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101 Ibid. ,37.
102 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 197-8. 104 Ibid., 102 106 Ibid., 326. 107 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17 108 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 197-8. 109 Pallud, Jean Paul. (The Road ends at Denee. Paris, 1986) 47. 110 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 36 111 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 188-196 112 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 120 113 Ibid., 128 114 Bauer, Eddy. The Panzer War. The Most Important Panzer Operations of the Second World War in Europe and Africa. Vol.1, Attack and Retreat of the German Panzer Units. (Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1965) 80. 115 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 96. 116 Bauer, Eddy. The Panzer War. The Most Important Panzer Operations of the Second World War in Europe and Africa. Vol.1, Attack and Retreat of the German Panzer Units. (Bonn: Verlag Offene Worte, 1965) 80. 117 Ibid,. 238 118 Ibid. 119 The Luftwaffe’s support was critical to the success of outgunned German armor formations in various engagements during Fall Gelb. Airpower was used to destroy dangerous Allied armored attacks in much the manner described by Guderian in Achtung – Panzer! It was also essential to the success of the river crossings at Sedan. Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 436.. 120 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 197. 121 Guderian, Heinz. Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Tank Warfare. (London: Cox & Wyman , 2002) 194-196. 122 Ibid., 188-9. 123 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 102, 484. 124 Frieser, Karl Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legend. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996) 344. 125 Ibid. 126 Josephus, Flavius. The Great Roman-Jewish War(First century A.D.) 127 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 18. 128 This is most clearly articulated in paragraph 13. Ibid., 19 130 There is an extensive body of literature promoting the idea that a common social background increases the cohesion of an organization. For one example, see A. Etzioni A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: 1961) 189 131 German General Staff. Ausbildungvorschrift fur der Panzertruppen. (Berlin: Heeres Dienstvorschirft, 1943) 8 132 van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) 43 133Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid., 75 136 Shills, E.A.., and M. Janowitz. "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II." Public Opinion Quarterly, 1948: 280-315. 137 Ibid. 138 van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982) 75 139 Again, the example of the Panzer Lehr division in France comes to mind. Reduced to well below 20% of its authorized strength on the eve of Operation Cobra, the division continued to fight until the end of the war despite near annihilation on 25 July 1944. See Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995) 207 140 The American and British Airborne divisions of World War II were recognized as elite divisions for their combat ability. These units benefited from years of training as cohesive teams. The nessecity that combat replacements be airborne qualified also resulted in replacements returning to their original unit.s. Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy. New York: Vintage, 1984. 141 Speech to the North German Reichstag 1867. 142 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) xii 143 While Desert Storm would witness use of truly astounding technologies, the operational conduct of the campaign was timid and halfhearted. VII Corps, the main striking force of Allied arms in the Gulf, lost a critical opportunity to capture the Republican Guard because of its lethargic rate of advance. For a first hand account, see Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009) 144 U.S. Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992) 251-8
145 Ibid. 146 Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009) 11 147 Ibid., 71 148 Ibid., 44, 47, 71, 80, 81, 82, 97 149 Ibid., 97 150 General Schwarzkopf issued a verbal directive barring battalion commanders and above from participating in combat! Ibid. 233 151 Ibid., 215 152 Ibid., 218 153 Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales. The Iraq War. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) 13 154 In pre war planning that did not include considerations for an occupation of Iraq by U.S. ground forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff originally requested 550,000 ground troops and projected a protracted struggle on the way to Baghdad. See Gordon, Micheal R., and Bernard E. Trainor. "Saddam's Utter Collapse Shows This Has Not Been a Real War." (Daily Telegraph, April 8, 2003) 2. 155 Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales. The Iraq War. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003) 77-85 156 The following is based on the author’s personal experience with the Atrmy’s personnel management system. 157 Churchill, Winston The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War ( London: 1898), 86 158 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. "Quarterly Operational Environment Review." West Point, September 22, 2010. 159 The Heritage Foundation. June 23, 2009. http://www.heritage.org/Multimedia/InfoGraphic/Obama-plan-cuts-defense-spending-to-pre-9-11-levels (accessed March 15, 2011). 160 The principles of “Battle Command” mentioned in FM 3-0 are very much in line with those of Auftragstaktik while the discussion of the nature of war in the appendix shares Clausewitzian roots with its counterpat in Truppenführung. 161 As mentioned in a previous footnote, FM 3,0 ‘s principles of “Battle Command” and its concept of the nature of war constitute examples of concepts borrowed directly from Truppenführung 162 The Army general officer is at times extremely risk adverse and unwilling to take the bold actions nessecary to secure success with minimal resources. Macgregor, Douglas. Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press , 2009) 218-220 163 van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982), 218 . 164 On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung. (Boulder: Stackpole Books, 2009) 17 165 van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982), 33 166 Ibid,. 165 167 FM 3-0’s introduction discusses the rapidly changing contemporary operating environment. Only in Appendix 168 Corum, James S. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992) 97 169 Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (New York: First Da Capo Press, 2002) 478 170 Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995) 243 171 Ibid. 172 Good Reads. 2011. http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/210910.Napoleon_Bonaparte (accessed April 23, 2011). 173 This comment was made during a speech given on 31 May 1941. van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power. (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1982),166 Directory: dmi -> siteassets -> sitepages sitepages -> West Point, New York 10996-5000 15 December 2004 Effective 9 March 2005 dmi -> A brief Social History of Game Play dmi -> Who plays, how much, and why? A behavioral player census of a virtual world dmi -> Root motion, function, scale-degree sitepages -> Registering your vehicle in the State of New York… Download 174.98 Kb. Share with your friends:
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