2NC Extension Solvency - #1 “Anti-Democracy Backlash” 102
1) New U.S. economic assistance will bolster anti-democratic movements within Venezuela and anger powerful elites looking to hang on to control. This collapses democratic reform and prevents all solvency. Extend our 1NC NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY evidence.
2) Democracy promotion will not solve anti-Americanism.
LARISON, 13
[Daniel, PhD., contributing editor at The American Conservative; “On Democracy Promotion and the Failure of the “Freedom Agenda”,” 01/22, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/on-democracy-promotion-and-the-failure-of-the-freedom-agenda/]
Support for democratic governments in other countries may be in our national interest in some cases, and it may not in others. At the very least, democratization in another country doesn’t ensure that U.S. relations with that country will be improved, and it may end up making it harder for the U.S. to secure cooperation from the new government. Arguments for democracy promotion would be more credible if its advocates were more willing to acknowledge that there are trade-offs and costs for the U.S. involved. In some cases, the interests of other states will diverge from ours no matter what form of government they have, and in other cases our interests with align with those of other states regardless of regime type.
2NC Extension Solvency - #2 “Conditioning Fails” 103
1) Attaching conditions such as verifying election results to U.S. economic assistance causes the plan to fail because nobody will be able to confirm the results, and because economic investment have to be long-term, Venezuela will treat the offer as an empty threat that does not require reform. Extend our 1NC BROWN evidence.
2) Conditioning doesn’t provide enough of a threat to produce change. Leaders will pretend to do the bare minimum, and then continue fighting democracy.
BROWN, 05
[Stephen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Political Studies, and affiliated with the Program in International Development and Globalization at the University of Ottawa; “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2, June; http://www.nimd.org/documents/F/foreign_aid_and_democracy_promotion-_lessons_from_africa.pdf]
Autocrats often survive pressure for democratisation. Political conditionality, as currently applied, can be evaded. Many African governments quickly learned how to make the minimum necessary reforms to retain their levels of aid: allowing opposition parties to compete, but not win; permitting an independent press to operate, but not freely; allowing civic groups to function, but not effectively; and consenting that elections be held, but not replace the ruling party [Joseph, 1997: 62; Carothers, 1997]. Many authoritarian regimes display considerable ingenuity to evade political conditionality and resist democratisation. In Zaire, for instance, President Mobutu Sese Seko responded to domestic and donor pressure by allowing multipartyism in 1990. He nonetheless remained in power until 1997, when rebel forces, backed by Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew him. His survival has been attributed to his ‘retain[ing] control of key institutions’ and his ‘formidable political skills, practicing successful divide-and-rule tactics against the domestic opposition as well as his erstwhile backers’, namely Belgium, France and the US [Turner, 1997:255–6].
2NC Extension Solvency - #3 “Democracy promotion fails” 104
1) The plan won’t have any effect on Venezuelan democracy because democracy promotion by foreign countries never works. If the country is ready for democracy, then it will become democratic on its own. If it isn’t ready, then no assistance will be enough to overcome domestic obstacles. Extend our 1NC LARISON evidence.
2) The past 10 years of democracy promotion in places like Iraq prove the United States cannot set up a democratic government.
LARISON, 12
[Daniel, PhD., contributing editor at The American Conservative; “The enduring failure of democracy promotion abroad,” 04/11, http://theweek.com/bullpen/column/226662/the-enduring-failure-of-democracy-promotion-abroad]
Since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has been one of the default elements of U.S. foreign policy. Spreading democracy became a particularly important part of the Bush administration's rhetoric in support of its so-called "freedom agenda," which was at the same time far more selective and inconsistent than its universalistic assumptions would suggest. And since the beginning of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Near East last year, democracy promotion has also figured more prominently in the public rhetoric and policies of the Obama administration. But let's face it: While there may be exceptions, democracy promotion during the last decade has generally produced dismal results for the nations affected by it. It is easy enough to point to well-known examples in which the "freedom agenda" immediately backfired: In places like Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza, democracy-hocking meddlers empowered sectarian parties, militias, and terrorist groups. However, that doesn't fully account for its failure. The best way to appreciate the failure of U.S.-led democracy promotion over the last 10 years is to look closely at its supposed success stories in Georgia and Libya.
2NC Extension Solvency - #4 “Elections aren’t enough” [1/2] 105
1) Elections are the last part of the democratic process, and trying to fix those without first establishing democratic institutions is impossible. Grassroots movements and human rights need to be addressed before elections will ever be fair. The plan doesn’t even try to deal with these other issues. Extend our 1NC PITTS evidence.
2) Trying to rush election reform before more fundamental institutional change will cause violence and collapse the process.
PITTS, 13
[Patrick, student at University of Birmingham; “Jumping the Loaded Gun: How Promoting Democracy Fails to Achieve Peace,” 02/13, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/05/jumping-the-loaded-gun-how-hastily-promoting-democracy-fails-to-achieve-peace/]
The issue of rushed democratization is a paramount subject in today’s realm of international relations. Before the United States, any Western nation, or multilateral coalition decides to intervene in the domestic affairs of another country, attention must be given to the political, economic, and social repercussions long after armies have come and gone. This should especially be kept in mind throughout developments in the Syrian conflict. By hurriedly sponsoring democracy in the form of “rushing to the polls”, the West has in fact increased political violence in the societies of the “bottom billion”, and most likely “retarded the reform of economic policies and governance” in these societies (Collier, 2009: 44). Thus, as of now, democracy has not been a source of peace and prosperity across-the-board in international relations. Only through producing the institutional necessities of successful democracy beforehand can democratization ever be remotely beneficial in end result; for “the establishment of functional systems of democratic governance … is an indispensable dimension of efforts to build lasting peace” (Brown, 2003: 176).
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