Analytical background 2. 1 Research Set-up and Structure

2 Analytical background

1. 2. 1 Research Set-up and Structure

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  What are the main external factors influencing the Soviet/Russian politics toward arms control / disarmament? And how and in what extent are they responsible in final outputs of Russia's policy of arms control / disarmament?
  
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  What are the main internal factors influencing the Soviet/Russian politics toward arms control / disarmament? And how and in what extent are they responsible in final outputs of Russia's policy of arms control / disarmament?
  
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  What role could play economic factors?
  
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  Who are the main actors? (Political leadership, representatives of interest groups, such as military officers and representatives of the so-called military-industrial complex; or the external actors, such as the US or NATO)
  
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  How are these external / internal influences reflected in Russia's security documents?
  
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  Which and to what extent are these external/internal influences present in negotiating of the international treaties on arms control / disarmament?
  
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  What is the actual state of Russian weapon arsenal in given terms?
  

Acquiring insight into the development of Russia's attitude towards arms control since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is achieved by revealing its background and main characteristics, and the consequential comparison of four eras under three different presidents. Although the internal development tells the very important part of the story, there are also external factors. To determine the role of the external influences on Russian attitude towards arms control, in particular one of them, there is a main research premise: the less RF perceives NATO as a threat the less arms-control treaties evolve (Umbach 2005: 111). The key method of research is the qualitative analysis and comparison of Russia's major strategic documents and international treaties, as well as the current literature on the subject, including the most recent expert political and economic analyses emerging from both Russian and international analytic centers.

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  Analyzing the role of domestic principles of every presidential term since the collapse of Soviet Union: political situation, civil-military relations and the role of military-industrial complex, and economic background
  
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  Analyzing the world view, interests, threats, ends, ways, and means in Russia's security documents in particular term
  
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  Analyzing main international treaties on arms control and their significance, in terms of their extent, depth, and international security environment
  
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  Finding the actual state of Russian weapon arsenal (confronting the political objections and commitments with reality)
  
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  Comparing the eras' outcomes and evaluating the premise
  

2. 2. 2 Limitations

The other problem poses the topic itself. Since the number of international treaties and initiatives in the field of arms control and disarmament is enormous, I have to restrain the analysis only to the most significant processes. Therefore, I choose the two processes according to the main weapons categories: nuclear and conventional weapons. This does not mean that I put lesser value on the treaties concerning, for example, other weapons of mass destruction. For purpose of this work it is not essentially necessary to analyze every international arms-control treaty, though it is enriching. There is one, especially tricky, part considering the choice of weapon categories. Many studies on arms control and disarmament omit the immense amount of so called small arms and light weapons (SALWs), although these weapons kill the most people in all conflicts worldwide. Specifically in Russia, the number of SALWs is literally uncountable by any statistician. Since we lack the accurate numbers, it is also extremely difficult to set an international regime of control of SALWs. Certainly, not included in official data (or only as a rough statistical estimate), these weapons present a big part of Russia's arms sales, and in general, they pose a big issue in studies of arms control.

The range of actors is more diverse. I regard the internal (within the state) actors, as well as the external ones (stemming from international area). Thus, I consider as actors also other states and alliances of states, the Soviet/Russia's state itself and its alliances; and inner state actors such as political parties and groups, interest groups, corporations, and individuals.

In addition, the approach to the original versions of some strategic Russian documents is not always easy, and sometimes it is not possible at all. I am thus dependent on the English versions of some documents, or to their interpretations of other authors.

3. 2. 3 Defining Arms Control and Disarmament

In the second arms-control era , given the lessons of the terrible experience of the World War II, disarmament – defined by some as a facile belief that less weapons means less war – might have been completely discredited if the Manhattan Project had not succeed in adding the nuclear weapons into the arms-control equation. The massive destructive potential of nuclear weapons lead, naturally, to the strong conviction that whatever the evidence might have suggested about the pertaining need of conventional weapons to preserve peace, disarmament as a strategy had more importance than ever where the atomic bomb entered the game. Consequently, the radical calls for disarmament shifted away from complete elimination of nuclear weapons to their management. The term “arms control” was established as more suitable than “disarmament”. The objective was never nuclear disarmament, which might be destabilizing, but an assured second strike capability, that, in theory, helped to maintain stability (Williams – Viotti 2012: 4). During the Cold War, arms control was essentially seen as a policy instrument which would support the stability of the bipolar relationship between the US and Soviet Union.

