Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
AT: Pakistani Instability
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AT: Pakistani InstabilityPakistan will stay stable – China and India check (The Hindu 7/12/10 “Call for China-India initiative for Pakistan stability” http://www.hindu.com/2010/07/12/stories/2010071255571100.htm) A senior member of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Advisory Group has proposed that China and India cooperate for the stability of Pakistan in the present circumstances. The Ministry's Foreign Policy Advisory Group Member, Wu Jianmin, told TheHindu here his intention was to “present this idea to the Chinese government in due course.” He said this on the sidelines of a conference on “the role of the media in India-China relations,” organised by the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and its Nalanda Sriwijaya Centre, the National University of Singapore, and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. The participants included India's former Ambassador to China, C. V. Ranganathan, and author Sunanda K. Datta-Ray. On whether the idea of a China-India initiative for the stability of Pakistan would at all fly, Mr. Wu, formerly a career diplomat, said: “The rise of Asia requires peace and stability in this region. So, you can see that China's interest and the Indian interest coincide. … We [in China] do not regard Pakistan as a counterweight to India. It is not propaganda: you [only] have to put yourself in China's shoes. .... For the first time since 1840, we have a chance to modernise China. To achieve our goal, what we need is peace abroad and stability at home.” AT: Pakistani Loose Nukes1. No risk of nukes getting loose – U.S. taking extreme measures to protect them Nathan Hodge (Wired Reporter) 4/4/2009: ‘Worst Downside’ of Pakistan’s Implosion: Loose Nukes (Updated). http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/worst-downside-of-pakistans-implosion-loose-nukes/ With the Pakistani army is slugging it out with Taliban gunmen just 60 miles from Islamabad, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is becoming an even more serious concern for the U.S. military. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently returned from a visit to the region. And while he expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was secure, he made clear his main worry: Pakistan’s nukes falling into the wrong hands. “We all recognize, obviously, the worst downside with respect to Pakistan is that those nuclear weapons come under the control of terrorists,” Mullen told reporters, adding: “I don’t think that’s going to happen.” So, is it time to worry about the worst-case scenario? For starters, it’s worth remembering that the United States has been keeping a watchful eye on the Pakistani nuclear arsenal for a while now, and the United States has provided money and equipment to improve Pakistan’s nuclear security. As the New York Times first revealed in 2007, the Bush administration committed over $100 million to help secure Pakistan’s nuclear materials; that assistance included night vision equipment, helicopters and detection gear. 2. Loose nukes aren’t the problem – officials will just sell of the technology anyway David Albright and Corey Hinderstein (president and deputy director of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C.) 2005: Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks. http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf The most disturbing aspect of the international nuclear smuggling network headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely viewed as the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, is how poorly the nuclear nonproliferation regime fared in exposing and stopping the network’s operation. Khan, with the help of associates on four continents, managed to buy and sell key nuclear weapons capabilities for more than two decades while eluding the world’s best intelligence agencies and nonproliferation institutions and organizations. Despite a wide range of hints and leads, the United States and its allies ailed to thwart this network throughout the 1980s and 1990s as it sold the equipment and expertise needed to produce nuclear weapons to major U.S. enemies including Iran, Libya, and North Korea. 3. Pakistani nukes are secure CTC Sentinel, The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the West Point, 2009 (CTC Sentinel, The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research institution based in the Department of Social Sciences at the West Point, July 2009 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf) Pakistan has established a robust set of measures to assure the security of its nuclear weapons. These have been based on copying U.S. practices, procedures and technologies, and comprise: a) physical security; b) personnel reliability programs; c) technical and procedural safeguards; and d) deception and secrecy. These measures provide the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD)—which oversees nuclear weapons operations—a high degree of confidence in the safety and security of the country’s nuclear weapons.2 In terms of physical security, Pakistan operates a layered concept of concentric tiers of armed forces personnel to guard nuclear weapons facilities, the use of physical barriers and intrusion detectors to secure nuclear weapons facilities, the physical separation of warhead cores from their detonation components, and the storage of the components in protected underground sites. With respect to personnel reliability, the Pakistan Army conducts a tight selection process drawing almost exclusively on officers from Punjab Province who are considered to have fewer links with religious extremism or with the Pashtun areas of Pakistan from which groups such as the Pakistani Taliban mainly garner their support. Pakistan operates an analog to the U.S. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) that screens individuals for Islamist sympathies, personality problems, drug use, inappropriate external affiliations, and sexual deviancy.3 The army uses staff rotation and also operates a “two-person” rule under which no action, decision, or activity involving a nuclear weapon can be undertaken by fewer than two persons.4 The purpose of this policy is to reduce the risk of collusion with terrorists and to prevent nuclear weapons technology getting transferred to the black market. In total, between 8,000 and 10,000 individuals from the SPD’s security division and from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Military Intelligence and Intelligence Bureau agencies are involved in the security clearance and monitoring of those with nuclear weapons duties.5 Despite formal command authority structures that cede a role to Pakistan’s civilian leadership, in practice the Pakistan Army has complete control over the country’s nuclear weapons. It imposes its executive authority over the weapons through the use of an authenticating code system down through the command chains that is intended to ensure that only authorized nuclear weapons activities and operations occur. It operates a tightly controlled identification system to assure the identity of those involved in the nuclear chain of command, and it also uses a rudimentary Permissive Action Link (PAL) type system to electronically lock its nuclear weapons. This system uses technology similar to the banking industry’s “chip and pin” to ensure that even if weapons fall into terrorist hands they cannot be detonated.6 Finally, Pakistan makes extensive use of secrecy and deception. Significant elements of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure are kept a closely guarded secret. This includes the precise location of some of the storage facilities for nuclear core and detonation components, the location of preconfigured nuclear weapons crisis deployment sites, aspects of the nuclear command and control arrangements,7 and many aspects of the arrangements for nuclear safety and security (such as the numbers of those removed under personnel reliability programs, the reasons for their removal, and how often authenticating and enabling (PAL-type) codes are changed). In addition, Pakistan uses deception—such as dummy missiles—to complicate the calculus of adversaries and is likely to have extended this practice to its nuclear weapons infrastructure. Taken together, these measures provide confidence that the Pakistan Army can fully protect its nuclear weapons against the internal terrorist threat, against its main adversary India, and against the suggestion that its nuclear weapons could be either spirited out of the country by a third party (posited to be the United States) or destroyed in the event of a deteriorating situation or a state collapse in Pakistan. Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. 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