Having established the problem and the basic premise of this paper, it is fitting that a detailed outline as to how this paper will proceed should be added. First, there will be a preliminary definition of terms that will be used frequently in the paper but have become vague in their general usage. After that will follow a brief synopsis of the course of Fall Gelb. This synopsis will be divided into two phases; the planning and preparation phase, and the operation itself, from the crossing of the German border until the British evacuation of Dunkirk. Following this synopsis will be the analysis. This will be subdivided into two broad subheadings, one dealing with German doctrine as it stood on the eve of battle on 10 May 1940 and the other dealing with the German institutions that created and sustained the combat units that fought Fall Gelb to a successful conclusion. After settling on the causes of German combat excellence as rooted in their doctrine and institutions, a brief comparison between the operational conduct of the German Army in Fall Gelb and the American Army in operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom will serve to show which lessons remain to be learned from the German experience. Finally, the policy implications of the study will be laid out, providing both a platform for continued study and concrete action. The policy implications will cover doctrinal, institutional, and technological recommendations for the U.S. Army as it moves into the future.
II: Definitions
”But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.”
George Orwell31
In order to address the question of Germany excellence during Fall Gelb, it is necessary to deal with words that have become over laden with various meanings and that are open to broad range of interpretations. Words like blitzkrieg and operations have been endowed with so many meanings that they have, in a sense, lost their power to describe and express. Additionally, words like excellence and success are also devoid of meaning when not placed in a particular context. Faced with this linguistic Gordian knot, this section seeks to cut through the tangle and provide a common basis of understanding.
Blitzkrieg
Few words in the military lexicon are as open to interpretation and controversy as blitzkrieg. Literally meaning “lightning war”, the term has adopted various meanings within military circles. The term was first used in a German periodical in 1935 and was described as a strategic expedient by which weaker or economically inferior nations might hope to defeat a strategically superior opponent by trying, “to finish a war quickly and suddenly by trying to force a decision right at the very beginning through the ruthless employment of their total fighting strength.”32Alternatively, blitzkrieg was taken by some to constitute a grand strategy formulated by Hitler with an ultimate goal of world conquest. 33 According to this understanding, blitzkrieg was an all encompassing national strategy with economic, foreign policy, domestic, and military dimensions all aimed at maximizing the striking potential of the nation in the short term relative to an isolated opponent.34 The issue is further complicated by the widespread use of the word blitzkrieg and its many variation in the common vernacular. The bombing of London during the Battle of Britain was referred to as “the Blitz”. Sportscasters use the word liberally, especially in football, to describe any rapid victory or score.
Within this paper, the term blitzkrieg is used as a tactical-operational term. Specifically, it means the use of concentrated air power and armor centric combined arms formations to achieve tactical and operational surprise, breakthrough, encirclement, and defeat of the enemy in operations designed for decisive results.35 This interpretation is most fitting for several reasons. First, the evolution of the term along strictly military lines is quite evident in pre-war German military literature36. Evolving from the Stroβtrupp-taktik, or storm trooper tactics of World War I, blitzkrieg was envisioned by German officers as means of restoring movement to warfare by scaling up the infiltration tactics of storm trooper units to operational proportions37 General Heinz Guderian refined the idea into the application of Stroβtrupp-taktik to large armored formations utilizing air power for support.38 Second, this interpretation of the term blitzkrieg is the most soundly supported through historical sources.39 The competing strategic thesis is heavily reliant on sources affected by the propaganda efforts of the Nazi regime to give their improvised foreign policy the appearance of forethought and genius while it is in fact difficult to apply any systematic explanation to such actions. 40 Finally, this interpretation is borne out by the ground truth of history. The campaigns of the German Army that are synonymous with the term blitzkrieg, like the ones undertaken in France, the deserts of North Africa, and the plains of the western Soviet Union, were all characterized by the concentrated used of air power and armor to achieve successive encirclements.
Operations
Although operational thought has been developing since the time of Napoleon, the term is still the subject of some ambiguity. This ambiguity largely arises from the fact that the term is meant to describe a concept principally defined by what it is not rather than what it is.41 Operations define the space between the tactical and the strategic. Operations lies in the gap between the command of tactical units and national policy. Its defining characteristic is the sequential of tactical engagements whose cumulative effect is to achieve strategic aims. 42 When the phrase “operational concept” is used, it refers to the manner in which one intends to use and sequence engagements to achieve their strategic aims. While these boundaries cannot be and never should be wholly inflexible, in the context of the German Army in World War II, the operational level of warfare begins at the level of army, (although in the case of Fall Gelb it also clearly applies to Panzergruppe Kleist) while when discussing modern conflicts, the operational level of war begins at the corps level.43
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