Slovak National Uprising, its Military Implications and History by Ing. Milan Štembera. This Uprising (1944-45) is very often interpreted only as an event that belongs to the records of our neighbouring state, but it is an affair that belongs to the history of both states, because one of its basic goals was the restoration of the former Czechoslovakia. This article deals with its military implications, not political background. In the course of events we can find four main periods: beginning, consolidation, German offensive, and territorial defence in the mountains. Combat activities were irregular. Unfortunately, the garrison of Slovak capitol Bratislava—which had the main task of insurgency, i.e. neutralize Slovak government and leading authorities of the Slovak State—failed. In the last moment, they replaced key officer and new one—Maj. Murgaš—was not able to realize prepared measures. Bratislava garrison was disarmed. Two divisions in Eastern Slovakia were without command and surrendered to the Germans. Rebels units withdrew to the mountains and fronts were consolidated, as partisan (guerrilla) units were not disorganized and disoriented, because their task was in fact warfare in the rear zone, behind enemy lines. Lately, partisan units came into contacts with the Soviet army and formed 4th Brigade of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. Besides guerrilla wars in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union, Slovak National Uprising was the largest action of resistance movement in Europe. It bound four or five Germany divisions, blocked main routes to the Eastern front and thus contributed to the overall victory of anti-Hitlerite coalition. It is a pity that many voices now degrade its importance. But history can’t be changed. Facts are eloquent. [VR No 3/2001]
PERSONAL DATA
General of the Army Eduard Kadlecby PhDr. Zdeněk Vališ. Although born into a clerical family, he began study Artillery School in Vienna. He started as a promising young officer, but his career was sharply disrupted after a quarrel with his superior. He left Austrian army and started new 5-year career in Colonial Administration in Belgian Congo (Africa). In 1914 the World War I broke out. Mr Kadlec was mobilized as a reserve officer. He was stationed in the Polish fortress Przemysl, as a commander of heavy guns battery, and finally as the commander of the whole complex Fort XI (with dozens of heavy guns). As a prisoner of war he entered the Czechoslovak Military Units in Russia. He fought against Germans at Bachmač, his units were first that met the Bolsheviks at arterial railway, where they fought for twenty days, besieged. For his activities he was decorated by several Russian, Czechoslovak, French and Romanian medals. In new Czechoslovak army he held the post of division commander in Banská Bystrica. But owning to political interests, mutual jealousy among generals, he was forced to retire, although he was extraordinary promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Then he lived in seclusion; in 1945 his activation was refused, after Communist Coup d’état in 1948 he was reduced to the ranks. He died in complete oblivion 13 years later. [VR No 3/2001]
VOJENSKÉ ROZHLEDY 4/2001, Czech Military Review [VR No 4/2001]
English Annotation REFORM OF THE ACR Analysis of Required Capabilities, Target Structure and Composition of the Armed Forces of the CR. The purpose of this analysis is to lay down what sort of armed forces the Czech Republic needs in today’s security environment, so that they could support or finally enforce vital and strategic interests, and under what conditions we could reach this declared state. Methodically this analysis follows up the Strategical Defence Review, but it goes beyond Defence Review’s boundaries and deals with all ACR forces, their missions, objectives, capabilities, composition and complex support. The starting point is the Czech Republic’s membership in the NATO alliance. The ACR is traditionally based upon compulsory military service. But this compulsory service in fact makes impossible to react quickly and send Czech armed forces abroad, out of the territory of the Czech Republic. Also demographical trends in our country lead to weak age groups that will not be able to recruit adequate numbers of conscripts. All this together supports the necessity to introduce fully professionalised armed forces. In the year 2000 the ACR started to build a new system of military professionals recruitment based on the principles of personnel marketing. But we still lack selective system that would take into account health, psychological, and physical qualifications of candidates. Similarly to other member nations, the ACR assigned most of its forces--in total 78 per cent--for Alliance missions. But it is hard to reach NATO standards, in due time. Even though no Czech unit has put through some of Alliance tests (for rapid reaction forces, ACE Forces standards). We can deduce that it would be very difficult to reach required levels of preparedness, training, arms and materiel compatibility, command and control systems, fire power, forward deployment, sustainability and self-support. In the system of manpower management we are gradually harmonising the functions of single organisational levels, especially those at operational levels. The analysis comes to a conclusion that the only way ahead is a radical reform. [VR No 4/2001]
Reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic: Objectives and Principles. The reform philosophy consists in a change of existing principles in social, economic, management and organisational fields. It is closely tied to a change in people’s thinking. Our future forces will be built in accordance with a principle of efficient sufficiency. The future professional army will be mobile, modern and efficient, capable of providing effective support to security interests of the CR. Its organisational structure will be reduced, so that it could help--among others--to achieve a situation in which particularly assigned forces will be relieved of some routine activities (e. g. repetitive training conscripts, etc.). The Czech Army will be capable of a continuous and sustained development, the scope of which will be similar to those common among other Alliance countries. It also is flexible enough to be able to respond to chances in the security environment. In addition to those tasks, there is also a task of efficiency and economy of expenditures that will be the key criteria governing their organisational structure, stationing, armament and training. There will be a fundamental change of the existing command and control system. It will be based on a principle of an organisational separation of conceptual and executive activities. A substantial part of the armed forces will comprise highly mobile ground and air forces divisions and units, the capacity of which is mainly designed to meet the Czech and contribution to common military capabilities of the Alliance. The priority mission will consist in their participation in operations conducted under Article 5, other non-Article 5 operations, and potentially in operations conducted by the European Union. Other parts of the forces will consists of in-place divisions and units. They will comprise units and facilities designated to provide logistic and medical support to troops, organise and co-ordinate the reception of Allied forces, as well as mobilise the Czech Armed Forces and protect the territory of the CR. [VR No 4/2001] Phases of the Reform and the Professionalisation of the ACR.This process can start immediately after the necessary legal environment has been established. The steps associated with the reform of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic are divided into four sequential stages which will provide a broader framework for strategic decisions needed to achieve its goals and objectives. The preparatory stage (till the end of March 2002) will determine priorities of the reform process and match them against available resources. Subsequently, projects and actions not consistent with the priorities will be re-evaluated. Stage 1 (2002-2003) is designed to prepare structural and material changes, and formulate general legal standards reflecting them, including amending existing and drafting new in-house standards. During Stage 1, the professionalisation of units assigned to the Alliance will continue and a pilot infrastructure project focusing on social, cultural, sporting and other (particularly training) needs of a professional unit will be launched. Stage 2 (2004-2005) will see the completion of the process of professionalisation of units earmarked for the Alliance and the beginning of professionalisation of territorial and support forces. The pilot infrastructure project will be completed and upgrading and modernisation projects will begin. Stage 3 (2006-2007) will see the Czech armed forces fully professionalized and the completion of the upgrading and another modernisation projects. To improve combat capabilities of the mechanised division, upgrading and modernisation projects will begin. The last stage will be devoted to upgrading and modernisation. Projects will be launched to improve combat capabilities of the air force and air defence system. To summarise: by the end of 2006, professional armed forces of the Czech Republic will achieve the required initial operational capabilities, which will lead to creating initial conditions for achieving the full operational capabilities in next horizon depending on actual development of available resources. [VR No 4/2001]
Mobilisation of the Czech Republic Armed Forces--Basic Principles. Mobilisation principles will make a basic and systematic frame and will be creatively elaborated in the Concept of Mobilisation of the Armed Forces of the CR and, consequently, in the internal implementation standards of the Czech Ministry of Defence. Decisive changes of the system that will enable to realise a high quality change in the system of the formation of reserves and mobilisation deployment of the Czech Armed, namely in: (i) cancellation of the basic military service while preserving conscription; (ii) reduction of both the peacetime and wartime structure of the CR Armed Forces to a strength that will be inevitable for the fulfilment of the above mentioned extent of tasks; (iii) change of the model of preparation of the reserves, which consists in a voluntary undertaking an obligation to act in the mobilisation reserve. Mobilisation Reserve of the ACR will be created so that