Intervention and Escalation: violence in american labor disputes, a comparative perspective

The Theory of Relative Deprivation

A house may be large or small; as long as the neighboring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighboring palace rises in equal of even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four walls.²⁰

Davies acknowledges his theory is problematic when one attempts to measure the moment when frustration is expressed through violence. When applying his theory to revolutions and rebellions, he acknowledges that socioeconomic factors are not the only issues that would instigate unrest, but they were the “easiest to quantify over time and are probably universal ingredients in civil violence.”²²

This theory was modified by Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend (1969), who used economic indicators to measure a country’s level of industrial modernization.²³ They found that the higher the ratio of expectation to fulfillment, the greater the chances are that the nation will be susceptible to social volatility. Moreover, the faster/slower rate of modernization within a society, the higher/lower the level of political instability.²⁴ Ted Gurr (1969) argues that both short-term and persistent deprivation influence civil unrest.²⁵

Clark Kerr (1960) addressed the “labor commitment” among the working class as it evolved during industrialization, and responded to the widening gap. Kerr argues, that as industrialization progresses, the frustration of the individual worker whose dissent is first displayed by “turnover and absenteeism”, evolves into “guerrilla warfare” of the “quickie strike” or boycott over immediate dissatisfactions; to a relatively structured and long-lasting organized economic and political action; to the “petty and covert sabotage of the trained bureaucrat whose chains can be rattled a bit but never lost.”²⁶

Economic Models

Economic models are based on the connections between the frequency of strikes and economic conditions. As a way of calculating the welfare of workers and industrial prosperity, they measure economic indicators, such as wages, prices, production, and unemployment. The theories are usually in agreement that strike activities vary in accordance with economic prosperity.²⁷

In his study of industrial conflict and institutions, David Snyder (1975) outlines the basic arguments behind the economic models. The following paragraphs will address the four main and ancillary assumptions within the economic models and the resulting “consequences” of the theories.

The first argument asserts that both the union and employer make rational choices based on the short-term economic benefits of settlements and the short-term costs of strikes. Both parties measure only short-term economic costs and benefits; the costs of striking for the worker decreases during economic upswings, but increases for the employers. The “consequence” of this assumption is that economic conditions will influence strike fluctuations, by increasing a union’s bargaining strength and propensity to strike.²⁸

The second assumption is that the collective bargaining process is “well-institutionalized”. Both parties are wiling to negotiate and acknowledge the others right to participate in the process. As a result of past negotiations, there is already a contract in place; both parties respect the agreements for the term of the contract, and each assumes the other will follow the outlined terms. Strikes become a result of the bargaining process, and occur when both parties fail to agree on a new contract before the previous one expires.²⁹

The theory that strikes are a product of failed negotiations between the union and management is advanced by Albert Rees and his study of union behavior. Rees argues that during periods of economic growth unions will call strikes to secure wage increases and other benefits in unionized establishments, and as a way to increase its ranks. During the periods of high employment and improving economic conditions, Rees argues, the unions have a “strategic advantage”. The employer is reluctant to lose its portion of the growing market; once he witnesses wage increases elsewhere his unwillingness to agree to union demands decreases. As employment increases, the employer loses the ability to use strikebreakers as replacement workers will also diminish. In addition, if the striking workers are replaced by strikebreakers, their chances of finding employment elsewhere will increase.³⁰

During periods of decreased employment, Rees argues, there is a sharp reduction in union strikes. Workers in nonunion establishments do not form unions in fear that they will be replaced. Unionized workers will be hesitant to strike when they see that their bargaining power has been usurped by the employers’. The jobs of union members would be threatened by a strike or if economic concessions are granted, because the employer may lose his competitive position; this is the biggest threat to the employer when competing with non-union establishments.³¹

Rees argues that union strategy will determine whether or not a strike will occur. The employers influence strike activity by agreeing to or refusing to make concessions. When the industry is profitable, the employer is more likely to avoid strikes; and is less willing to make concessions during business downturns.³²

The third hypothesis outlined by Snyder is that the decision to strike is made by the union. The secondary assumptions are that only union members will strike, and that unions are supported by its members, in both the decision to strike and by the payment of membership dues. Therefore, it is argued, unions are a necessary element for relatively large strikes.³³

