A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Backer, Winds of History, pp. 149-151; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 242, 248-250, 288.
187. Stalin-Marshall meeting, April 15, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:342. 188. State Department briefing paper on reparation, FRUS 1947, 2:218. 189. Marshall-Bevin meeting, March 22, 1947, and Marshall to Truman, March 31, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:273-275, 298-299. 190. See Appendix One, "The Potsdam Agreement and Reparations from Current Production," in the Internet Supplement [IS]. 191. Marshall to Truman, April 1, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:303. 192. Marshall to Truman and Acheson, March 17, 1947; Bevin to Marshall, March 23, 1947; Bevin-Stalin meeting, March 24, 1947; Truman to Marshall, April 1, 1947; in FRUS 1947, 2:256, 274n., 279, 302. For British views, see also Ernest Bevin, "Main Short-Term Problems Confronting Us in Moscow," February 20, 1947, CP(47)68, Cab 129/17, PRO, and the cabinet discussion of this issue on February 27, 1947, CM 25(47), Cab 128/9, PRO. 193. Report of Coordinating Committee, April 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:436-437. 194. Murphy to Byrnes, January 6, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:846. 195. See Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 44; John Lewis Gaddis, "Spheres of Influence; The United States and Europe, 1948-1949," in his The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 54-55. Note also the views of top British officials cited in Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 308-309, 332. 196. See, for example, Deighton, Impossible Peace, pp. 72-73; Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 310. See also Bevin's remarks in foreign ministers' meeting, April 11, 1947, summarized in Marshall to Truman et al, April 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:327. 197. It was largely for this reason, in fact, that the British especially thought it so important to limit the power of any central German government that was set up. See Bevin's important analysis for the Cabinet of British policy toward Germany, CP(46)186, May 3, 1946, Cab 129/9, PRO: "If the German government in Berlin fairly reproduced the outlook of the country it would be neither wholly eastward looking nor wholly westward looking. The question would then turn on whether the western democracies or the Soviet Union would exercise the stronger pull. On the whole the balance of advantage seems to lie with the Russians." Note also Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 311-312. Not everyone was so worried. See, for example, Strang's comments quoted in ibid., p. 326, and the views of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, in JCS to SWNCC, May 12, 1947, FRUS 1947, 1:741. 198. Marshall in meeting with Bidault, March 13, 1947, and in meeting with Bonnet, November 18, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:247, 722. Note especially Dulles's views on these issues. See Backer, Winds of History, 173; Smith, Clay, pp. 415-416; and Pruessen, Dulles, pp. 335, 343-344. 199. See Deighton, Impossible Peace, pp. 72-73. 200. "Policy toward Germany," May 3, 1946, CP(46)186, Cab 129/9, PRO; CM(46)43rd Conclusions, Confidential Annex, May 7, 1946, Cab 128/7, PRO. 201. Deighton, Impossible Peace, pp. 123-124, 134, 138, 148; and Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 341. 202. Ernest Bevin, "Main Short-term Problems Confronting Us in Moscow," February 20, 1947, CP(47)68, Cab 129/17, PRO. 203. Marshall to Truman, March 31, 1947; U.S. Delegation to Truman, November 27 and 28, 1947; Marshall to Lovett, December 6, 1947; in FRUS 1947, 2:300, 735, 737, 752. See also Bevin to Attlee, April 16, 1947, FO 800/447, PRO. 204. See, for example, Reston memo, c. March 1947, KP/1/192ff/ML. 205. Georges Bidault, the French foreign minister, had told Marshall a month earlier that the French were cool to the idea of a demilitarization treaty because they were worried it might "be considered as a sort of 'substitute' for other guarantees"--namely, an American troop presence in Europe, especially in Germany--that his government believed to be necessary. Bidault-Marshall meeting, March 13, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:247. 206. Marshall to Truman and Marshall-Stalin meeting, both April 15, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:335, 338. Note also Marshall's account of his interview with Stalin in Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 266-268. Again, his emphasis on the USSR's failure to answer American communications is striking: "he said such conduct was not merely discourteous but that it amounted to an attitude of contemptuousness, and if their design was to earn our ill will they were going about it most successfully." 