Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
NC/1NR AT #6—Cooperation Solves Conflict
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- Cooperation with the US causes nationalist backlash and drains Xi’s political capital
- 2NC/1NR Human Rights Link
- By helping religious minorities in China, the affirmative is directly undermining CCP authority.
2NC/1NR AT #6—Cooperation Solves ConflictThey say economic cooperation solves conflict, but [GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME] It’s much better than their evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME] [CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]: (it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts) (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument) ( ) (their evidence supports our argument) [WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW] and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader”] The foundations for a turn to nationalism have been laid for decades. After Tiananmen Square, the party inculcated nationalist sentiment through relentless propaganda, a barrage of chauvinistic television shows and movies, and a “patriotic education campaign” in the country’s schools.31 According to the government’s nationalist narrative, which downplays the party’s failures and communist ideology, China is a country whose “century of humiliation” began with the Opium Wars and ended with the party’s assumption of power in 1949. The party’s primary mission has not been to bring about a communist utopia but to extricate China from the predations of Western and Japanese imperialists and to put it on a path to becoming the world’s largest economy. China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors and Taiwan’s ambiguous status are seen as wounds from this humiliating past that only the party can heal. This slanted view of history has been successful in building a deep reserve of grievance and victimhood among ordinary Chinese citizens that dominates their worldview and can be harnessed by the leadership. It was no accident that Xi, when he assumed power, declared that his main objective was to bring about the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” That slogan was an attempt to position Xi’s leadership within the arc of a larger narrative that portrays the party as responsible for restoring China’s historic place in the world. In December 2015, the Communist Party Central Committee held a group study of Chinese patriotism and Xi himself called for further “promoting patriotism to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”32 By connecting patriotism to Xi’s mission to restore Chinese greatness, that link is being made even more concrete. Although these themes have long been an important part of Chinese politics, Xi will choose to strengthen them in coming years. By stoking Chinese nationalism, Xi will seek to protect himself and the party from the worst of the economic downturn. His control over policymaking will be an advantage in that effort, and his policies will respect and support his domestic political agenda. 2NC/1NR Human Rights Link
Kirk, April 2016 4/14 Jessica, assessed as part of a university degree, University of Queensland “The Shadows of Tiananmen: Chinese Foreign Policy and Human Rights” http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/matthew-hall.pdf The choice made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to authorise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to fire upon pro-democracy protestors in Beijing, June 1989 – widely referred to as the Tiananmen Square incident – has had a lasting yet complex impact upon foreign policy in China. At its core, it placed China at the centre of a conundrum. How much should outside yet widely circulated discourses affect domestic matters? Should states’ actions within their sovereign territory affect their international standing? Tiananmen demanded answers to both of these questions. In particular, it demanded that China, as well as the rest of the world, ask themselves how closely meshed their foreign policy and ideas of universal human rights are. This essay will argue that, for China, the international reaction to Tiananmen signified that the human rights discourse holds significant – but contingent – “productive power” (Barnett and Duvall 2005). In other words, the human rights discourse can affect the behaviour of states by defining their realities and encouraging particular behaviours. Yet it is, in itself, an expression of power and is thus ultimately reliant upon the coherent performance of those major players (notably the US) who are in the unique position to construct discourses and establish their dominance. An understanding of these factors has driven China’s foreign policy, leading to two seemingly contradictory sets of behaviours since 1989: compliance and resistance … The reactions that led from this discursive construction of the event as a human rights violation impacted China significantly. The US suspended weapons’ sales, communication between high level officials, and civilian nuclear cooperation, as well as implementing sanctions and demanding the postponement of new loans to China from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Outside of the United States, Japan and the European Union as well as individual European states announced sanctions and Australia and New Zealand cancelled visits of high ranking officials. Ultimately, over four years following Tiananmen, China was denied US$11 billion in bilateral aid (Foot 2012: 337-339). Moreover, China was publically humiliated; its international image and bargaining power damaged. Humiliation is apparent from the fervent attempts undertaken by Chinese diplomats and leaders to minimise public criticism. From 1990 through to 1997, China had to defend itself against numerous condemnatory resolutions presented before the UN Human Rights Commission, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention among others through extensive diplomacy, lobbying, and even aid projects from the developing state to others (Nathan 2010: 212-3). Even states such as Malaysia and Brazil who typically adhered to a position of non-intervention issued “expressions of regret” (Foot 2012: 339).
Wyne, 2013 Ali, contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a global fellow at the Project for the Study of the 21st Century. “Some Thoughts on the Ethics of China’s Rise.” 08/14 http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0084 The more contentious topic, of course, is the role that human rights should play in U.S.-China relations. While the United States should neither hesitate to articulate its differences with China on issues of human rights, nor refrain from encouraging those trends within China that are promoting greater citizen empowerment, it should not urge China to democratize or condition its interactions with China on the leadership's acceptance of core American values. A country that is not yet 250 years old should appreciate the possibility that a country several millennia old may have its own strain of exceptionalism. Furthermore, attempts to democratize China could backfire. One of the foremost China watchers, former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, declares that it will not "become a liberal democracy; if it did, it would collapse." While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is willing to experiment with democratic reforms in "villages and small towns," he explains, it fears that large-scale democratization "would lead to a loss of control by the center over the provinces, like [during] the warlord years of the 1920s and '30s.3 Whatever challenges an increasingly capable and assertive China might pose, a weak China in the throes of chaos would be even more problematic, especially now that its growth is vital to the health of the global economy. It is China's ongoing integration into the international system and attendant exposure to information technology that hold the greatest promise for improvements to its human rights climate. Since the late 1970s, the CCP has implicitly conditioned its delivery of rapid growth to the Chinese people on their acquiescence to its rule. The problem is that citizens' priorities become more sophisticated as their day-to-day situations grow less exigent. Those in dire poverty are quite likely to censor themselves in exchange for food, shelter, and other necessities. As they enter the middle class, however, and become less preoccupied with the demands of survival, they naturally think more about critiquing government policy. Within this transition lies a fundamental challenge for the CCP: the very bargain that it implemented to forestall challenges to its rule is enabling greater numbers of Chinese to pose such challenges. There were only 20 million Internet users in China in 2000; today, there are more than 560 million.4
Dillon, 2011 Michael, Senior Lecturer in Modern Chinese History and Director of the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Durham in the UK, “Religious Minorities and China” http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-140-Religious-Minorities-and-China.pdf The People’s Republic of China (PRC), created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, is officially an atheist state.1 Religious belief and worship have been tolerated to some extent, although the degree of toleration has varied considerably with the political climate. The CCP has always been concerned about the threat to its authority posed by religious organizations. Sects of the traditional Chinese religions, Buddhism or Daoism, have a long history of involvement with underground secret societies and were frequently implicated in the overthrow of governments in the 2,000 years of the Chinese Empire. With religions of foreign origin, particularly Christianity, there is the added dimension that they are perceived to be undermining both the authority of the state and traditional Chinese values, and patriotic fervour has from time to time been mobilized against them. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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