The last argument provided by Snyder, posits that “net of secular trend”, union membership does not fluctuate much.³⁴ Changes in membership or the number of unions does not account for the changes in the amount or size of strikes. However, if there is a connection between the changes in membership and in the degree of industrial conflict, than it is a result of the influence of economic conditions on both.³⁵

The Institutional Model

In comparing institutions and industrial conflict in France (1876-1937; 1946-1966), Italy (1901-1924; 1947-1970) and the United States (1900-1970), Snyder argues that the economic models do not fully explain the labor disputes within the three countries prior to the Second World War for a number of reasons. First, in France and Italy, employers were unwilling to negotiate with the unions.³⁶ Second, the theory that strikes occur as a result of failed contract negotiations is not applicable due to the small number of existing collective bargaining agreements; moreover, employers frequently did not honor the signed agreements that did exist. Finally, unions are not always concerned with the short-term economic benefits and costs.³⁷ Shorter and Tilly argue that unions often used collective action as a way to gain entry into the political power structure, and used the issue of wages as a rallying call amongst the rank and file.

The strikes in my comparison are similar to those of France and Italy. In Homestead contract negotiations did occur prior to the lock-out and strike; however, only the skilled workers were organized, representing a fraction of the entire workforce. At Pullman and in the coal fields of Mingo County, pre-strike negotiations were virtually non-existent. In the case of Pullman, negotiations between management and the not yet organized workers were illusory. Many of the miners worked in organized mines under a federally mandated wartime contract; however, it was generally ignored and eschewed by the coal operators once the war ended.

In regards to unions determining strike activity, we will see that this argument is not entirely applicable for all of the strikes in my comparison. In Homestead, the union represented only a fraction of the workforce; however, the non-union workers backed the mill’s union and the strike. In the coal fields of Mingo County, the conflict was largely based on union related issues and escalated following an official strike call by the union. In Pullman, when the workers called for a strike the ARU advised them not to do so, arguing that the union was too young to support a possibly extensive strike against a corporate powerhouse.

Snyder argues that the theories’ degree of relevancy in the United States versus France and Italy is the result of the dissimilar characteristics of labor relations within the three countries. These differences include the size and stability of union membership, the position of labor in national politics and the extent of the institutionalization of the bargaining process.

Snyder created a model of the two types of institutional settings for labor disputes, as they relate to the economic theories. In the first model, or “type A”, collective bargaining is firmly institutionalized; unions have a large and stable membership; and labor is a legitimate interest group within the polity and routinely participates in decisions which affect the allocation of resources. As a result, organization strength will not be “problematic”; economic goals will be the main motivation behind organized action; and strikes will fluctuate in response to changes in economic conditions and wages.³⁸

In Snyder’s second model, or “type B”, collective bargaining is poorly institutionalized; unions possess a small and unstable membership; and are not a legitimate interest group within the polity. Consequently, organizational strength will be “problematic”; politics – not economics – will initiate action; and strikes will fluctuate mainly in response to union membership (or organizational strength) and political changes.³⁹

In their study, Strikes in France: 1830-1960, Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly examine the evolution of the strike in an effort to explain long-term trends in their size, duration, and frequency; and how labor disputes evolved alongside changes in industrial organization, and how these changes impacted institutions.

The authors found that strikes were a form of collective action less rooted in the concepts of relative deprivation or the breakdown of traditional society, and can be defined in terms of a struggle for space within political power structure. ⁴⁰ Shorter and Tilly also argue against the “conventional wisdom” that strike activity is based on variations within the business cycle or long-term developments which equate “secular trends in strikes to trends in economic life”.⁴¹ In their research, the authors discovered that the frequency of strikes prior to the First World War increased; however, real wages increased as well. Moreover, the unions used wage demands more as a tool for mobilizing the workers than as a grievance issue. The business cycle may influence management’s willingness to make concessions, or influence the workers' assessment of the risks if they did go on strike. “Thus”, Shorter and Tilly argue, “the state of the economy helps to explain why one year sees a lot of strikes, another year fewer. But such relationships are not constant, and indeed display a disconcerting tendency to reverse themselves from one epoch to another.” ⁴²