207. Marshall-Stalin meeting, April 15, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:343-344. 208. Ibid., p. 340. 209. Radio address of April 28, 1947, DOSB, May 11, 1947, p. 924. 210. See John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), esp. pp. 15-17, 194, 254. 211. Interdepartmental meeting, August 30, 1947, FRUS 1947, 1:762-763. On "third force" thinking at this time, see Gaddis, Long Peace, pp. 57-60; Hogan, Marshall Plan, pp. 37-45, esp. pp. 39, 44-45, and also the quotation from an unpublished State Department history of the Marshall Plan in Max Beloff, The United States and the Unity of Europe (Washington: Brookings, 1963), p. 28. The "third force" question will be discussed again in chapter 3 (pp. xxx-yyy) and chapter 4 (p. xxx). 212. Hogan, Marshall Plan, p. 44. 213. See, for example, Kennan and Policy Planning Staff memoranda, April 24, May 16, and May 23, 1947; Policy Planning Staff meeting, May 15, 1947; Clayton memorandum, May 27, 1947; inFRUS 1947, 3:220n, 220-232. 214. Hogan, Marshall Plan, p. 52. For domestic political reasons, Bidault, however, had to make it appear that he favored Soviet participation. See, for example, Caffery to Marshall, July 2, 1947, FRUS 1947, 3:305, cited, along with some other evidence supporting this interpretation, in chapter three of Will Hitchcock's The Challenge of Recovery (forthcoming). 215. See Hogan, Marshall Plan, p. 52, and Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp. 185-186. 216. See especially Lilly Marcou, Le Kominform: Le Communisme de guerre froide (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1977), pp. 34-77. On France, see Georgette Elgey, La République des illusions (Paris: Fayard, 1993), pp. 405=470. On Greece, see Lawrence Wittner, American Intervention in Greece, 1943-49 (New York: Columbia, 1982), p. 260. Note also the account, based on Czech archives, of the effect of the new policy on Communist tactics in Czechoslovakia in late 1947 in Karel Kaplan, The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1948 (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 75-77. 217. Strang-Hickerson meeting, October 17, 1947, enclosed in Harvey to Massigli, October 21, 1947, MP/65/FFMA. See also Bedell Smith to Marshall, June 23, 1947, FRUS 1947, 3:266. 218. Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, December 10, 1947, quoted in L. Galambos, ed., Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 9 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 2130n. 219. Marshall to Lovett, December 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:765. 220. U.S. Delegation to Truman et al, December 8, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:757. 221. U.S. Delegation to Truman et al, and to State Department, both December 12, 1947, and Marshall to Lovett, December 13, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:767-770. 222. U.S. Delegation to Truman et al, December 15, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:771. 223. Marshall to Lovett, December 8, 1947, and Bidault-Marshall and Bevin-Marshall meetings, December 17, 1947; FRUS 1947, 2:754-755, 814-816. The French account of the Bidault-Marshall meeting is in Y/297/FFMA. Bidault-Bevin meeting, December 17, 1947, FO 371/67674; a French translation is in Y/297/FFMA. Note also the Bidault-Marshall meeting, September 18, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:681-684. 224. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 348. On the coal question, see Raymond Poidevin, "La France et le charbon allemand au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale," Relations Internationales, no. 44 (1985): 365-377, and John W. Young, France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), p. 141. See also Clayton-Marshall meeting, June 20, 1947; Marshall to Clay, June 24, 1947; Clayton to Marshall, June 25, 1947; in FRUS 1947, 2:929, 931-932. On America's "predominant voice" on bizonal economic matters, see Royall to Marshall, May 18, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:251-252. For an example of the way economic and financial issues were tied into the negotiations on general political issues, see Webb-Truman meeting, September 25, 1950. The French defense minister had said that if the U.S. government could see its way "to help on the financial and production problems, then the German matter will be much easier to handle. France needs about $100,000,000 of raw materials and has to find some way to finance a substantial budget deficit." FRUS 1950, 3:354. For another example, see Eisenhower-Ismay meeting, December 8, 1953, Policy Planning Staff [PPS] records, 1947-53, box 75, Bermuda Conference, Record Group [RG] 59, U.S. National Archives [USNA], College Park, Maryland. This shows how French support for the European Defense Community was tied to a U.S. grant of $385,000,000 to support the French effort in Indochina. 