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Annex 5. Learning by Doing in Nigeria



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Annex 5. Learning by Doing in Nigeria


  1. The Delivery Case Studies series – part of the Doing Development Differently initiative – aims to generate knowledge on what works in Nigeria and why. The case studies are among a number of instruments being piloted to help the Bank continually improve its effectiveness as a partner to Nigeria. These qualitative case studies offer complementary learning to information to implementation completion reports.

  2. In ‘Against the Current: How to Shape an Enabling Environment for Sustainable Water Service Delivery in Nigeria’, a number of obstacles to improving the institutional capacity of the water utilities are identified. The study found that the absence of a culture of staff performance at the state level, together with high management turnover, have undermined reform momentum and eroded citizens’ trust in state services. Coordination problems across government, and between the government and the Bank, have caused delays and impeded accountability for results. Despite water users’ demonstrated willingness to pay for reliable services, the perception that water provided by the Government should be free has hindered water authorities’ ability to operate on a commercial basis. These findings provided valuable lessons on aligning reforms with political incentives, balancing “hardware” investments with the “software” of institutional reforms, changing mindsets, using data, tailoring reforms to each state, and disbursing on results, which have fed into the Urban Water Sector Reform Project III project.

  3. In ‘When Institutions Work: Nigeria’s Ebola Response’, the factors behind the country’s successful containment of Ebola are distilled. Nigeria’s response came as a surprise to many observers given the limited progress in improving health outcomes and service delivery in the two decades before. Aside from fear of the rapidly spreading epidemic that new no bounds, Nigeria’s response was motivated by strong technical leadership, the use of creative incentives to mobilize and motivate health workers working within and around the system, operational efficiencies like streamlined procurement and stopgap funding from Lagos State, the repurposing of existing technical assistance resources, and the use of smartphones for real-time reporting, data tracking and course corrections. Importantly, Nigeria’s Ebola response was developed on the basis of pre-existing institutional systems, taking advantage of physical and human resources that were already on the ground, while strengthening this through hybrid innovations and private sector actors. This case study shows that passionate leadership, first-class technical capacity, clear roles and responsibilities, strong internal communication, and freedom from political interference can work together to promote effective delivery in Nigeria.

  4. In ‘The Lagos Eko Secondary Education Sector Project: Tailoring International Best Practices to Improve Educational Outcomes at the State Level’ a summary is provided of how international experience was tailored to leverage impact in Lagos State’s public secondary education reforms. The report concluded that a proactive approach in a moment of committed political leadership, targeted program design, thoughtful tailoring, and efforts to foster a culture of performance created the conditions for meaningful, sustainable reform despite demographic pressures and funding constraints.

  5. The Nigeria Fadama National Development Series: How to Build a Pilot into a National Program through Learning and Adaptation’ told the story of how a small-scale Nigerian agricultural pilot was expanded and adapted over four iterations into a national brand for community-based agricultural development. Using a chronological approach, the study looked at how the Fadama program built on existing knowledge of local conditions to carefully pilot and learn how to tailor its design to different local contexts before scaling up. Global practices were key to changing the debate about community-led development in Nigeria but the pilots were tailored, locally owned and incrementally scaled up to build and sustain important new structures at the local level. The program’s evolution led to impressive income gains for farmers as well as a change in the social contract among farmers, other stakeholders, and different levels of government, shifting how local development works.



Annex 6. The North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment


  1. On August 21, 2015, the GoN requested assistance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis recovery. Support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 Joint EU – UN – the Bank Declaration on crisis assessment and recovery planning. The RPBA has been prepared and implemented by the Federal Government, led by the Vice President’s Office, and the Governments of the six affected states, with support from the Bank, UN, and EU.

  2. The RPBA informs a collective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery, and provides a framework for coordinated and coherent support to assist conflict-affected people in the NE. The assessment covers the six states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi, and provides an overarching framework for stability, peace building, and recovery. The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in the NE requires addressing the structural and underlying drivers of violent conflict.

RPBA Recovery Strategy and Framework

  1. The RPBA confirmed the need for recovery and peace building efforts, to be carried in tandem with the on-going scaling up of the humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS) will need to be closely coordinated with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)19 in order to build on the HRP’s achievements and avoid overlaps.

  2. Careful and coordinated sequencing of the RBPA and subsequent support will be critical in view of the fluidity of the security environment, and the marked variation in security within and among the six states. Priorities should be carefully assessed on a continuous basis, and adjusted as needed in light of the prevailing situation on the ground. In some areas, a humanitarian response combined with stabilisation will be needed, while in other areas, the context will permit more substantial movement towards recovery.