Shorter and Tilly outline the transformation of the French strike as a four-stage process; however, we will concern ourselves with only the first three. First, strikes in the 1830s were attempts by skilled craftsmen to negotiate increased wages from individual firms. The protests were not aimed at anyone other than the local authorities. The second stage- referred to by Shorter and Tilly as the “great mobilization of the working classes” - occurred during between 1880 and 1910. During this phase, formal organizations with national networks were established. Linked to “revolutionary syndicalism”, the strikes became political protests, which challenged the allocation of resources and authority within the plant and national polity.⁴³ The unions were successful in increasing strike size; there were three times as many strikers in union strikes than in non-union strikes.⁴⁴ In addition, large strikes led to an increase in government intervention as mediators; between 1895 and 1914, state officials intervened in 20% of the labor disputes, and the workers were able to obtain some of their demands in around 70% of the cases.⁴⁵ Gerald Friedman (1988) argues that by rewarding the unions with mediation, it encouraged union political activity and inclusive forms of union organization that, in turn increased strike size.⁴⁶

The third phase outlined by Shorter and Tilly began during the 1920s, when the process of mechanization and industrialization finally made the workers realize they had little sway in regards to job control or shop-level influence. Moreover, they were weakly organized and did not influence local or national politics. In 1936 and coinciding with the Popular Front, the workers joined en masse the organizations that promised them a voice in national politics.⁴⁷

Shorter and Tilly argue that strikes are not tests of economic strength; rather, they are “symbolic displays of political energy and resoluteness” directed at the political power structure. The political processes involved in collective actions consist of the union’s effort to persuade the government to intervene, and by doing so, the workers strengthen their lines of communication with the “political center”. Shorter and Tilly found that once the government intervened, the chances for compromise increased. Collective action contains an intimidation factor by becoming symbolic public displays of strength and solidarity, which challenges the political structure. The last process involves placing pressure directly upon the center of the political power through strike waves, which corresponded with significant turning points in France’s political history, most significantly when labor appeared to be joining or exiting the polity. ⁴⁸

While it is important to examine the determinants of strike activity, what form the strikes take is an important gauge of the strategy, significance and institutionalization of conflict. In their study, "The Shape of Strikes in France: 1830-1960" (1971a), Shorter and Tilly discovered that early strikes tended to be sporadic, small in size, and long in duration. The character of these early strikes was a result of the small size of the enterprises, the relatively remote location of the plants and the poor organization among the workers. Over time (most significantly following the Second World War) and corresponding with a better organized French working class, the strikes became more frequent, larger, but shorter in duration.⁴⁹ In addition, violent strikes decreased. Theorists have explained that this was a result of long-term changes in labor relations; labor organizations became more "sophisticated" and "disciplined", were accepted by the employers and governments, and the collective bargaining process became institutionalized.⁵⁰

In "Industrial Violence in Italy, 1878-1903", David Snyder and William R. Kelly investigated the determinants of violent labor conflicts and its consequences. For their study, the authors used government data covering over 6,000 strikes within 25 years, and examined industrial conflict at the individual strike level.

Snyder and Kelly note the difficulties of such research due to the limitations of the data available for labor disputes: strike statistics, which formed the basis of aggregate models, did not report which strikes were violent, therefore the investigation of violent labor disputes rely on case studies.⁵¹ The 1969 study “American labor Violence: Its Causes, character and Outcome”, by Philip Taft and Philip Ross, and Shorter and Tilly's “Le Déclin de la grève violente en France de 1890 à 1935” (1971b), are two exceptions. Taft and Ross studied numerous accounts of violent strikes throughout U.S. history, and theorize that union recognition was the main instigator of American labor violence. However, Snyder and Kelly argue that the conclusions made by Taft and Ross were limited, because they did not weigh their sample against non-violent strikes.

