United states military academy learning from Lightning
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Operational ConceptIn Truppenführung, a series of operational principles are espoused that, when taken together, can be called the operational concept of the German Heer.72 Most important among these, is the consideration of the operational level of war in the first place. World War I had witnessed the elevation of fire over movement as the dominating characteristic of warfare. This tactical development led many armies to develop doctrine dominated by static warfare and the application of firepower.73 This is especially evident in French doctrine which states, “The attack is bringing fire forward. The defense is fire that stops.”74 On the other hand, in keeping with traditions of German operational thought, shaped by their central and inherently vulnerable position on the continent of Europe, Truppenführung stresses decision through movement.75 The consequences of such a contrast are clear in the 1940 campaign. The Dyle-Breda Plane developed by the Allies which sought maintain a linear defense. The Sickle Cut of Germany’s Fall Gelb which aimed at operational decision through concentration and movement. It is difficult to conceive of an instance when two more different ideas of warfare clashed on the field of battle. Another operational principle found in Truppenführung is that of the Schwerpunkt or point of main effort. More specifically, in paragraph 358, Truppenführung describes the Schwerpunkt as being the decision point.76 In paragraph 323, Truppenführung maintains that every attack must have a Schwerpunkt and that piecemeal attacks across a broad front must be avoided at all cost.77 This operational principle is witnessed in Fall Gelb. The concentration of half the German Panzer and motorized divisions in Panzergruppe Kleist, and the use of this formation against a narrow frontage of the enemy line at Sedan represents a definite selection of a Schwerpunkt. Conversely, the Allies’ more equitable distribution of combat power and armor along the whole of their line left them unable to respond in any meaningful fashion to the mass of tanks exploding out of Sedan. One almost hears the echoes of Guderian exhorting his troops, “Klotzen! Nicht kleckern! Hit with the fist! Don’t feel with the fingers!”78 An operational principle of tremendous import is the rejection of linear operations in order to achieve operational level penetrations.79 Paragraph 319 on penetration attacks and paragraph 339 on armor in the attack, stress the necessity of deep penetrations into the enemy’s rear zone to neutralize artillery and upset lines of supply and communication.80 A practical blueprint for such non linear operations can be found in Guderian’s book Achtung-Panzer!. In the chapter detailing the employment of the Panzer forces, Guderian advocated “bringing the entire depth of the enemy position attack simultaneously”, followed by a vigorous exploitation of the resulting breakthrough.81 The acceptance of this doctrinal departure from linear warfare is clear in the headlong dash Panzergruppe Kleist to Channel coast. This independent maneuver was conducted without regard for the Panzergruppe’s lengthening southern flank, an open flank that would stretch some 200 miles at its longest.82 The Allies, tied to a more linear model of fighting that stressed the continuous front, found themselves unable to mass sufficient fighting power where it mattered most, on the flanks of the German penetration. 83
Far from being a recipe for disobedience, the German leadership viewed Auftragstaktik as crucial to coping with the high tempo of mobile warfare, where events often overtook directives.90 Paragraph 36 explains that the mission should dictate the objective given to subordinates.91 Paragraph 37 expands on this by emphasizing the necessity of subordinates being able to act in line with the commander’s intent even if the original mission has been rendered obsolete by events.92 When faced with a conflict between reality and the order at hand, the responsible commander “always works within the framework of the situation.”93 The freedom this framework provides places immense responsibility upon subordinates as they are held accountable for the outcome of all tactical actions.. The effect of this decentralized method of authority was clearly decisive in determining the outcome of Fall Gelb. In the rapid movement of XIX Panzer Corps from the German border to its successful breakthrough at Sedan, Guderian repeatedly acted on his own imitative to exploit opportunities in the face of orders that had outlived their usefulness.94One of the most momentous of these intastances was Guderian’s decision to drive west with the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions immediately following the breakthrough at Sedan leaving only the 10th Panzer and the Groβdeutschland Infantry Regiment to defend the bridgehead over the Meuse.95 This risky command decision allowed the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions to overtake secondary French defensive positions before they could be occupied. 96 This type of initiative and ability to accept responsibility in the face of rapidly changing events could also be seen in the actions of General Erwin Rommel and his 7th Panzer division at Houx, Flavion, and Arras, in the actions of Hermann Balck and 1st Infantry Regiment at Sedan, and countless other German units on their bold drive to the Channel coast. The French system of command, what might be called order type tactics, compares quite poorly. The example of General Lafontaine at Sedan illustrates this quite well. Responsible for counterattacking the German bridgehead at Sedan, General Lafontaine ignored several requests for immediate assistance on the basis that he had received no orders to move his command.97 More pointedly, the French general had received his mission as early as 2000 hours on 13 May but, as French doctrine dictated, he waited for an order. 98 As a result, by the time Lafontaine finally launched his attack 0445 the next day, German panzers were already in place on the heights overlooking the military bridge at Sedan.99 Truppenführung also stressed command from the front. In paragraph 109 it states that, “The personal influence of the commander on his troops is vitally important. He must position himself close to the combat units.”100 Paragraph 111 puts matter more explicitly when it says, “The division commander’s place is with his troops.”101 Guderian spelled out what this meant for the commander of a Panzer formation. Enabled by radios to keep in touch with the far flung elements of his command, the Panzer commander was to lead from the front, at the decisive point.102 During Fall Gelb, Guderian put this principle into action, often making use a of mobile command station.103 On 13 May, Guderian crossed the River Meuse in one of the first waves, and was playfully reprimanded by a subordinate who called out, “Joy riding in canoes on the Meuse is forbidden!”104 Rommel, famous for driving his staff crazy for leading from the front in North Africa, was no less cavalier in France. During the 7th Panzer division’s crossing of the Meuse, he took personal command of an infantry battalion on the opposite bank.105 Again the French compare rather poorly to this energetic style of leadership. While German division, corps, and occasionally even army commanders were seen at the front, orders from French commanders often took up to 48 hours to reach the concerned unit.106 Directory: dmi -> siteassets -> sitepages sitepages -> West Point, New York 10996-5000 15 December 2004 Effective 9 March 2005 dmi -> A brief Social History of Game Play dmi -> Who plays, how much, and why? A behavioral player census of a virtual world dmi -> Root motion, function, scale-degree sitepages -> Registering your vehicle in the State of New York… Download 174.98 Kb. Share with your friends:
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