shanghai member companies. Members also provided their views on the state of the bilateral economic relationship and updated him on their investment outlook.

Several new agreements between the U.S. and China headlined the relationship in 2014. The U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation and new visa agreement that extends short- term business/tourist visas from 1 to 10 years and student visas from 1 year to 5 years, led the way, Mr. Fritz said. These types of agreements demonstrated the deepening ties between the two countries and, he hopes, will be beneficial to American businesses.

The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) featured heavily in the discussion. Mr. Fritz noted that the U.S. side is currently awaiting China’s first draft of its “negative list”, which will help set the tone for negotiations on the treaty in 2015. U.S. negotiators expect to see it in early 2015, he added. The BIT will continue to be a focus of AmCham Shanghai’s Government Relations work, and remains one of AmCham’s top priorities when meeting with Chinese and American government officials.

Mr. Fritz noted that 2014 saw several high-level visits from the U.S. to China, most notably the visit by President Obama in November 2014 for the APEC Summit in Beijing and separate bilateral meetings with President Xi Jinping. Secretary of State John Kerry, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and other senior U.S. officials accompanied the President during his November visit. The Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), hosted in Chicago, IL in December 2014, wrapped up the year and continued the very successful and ongoing dialogues between the U.S. and China. He expected another busy year of high-level meetings in 2015 and reported that Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz will visit China in April and stop by Shanghai on that trip.

Alt Causes

Alt causes – deeply engrained negative perceptions from the Cold War mean that political partnerships are too goal-driven to reform relations.

Carroll 14 (William J. Carroll, President of Benedictine University, “China and the US: A New Century, a New Partnership,” Huffington Post, 31 December 2014, Updated 02 March 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-william-j-carroll/china-and-the-us_b_6396574.html, *fc)

My very strong sense is that China does not want to conquer the world; it wants to secure its borders and live in peace -- as does the United States. Our number one problem is that the USA and China do not know one another. Our old ways of viewing one another are remnants of the Cold War. A new century requires a new way of looking at one another. We must move away quickly from viewing one another as potential enemies to a view that as friends there is no problem we cannot solve.

How do we get America and China to recognize each other as respected partners and not potential aggressors -- through education! When we exchange faculty, courses, and students and when we build strong educational programs together -- we become friends! Government officials are not in the best position to develop friendships when they are charged with enforcing policies. Our students -- in the classroom, in mutual visitation of campuses, in joint research projects, in simple interaction -- become friends for life.

As I have said, I am convinced that the Chinese do not want an aggressive relationship with the USA. Part of the problem is that the United States continues to view China as if the Cultural Revolution was still unfolding and is a potential foe; another part of the problem is that the Chinese do not market themselves well. The 2008 Olympics forged an amazing marketing effort by the Chinese to open the country to the outside world. I still have on my computer the song "Beijing Welcomes You."

What happened to that marketing after the Olympics? Our countries still do not know one another, which does not bode well for the 21st century. Both countries need to take a "timeout" and learn about one another.

We need to build a platform for a long-term U.S./China partnership. This can be done through our educational institutions partnering in new and exciting ways. Through education, Chinese and Americans get to know one another at a very young age and can become close lifetime friends. In educational activities, we share, work, and solve problems. This same ability will transfer to the world's stage when our students become tomorrow's leaders. As a result it is very hard to view your friend as the aggressor.

No US-China War

International relations scholars contend that the US and China will not go to war regardless of tension with Japan.

Shukla 15 [Vikas Shukla, reporter and value investor, “A War Between U.S. And Russia Or China Unlikely, Say Scholars,” January 30, 2015, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/01/war-us-and-russia-or-china/]//JIH

Meanwhile, China is involved in a conflict with most of its neighbors, including Japan, which has a security pact with the United States. If a war breaks out between China and Japan, the U.S. will have to jump in to protect its ally. Rising tensions in these geographies have sparked fears that a war is imminent. But international relations scholars believe that a war is unlikely between the U.S. and Russia or China. Foreign Policy conducted a survey in collaboration with Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP). They interviewed 1,395 international relations scholars across the United States. Findings of the study revealed that the opinion of scholars was dramatically different from the mainstream public opinion. What experts say about a new Cold War with Russia When asked how likely was a war between the U.S. and Russia or China in the next 10 years, they said that war between these powers was unlikely. They added that war between the U.S. and China was far less likely than between the U.S. and Russia. Foreign Policy also surveyed scholars in Russia and East Asia. On a scale of 0 to 10, for all scholars, the average perceived risk of war with China was 1.91. The figure was a little higher at 2.55 for the likeliness of a war with Russia. Then they asked scholars whether the U.S. and Russia were headed back to a Cold War. Less than 38% scholars believed that the two countries were on the verge of a new Cold War. Over 47% said a Cold War was unlikely, while about 15% were uncertain.

No risk of U.S.-China conflict – too economically dangerous, and China knows it won’t win.