  3. An integrated and balanced approach to recovery is essential. Peace building and social cohesion is the backbone of the assessment. Hence it is crucial to properly balance peace building, stability, and social cohesion interventions with other interventions aimed at reconstructing or rehabilitating social, physical, and productive assets. Peace building, stability, and social cohesion interventions will ensure the sustainability of recovery interventions on the ground and lay the foundation for human security to prevail. The assessment sets out four strategic outcomes for recovery and peace building: 1) Safe, voluntary, and dignified return and resettlement of displaced populations; 2) Improved human security, reconciliation, and violence prevention; 3) Enhanced government accountability and citizen engagement in service delivery; and 4) and Increased equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities.

Overview of Overall Impacts and Needs from the Crisis under the RPBA

  1. The assessment indicates that the economic impact of the crisis is substantial, reaching nearly US$9 billion. Needs for recovery and peace building are disproportionately concentrated in Borno, followed by Yobe and Adamawa. Two-thirds of the damages (US$5.9 billion) are in Borno, the most affected state; damages in Adamawa and Yobe account for US$1.6 billion and US$1.2 billion respectively. Three-quarters of the overall impacts are on agriculture (US$3.5 billion) and housing (US$3.3 billion). The conflict resulted in more than 400,000 damaged and destroyed housing units, 95 percent of which are located in Borno.

  2. The total need for recovery and peace building across the three strategic areas of interventions in both the stabilization and recovery20 phase is US$6.7 billion (Table 5).

Table . Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component




Adamawa

Borno

Yobe

Gombe

Taraba

Bauchi

Federal

/Regional



Total




(US$ million)

Peace building and social cohesion

27.5

37.8

22.5

13.6

19.4

23.9

5.7

150.5

Infrastructure and social services

594.9

3,933.3

668.3

129.1

144.9

202.9

94.7

6,040.1

Economic Recovery

37.6

68.8

30.7

22.3

27.7

41.4

245

473.5

Total

660.0

4,040.0

721.5

164.9

192.0

268.2

345.4

6,664.1

  1. Forced displacement and social cohesion are the most acute impacts of the conflict in NE Nigeria. An estimated 2 million people have been forcibly displaced by the conflict, 1.8 of which are displaced within Nigeria. The burden of displacement is asymmetric across regions and populations. Borno, at the heart of the crisis, hosts 67 percent. The majority of IDPs live in host communities with only 8.5 percent in camps and camp-like sites. Yobe and Adamawa also share large burdens of IDPs, hosting 130,000 and 136,000 respectively, or around 6 percent in each state. Women, children, and the youth bear the brunt of forced displacement, accounting for nearly 80 percent of affected populations. Of the 1.8 million identified IDPs nationally, 53 percent are women, 57 percent are children (of which 28 percent are five or younger) (IOM, 2015).

  2. Security remains the main factor preventing an accurate assessment of the extent of needs of displaced population, as well as any attempts of return. Most of Borno and parts of Yobe and Adamawa remain inaccessible due to unstable security conditions. Attempts of return by IDPs have been frustrated due to attacks by Boko Haram, forcing people to displace again. More recently, reports of unexploded ordinance have increased, preventing access to farmlands and limiting the restoration of livelihoods. Displacement has also increased vulnerability in many ways, including to Sexual and Gender Based Violence. There is evidence from humanitarian agencies that sexual abuse of women and children is widespread. Girls and women who have experienced sexual violence from Boko Haram members are stigmatized by their communities, especially when they become pregnant. Men and boys also confront a range of threats, including violence, abduction, and forceful recruitment by Boko Haram and vigilante groups, and detention on suspicion of militancy sympathies.

Figure . NE Nigeria: Conflict fatalities by Local Government Area (LGA) and displacement by ward

cid:image001.jpg@01d19ed9.8abbf280

  1. The rapid deterioration of the conflict, and vacuum of law enforcement mechanisms to contain and control conflict, resulted in widespread levels of suspicion, mistrust and stigma along ethnic, religious, political, and geographical lines. The social fabric in the NE was deeply damaged, eroding social relations between citizens and government, down to ethnic clans, communities and even extended families. Economic, ethnic, religious, political, and geographical divisions have hardened, affecting the way in which any recovery effort is perceived, while new divisions have emerged. The sequentially overlapping phases of humanitarian, early recovery and development assistance need to incorporate confidence and trust-building, collaboration and mutual understanding. Social impacts of efforts are central considerations in all proposed interventions in such a fragile social system.

Guiding Principles Emerging from the RPBA for Recovery and Peace Building Responses

  1. The response to recovery and piece building needs in the NE will require (1) adopting holistic approaches that address the multi-dimensional impacts of the conflict; (2) retaining flexibility for future adjustment in light of post-RBPA delivery mechanisms, financial complementarity, and in-depth assessments; (3) adapting implementation flexibility to the evolving situation around security; and (4) allocating impact-based resources along geographic, demographic and sectoral priorities.

  • The RPBA indicates that the recovery and peace building of the Nigerian NE calls for a holistic approach that promotes peace, stability, and social cohesion addresses the rehabilitation of infrastructure and services, and also addresses underlying macro-economic issues to overcome the nexus of instability, conflict, and deteriorating development. Throughout this process, principles such as sustainable recovery, do-not harm approaches and building-back-better/smarter standards should be further integrated.