In the post-cold-war era the priorities of restraint remain as before but the actors have changed. At the top of most arms-control agendas are non-proliferation and the consequential control regime establishment for the weapons of mass destruction (Evans – Newnham 1998: 33). There's a clear difference between second and third arms-control era. While in the second term the accent was put on vertical proliferation – the danger of sharp rise in numbers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in arsenals of two nuclear superpowers, the third arms-control era is more concerned about horizontal proliferation – the increasing number of powers and non-state entities possessing WMD. In the third arms-control era which began with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War is, thus far, marked by a dramatic reduction of concern about second-strike capability. According to some, this has made possible the deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers during the 90's continuing by now (Williams – Viotti 2012: 3).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, provides on its websites definitions of arms control and disarmament. While often used together, the terms arms control and disarmament reflect two associated, but different areas in the same discipline or subject.

Arms control generally refers to mutually agreed-upon restraints or controls (usually between states) on the research, manufacture, or the levels of and/or locales of deployment of troops and weapons systems.
Disarmament often inaccurately used as a synonym for arms control refers to the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons (particularly offensive arms) either unilaterally (in the hope that one’s example will be followed) or reciprocally (NATO 2012).
Thus, there’s a big terminological difference between terms “arms control” and “disarmament”. The first one refers to the mutual effort of two or more parties to set the limits on research, manufacture, and deployment of troops and weapon systems. The second term describes either unilateral, and bi- or multilateral elimination or prohibition of particular weapons. Albeit, the reductions of weapons systems can be brought about in terms of arms control, the difference is in a different point of view, and also in the role of reductions.

The Penguin dictionary of International Relations provides another outlook on arms control:

The exercise of restraint in the acquisition, deployment and use of military capabilities. Furthermore, the term also covers any measure that enables actors to conduct themselves in a more restrained way, for example by developing techniques of crisis management. One of the most important underlying assumptions of arms control is that weapons are a continuing and persistent feature of international relations and that deterrence policies are a valuable and positive means of coercive diplomacy” (Evans – Newnham 1998: 33).
The adherents of arms control accept the role of weapons in terms of international relations as a mean for coercive diplomacy or deterrence. Although they see the negative aspects of armament on the international relations they follow the assumption that the friction between states has predominantly political causes. Thus, they are reserved to the complete abolition of weapons possession which is a goal of proponents of disarmament who believe that the weapons in hands of states are the cause of interstate conflicts and wars (Kuchyňková – Suchý 2005: 12). Following the same logic, Penguin dictionary of International Relations defines the disarmament as:

Both a process and an end state. As a process it involves the reduction, removal or elimination of identified weapon systems. As an end state it involves the establishment of a disarmed world and the prevention of rearmament thereafter (Evans – Newnham 1998: 131).

In 1961, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin provided the most widely used definition of arms control in their book “Strategy and Arms Control”. The main part of Schelling’s and Halperin’s definition makes up abstention in the acquisitions, deployment, and usage of military means. They think about arms control in terms of military strategy. In their view, the arms control represents another strategic tool in minimizing the potential costs of conflict with perceived enemy.

We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement on the scope of military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs (Schelling – Halperin 1961: 165-166).

Too often, the term “arms control” is described in too narrow fashion. Both supporters and opponents have argued that arms control has sought to reduce the likelihood of war in bipolar relations between East and West, to do so by underpinning nuclear deterrence. In “Strategies of Arms Control” Stuart Croft goes far beyond this basic definition of arms control. Arms control in 90's, as before, is about influencing the nature between states that are between war and peace. In Croft's view, there's no space for arms control during a bloody conflict, neither is there any scope for arms control in a peaceful inter-state relation (for instance, the relations between the US and Canada do not require any form of arms control). However, many states operate in state of non-war, where cooperation is of the same importance as competition; and where recourse to arms control may be not only to make war less likely, but also to enhance the position of one state over another, or to influence the nature of government in a target state (Croft 1996: X).

