United states military academy learning from Lightning

Technology

The German Army made more extensive use of radios than any other major combatant in 1940. In stark contrast to the French and British who supplied only command tanks with radios, every single German tank was equipped with at least a radio receiver.¹⁰⁸ This had a very telling effect on the tank on tank clash between French 1^st Armored division and the German Army’s 5^th Panzer division at Flavion on 15 May. French tanks, unable to communicate with each other fought essentially individual actions while the German tank formation executed concerted feints, enveloping movements and attacks. ¹⁰⁹ The end result of the clash between these two units and two methods of warfare was a resounding vindication of the German emphasis on flexible command enhanced by modern technology.

Given the decisive role played by Panzergruppe Kleist during the course of the campaign, it is necessary to discuss the doctrinal innovation represented by the Panzer division. The organization of German men and machines into combined arms Panzer divisions, first done in 1935,¹¹⁰ was truly novel. Guderian, instrumental in the formation of the Panzer divisions in his role as Inspector of Motorized Troops, insisted on motorizing the tanks supporting arms so that they could keep pace with armored formations on operational maneuvers.¹¹¹ of the organization of the 1^st Panzer division as it stood on 10 May 1940, largely representative of panzer divisions overall, is a helpful example. In the 1^st Panzer division one finds engineers, self propelled artillery, motorized infantry, and all other supporting arms , rendering the division a highly mobile and self contained combined arms team capable of independent operational maneuver.¹¹² The effectiveness of Panzergruppe Kleist in penetrating French lines at Sedan and then conducting an operational level maneuver far to the rear of the bulk of Allied forces are proof positive of the Panzer divisions’ ability to operate independently and with operational significance. Allied armor formations on the other hand were much less diverse and did not train with organic support elements.¹¹³ Additionally, only a portion of the Allies armor was even notionally organized for operational employment. ¹¹⁴The bulk of allied tanks were parceled out piecemeal to the infantry units,¹¹⁵ robbing them of the kind of striking power possessed by units like Panzergruppe Kleist and Panzers corps Hoth and Hoepner.¹¹⁶ As a result, the Allies were unable to mount any operationally significant armor thrust throughout the campaign. Additionally, what armor the Allies had organized for operational employment was thrown into battle against the Germans in penny packets. This organization resulted in the disastrous defeat of the French 1^st Armored division at Flavion¹¹⁷ and the inconsequential raid of De Gaulle’s 4^th Armored division at Montcornet.¹¹⁸

Equally critical to the success of the Wehrmacht in Fall Gelb was the ability of the ground forces to cooperate effectively with the Luftwaffe.¹¹⁹ Cooperation between air and ground elements is stressed in paragraph 759 of Truppenführung.¹²⁰ However, as Guderian pointed out in Achtung-Panzer!, if the support of airpower is important to the army in general, it was essential to the Panzers.¹²¹ With the emphasis in Panzer operations placed on speed, it was very likely that the Panzers would outrun their heavy artillery support. In this case it was essential that the Luftwaffe function as “vertical artillery” for the armored formations. ¹²² The close cooperation between the panzers and the Luftwaffe is most evident in the breaktrhough at Sedan where a rolling air barrage drawn up to Guderian’s specifications was instrumental in suppressing French artillery and ensuring the success of the Meuse River crossings.¹²³ The French system of providing air support is nearly laughable in comparison. As where the Luftwaffe and Heer had drilled cooperation repeatedly and to great effect, the French Air Force was plagued by a lack of a central command or any set procedure for providing air support.¹²⁴ The result was that, despite numerical inferiority, the Luftwaffe would generate sorties at nearly twelve times the rate of the French Air Force during the course of the campaign. ¹²⁵

V: Institutional Roots of Victory

For the Romans do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, having been idle in times of peace: but as if their weapons were part of of themselves, they never have any truce from warlike exercises…nor would he be mistaken that would call their exercises unbloody battles and their battles bloody exercises.

Flavius Josephus¹²⁶

The doctrine of the German Heer was very clear on the demands the modern battlefield would place on the soldier.

“ 10. The decisive factor, despite technology and weaponry is the value of the individual soldier.. The emptiness of the battlefield requires soldiers who can think and act independently, who can make calculated, decisive and daring use of every situation, and who understand that victory depends on each individual.”¹²⁷

In order to fully benefit from their doctrine, the Germans found it necessary to arrange their personal management system in such a manner as to instill a maximum of unit cohesion. Rigorous individual training is clearly necessary to prepare a soldier to succeed in such an environment but is not on its own sufficient. The unit to which the soldier belongs is his most immediate and vital source of support both on and off the battlefield. Because of this philosophy, Truppenführung stresses the importance of unit cohesion to overall victory.¹²⁸ But how did the German Heer achieve such cohesion? To answer that question, it is necessary to examine how the German Heer created and maintained the combat formations that it took to war in 1940.

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