What is ocean development? Professor Kiyomitsu Fujii of the University of¶ Tokyo defines ocean development in his book as using oceans for mankind, while¶ preserving the beauty of nature. In the light of its significance and meaning,¶ the term "Ocean Development" is not necessarily a new term. Ocean development¶ is broadly classified into three aspects: (1) Utilization of ocean resources,¶ (2) Utilization of ocean spaces, and (3) Utilization of ocean energy. ¶Among these, development of marine resources has long been established as¶ fishery science and technology, and shipping, naval architecture and port/harbour¶ construction are covered by the category of using ocean spaces, which have¶ grown into industries in Japan. When the Committee initiated its activities, however,¶ the real concept that caught attention was a new type of ocean development,¶ which was outside the coverage that conventional terms had implied.
Violation: The plan does action that is not mandated by the resolution
The National Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Act advocates un-topical action – not ocean development/exploration
Gov Track Jun 24, 2011
“Text of the National Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Act of 2011”; Gov Track; June 24, 2011; https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2373/text; Accessed July 5, 14//
The purposes of this Act are the following:¶ (1)To establish a regulatory system for sustainable offshore aquaculture in the United States exclusive economic zone.¶ (2)To authorize the Secretary of Commerce to determine appropriate locations for, permit, regulate, monitor, and enforce offshore aquaculture in the exclusive economic zone.¶ (3)To require the Secretary of Commerce to issue regulations for permitting of offshore aquaculture in the exclusive economic zone that prevent impacts on the marine ecosystem and fisheries or minimize such impacts to the extent they cannot be avoided.¶ (4)To establish a research program to guide the precautionary development of offshore aquaculture in the exclusive economic zone that ensures ecological sustainability and compatibility with healthy, functional ecosystems. NOAA Office¶ (1)In general¶ The Secretary shall establish an Office of Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture within the National Marine Fisheries Service at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration headquarters, and satellite offices of such office in each of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s regional fisheries offices.¶ (2)Duties¶ The Office shall be responsible for implementing this Act, and shall—¶ (A)conduct the regional programmatic environmental impact studies under section 4;¶ (B)implement the permitting and regulatory program under section 5;¶ (C)administer the research program established under section 7;¶ (D)coordinate aquaculture and related issues within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;¶ (E)perform outreach, education, and training;¶ (F)provide opportunities for consultation among owners and operators of offshore aquaculture facilities, Regional Fishery Management Councils, nonprofit conservation organizations, and other interested stakeholders;¶ (G)organize through each regional office a network of regional experts, in coordination with relevant organizations such as the National Sea Grant College program and other academic institutions, to provide technical expertise on aquaculture;¶ (H)maintain the database required by paragraph (3); and¶ (I)perform such other functions as are necessary to carry out this Act.¶ (3)Database¶ The Secretary shall establish and maintain within the Office an aquaculture database, which shall include information on research, technologies, monitoring techniques, best management practices, and recommendations of the Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Advisory Board established under subsection (b). The Secretary shall make the database available to the general public in a manner that protects proprietary information of owners and operators of offshore aquaculture facilities.¶ (b)Advisory board¶ (1)In general¶ The Office shall establish a Sustainable Offshore Aquaculture Advisory Board, the members of which shall be appointed by the Secretary.¶
***Fishing Ban CP
Text: The United Nations should implement a legally binding agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas to ban fishing in the high seas.