Shorter and Tilly, on the other hand, did measure French strike violence against non-violent disputes. The authors sampled over 4,000 strikes and found only 88 episodes of violence. The violent strikes tended to be both larger and longer in duration than the non-violent strikes. Shorter and Tilly expected to find that issues concerning union organization would form the basis of violent strikes, but this was not the case. The authors found that industries with integrated work organizations and progressive conflict strategies were more likely to strike, but less likely to resort to violence.⁵² Taft and Ross, on the other hand, argue that that the denial of the workers' right to organize, through refusing to recognize the unions was the main determinant of violent labor disputes in the United States.⁵³

Snyder and Kelly used the French example as a basis of comparison for labor disputes in Italy. In their study, the authors used three types of variables: 1) contextual, which included the rate of industrial growth, wage changes, and government repression; 2) the individual strike characteristics of size, duration, demands (offensive-defensive), type of issue, number of issues (complexity), and industry; 3) the dependent variable of strike violence and outcome.⁵⁴ In comparison with France, Snyder and Kelly found that Italy experienced a higher degree of labor conflict, despite government prohibitions on strikes, and was more violent; eleven percent of the strikes in their sample were violent, as compared to two percent of occurring in France.⁵⁵ In agreement with the conclusions of the study by Shorter and Tilly, Snyder and Kelly’s research found that violence was more evident in strikes that were large and long in duration.

Snyder and Kelly argue that there is no connection between the pace or level of industrialization and the decline of violent strikes, as purported in the theory of social breakdown. In France, strike violence declined around the First World War.⁵⁶ In the United States, the decrease in strike violence did not occur until the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which gave workers the right to organize and bargain collectively; bolstering the theory that union related issues had a significant impact on industrial violence in the United States, as argued by Taft and Ross.⁵⁷

2. Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to compare the industrial conflicts in Homestead, Pullman, and Mingo County. While I expect to see differences in strike issues, levels of violence and strike outcome, I anticipate similarities in the companies’ response to the strikes and intervention by the State and Federal authorities.

The methods used by Snyder and Kelly to measure individual strike activity will form the basis of my comparison. I will address the contextual variables, which include the economic health of the industries at the time of the strikes and the working and living conditions, and the role of the labor unions. The independent strike variables that will be examined are size, duration, and the type of strike issues and their complexity. The dependent variables of violence and outcome will be addressed by examining the types of violence displayed and how the individual strike variables influenced the outcome of the strikes.

I will also assess the role of the labor unions by using the theories of Taft and Ross. For this I will address several factors: whether the unions were recognized in the establishment prior to the strike; if negotiations between the union and management occurred prior to the strike; if the union supported the workers call for a strike; and if management negotiated with the unions during the strike. In their study of American labor violence, Taft and Ross argue that strikes concerning union-related issues are more likely to be violent than the labor disputes over other issues. The most severe form of industrial violence, they argue, occurred in environments where efforts were made to break up a functioning union or union recognition was denied to the workforce.⁵⁸

In this comparison, violence will be defined by the collective action of workers during the time of the work stoppages. Violence will be divided into seven major categories: 1) destruction of company property; assaults against strikebreakers; assaults against company officials; assaults against private guards; assaults against local police forces; assaults against the State National Guard; and 7) assaults against the United States Military.

Measuring Strike Variables

Following the lead of Snyder and Kelly, I will use the variables of strike size, duration and issue type to examine the individual strikes. The subsequent paragraphs will outline the variables used by the authors to measure strike violence.

Snyder and Kelly measured several individual strike variables of Italian strikes between 1878 and 1903. First the authors examined strike size. They found that strikes involving more than 1500 participants were more likely to contain violence, but also more prone to official intervention.⁵⁹ Shorter and Tilly’s research into violent strikes in France found that both violent and non-violent took place “disproportionately” in firms of approximately fifty workers, but violent strikes are larger, due to the larger number of establishments involved and the amount of strikers per establishment.⁶⁰

The second variable measured was strike duration. Shorter and Tilly found large differences in the average duration of violent and non-violent strikes. In violent strikes the median duration was 31 days, versus 6 days for non-violent stoppages.⁶¹ The results of Snyder and Kelly’s research were consistent with those seen in the French sample. However, Snyder and Kelly provide a caveat to the duration variable: strikes may become violent due to “random precipitating events”, but the likelihood that such events will occur is greater in prolonged strikes. The level of antagonism between the parties at the beginning of the strike may influence its length, making a settlement difficult.⁶² Moreover, increased animosity may lead the participants to change tactics and strategy.