225. See CP(48) 6, January 4, 1948, Cab 129/23, PRO. See also David Dilks, "Britain and Europe, 1948-1950: The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet," in Raymond Poidevin, ed., Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948 - mai 1950) (Brussels: Bruylant, 1986), p. 396, and Anthony Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office," International Affairs 61 (1985): 226, 228. On the idea of a "western group," see Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1976), 5:193ff; Bullock, Bevin, p. 242; Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, chapter 8, esp. pp. 433, 435, 449. For a detailed official discussion, see the Foreign Office briefing paper, "Franco-German Treaty and Policy in Western Europe," July 12, 1945, DBPO I, 1:234-251. 226. Bevin-Attlee-Bidault meeting, September 16, 1945, Prem 8/43, PRO. This document was also published in Rolf Steininger, ed., Die Ruhrfrage 1945/46 und die Entstehung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen: Britische, Französiche und Amerikanische Akten (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1988), pp. 331-332. This book, a massive collection of documents with a long introduction by the editor, is the best source of published material relating to Ruhr-Rhineland question in the immediate postwar period. For another example of Bevin's pro-French stance on this question, see Massigli to Bidault, October 26, 1945, MP/92/FFMA, discussed in Georges-Henri Soutou, "La politique française à l'égard de la Rhénanie, 1944-1947" in Peter Huttenberger and Hans-Georg Molitor, eds., Franzosen und Deutschen am Rhein: 1789, 1918, 1945 (Essen: Klartext, 1989), pp. 53-54. See also Sean Greenwood, "Ernest Bevin, France and 'Western Union,' August 1945-February 1946," European History Quarterly 14 (1984), and Greenwood's "Bevin, the Ruhr and the Division of Germany: August 1945 - December 1946," Historical Journal 29 (1986): 204. 227. Bullock, Bevin, pp. 242, 340. 228. See CP(48)6, January 4, 1948, Cab 129/23, and CP(49)208, October 18, 1949, Cab 129/37, PRO. See also Dilks, "Britain and Europe," p. 411; Adamthwaite, "Britain and the World," p. 228. The idea was ruled out again in early 1950 when Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed it as an alternative to a policy which came "much nearer permanent subservience to the U.S.A. than anything else." There was a certain sense by this point that Britain could not take too independent a line even if she wanted to. As a Foreign Office official commented on Cripps's proposed policy, it was obvious that with Britain so dependent on American financial and military assistance and political support, "we cannot take up a completely intransigent attitude." See Cripps minute, May 2, 1950, and Makins to Bevin, May 7, 1950, DBPO II, 2:87 n.4, 248. For other documents bearing on the issue, see DBPO II, 2:54-63, 214-215, 227-228. For Bevin's views on the issue in late 1950, see DBPO II, 3:290. For British policy on the "Third Force" question in 1945-48, see also Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 414, 422, 435, 449, and Bullock, Bevin, p. 517. 229. Jebb memorandum, July 29, 1945, DBPO, I, 1:993; Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 320. Note also the comment of a high Foreign Office official in early 1947 that "too great independence of the United States would be a dangerous luxury," quoted in ibid., p. 270. 230. See, for example, General Jean Humbert (temporary head of French general staff) to prime minister, July 29, 1947, box 4Q2, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre [SHAT], Vincennes; and General Pierre Billotte, Le Passé au futur (Paris: Stock, 1979), pp. 33-52. Note also Bidault's remarks to the French parliament in February 1948, quoted in Cyril Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin: La France et l'Allemagne, 1945-1949 (Paris: Colin, 1991), p. 79. 231. Marshall to Lovett, December 8, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:754-755. For the best window into Bevin's and Bidault's thinking at this point, see the 15-page account of their meeting of December 17, 1947, "Conversations anglo-françaises," Y/297/FFMA; or FO 371/67674, PRO, for the original English-language version. 232. Quoted in Deighton, The Impossible Peace, p. 76. See also Elisabeth Kraus, Ministerien für dans ganze Deutschland? Der Alliierte Kontrollrat und die Frage gesamtdeutscher Zentralverwaltungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), esp. pp. 103-104 (Sir Oliver Harvey's views) and pp. 112-113 (Bevin's support for Harvey's position). 