High seas ban solves the aff—no economy or enforcement DAs
White and Costello 14
Crow, Ph.D. Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Marine Biology UC Santa Barbra, Christoper, professor of Environmental and Resource Economics at the Bren School of Environmental Science & Management, UC Santa Barbara, Close the High Seas to Fishing?, March 25, PLoS Biol 12(3): e1001826, http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1001826
The past 60 years have been a tumultuous period for the world's marine fisheries. In the early 1950s few stocks had been exploited heavily; but without explicit governance, 5ge industrial fisheries took hold and systematically overexploited many stocks ,. In 1994 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) implemented Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) adjacent to all coastal nations (Figure 1). These property rights extend 200 nm (~42% of the ocean) and allow countries to exclude foreign fleets and exclusively manage fisheries within their jurisdictions ,. Indeed, for countries with science-based fisheries management policies, many local stocks and fisheries contained in their EEZs are rebuilding –. But for many pelagic, migratory stocks such as tuna, billfish, and shark, the size of the EEZs has been insufficient to incentivize sustainable fishing behavior –. Fish that traverse multiple EEZs and the high seas ([HS], ~58% of ocean) are overexploited relative to those contained in a single EEZ ,.¶ This observation accords with two long-standing theoretical predictions: First, that open access tends to produce a “tragedy of the commons” (an unregulated state of affairs in which individuals inefficiently compete for a shared, limited resource, resulting in its eventual ruin ), where fishermen will race to fish, drive stocks down, and compete away economic value ,. Thus, we may expect HS stocks to be overexploited. Second, that spatial property rights, such as EEZs, will mediate overexploitation, but only to the extent that they enclose the full range of the species ,. If fish migrate , and/or have dispersive larvae , the ensuing spatial externality presents a competitive situation in which countries act like players in a non-cooperative game . Thus, we may expect that the more EEZs a stock traverses, the less likely a sustainable outcome. When put together, these theories suggest that migratory species pose perhaps the greatest global challenge to sustainable fisheries management .¶ In an ideal world, all nations would cooperate in the management of transboundary stocks. Indeed for decades hundreds of attempts have been made at multi-lateral agreements primarily through regional fishery management organizations,which aim to coordinate fishing across EEZs and on the HS. While some exceptions exist, these efforts are widely regarded as a failure ,,,.¶ It is within this context that we analyze the alternative of a complete HS closure. While large marine protected areas (MPAs) in the HS are of increasing interest –, a complete closure has not been proposed, and what little analysis exists suggests there would be substantial economic losses from such a policy . Smaller MPAs, increasingly common and well-studied in coastal waters ,, are too small to produce significant benefits for most migratory stocks . Also, closing only a portion of the high seas may simply displace fishing effort to other open-access areas , thereby leaving the problem unsolved. Instead, a complete closure of the HS may simultaneously achieve three desirable outcomes: (1) It acts as a coordination mechanism across EEZs; (2) it reduces overall exploitation rates; and (3) it protects a sufficient range of the stock to allow rebuilding.¶ The “risk” of closing the HS is that some species may not range sufficiently far into EEZs, leaving those stocks underexploited. Therefore, we also consider changing the size of the EEZs. A key aspect of our analysis involves modeling the behavioral competition between countries for stocks in EEZs and on the HS. To do so, we adopt a game theoretical perspective (for estimating the strategic decisions among interacting players in a competitive scenario), and use coupled biological-economic models in which stocks traverse multiple EEZs and the HS and the relevant players compete for fisheries profits. Thus, rather than making assumptions about exploitation rates we derive the likely behavioral adjustments under any given policy.¶ We model a large range of governance and biological scenarios that represent the range of conditions for pelagic, migratory species in the world's oceans. Any given scenario is defined by: (1) the fraction of the fish stock's range (and fishery) in EEZs (the remainder being on the HS); (2) the number of EEZs traversed by the stock; (3) the biological parameters of the stock; and (4) the degree of site fidelity of individual fish. For each scenario we evaluate three states of governance of the HS: open access (“HS open [OA]”), closed to fishing (“HS closed”), or competed for by N players (“HS open [N]”). We use a widely used cost function throughout. Our baseline model adopts conservative parameter values, stacking the deck against a HS closure. As a benchmark we also model the idealistic case of complete global cooperation across the entire range of the stock. Full methods are given in Text S1.