Of course, Xi Jinping has no interest in triggering armed conflict with the U.S., a nightmare scenario that would fundamentally undermine China’s economic rise. Furthermore, there are few, if any, credible military scenarios in the immediate period ahead in which China could militarily prevail in a direct conflict with the U.S. This explains Xi’s determination to oversee the professionalization and modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a credible, war-fighting and war-winning machine. Xi Jinping is an intelligent consumer of strategic literature and would have concluded that risking any premature military engagement with the U.S. would be foolish. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking is unequivocal in its advice not to engage an enemy unless you are in a position of overwhelming strength. Under Xi, the ultimate purpose of China’s military expansion and modernization is not to inflict defeat on the U.S., but to deter the U.S. Navy from intervening in China’s immediate periphery by creating sufficient doubt in the minds of American strategists as to their ability to prevail.

No great power war with China – Xi Jinping recognizes U.S. capabilities to rebound.

In the medium term, the report analyzes the vulnerability of the U.S.-China relationship to the dynamics of “Thucydides’ Trap,” whereby rising great powers have historically ended up at war with established great powers when one has sought to pre-empt the other at a time of perceived maximum strategic opportunity. According to case studies, such situations have resulted in war in 12 out of 16 instances over the last 500 years. 6 Xi Jinping is deeply aware of this strategic literature and potential implications for U.S.-China relations. This has, in part, underpinned his desire to reframe U.S.-China relations from strategic competition to “a new type of great power relationship.”

In the longer term, neither Xi Jinping nor his advisors necessarily accept the proposition of the inevitability of U.S. economic, political and military decline that is often publicized in the Chinese media and by the academy. More sober minds in Xi’s administration are mindful of the capacity of the U.S. political system and economy to rebound and reinvent itself. Moreover, Xi is also aware of his own country’s date with demographic destiny when the population begins to shrink, while the populations of the U.S. and those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) economies will continue to increase.

For these reasons, the report concludes that the likelihood of U.S.-China conflict in the medium to long term remains remote. This is why Xi Jinping is more attracted to the idea of expanding China’s regional and global footprint by economic and political means. This is where he will likely direct China’s diplomatic activism over the decade ahead.

No war – Xi Jinping recognizes value in politically collaboration with the U.S.

Rudd 15 (Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia with a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies from the Australian National University in Canberra, “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping,” Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf, *fc)

Three concepts define how Xi Jinping’s leadership differs from that of his predecessors: his personal authority; his deep sense of national mission; and an even deeper sense of urgency. Xi’s audacious leadership style sets him apart from the modern Chinese norm. Both in personality and policy, he represents one part continuity and two parts change. Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng (Deng Xiaoping 邓小平), and possibly since Mao (Mao Zedong 毛泽东). Whereas his predecessors believed in, and by and large practiced, the principle of collective leadership, Xi Jinping is infinitely more primus than he is primus inter pares. As a Party blue blood, he also exudes a self-confidence that comes from someone utterly comfortable with the exercise of political power.

Xi is driven by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive role that he is to play in bringing about two great historical missions for his country: first, national rejuvenation, thereby restoring China’s place as a respected great power in the councils of the world; and second, saving the Communist Party itself from the cancer of corruption, thereby securing the party’s future as the continuing political vehicle for China’s future as a great power. Xi is both a Chinese nationalist and a Party loyalist. He is deeply and widely read in both international and Chinese history, including an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the Communist Party itself.

His core, animating vision centers on his concept of the “China Dream” (zhongguomeng 中国梦) which in turn has two objectives: to achieve a “moderately well-off China” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会) by 2021 when the Party celebrates its centenary; and “a rich and powerful” (fuqiang 富强) China by 2049 on the centenary of the People’s Republic. Realizing the China Dream, according to Xi, requires a second phase of transformative economic reform. He sees no contradiction in prosecuting deeper market reforms to achieve his national objectives, while implementing new restrictions on individual political freedom. In fact, he sees this as the essence of “the China Model” (zhongguo moshi 中国模式) in contrast to the liberal democratic capitalism of the West which he describes as totally unsuited to China.1

For Xi, China must seize the moment of “extended strategic opportunity,” following ten wasted years when necessary reforms were postponed, and corruption allowed to run rampant. China’s domestic policy needs are now integrally bound up with the country’s foreign policy direction. In Xi’s worldview, an increasingly “rich and powerful” China must now start playing a much bigger role in the world. No longer will China “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou 韬光养晦决不当头), Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy mantra for decades. China must now pursue an “activist” (fenfa youwei 奋发有为) foreign policy that maximizes China’s economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in the longer-term reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of China’s “grand strategy” needing to embrace “a new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao 有中国特色的新型大国外交), in order to craft a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi 新型大国关系) with the United States.2 Xi, in short, is not a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his sense of national mission and personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party culture.

Xi Jinping’s sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his Party colleagues and policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the interminable processes of the Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much a man in a hurry.

For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for China’s future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of China’s one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the term “win-win” (shuangying 双赢) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it still lasts.

Despite Chinese military growth, there’s no risk of conflict – economic interdependency.

Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic inter-dependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.

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