Snyder and Kelly also examined the type and number of issues involved. First, they considered whether the strike demands were “offensive” or “defensive”. The authors define “offensive” strikes as those where the workers demand an increase in benefits. Stoppages that are labeled “defensive” are those in which the workers strike in response to a decrease in their welfare.⁶³ These definitions are embodied in the work of Davies, and other theorists who explain violence as a response to a group’s relative deprivation and the existing economic conditions.

Second, Snyder and Kelly classified the type of issues involved as 1) wages, hours and/or working conditions; 2) union related, which include recognition, demands for reinstatement of dismissed workers, and sympathy strikes; or 3) a combination of the two.⁶⁴ The studies of both Shorter and Tilly and Snyder and Kelly found that the level of violence increases with the number – or complexity – of issues involved.⁶⁵ For the purpose of my examination, I am going to broaden the scope of the first category. Since the town of Pullman and the coal mining camps were extensions of the companies, I will consider living conditions to be a part of working conditions. A court decision which upheld the legality of company housing equated the worker-employer relationship in such environments with that of “master-servant” makes this a necessary addition.

3. Context

The following section will outline the contextual variables which surrounded the labor disputes. I will examine the steel, rail and coal industries; the living and working conditions of the employees, and the history of labor organization within the establishments. Issues such as company housing will be addressed in detail due to its effect on worker grievances in the Pullman and Mingo County strikes.

Homestead

On July 1, 1892, the workers of Homestead, Pennsylvania were locked out of the Andrew Carnegie owned steel mill, a result of failed contract negotiations between the union and management. The union sought to maintain wage rates, and the company wanted to break the union’s influence within the mill. The subsequent strike resulted in a violent clash between the striking workers and Pinkerton detectives, and the intervention by the state militia to end the strike. The following section will address the contextual variables surrounding the workers decision to strike and the factors which led to the battle on the banks of the Monongahela River.

The Industry: The Empire of Andrew Carnegie

Undated photo of Carnegie steel works, Homestead, PA.⁶⁶

The growth of the steel industry was a by-product of the expansion of the railroads, comprising nine-tenths of the steel produced in 1882.⁶⁷ After 1887, steel entered markets beyond that of the railroads; in 1890, less than half of the steel output was used for rail construction.⁶⁸ Businesses began to concentrate in urban centers, ushering in the era of the skyscraper. The steel industry responded by expanding production, making up for the slack created by the stabilization of railroad demands.

Andrew Carnegie entered the industry during the Civil War. During the years of heavy competition, many steel producers attempted to economize at the expense of growth; Carnegie was able to do both, largely by acquiring bankrupt plants, and underselling the competition. He acquired three mills on practically adjacent sites on the banks of the Monongahela River a few miles north of Pittsburgh, the Edgar Thompson Works, Duquesne and Homestead, in 1874, 1883, and 1890 respectively. Carnegie possessed and operated various steel and coke works around Pittsburgh, and employed approximately 13,000 workers.⁶⁹

The Carnegie Company sought to control the entire production process. Carnegie made alliances with local coal companies, and by absorbing the Lake Superior Iron Company, Carnegie, became one of the largest shippers of ore on the Great Lakes. These enterprises, combined with a controlling interest in the Pittsburgh, Bessemer and Lake Erie Railroad, made the Carnegie Company an independent player in the transportation of ore. Carnegie’s steel production increased from 332,111 tons in 1888, to 1,115,466 in 1894, one-fourth of the national output.⁷⁰ Moreover, the capital of the Carnegie’s parent company increased from $5 million in 1879, to $12 million in 1891.

The Town and Living Conditions

When the mill was built in 1879, around 600 people lived in the town of Homestead, located seven miles outside of Pittsburgh. By 1892, Homestead’s population was approximately 12,000. The town developed around the steel mill, and it was the chief employer of the population - including the Mayor of the borough, John McLuckie, who earned $65 a month as an assistant roller.

