United states military academy learning from Lightning
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- Training
- Replacements
- The Effect of This System
- VI: The American Experience
- Desert Storm
RecruitmentWhat will stand out immediately to the American eye as one looks at the recruitment methods of the Wehrmacht is the decentralized method of management. Except in the case of elite units like the Groβdeutschland Infantry regiment, units of division size and down were recruited on a regional basis.129 This was done to give units a built level of cohesions owing to the uniform dialect and regional sensibilities of the men recruited to serve together.130 Furthermore, once a recruit arrived at his particular regiment, it was the regimental commander and not some distant personnel officer who ultimately decided the recruit’s MOS.131 It is not difficult to see how this policy, while perhaps less efficient than a centrally controlled one, served to immediately form strong bonds between the incoming recruit and his receiving unit. TrainingIn discussing training it is necessary to first discuss the structure of the German Heer. The German Heer was broadly divided into the Feldheer or Field Army and the Ersatzheer or Replacement Army. 132All combat units were the responsibility of the Field Army while the Replacement Army oversaw such functions as basic training, replacements, and procurement,133 The Replacement Army was further divided into regional districts with several divisions of the Field Army corresponding to each district.134 Because, men of the Field Army would often rotate back to serve as cadre in their Replacement Army districts, new recruits were often trained by the very officers and NCOs with whom they would serve.135 ReplacementsOnce a recruit had completed basic training within his district, or a wounded soldier had recovered, he would be sent to his unit in the Field Army in part of a marching battalion of roughly 1,000 men so that he never travelled individually.136 The marching battalion would be disbanded upon arrival to the receiving unit and its personnel taken in by the field replacement battalion of the receiving division.137 Each company in the field replacement battalion corresponded to a command within the division. The field replacement battalion, manned by the officers and NCOs of the receiving division, finished the training of the incoming recruits and incorporated any lessons learned in division’s area of operations into the recruit’s body of knowledge 138 The maintenance of a large number of vacancies within a division’s table of organization had several effects. First, it allowed soldiers recovering from wounds or returning from advanced training courses to return to their units. Additionally, by waiting until replacements could be grouped into marching battalions, it was possible to plan appropriately for their incorporation into the receiving division en mass. Additionally, the German practice of creating new divisions rather than maintaining existing ones at full strength allowed for regular rotation of units and ensured the replacements would not enter units piecemeal. The Effect of This SystemThe elaborate system established by the Germans for personal management was not without its drawbacks. The system was inherently complicated because of its decentralized nature.. However, the impact of a system designed in every respect to build combt teams out of individuals, was an impressive level of unit cohesion. This cohesion is evident in the ability of German units to continue fighting after taking casualties well beyond those necessary to render them formally combat ineffective.139 Overall, it seems that the combat formations of the German Army outperformed their opponents for many of the same reasons that American airborne divisions were considered elite.140 As a rule, the men of the Wehrmacht trained together, fought together, and died together. VI: The American Experience“There is a Providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children and the United States of America.” Otto Von Bismarck141 Military organizations are learning institutions that evolve and change as a result of their experiences and considerations of the environment in which they operate. The experiences of the American Army in the second half of the 20th century, and especially those of Vietnam, are examples of such opportunities for institutional growth. Utilizing German doctrine and the lessons therein was a central aspect of the creation of the all volunteer force and the formulation of operational doctrine following the Army’s traumatic experience in Southeast Asia.142 But how well were the lessons of the German experience in campaigns such as Fall Gelb learned? What lessons remained to be learned? To answer these questions, it is necessary to evaluate the recent performance of the U.S. Army in major combat operations. Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom serve as the cases to be examined. The examination of these two cases in tandem will provide not only a valuable snapshot of the state the U.S. Army’s operational art, doctrine, and institutions, but also give a sense of trends over time..
At first glance, the overall scheme of maneuver for Allied forces developed by General Schwarzkopf and his staff resembles the German “Sickle Cut” plan of 1940 turned sideways. Marines, playing the part of German Army Group B, would simulate the main effort by feinting into Kuwait. The part of Panzergruppe Kleist was to be played by the U.S. Army’s VII Corps. VII Corps was to execute a rapid sweep into the western Iraqi desert and fall upon the rear of the Iraqi Army in a giant “Left Hook”144. Appearances are where the similarities between the German invasion of France in 1940 and the American invasion of Iraq end however. VII Corps was composed of the 1st Infantry division, 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, 1st Cavalry division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry regiment and over 110,00 men, 1,100 tanks and 2,000 other armored vehicles.145 This tremendous assortment of combat power was assembled to destroy and prevent the escape of Iraq’s Republican Guard, the professional core of Iraq’s conscript based army.146 Clearly, just as in 1940, success was dependent on speed and decisive maneuver. Unfortunately, the advance of VII Corps was typified more by timidity and caution than by the boldness merited by its overwhelming strength. Over the course of four days between 21 and 26 February 1991, VII Corps moved a little over 123 miles with an average rate of advance of just 1.25 miles per hour.147 The Second Armored Cavalry regiment, the lead element of VII Corps, was repeatedly commanded to halt during its advance across the open desert.148 At one point, the regiment was halted for a period of 24 hours between the 25th and the 26th.149 Almost more troubling than the inability of the VII Corps to move forward at anything faster than a snail’s pace was the almost complete absence of division and corps commanders from the front.150 The result of this lethargic advance was the escape of the bulk of Iraq’s Republican Guard.151 These very same forces would later be used in committing various atrocities against the Shia population.152 Directory: dmi -> siteassets -> sitepages sitepages -> West Point, New York 10996-5000 15 December 2004 Effective 9 March 2005 dmi -> A brief Social History of Game Play dmi -> Who plays, how much, and why? A behavioral player census of a virtual world dmi -> Root motion, function, scale-degree sitepages -> Registering your vehicle in the State of New York… Download 174.98 Kb. Share with your friends:
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