the soldier in reserve will voluntarily undertake the obligation to act in this reserve for the time defined by the contract. The Mobilisation Reserve will be divided into Compulsory Reserve that will consist of military professionals who have accomplished their service in the ACR. Voluntary Reserve that will consist of the soldiers in reserve--volunteers that will be trained for their functions in a wartime organisational structure of the ACR in special training system. Soldiers in reserve will be earmarked for these positions as late as the preparation period for the transition to the state of national emergency, or the state of war. The Compulsory Reserve and a part of Voluntary Reserve (the soldiers that have completed the training of reserves or the soldiers in reserve selected according to their profession) form an Active Reserve that is special, as far as the character of its use is concerned, for the augmentation of the armed forces. Because of conscription cancellation the administrative acts related to the service in arms (substitution service, postponement of service etc.) will become easier. [VR No 4/2001]
The Importance of Civilian Control of the Army(Its History and Future) by PhDr. Antonín Rašek. Relation between the armed forces and society were many times very tight, which culminated sometimes in an open conflict. The examples are abundant: in ancient China, Rome, Egypt. In modern times those relations become political, social, and military problem. In our country we concentrate on civil-military relations, because civilian control has not required qualities, even some speak about the failure of democratic control and civilian management of the army. After the so-called Velvet Revolution in 1989 the civilian control represented the transformation of totalitarian model into democratic one, with differentiated civilian and military components, where civilian personnel has precedence and military personnel must subordinate their interests to state security. The main task was to establish the neutrality of the Czechoslovak People’s Army in a political struggle and secondly its loyalty new, democratic regime. The serious handicap was that the Federal Government had no special political programme dealing with the military. After the separation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic into two independent states, the role of civilian control was to guarantee a smooth division of the forces, their arms, vehicles, materiel, logistics, and so on. And the situation reiterated. The government of the Czech Republic had no special military programme. It had not any specialised bodies like as the State Military Board, the task of which should be to analyse, discuss, approve and recommend basic strategical policy for defence and the Czech Army. Another mistake was also the fact that the Parliament established only one defence and security committee, and therefore above-mentioned questions were not negotiated at the appropriate level. The system of civilian control and management in the Czech Republic is still forming. But in comparison with advanced democratic countries we are still at the beginning, even though we had made some advances since 1989. [VR No 4/2001]
Modern Accounting of Expenses in the ACR by Doc. PhDr. Miroslav Krč, CSc. Our new military doctrine takes for granted the deployment of the Czech Armed Forces both at home and beyond our territory and the territory of NATO member nations. This assignment has changed a scope of Czech soldier’s responsibilities. So far, his duty has been tied with the defence of his homeland. Such simple duty was justified morally and legally. Financial spending was transparent and politically justified. New missions bring for our army another financial burdens. The army’s attitude towards them must solve this deployment with the respect to the forces cost-effectiveness, exploiting modern accountancy. What we understand under the term cost-effectiveness is an economical and operational balance, costs, outlays, and their utilisation, related to their deployment. Deployed costs are not only material and financial expenses. Their usage is tied with nearly all society defence activities. But they oughtn’t to cover outlays that are not closely tied with country’s defence, now paid out of defence budget. Namely the financial means allocated for the Ministry of Defence shouldn’t take over expenses of civilian agencies and institutions. The goal making the activities of the ACR more effective, making thing more economical we shall reach only by introducing the system of enterprise economy, pursuing economic point of view, taking into account fluctuations, waste, evaluating forces in terms of economic performance. Commanders economical flexibility, their quantification, the author thinks, will lead to rational performance. Economical analysis, even at the lowest levels, has not universal rules, but a certain criterion was introduced via the PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System). Our financial situation is critical. Every director of a General Staff department and /or a commander at an operational level ought to be responsible for the development and training of subordinate forces, even though financial means are not under their control. [VR No 4/2001]