The Homestead mill was one among many in the heavily industrialized region. The river was contaminated with the chemicals used in coke and metal processing, most significantly sulphuric acid. Aside from well water, this was a major source of water for the town.⁷¹ The town did not possess paved roads or a sewage system. The more upscale homes had four rooms and possessed a single kitchen faucet. All of the buildings were the color of the soot emitted by the mills.⁷²

Hamlin Garland, a journalist visiting the town around the time of the strike wrote:

The streets were horrible, the buildings were poor; the sidewalks were sunken and full of holes…Everywhere the yellow mud of streets lay kneaded into sticky masses, through which the groups of pale, lean men slouched in faded garments, grimy with the dirt and soot of the mills. The town was as squalid as could well be imagined, and the people were mainly of the discouraged and sullen type to be found everywhere where labor passes into the brutalizing stage of severity.⁷³
The unmarried and poorer workers rented rooms in tenements or rooming houses for about $2 a week. Most of the immigrants, mainly Slavs, lived in shacks and lean-tos for little or no rent. In 1893, the company bought land adjacent to the mill and constructed houses for sale to employees, who were urged to buy the property. Carnegie offered low-interest loans to be repaid through wage deductions over a long period. In 1892, the workers had $140,000 on deposit with the company at 6% interest; 69 workers had borrowed $42,796.75, also at 6% interest, averaging $620 each, with which the workers used to buy homes.⁷⁴

Hours and Wages

Homestead’s sliding scale wage system was based on the market price of steel billets.⁷⁵ A minimum rate of $25 per ton was determined by the outcome of 1889 contract negotiations between the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AAISW) and management. Per the contract, wages were not to fall below this amount, regardless of the market price.⁷⁶

The main immigrant group at the time was the Slavs, who were generally unskilled day laborers. The unskilled laborers worked about ten hours per day, and were paid approximately $9.80 per week. The skilled technicians worked eight hours per day, and paid a weekly amount between $34.80 and $71.04, during times of peak production.⁷⁷ It is difficult to determine the wages and hours of the 2000 semiskilled workers at the mill. For this group of workers, the wages were paid either by the piece or by the hour. The hours worked ranged from 8 to 12 hours a day, and 6 to 7 days a week. A Congressional investigation following the strike reported that the workers within Homestead’s largest department – the 119-inch plate mill – averaged $120 a month.⁷⁸ This department was mechanized and employed few unskilled workers. The level of production determined the wages and hours; periods of heavy production could be followed by periods of lay-offs. The majority of workers at Homestead worked twelve-hour shifts everyday of the year – excluding Christmas and the 4^th of July. Every two weeks, the worker did what was called a “turn”; after working a double shift the worker would get the following day off.⁷⁹

Working Conditions

The job of the steel worker was hot, dirty and physically demanding; within the manufacturing industries, iron and steel processing was the most dangerous. As late as 1909-1910 almost one-fourth of all full-time workers in the nation’s 150 plants suffered an injury of some type.⁸⁰

Definitive estimations of the mill’s casualty and accident rates in 1892 are unknown; however, the fatality and injury rates for the industry as a whole were staggering. Wolff estimates that in 1891 there were approximately 300 deaths in the Pittsburgh mills due hot metal explosions, asphyxiation, rolling accidents, operation of cranes and cars, falls from heights or into pits, electrocution, and loading and piling.⁸¹ Wolff estimates that the total number of workers in accidents in the same year was around 2,000.⁸²

At the time, mechanization was just beginning to enter the plants, and most of the work was hands-on. In the hot departments, the blast furnaces were operated by three men alternately. The furnaces were ninety-feet high and heated by several stoves of equal height. Under immense heat, the puddlers stirred the molten pig iron through a hole in the furnace door. Eventually, the molten metal would be worked into five-hundred pound iron balls. The men who dumped iron ore into the blast furnaces were called “top fillers”; they worked in 128 degree heat and were surrounded by noxious fumes.

