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BibliographyPrimary Sources Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989. German General Staff. Ausbildungvorschrift fur der Panzertruppen. Berlin: Heeres Dienstvorschirft, 1943. Gordon, Micheal R., and Bernard E. Trainor. "Saddam's Utter Collapse Shows This Has Not Been a Real War." Daily Telegraph, April 8, 2003: 2. Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. London: Cox & Wyman , 2002. —. Panzer Leader. New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002. Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. "Quarterly Operational Environment Review." West Point, Septemeber 22, 2010. U.S. Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992. U.S. War Department. War Department Technical Manual TM-E30-451: Hand on German Military Forces. Washington D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1945. Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275. Secondary Sources Bonn, Keith, When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994). Bauer, Eddy. The Panzer War. The Most Important Panzer Operatoins of the Second World War in Europe and Africa. Vol.1, Attack and Retreat of the German Panzer Units. Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1965.COL Wilson, Isaiah. "Past as Prologue: Compound Security in the 21st Century and Implicatoins for American Global Leadership." West Point, November 20, 2009. Cook, Samuel. "The German Breaktrhough at Sedan." Armor, 2004: 9-15. Corum, James S. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Doughty, Robert. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. New York: Archon Books, 1990. Dupuy, T.N. A Genius for War. London, 1977. —. Numbers, Predictions, and War. New York: Quill, 1979. Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Giuliano, Gerard. The Fighting at Mont Dieu. Charleville-Mezieres: Terres Ardennaises, 1990.Hart, B.H. Liddell. The German Generals Talk. New York: Quill, 1979. Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. New York: Vintage, 1984. Heusinger, Adolf. Conflicting Orders: The Fateful Hours of the Germany Army, 1923-1945. Tubingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1957. Lowry, Richard. The Gulf War Chronicles: A Military History of the First War with Iraq. New York: iUniverse, 2008. Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales. The Iraq War. Combridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003.Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. Pallud, Jean Paul. The Road ends at Denee. Paris, 1986. Shills, E.A.., and M. Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." Public Opinion Quarterly, 1948: 280-315. Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983. The Heritage Foundation. June 23, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/Multimedia/InfoGraphic/Obama-plan-cuts-defense-spending-to-pre-9-11-levels (accessed March 15, 2011). The Heritage Foundation. March 3, 2011. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/03/Assessing-the-Strategic-Readiness-of-the-US-Armed-Forces (accessed March 15, 2011).van Crevald, Martin. Fighting Power. Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982. 1 Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. (New York: Barnes and Nobles Books, 2003) 1. 2 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. "Quarterly Operational Environment Review." West Point, September 22, 2010. The G-6 for TRADOC briefed the QOER at West Point and detailed the Army’s official projections for what challenges the service faces in the next 15 years. 3 COL Wilson, Isaiah. "Past as Prologue: Compound Security in the 21st Century and Implicatoins for American Global Leadership." West Point, November 20, 2009. Colonel Isaiah Wilson, an associate professor at the United States Military Academy delivered this lecture conerning “Compound Security” to the annual SCUSA conference. The lecture stressed a more holistic uncerstanding of security. This reconceptualization of what it means to be secure naturally requires a corresponding alteration of how security threats are viewed. More information is available at http://www.thinkbeyondwar.com 4 The Heritage Foundation. June 23, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/Multimedia/InfoGraphic/Obama-plan-cuts-defense-spending-to-pre-9-11-levels (accessed March 15, 2011). 5 The Heritage Foundation. March 3, 2011. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/03/Assessing-the-Strategic-Readiness-of-the-US-Armed-Forces (accessed March 15, 2011). 6 This story was related to the author during a lecture given by NATO commander Admiral Stavridis. 7 For an detailed account of the reversal of German fortunes during World War II, see Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995. 8 U.S. War Department. War Department Technical Manual TM-E30-451: Hand on German Military Forces.( Washington D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 1-2. 9 This point is the subject of much debate. Several historians have dedicated entire works to demonstrating that the German reputation for tactical and qualitative superiority in the Second World War has been greatly exaggerated. Books in this vein include M. Cooper, The German Army 1933- 1945 (London , 1978) and Bonn, Keith, When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994). However, the issue of the qualitative superiority of the Wehrmacht was subjected to statistical analysis by Col. (Ret.) Trevor Dupuy. His research of 78 engagements revealed that, on average, the German soldier of WWII was between 20% and 30% more effective than his American and British opposite numbers after accounting for material factors. See Dupuy, T.N. Numbers, Predictions, and War. (New York: Quill, 1979) 10 Panzergruppe Kleist, an armored formation composed of 5 Panzer divisions and a motorized infantry division, was an unprecedented operational experiment. The Panzergruppe served as the spearhead of the decisive German breakthrough at Sedan and lead the subsequent drive to the English Channel that resulted in the largest encirclement in history. The role this formation played in the success of Fall Gelb cannot be overstated. 