¶ We examined the effects of a HS closure first with a simple example. Suppose a reasonably fast-growing stock (r = 0.2)  has high site-fidelity (S = 0.75), and is proportionally distributed across the HS (58%) and ten EEZs (42%). Our model predicted that when the HS were open, the ten countries would compete on both the HS and their EEZs, and drive stocks to a third of the economically optimal stock size. When the HS were closed, countries would compete across EEZs, but no fishing would occur on the HS: stock increased everywhere (4-fold on the HS and 30% in EEZs), profit more than doubled, and yield increased by 42% (though profit and yield are still only 68% and 84% of their theoretical values under complete cooperation). The disproportionate increase in profit is due to interacting effects of elimination of the inefficient overexploitation on the HS, enhanced coordination across EEZs incentivized by the spillover and protection of fish from the HS, and reduced fishery cost from harvesting a higher stock density in the EEZs. Collectively, these factors raise profit (and yield) beyond the loss from not fishing on the HS.¶ The figures plot various results against the fraction of the fishery contained in EEZs. When a fishery is mostly in EEZs, the problem boiled down to a transboundary one—where an international fish stock was not contained in any one country's jurisdiction. In that case, closing the HS did not, by itself, fix coordination problems across nations (Figures 2A and S2), because escaped stocks still could be harvested by a competing fishery . Instead, if a fishery is primarily on the HS, closing the HS eliminated the fishery, generating a loss. For fisheries targeting pelagic, migratory stocks, typically some but not all of the fishery occurs in EEZs ,,,,. In those cases, closing the HS nearly always benefited the fishery: with our baseline parameters, if at least 10% of the fishery were contained in EEZs, then closing the HS increased fishery profits (Figures 2A and S2A). Across the full range of parameters, if at least 20% of the fishery were contained in EEZs, then closing the HS increased profit. The explanation is simple: most species harvested on the HS are vulnerable to overexploitation when the HS are fished, but are likely to recover (and benefit sovereign fisheries via spillover) when the HS are closed. As expected, profits and yields from a HS closure were never as large as levels achievable under complete global cooperation of harvest levels across the HS and EEZs (at best, they were on average ~60% and ~80% as high, occurring when ~40% of the fishery is in EEZs; Figures 2A and S1). Regarding conservation, a HS closure always resulted in large increases in fish stocks (possibly by >100%; Figures 2B and S2C), consistent with the literature cataloging the conservation benefits of marine reserves  (but see , for counter-examples, particularly in relation to cumulative impacts and management challenges in marine ecosystems).¶ The more EEZs traversed by the stock (N) the worse was the tragedy of the commons, and the greater was the percentage increase from a HS closure (Figures 3 and S3). Under typical values of N (say, N = 10–20), the gain was considerable. If fish are evenly distributed between HS and EEZs, so 42% are enclosed in EEZs, then any N>3 scenario provided benefits, and any N>10 more than doubled the value of the fishery. In the extreme, for stocks that traverse 50 or more EEZs, the gains could exceed 500%. If the true N is large (say, N = 20), but nations cooperate, the effective N may be small (say, N = 5). Even in that case, a HS closure increased fishery profit. We assumed relatively high site fidelity (S = 0.75); results were strengthened under lower site fidelity (Figure S4). All of the above results held over a large range of growth rates, though gains from HS closure were largest for slower-growing species (Figure S5).¶ Holding a species' range constant, larger EEZs will increase the fraction of the fishery contained in EEZs (rightward shift in Figures 2–3 and S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6). Focusing on the blue and red shading in Figure 2, except for narrow EEZs, closing the HS typically generated large gains for both profit and stock (also see Figure S2). Further, when the HS are open, the worst possible EEZ width was around 40%—this width gave rise to the lowest profit and stock of any possible configuration of EEZs (on average, around 25% and 20% of what was possible for each). Thus the status quo (open HS and 42% in EEZs) was nearly the worst case scenario: the HS are heavily overexploited and countries' EEZs are too small to protect stocks from non-cooperative harvest. Why not simply extend the EEZs ? Doing so entailed a benefit, but as the EEZs enlarge, the source of overharvest changed from being primarily a HS problem to being primarily a transboundary problem. Rather, we have shown that completely closing the HS to fishing provided ample protection to the migratory stocks from transboundary overharvest, and without changing EEZ size still allowed each country sufficient space to harvest profitably in their EEZ.