The working conditions in the steel mills were noted by a visiting member of the British Iron and Steel Institute, who commented: “The Men, I dare say, are paid well, but it was hot weather when I was there and they were certainly selling their lives.” ⁸³

Carnegie’s official biographer also remarked on the working conditions of the plant:

Everywhere in the enormous sheds were pits gaping like the mouth of hell, and ovens emitting a terrible degree of heat, with grimy men filling and lining them. One man jumps down, works desperately for a few minutes, and is then pulled up, exhausted. Another immediately takes his place; there is no hesitation.⁸⁴

The Union: Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers

In 1876, three iron and steel trade organization merged to form the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (AAISW).⁸⁵ The union’s goal was to organize the workers within western Pennsylvania and Ohio. Membership to the union was open to only skilled workers; unskilled laborers were allowed to join, but only at the discretion of the skilled membership.⁸⁶ In 1887, the AAISW joined the American Federation of Labor (AFL), becoming one its largest unions and helped direct its national labor policy. In 1892, the national AAISW had 24,000 members in eight districts between the cities of Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis and Birmingham. In 1894, membership had risen to 34,000 skilled iron and steel workers.⁸⁷

The union obtained recognition in Homestead, following a strike in 1889. Of the 3800 workers at Homestead, approximately 400 skilled workers were members. Following a pre-lockout organizing push in 1892, the union was able to increase its ranks to around 800.⁸⁸

Since its formation, the AAISW possessed an attitude of conciliation towards management. The sliding scale for wages had been in use since 1865; and was consistently supported by the AAISW and the mill managers.⁸⁹ The union did not seek uniform wages throughout the steel industry and each lodge negotiated separately for local rates. Since new technology was not used in all mills, the union conceded that increased output resulting from innovation, necessitated rate adjustments.⁹⁰ However, the AAISW hoped to make the cost of labor as uniform as possible, where the work was similar.⁹¹ The union did not oppose innovation in the mills. The president of the AAISW, William Weihe stated: “The Association never objects to improvement,” and if innovation did “away with certain jobs they make no objection. They believe in the American idea that the genius of the country should not be retarded.”⁹²

The AAISW was accommodating in other areas as well. For example, the rollers and heaters at Homestead traditionally were responsible for hiring and paying their crews. The union permitted the mill managers to take over this task, and the practice was later abandoned in other steel mills. In addition, the union left the question of work hours up to the employers.⁹³

The workers believed in the benevolence of Andrew Carnegie towards organized labor. In his writings, Carnegie advocated trade unionism, the arbitration of differences, and criticized “absentee capitalism”. In an 1886 article published in Forum, Carnegie wrote:

The right of the workingmen to combine and to form trade-unions is no less sacred than the right of the manufacturer to enter the association and conferences with his fellows and it must be sooner or later conceded. Indeed, it gives one but a poor opinion of the American workman if he permits himself to be deprived of a right which his fellow in England has conquered for himself long since. My experience has been that trade-unions upon the whole are beneficial both to labor and to capital.⁹⁴
In an article published four months later in the same journal, Carnegie wrote of the “terrible temptation” the workingman has to use violence against strike breakers, and that there “is an unwritten law among the best workmen: ‘Thou shalt not take thy neighbor’s job...’”.⁹⁵

Therefore, it is puzzling that Carnegie would enlist the aid of someone as anti-union as Henry Clay Frick. Frick made millions in the coke and coal industry of Pennsylvania. After his firms were bought out by Carnegie during the 1880s, Frick acquired interest in Carnegie’s steel company. In 1889, he became chairman and general manager of the steel firm and was instrumental in the organization of the Carnegie Steel Company in 1892.⁹⁶

While the workers may have viewed Carnegie as a “friend to labor”, they knew that Frick posed a threat to the union. Known as the “Coke King”, Frick had a history of being anti-union and breaking strikes by using the Coal and Iron Police, the Pinkerton Agency and the state militia.⁹⁷ In 1884, Frick, used Pinkerton guards to protect his coal mines and the Hungarian and Slavic strikebreakers imported to replace the striking northern Europeans. When the Slav and Hungarian immigrants went on strike in 1891, Frick hired the detectives to protect Italian strikebreakers.⁹⁸

