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- IV: Doctrinal Roots of Victory
- The Lineage of Truppenführung
Why Victory?In seeking to explain why the Wehrmacht was able achieve such an impressive victory over the Allies, certain options fall flat immediately. One of these is the notion that the German victory in France and the Low Countries had any basis in material factors. At this stage in war, the western allies held considerable advantages in almost every major category of weapons. Taking the Wehrmacht on the one hand and the French, British, Dutch and Belgians on the other, the numerical gap between the combatants is rather astonishing. 60 What’s more, the Allies were also able to maintain a rather impressive qualitative edge over the Germans during the campaign. While German weapons like the Tiger and Panther tanks dominate the popular conception of World War II, these and other German heavy tanks were exclusively products of the war’s later years.61 As things stood on 10 May 1940, Allied tanks were vastly superior. Fully one fifth, of German tanks were Panzer Is, mounting only machine guns and very lightly armored.62 The bulk of German Panzers were Panzer IIs which were only slightly heavier than the Panzer Is. The Panzer IIsmounted a 20mm cannon wholly inadequate for dealing with Allied tanks.63 The heavier Panzer IIIs and IVs were available only in small numbers and would still experience great difficulty in handling their opposite numbers.64 Allied tanks, on the other hand, were almost universally equipped with cannon of 37mm or greater.65 The extreme disparity between the technical capabilities of the opposing tanks is rather vividly illustrated in an episode that took place in the fighting around the German town of Mont Dieu. One captured French Char B tank was found to have been hit 140 times with German anti- tank rounds without a single penetration of its armor.66 The Allies qualitative edge also extended to the realm of aircraft. 67Although the Germans had a unique and undoubtedly useful aircraft in the Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber, Allied aircraft generally had superior range and payload than their counterparts in the Luftwaffe.68 Another possible explanation for the success of the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940 is that Guderian’s individual ability and force of character was the deciding factor. Certainly, it is difficult to overstate the role that Guderian played in conduct of Fall Gelb. However, the claim that Guderian’s ability overrides doctrinal and institutional factors in importance is problematic for several reasons. First, while Guderian’s successful breakthrough and exploitation at Sedan essentially decided the campaign, similar crossings of the Meuse forced by the XV Panzer Corps at Dinant would likely have had a similar affect. Second, the conduct of other German officers throughout the campaign suggests that Guderian’s boldness and initiative are more doctrinally than individually based. Echoes of Guderian’s boldness and adaptability can be found in the actions of countless German officers. General Erwin Rommel’s handling of the 7th Panzer Division and Colonel Hermann Balck’s command of the 1st Infantry Regiment, 1st Panzer Division demonstrate the very same sense of initiative that we find in Guderian’s leadership of XIX Panzer Corps. The ability of the largely infantry based German officer corps to plan and conduct an armored centric campaign also speaks to the fact that Guderian did not have a monopoly on adaptability. Given the numerical and qualitative inferiority of the equipment of the Wehrmacht, its victory over the Allies in 1940 cannot have its roots in material factors. Also, while Guderian’s efforts were important to the success of Fall Gelb, the near universal presence of initiative and boldness within the German officer corps suggests that the very tendencies that lead Guderian to excel have doctrinal roots. The answer must therefore lie in the other factors that determine the worth of fighting forces. This paper will demonstrate that it was Germany’s superior doctrine, and the effect of this doctrine on the German Heer’s methods of personnel management and attitude towards technology that would provided the margin of excellence necessary in Fall Gelb.
Doctrine is the intellectual framework upon which armies are properly built. Without a sound concept of what war is and how it should be fought, it is impossible to answer the questions of how a nation’s fighting forces should be organized, how they should be trained, and with what they should be equipped. It is for these reasons that the German Army derived significant advantages from having a sound and superior doctrine. German doctrine in 1940, specifically its capstone manual, Truppenführung, as well as professional writings of certain German officers, provides insight into the Germans’ operational success during Fall Gelb. Examining these writings against the backdrop of the invasion of France and the Low Countries serves two purposes.. The comparison between German doctrine and their actions on campaign will determine whether or not the German army derived the qualities from its combat formations that its doctrine demanded. Second, the evaluation will bring to the fore the advantages that doctrine provided the Wehrmacht in defeating the Allies. The Lineage of TruppenführungDespite it profound effect on the course of World War II, Truppenführung is a document that is evolutionary in its nature and representative of a process of continual refinement in the German art of war. From the very first paragraphs of the introduction, Clausewitz’ influence is clear. In characterizing war as a free activity in which, “One’s own will is pitted against the independent will of the enemy,”70 and subject to “friction”, Truppenführung lifts several key concepts directly out of On War. Truppenführung places emphasis on the Clausewitzian principles of the uncertainty of war and the importance of decision making in ambiguous circumstances. The lessons of World War I, distilled during the tenure of General Hans Von Seeckt as Chief of Staff, are also apparent. In its rejection of trench warfare (the phrase is not even mentioned) for maneuver, and its emphasis on the offensive as the only means towards achieving decisive results, Truppenführung marks the revival of traditional principles of war in the modern setting.71 Directory: dmi -> siteassets -> sitepages sitepages -> West Point, New York 10996-5000 15 December 2004 Effective 9 March 2005 dmi -> A brief Social History of Game Play dmi -> Who plays, how much, and why? A behavioral player census of a virtual world dmi -> Root motion, function, scale-degree sitepages -> Registering your vehicle in the State of New York… Download 174.98 Kb. Share with your friends:
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