¶ While our main finding is likely to hold across many, if not all, ocean basins, there inevitably will be distributional impacts. For example, the handful of countries whose current fishing fleets specialize in fishing the HS (e.g., Japan, China, and Spain ) may be harmed by the closure. On the other hand, these countries' HS losses may be offset by enhanced fishing opportunities in their EEZs as stocks rebuild. Developing countries whose stocks are depleted by HS over-exploitation but who have not invested in HS fleets may benefit most from a HS closure. Thus, for a HS closure to be considered in practice, it will be important for future work to explore empirically the fishery and country-level distributional impacts of this proposal.¶ While a complete policy analysis is beyond our scope, a few comments are worth noting. Closing the HS to fishing may seem politically unviable, partly because UNCLOS recognizes the freedom to fish there by all nations . However, UNCLOS also requires ecosystem protection and equitable and efficient utilization of the ocean's resources. Thus, there is demand for a new legal instrument for HS governance ,; it could support a HS closure to meet the UNCLOS equity, economic, and conservation objectives. First, gains from a HS closure are attributable to fish spillover into EEZs, thus although not fishing in the HS, the freedom to fish resources from the HS is maintained. Second, the closure may only apply to mobile fishery species (and perhaps over-exploited by-catch species), and not sessile species (S = 1) where fishery value would be reduced (Figure S4). Third, a portion of the gains from closing the HS could be distributed among land-locked nations in a fashion similar to existing transfers for transboundary fisheries . Finally, although perfect compliance with a HS closure may not be necessary for gains to emerge (Figure S6), enforcement is a concern ,. Yet major advances in fishery surveillance technology , recent increases in the scope and use of agreements on the HS (including with MPAs) ,,,,, and perhaps part of the fishery gains due to the HS closure, could be used to support its enforcement. Research on the viability of these options would contribute substantially to our understanding of the political and economic feasibility of closing the high seas.
2NC Solvency—HS Ban
High seas fishing ban solves overfishing impacts
Alister, Should We Close Part Of The Ocean To Keep Fish On The Plate?, April 2, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/04/02/297840486/should-we-close-part-of-the-ocean-to-keep-fish-on-the-plate
For lovers of fatty tuna belly, canned albacore and swordfish kebabs, here's a question: Would you be willing to give them up for several years so that you could eat them perhaps for the rest of your life?¶ If a new proposal to ban fishing on the open ocean were to fly, that's essentially what we might be faced with. It's an idea that might help restore the populations of several rapidly disappearing fish – like tuna, swordfish and marlin — that we, and future generations, might like to continue to have as a food source.¶ The novel conservation plan, introduced recently in a in the journal PLoS Biology, would close international waters – where there's currently pretty much a fishing free-for-all — to all fishing and restrict commercial fishermen to coastal areas managed by individual nations. The authors, and , suggest turning the open ocean into a worldwide reserve for the migratory species that travel huge distances.¶ That reserve would give these fish populations to chance to rebound. And the fish that strayed into coastal national waters, where fishing would remain legal, could meanwhile be caught by fishermen. Overall, under such a plan, fish populations would grow healthier, fishing would become a more lucrative business and we would have more fish to eat, the researchers argue.¶ But let's face it: Closing off most of the ocean to fishing boats would be a pretty drastic move.¶ But as White, a marine biologist at the California Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo, notes, the policies we currently have in place to regulate fisheries — catch quotas, seasonal closures and minimum size limits — aren't working.¶ "We're already failing to create, much less enforce, other fishery regulations on the high seas," White tells The Salt.¶ The "high seas," according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, are international waters more than 200 miles from land that make up 64 percent of ocean's surface and 95 percent of its volume.¶ In these waters, millions of tunas, sharks and billfish every year are hauled onto enormous industrial-scale fishing vessels at a rate faster than they can reproduce. Tunas are a main target of high seas fishing boats, with species like the Atlantic bluefin, albacore and bigeye especially impacted by overfishing.¶ Costello, an environmental and resource economist at the University of California, Santa Barbara, tellsThe Salt that populations of these fish could start rebounding within five or ten years of enacting a high seas fishing ban. He says catches — and availability for consumers — would decline for only a few years.¶ "By catching less fish in the short run we'd be able to catch more fish every year on a sustainable basis forever," he says. "This has huge implications for food security."’¶ Enforcement could be relatively simple, too, says White — with the help of satellites. Any large ship observed moving slowly, meandering in circles or simply drifting in international waters would be considered suspicious.¶ White and Costello expect some nations — like Spain, China and Japan, which have major investments in fishing fleets in international waters — to resist the idea of a ban. White says that Spain, especially, could be impacted because, while it currently relies heavily on offshore fish populations, it has relatively little of its own national waters to exploit.