11 Doughty, Robert. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. (New York: Archon Books, 1990), 5. 12 Creveld explains that “an army’s worth as a military instrument equals the quality and quantity of its equipment multiplied by.. ‘Fighting Power’” van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982), 3 . 13 Truppenfürhrung, literally meaning “unit command”, was released in two parts. The first was printed in 1933 and the second in 1934. This manual was written strictly for the German Army and finds its American counterpart in FM 3-0. While work had begun on a manual, Kriegsführung, that would have incorporated the other services in January 1938, the work was brought to a halt with the outbreak of hostilities the following year. Truppenfürhrung would remain the definitive German operations manual throughout World War II. See On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung.( Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 14 Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 10; Cook, Samuel. "The German Breaktrhough at Sedan."( Armor, 2004) ,9 Interestingly, the term cannot be found in German doctrinal writings of the period. 15Ibid. 16 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend.( Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 33. Of a total of more than 160 divisions assembled for the invasion of France, German possessed only 10 Panzer divisions and 6 motorized infantry divisions. 17 Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 11. 18 Ibid., 91. 19 Ibid., 192 20 Ibid. 21 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) First published in 1937, 1-16; Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) First published in 1954, 18-30; Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Wichita: University Press of Kansas, 1992),25-36. 22 Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Wichita: University Press of Kansas, 1992),122-5 23 While there was significant theoretical work done on the subject of armored warfare done in countries like Britain and France, there were significant problems with the conclusions reached as a result of interwar experimentation. British experiments with mechanized task forces in the thirties highlighted the difficulties of coordinating tanks with other combat. As where Guderian had sought a solution to this problem by motorizing the tank’s supporting arms, British doctrine would hold that tanks could operate independently. French experiments would lead to the retention of operationally and tactically useless horse cavalry divisions. While the French, pressured by De Gaulle would develop 4 armored division in time for the battle of France, French doctrine would fail to place the emphasis on tank/aircraft cooperation we find 24 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) First published in 1954, 32-36. 25 Ibid., 276-80. 26 The several lines from the introductory paragraph of Truppenführung could have been taken directly from On War. “ War is an art, a free and creative activity…One’s will is pitted against the independent will of the enemey” On the German Art of War Truppenfürhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17. 27 van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982.) 37. 28 Ibid., 165 29 Ibid. 30 Dupuy, T.N.Numbers, Predictions, and War. New York: Quill, 1979. 234-5. Dupuy’s analysis, based on an examinatoin of some 78 different engagements including German victories and losses, inflicted casualties at a 50% higher rate than they incurred in their fighting with the Allies. 31 Orwell, George “ Politics and the English Language” ( Horizon,1946) 32 Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." (Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275), 275. 33 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 7-9. 34 Ibid., 7-8. 35 In Blitzkrieg Legend, Karl-Heinz Frieser defines blitzkrieg as, “ the concentrated employment of armor and air forces to confuse the enemy with surprise and speed, and to encircle him, after a successful breakthrough, by means of far reaching thrusts.” 36 Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." (Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275), 37 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 7. 38 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002.) 178-84. 188-98. 39 Von Schwichow. "The Food Economy as a National Defense Problem." (Duetsche Wehr, 1935: 275), 40 Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983) 163 41 While Clausewitz never explicitly defines an operational level of war, it is clear especially in chapter 11 of book four of On War entitled “The Use of the Battle”, that he had conceived of something distinct between the purely tactical and strategic levels of warfare. 42 In On War, book four, chapter eleven, Clausewitz discusses the preparation and use of battle in sequence to achieve strategic goal and states that, “ the greatest strategic skill will be displayed in creating the right conditions for it [battle], choosing the right place, time and line of advance, and making the fullest use of its results.” Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 261 43 Frieser, Karl Heinz. (Blitzkrieg Legend. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 6. 44 Clausewitz explains that “ The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 87. 45 In discussing the effort to be made in the pursuit of war’s political object, Clausewitz states“The smaller the penalty you demand from your oppent, the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, and the less you need make yourself.” Moreover, the more modest your own political aim, the less importance you attach to it and the less reluctantly you will abandon it if you must.” Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 81. 46 van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) ,5. 47 The cases of the Panzer Lehr division in Normandy and the Groβdeutschland division on the Eastern front at Pilau are two notable examples of German outfits fighting well beyond a level of casualties that mark a unit combat ineffective. 48 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 60. 49 Ibid., 65. 50 Ibid. 51 Heusinger, Adolf. Conflicting Orders: The Fateful Hours of the Germany Army, 1923-1945. (Tubingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1957) 86. 52 Ibid. 53Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 114 . 54 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 104. 55 Ibid., 105. 56 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 183 57 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 108 58 Ibid., 110. 59 Ibid., 117. 60 The Allies, largely as a result of the Versailles Treaty, still held incredible quantitative advantages over the Germans in every major category of weapon. For example, in term of artillery, the Allies held a nearly two to one advantage, amassing 14,000 tubes against roughly 7,000 for the Germans! This numerical gap is rather neatly laid out in Annex A. 61 For an excellent account of German armor developments during the second half of World War II, see Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995) 62 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 37 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. ,41 66 Giuliano, Gerard. The Fighting at Mont Dieu. (Charleville-Mezieres: Terres Ardennaises, 1990) 51. 67 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 50-53. 68 Ibid. 69 Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. (Princeton: Princeton Univiersity Press, 1989) 136. 70 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17. 71 In the chapters concerning the attack and command, the echoes of traditional German military thought are clear. Truppenführung’s identification as the offense as the only means of achieving positive aims is a Clausewitzian notion. Additionally, the overall emphasis on movement instead of firepower marks the revival of operational thought. 72 In selecting the what portions of Truppenführung to examine, the author selected those chapters that bore most relevance to the conduct of Fall Gelb. The chapters on attack, command, and armor operations, and air operations received special attention for this reason. 73 While this may be said of all the Allied armies to varying degrees it is particularly true of the French during this period. Translation of French Operational Manual. (Berlin, 1921), 80-91. 74Ibid., 87 75 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 88 76 Ibid., 101. 77 Ibid., 90 78 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 105. 79 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009). 88, 94-5. 80Ibid. 81 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 180. 82 The acceptance of non linear operations was by no means complete or without controversy. The debates surrounding the adoption of Manstien’s “Sickle Cut” plan as the template for the campaign are clear evidence of uneasiness within the German High Command regarding such maneuvers. The various episodes of flank fright, culminating with Hitler’s momentous stop order on 23 May, are further evidence of this anxiety and are, in the author’s view, responsible for the escape of the bulk of the British expeditionary force. 83 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 336. 84 James S. Corum notes in a foreword to the most recent English translation of Truppenfuhrung that the principles of dectralized command embodied in Auftragstaktik would not be practicable or accepted in many of the world’s militaries. The author’s admittedely limited experience in the American Army and interactions with the Egyptian Army seem to suggest that these principles are more easily preached than practice. 85 The principles of decentralized authority and broad mission type orders are clearly stated in paragraphs 6, 9, 10, 15, 36, 37, 73, 74, 75, and 76 of Truppenfuhrung. 86 Paragraphs 73-76 are very clear on this point. On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 30 87 Ibid., 23 88 Ibid., 17-19 89 Ibid., 18-19 90 Ibid., 30. 91 Ibid.,23. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. ,30 95 Guderian, .Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 105. 96 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 194. 97 Ibid,. 184. 98 Ibid., 184-5. 99 Ibid. ,185. 100 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 36. Directory: dmi -> siteassets -> sitepages sitepages -> West Point, New York 10996-5000 15 December 2004 Effective 9 March 2005 dmi -> A brief Social History of Game Play dmi -> Who plays, how much, and why? A behavioral player census of a virtual world dmi -> Root motion, function, scale-degree sitepages -> Registering your vehicle in the State of New York… Download 174.98 Kb. Share with your friends:
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