Samuel Yellen argued that the inconsistency between Carnegie’s public support of labor and his private business practices was a way for Carnegie to increase his advantage within the industry. The union was a necessary tool for this objective. When the union called for uniform wages for the same type of work, Carnegie had an advantage over his competitors whose plants were not on the same level technologically. Moreover, the Carnegie mills were located at the center of the coal and iron supplies, with excellent transportation systems. Once wages were made uniform, the competitors, who were unable to make further cuts in labor costs would collapse before Carnegie’s weight. Once the competition was beaten by this strategy, the union was to be ousted from the mill.⁹⁹

Contract Negotiations

Management was beginning to feel increasingly confined by the union and its work rules; the “Memorandum of Agreement for Homestead Works” contained fifty-eight pages of stipulations which defined and limited the work expectations for the union members, in such matters as work breaks and production speed-ups. Frick addressed his concerns to Carnegie: “The mills have never been able to turn out the product they should, owing to being held back by the Amalgamated men.” Carnegie responded by declaring that breaking the union’s hold was “a chance to reorganize the whole affair, and …exact good reasons for employing every man. Far too many men required by Amalgamated rules.”¹⁰⁰

In February 1892, negotiations for a new contract were opened, and wages were the main issue addressed. The company sought to lower the minimum wage rate from $25, to $20 a ton.¹⁰¹ Frick argued that wage reductions would help pay for new machinery; and the workers would earn more by increasing output by simplifying the production process. The company stated that the cuts would only affect 320 of its 3800 employees, and the reduction in wages would only amount to 18%. Moreover, he proposed eliminating the job rules the union had previously established.¹⁰²

The union objected to the new proposals on three major points. First, they opposed a reduction in the minimum market price of the sliding scale from $25 to $20 a ton for steel billets. Second, the union rejected the reduction in tonnage rates in the furnaces and mills where improvements and new technology introduced. Finally, the union opposed management’s proposition to change the contract expiration date from June 30 to December 31.¹⁰³

The company defended its stance, arguing that the price of billets had fallen below the minimum tonnage amount, and it was unfair for the workers to benefit when the market was robust, but not take a share in the losses when the market declined. Furthermore, the workers were not entitled to the share of the profits resulting from invested capital.¹⁰⁴

The union argued that the fixed minimum prevented the workers from losses when the company deliberately kept prices low to undersell the competition. Moreover, the workers had been partly responsible for the suggestions which resulted in improvements and new technology. The union disputed the 18% reduction in wages figure put forth by the management; the union estimated that the reduction would amount to 26%. While the reduction might only affect a few workers at first, the union argued, it would eventually be felt by all.¹⁰⁵

The negotiations began to break down, and were put on hold. Frick, critical of Carnegie’s recognition of the union, initiated his plans to break the union’s hold on the company. Carnegie, who wished to uphold his pro-labor image, went on a yearlong sabbatical to Scotland.

At the end of May, Frick issued an ultimatum to the union: accept the proposals by the end of June, or face a lockout. More than 3,000 delegates to the AAISW annual convention in Pittsburgh met at the Homestead Opera house on June 19. The mayor of Homestead and the union leaders urged the workers not to bend to Frick’s demands, because he believed that Carnegie would not allow the situation to escalate in to a full-blown strike. Several hundred unskilled workers voted to follow the AAISW.

During negotiations in mid-June, Frick rejected the union’s final offer of a sliding scale minimum of $24 per ton, and began to prepare for a possible strike. He surrounded the plant’s periphery with a three-mile long, eleven-foot high wooden fence topped with barbed wire. The only opening was at the riverside, in order to allow the Pinkerton detectives and strikebreakers to reach the plant safely. Twelve-foot towers were erected, with searchlights and bored holes. The workers viewed the fence as a declaration of war, and named the plant “Fort Frick”.¹⁰⁶

On June 29, Frick began to close various departments within the mill; by July 1, all were closed and the workers dismissed. Company representative declared: “Hereafter, the Homestead steel works will operate as a non-union mill…there will be, no doubt, a scale of wages; but we shall deal with the men individually, not with any organization.”¹⁰⁷

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