¶ White and Costello aren't the only ones raising the idea of a fishing ban in international waters. Martin Stuchtey, with the global management consulting firm McKinsey & Company, recently argued that high seas fishing operations are overall a losing endeavor, . Fishing on the high seas is often supported with subsidies. But Stuchtey calculated that closing the high seas would cost every person on earth $2 but would ultimately give them a return of $4.¶ There could be unintended environmental consequences, however. Gib Brogan, fisheries campaign manager with Oceana, wonders if restricting the global fishing fleet to nearshore waters could have adverse effects on fishes like flounder, snapper and grouper that occupy these waters year round.¶ "If we swap diffuse fishing across a wide swath of ocean for intense fishing on the edges and near shore, will this be a good thing or will it just concentrate the effects near shore?" Brogan says in an email.¶ Costello, the environmental economist, says no, because overfishing of nearshore species could be avoided if each nation steps up to manage its own resources and protect them from foreign plundering.¶ Costello and White are now taking the next step toward a high seas fishing ban by trying to determine precisely how such a measure might affect individual nations, certain fish species and seafood consumers. Costello expects that research to be published in about a year.¶ "All big ideas have to start somewhere," White says.
Ban et al. 13
Natalie C., School of Environmental Studies, University of Victoria, ARC Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Systematic Conservation Planning: A Better Recipe for Managing the High Seas for Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use, January 22, Conservation Letters, 7(1), 41–54
Given that no existing management regime comprehen- sively encompasses SCP on the high seas, nor do they have a mandate to engage in the full planning process, other avenues must be developed. Two complementary approaches are emerging as ways to implement conservation and sustainable use of the high seas: a legally binding agreement under UNCLOS and regional multi- lateral agreements (Table 3). Some argue that an agreement to implement and update the general environment provisions under UNCLOS would be the more effective (Gjerde 2012). As with a prior UNCLOS implementing agreement for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement), this approach could operationalize management principles such as ecosystem- based and precautionary management. It could set explicit goals, objectives, and targets for protection of bio- diversity and the marine environment alongside sustain- able use of resources, designate responsible organizations to implement tools such as MPAs and cumulative im- pact assessments on the basis of a systematic approach (Gjerde 2012). It need not replace existing sectoral or re- gional organizations, rather it could establish a conference of parties and secretariat to facilitate coordination, enhance coherence, and promote compliance through global-level review and assistance. In short, it could establish the balancing mechanism for decision-making that is currently lacking, and the legal mandate and procedure for incorporating a systematic approach into management planning and decision-making. As scientific input is vital, a new agreement could designate or cre- ate a science body to inform the systematic planning efforts.
UN high sea fishing resolutions are effective—empirically proven
Deep Sea Conservation Coalition 14
What's Been Done, In the Water, Bottom Trawling, http://www.savethehighseas.org/whatsbeendone/inthewater.cfm
Each of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (in 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011) has been progressively stronger than the last. Though much more still needs to be done, this momentum has led to increasing action by States and regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) to regulate deep-sea fishing on the high seas, in particular bottom trawling. To date, States and RFMOs have not fully implemented the United Nations General Assembly resolutions and much of the high seas still remain unprotected from the unregulated and destructive impact of deep-sea fishing.¶ Nonetheless, as result of our work and in response to the debate and resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, significant changes have already occurred on the water. Tangible results achieved, moving chronologically backward from the most recent, include:¶Closure tos bottom fishing of a substantial portion of deep-sea areas at fishable depths (i.e. < 2000m) on the high seas of the Northeast Atlantic south of Iceland, including a number of areas where cold water coral reefs are known to occur; the prohibition of deep-sea bottom gillnet fishing; and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) required for bottom fishing in most of the remaining high seas areas.¶ Closure in the Northwest Atlantic of 12 deep-sea areas along the continental slope to all bottom fishing, to protect concentrations of corals and sponges; closure of six seamount areas to bottom fishing (with the proviso that up to 20% of each area could be fished on an exploratory basis), and prior EIAs required for any bottom-fishing in previously unfished areas.