233. Quoted in Deighton, The Impossible Peace, p. 73. 234. Ernest Bevin, "Policy towards Germany," May 3, 1946, CP(46)186, Cab 129/9, PRO; and CM(46)43rd meeting, Confidential Annex, May 7, 1946, Cab 128/7, PRO. 235. For Bevin's reluctance to accept the American offer on the bizone, see Greenwood, "Bevin, the Ruhr and the Division of Germany," p. 209. 236. This is one of the basic themes of Deighton's Impossible Peace: see, for example, pp. 124, 134, 136, 148, and esp. 163. 237. Ernest Bevin, "Main Short-term Problems Confronting Us in Moscow," February 20, 1947, paragraph 14, CP(47)68, Cab 129/17, PRO. 238. Ernest Bevin, "Implementation of the Fusion Arrangements in the British and United States Zones of Germany," April 30, 1947, CP(47)143, Cab 129/18, PRO. See also Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 328. 239. Ernest Bevin, "Policy towards Germany," May 3, 1946, CP(46)186, Cab 129/9, PRO. Emphasis in original. Bevin's caution through mid-1947 is emphasized in John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993), pp. 42-48. 240. On de Gaulle, see Georges-Henri Soutou, "Le Général de Gaulle et l'URSS, 1943-1945: Idéologie ou équilibre européen," Revue d'histoire diplomatique 108 (1994): 347-353. As Soutou shows (p. 353), by late 1945 de Gaulle and certain top military advisors wanted to negotiate a "secret military agreement" with the United States and Britain. In fact, even in 1944 de Gaulle had been worried about the implications of an Anglo-Saxon troop withdrawal from Europe. See Mai, Alliierte Kontrollrat, p. 84n. On de Gaulle and the question of a security relationship with the United States, see Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 33, 41-42. For French policy in the period after de Gaulle's resignation, see Georges-Henri Soutou, "La securité de la France dans l'après-guerre," in Maurice Vaïsse et al, eds., La France et l'OTAN, 1949-1996 (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996), pp. 25, 27, and Soutou, "La politique française à l'égard de la Rhénanie," pp. 52, 56, 61, 65 (especially for Bidault's views). 241. Murphy to Byrnes, October 2, 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:844. 242. See, for example, Caffery to Acting Secretary, August 6, 1945, FRUS Potsdam, 2:1548-49; Caffery to Byrnes, August 13 1945, 851.001/8-1345, RG 59, USNA (cited in an unpublished manuscript by James McAllister); Byrnes-Bidault meeting, August 23, 1945, FRUS 1945, 4:718-719; Caffery to Byrnes, September 27, November 3, and December 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:878, 890-891, 916n. Bidault, in fact, later took credit for having blocked the central administrations. If France had gone along with the idea, he said in December 1947, "the Communists would now be in power in Cologne." This assessment was shared by such high American officials as Bohlen and Bedell Smith. "Conversations anglo-françaises," December 17, 1947, p. 13, Y/297/FFMA, quoted also in Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, p. 73. For Bohlen and Bedell Smith, see Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 131. There is a sizeable literature dealing with France's German policy during this period. Soutou's "La politique française à l'égard de la Rhénanie" is the best summary account, but see also the four major studies cited in the first footnote of that article and a more recent work by Dietmar Hüser: Frankreichs 'doppelte Deutschlandpolitik' (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1996). For a brief and pithy statement of Hüser's interpretation, see his article, "Charles de Gaulle, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman et l'Allemagne," Francia 23 (1996), esp. pp. 57-64. 243. Deighton, The Impossible Peace, pp. 70-71. See also Bevin's basic policy paper on Germany of May 3, 1946, CP(46)186, Cab 129/9, PRO. 244. Mai, Alliierte Kontrollrat, pp. 97-98. 245. Byrnes-Bidault meeting, August 23, 1945, FRUS 1945, 4:720. Bidault had argued that the shift in Germany's "center of gravity" to the west, resulting from the loss of the eastern territories, was a threat to France. Byrnes responded that the shrinking of Germany from a country of 65 million inhabitants to one whose population was only 45 million should be a source of reassurance to France. Byrnes, however, went on the muddy the waters a bit, and referred in the same breath to the American policy of setting up central administrations--although he did take care to minimize their political significance. 246. Mai, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. 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