  • Flexibility in the design of AF project components and operational and implementation modalities greatly facilitates the alignment between the post-RPBA programmatic response and the proposed AF. The RPBA will be followed by a more detailed conflict recovery planning, prioritization and operationalization led by the Federal and State Governments and supported by the EU, UN and the Bank. A formal request of the GoN for support during this phase has been received by partners. This post-RPBA phase will produce with a programmatic response for recovery and peace building of the NE, including duly prioritized plans for recovery at the sector levels as well as institutional arrangements for recovery for the entire recovery program in the six states as a cohesive whole. It is important that AF operations built in enough flexibility as to remain aligned with this programmatic response.

  • As the situation in the NE remains fluid in terms of security and forced displacement, adaptability is key to ensure positive impacts. Security continues to be the number one reason preventing people from returning or resettling as large part of the NE remain unstable. The RPBA provides a series of recommendations on how to carry out interventions in this context, strongly advising that a series of steps are undertaken as to avoid that any harm is done to the affected populations through operations. Risk associated with return and resettlement of displaced population have been identified as particularly high, and a series of preliminary actions have been identified as critical to ensure their safe, voluntarily and dignified return and resettlement.



1 In March 2015, Boko Haram became the first extremist group in sub-Saharan Africa to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State.

2 1.69 million bpd per day in May 2016.

3 Kerosene, petrol and diesel.

4 CBN regulations stipulate that banks cannot have a NPL ratio that is above 5 percent of gross loans.

5 Estimate by Agusto & Company (Nigeria’s foremost credit rating agency).

6 The revised Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), currently under discussion in the National Assembly, could help to attract significant investment in the oil and gas sector, although the impact could occur over time.

7 The Fiscal Responsibility Act is being enforced; all agencies are asked to limit their operating expenses to 75 percent of their gross revenues and remit 80 percent of their operating surpluses; collection of Corporate Income Tax has intensified and institutional reforms are being implemented to increase compliance and efficiency in the collection of taxes.

8 Nigeria spent an estimated average of US$7 billion annually (equivalent to 1.3 percent of GDP) in fuel subsidies between 2010 and 2014. The subsidy was not targeted and of limited benefit to the poor. Moreover, much of the subsidy was captured by importers and traders who collected them and did not respect administered prices especially in more remote areas.

9 The GoN has endorsed the ‘Zero Routine Flaring by 2030’ Initiative.

10 For example, the learning event in November 2015 focused on internally generated revenue. The event was organized in partnership with UK Aid under the auspices of the Nigeria Governors’ Forum.

11 The project is also supported by AfDB, European Investment Bank, the German Development Bank, and the AFD.

12 Performance in this area was stronger than expected demonstrating the resilience of microfinance to shocks in the overall economy.

13 The Government withdrew from direct procurement and distribution of fertilizer, made the input subsidy program more effective and reduced corruption and leakages in the program. The National Policy on Staple Crop Processing Zones was adopted and the Nigeria Agricultural Insurance Corporation was restructured for better service delivery and the level of protection for rice was reduced.

14 The Health in Africa Initiative links governments with the private sector in order to improve the quality of healthcare with a focus on nine countries.

15 Bridge pupils on average gain an additional 0.32 standard deviations on core reading skills and 0.51 standard deviations on math skills translating into 252 and 288 additional days of learning contributing to the number of schools demonstrating improvements in learning outcomes.

16 An economic corridor strategy encompasses a set of coordinated actions that ensure a critical mass of public and private investments with the ability to transform the region, integrating “hard” (infrastructure) and “soft” investments (such as policy and regulatory framework, institutional strengthening and capacity building) to unleash private investments.

17 Examples of such support include investments in Primera Foods’s green-field instant noodle processing factory and the Boulos food and beverages processing company’s expansion into fruit juices/drinks and milk products.

18 Bridge is a data-driven, technology-enabled company targeting the needs of families living on less than US$2 per day. It uses smartphones and digital tablets to monitor student and teacher performance and to ensure that teaching materials can be revised and improved.

19 The HRP 2016 was prepared by the UN-Nigeria, with the purpose assessing the humanitarian conditions of the Nigerian NE and providing a framework for the continuous national response and early recovery plans and interventions to these needs. For more information, please visit:

https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/system/files/documents/files/nigeria_2016_hrp_03032016_0.pdf



20 Stabilization generally denotes the period during which initial recovery interventions commence and start taking effect while ongoing humanitarian operations continue. These initial recovery interventions build upon humanitarian interventions, do not duplicate them, and do not address the development deficits existing before the insurgency. Recovery denotes the period during which the initial recovery interventions start galvanizing into concrete recovery outcomes while more medium-term recovery and reconstruction activities take shape, scale up and intensify. The RPBA recognizes that these periods will overlap across the territory, with some areas being ready for recovery efforts sooner than others.



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