¶ Negotiation of a new treaty to establish a North Pacific RFMO to regulate deep-sea fisheries and a requirement for EIAs to be conducted for all high seas bottom fisheries in the region.¶ Negotiation of a new treaty to establish a South Pacific RFMO to regulate deep-sea fisheries; a temporary prohibition on the expansion of bottom fishing in the South Pacific into new high seas areas; the closure of some 40% of the area previously bottom trawled by New Zealand's orange roughy fleets on the high seas; and a ban on bottom gillnet fishing.¶ Closure of 10 seamount areas in the Southeast Atlantic (revised in 2010), and a prohibition of bottom gillnet fishing.¶ A prohibition on bottom trawling and bottom gillnet fishing in Antarctic (Southern Ocean) waters, and a requirement for EIAs as a pre-condition for bottom longline fisheries.¶ Prohibition of bottom trawling below 1000m in the Mediterranean, and closure of three areas to bottom fishing at lesser depths to protect a seamount, cold seep and cold-water corals.¶ All of these actions are positive steps forward, and many of them will serve to protect some species and deep-sea ecosystems in some areas. However, the set of actions called for by the United Nations General Assembly are far from having been fully implemented. The impact assessments produced to date are partial and inconclusive at best and while some high seas areas have been closed to bottom fishing, many high seas areas where vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) are likely to occur remain open to bottom fishing with few or no constraints. The move-on rule is often the only conservation regulation in place to protect VMEs in both existing and new or unfished areas; however it is of limited value in protecting VMEs given the high threshold levels established as triggers for the move-on rule in many of the high seas fisheries.
2NC AT Perm—Enforcement DA
Perm creates regulatory uncertainty and undermines enforcement mechanism—only way to prevent free-riders and opt-out
Global Ocean Commission 14
Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts, in partnership with Somerville College at the University of Oxford, Adessium Foundation and Oceans 5, “From Decline to Recovery A Rescue Package for the Global Ocean,” Global Ocean Commission Report 2014
It is clear that the threats facing the high seas today are global and, even more so than in 1982, international cooperation is essential if they are to be tackled effectively. The conclusion we have come to is that the current governance system for the management of human activities impacting the high seas is no longer fit for purpose to ensure long-term sustainability or equity in resource allocation, nor to create the conditions for maximising economic benefits from the high seas.¶ Essentially, the problems with the international governance regime for the high seas are threefold.¶ First, even though UNCLOS enshrines in its Preamble¶ the notion that all “problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole”, the regime is essentially sectoral in nature, based around the siloed regulation of industries and activities such as fisheries, shipping and seabed mining. A large number of agreements and institutions are mandated to regulate these sectoral activities, but there is little interplay between the various sectors.¶ Conservation of species, habitats and ecosystems – the core components of biological diversity – too often slip through the cracks. Transparency, accountability and compliance-reporting are especially weak, and few mechanisms exist to assess or manage the cumulative effects of multiple industrial activities on the same ocean environment.¶ Unlike many other global conventions adopted in the past 20 years – for example the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) – UNCLOS did not establish a separate secretariat tasked with monitoring its implementation. Nor did it establish any built- in compliance mechanisms to monitor the performance of States and issue sanctions where necessary. Instead UNCLOS created three entirely separate institutions tasked with implementing certain specific parts of the Conventionb while leaving many other provisions to be implemented either by States or through ‘competent international organisations’, agencies and bodies, at regional or global levels. The result is a bewildering proliferation of authorities, often with competing and overlapping mandates but for the most part lacking any real regulatory or enforcement power. States are free to opt out of measures they do not agree with and there is very little accountability at the global level. ¶ Where regulatory mechanisms do exist for specific sectors,¶ they vary widely in their effectiveness and there is inconsistency¶ in the rules set in each sector and how they are applied. In¶ some areas regulation is relatively effective. In the case of high seas fishing, however, which is managed primarily through regional arrangements under the auspices of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), there are severe challenges as a result of a lack of cooperation between States; conflicting interests in resource utilisation and conservation; fragmented responsibilities; lack of political will; lack of enforcement; and perverse economic incentives for ‘free riders’ to cheat the system.