Japan Aff Michigan



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***GENERAL


Economic Costs O/W, Withdrawal Causes Alliance Chance

Economic costs outweigh the necessity of U.S. presence in Okinawa- US withdrawal would force a much needed redefinition of the US-Japanese alliance

Hosokawa, 98 – the 79th Prime Minister of Japan from August 9, 1993 to April 28, 1994. Leader of the first non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government since 1955. (July-August 1998 , Morihiro, “Are U.S. troops in Japan needed? Reforming the alliance.” Foreign Affairs 77.n4 pp2(4)

As the common threat presented by the Cold War diminishes, it is natural for the Japanese people to be skeptical of the U.S. military presence. The American military bases cost Japan $4 billion annually. If for-gone rent and other revenues are included, Japan's annual burden jumps to $5 billion, at a time when the Japanese government faces a serious financial crisis. In terms of cost-sharing, Japan bears the largest burden among U.S. allies for maintaining U.S. forces, with Germany and South Korea paying $60 million and $290 million, respectively. By a 1995 Special Measures Agreement, Japan is committed through the year 2000 to pay the salaries of 24,000 civilian employees at the bases, the utility costs, including energy, water, and communications, and most of the construction expenses. This burden to Japanese taxpayers hangs like a darkening cloud over the future of the alliance. Japan should honor the 1995 agreement but put America on notice that it will not renew the agreement in 2000. It is the business of statesmen, not bureaucrats or generals, to plan for the future. The U.S. military presence in Japan should fade with this century's end. The time has come for the leaders of Japan and the United States to discuss an alliance fit for the next century.

Troop Presence Causes Conflict



Okinawa no longer provides strategic advantage to the U.S and increases the risk of conflict in the region

Bandow 98 - senior fellow at Cato Instituion and special assistant to Reagan (9/1/98, Doug, “Okinawa: Liberating Washington's East Asian Military Colony” Policy Analysis no. 314)

Marine Presence Is Strategically Irrelevant. Should Washington find itself at war with China (or another aggressive power in East Asia), the Air Force and Navy would do the heavy lifting. The half-strength 3rd MEF would have no meaningful role to perform. Washington's participation in another ground war on the Asian mainland is almost inconceivable, leaving the 3rd MEF no useful function. Moreover, a sizable American presence on Okinawa, especially if it were directed against China, would turn Japan into a military target--something likely to make Tokyo hesitate to support Washington, just as Japan lacked enthusiasm for U.S. saber rattling over Taiwan in early 1996. Is there any other reason to keep the Marines on Okinawa? The Marines, not surprisingly, respond yes. National animosities, territorial disputes, ethnic tensions, and poverty still bedevil the region. Among the potential dangers the Marine Corps points to are trade imbalances, bank failures, and currency devaluations. Stability could be at risk, with potential chaos in Indonesia, enmity between India and Pakistan, and so on. And air and naval power is not enough, argued one Marine Corps officer, as "stability is often provided by simple combat power in the region. You don't get much stability with air or naval power. You can't occupy territory." So what? If one wanted to catalog conflicts in which the United States should not intervene, and certainly not with ground forces, the examples cited by the Marines would be at the top of the list. What if the successor regime to Indonesia's corrupt Suharto dictatorship totters? Let it go. What if Filipino and Chinese ships exchange shots over the Spratly Islands? Stay out of it. What if Japan and South Korea engage in more bitter sparring over the Tokdu, or Takeshima, Islands? Tell both countries to grow up and settle their differences like mature democracies. What if India and Pakistan move toward war over Kashmir? Stay as far away from the conflict as possible. There is no need for Washington to treat every problem in the world as its own.

Troops Cause Costs, Shifting Asian Powers, Lack of Defense



US should close the Okinawa base: high costs, shifting Asian powers, and lack of Japanese self-defense

Bandow, 5/12/10

(Doug, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Japan Can Defend Itself,” Cato Institute, pg online @ http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804 //ag)



Still, the primary problem is Japan. So long as Tokyo requests American military protection, it cannot easily reject Washington's request for bases. Thus, Okinawan residents must do more than demand fairness. They must advocate defense independence. Who should protect Japan? Japan. Tokyo's neighbors remain uneasy in varying degrees about the prospect of a more active Japan, but World War II is over. A revived Japanese empire is about as likely as a revived Mongol empire. Both Japan and India could play a much larger role in preserving regional security. Many Japanese citizens are equally opposed to a larger Japanese military and more expansive foreign policy. Their feelings are understandable, given the horrors of World War II. However, the most fundamental duty of any national government is defense. If the Japanese people want a minimal (or no) military, that is their right. But they should not expect other nations to fill the defense gap. Moreover, with an expected $1.6 trillion deficit this year alone, the United States can no longer afford to protect countries which are able to protect themselves. Washington has more than enough on its military plate elsewhere in the world. Raymond Greene, America's consul general in Okinawa, says: "Asia is going though a period of historic strategic change in the balance of power." True enough, which is why East Asian security and stability require greater national efforts from Japan and its neighbors. Regional defense also warrants improved multilateral cooperation — something which should minimize concerns over an increased Japanese role. The other important question is, defend Japan from what? Today Tokyo faces few obvious security threats. For this reason, many Japanese see little cause for an enlarged Japanese military.


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