According to Croft, five types of arms control have evolved as an arms control practice widened over the time: (1) arms control at the conclusions of conflicts; (2) arms control to enhance strategic stability; (3) arms control to create the norms of behavior; (4) arms control to manage weapons proliferation; and (5) arms control in terms of international organization.

Arms control at the conclusion of conflict serves to settle a completely new relationship between former foes. A new, post-conflict treaty is fully dependent on the result of conflict, and position of the sides of settlement. Typically, the winner sets the rules of the new mutual relations. The focus is not yet on creating of strategic stability and aversion of impending conflict; rather the attempts are directed to the establishing of the new post-conflict relationships. Arms control to enhance strategic stability focuses upon the attempt to create a greater measure of strategic stability between two or more states that usually perceive each other as a threat. In past, there have been many more or less successful attempts of creating arms-control treaties to establish new norms of behavior. This kind of arms control can be divided to three following categories: first, to contain the destructive force of particular weapons; second, to set up the rules on identification and treatment of non-combatants; and third, to identify certain areas where a conflict is illegitimate. The statesmen have always been concerned with deadly weapons in hands of their enemies. In twentieth century, there has also been emphasized a new role of unhealthy spread of weapons. According to modern theories, the weapons-proliferation also destabilizes the international systems, from the relations between two adversary states to the regions, or in the world as a whole. Thus, three types of proliferation control can be identified: defensive arms control to limit arms trade; attempt to achieve global stability; and arms control to limit the escalation of conflict in particular region. Considering the level of international organization, Croft sees them mainly as a platform for discussions about arms control, or disarmament (Croft 1996: 40 – 55).

Focusing on the era after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the first two Croft's categories of arms control may come in hand. Clearly, in the early years of Russian Federation the arms control at the conclusion of conflict fits to the post-cold-war situation. As the losing side of Cold War conflict the Russian federation tended to accept the conditions of the winning US. Reversely, the US set up a framework of arms control and the most incentives for arms control came from the US government. These tendencies can be observed in START process as well as in the earlier treaties INF and CFE. There are some of the most important treaties signed up between US – Soviet/Russia which can be placed in the category of arms-control treaties to enhance strategic stability, such as Cold War treaties SALT I, SALT II, ABM; and also more recent START I, START II, or SORT (Kuchyňková – Suchý 2005: 13). Both side of conflict tried to overcome the former adversaries in attempt to find a new path of dealing with the new international political reality.

The other aspect in categorizing of arms control presents a concept of deepening. Basically, the deepening means the quality of arms-control agreements (clarification of terms, coverage, etc.), the efficiency of verification regime, and refers to the regime formation/continuation. The CFE treaty was an excellent example of such a deepening. According to Croft, there are four variants of treaty in terms of depth: (1) total loss which can facilitate a total disarmament of enemy; (2) partial loss which leads to a partial disarmament of enemy; and eventually establishes imbalance in mutual relations; (3) winner gains certain domination over the foe, thus, the stability of dominance is established; and (4) there is a non-existence of clear victory, thus, there is a possibility of relatively equally-advantageous treaty which, at the end of the day, gives advantages to the winners (Croft 1996: 15, 83). The treaties signed after the birth of Russian Federation oscillate between the points three and four. On the one hand, the US rose as the only hegemonic power after the collapse of the Soviet empire, and in a way it could dictate the rules to the defeated Soviets in terms of stability of dominance. On the other hand, the US has never attempted to overrule the former Soviet territory, thus, US has sought more to cooperate than to rule.

Colin Gray's “House of Cards: Why Arms Control must fail” is perhaps the most wide-ranging condemnation of arms control ever written. The main point of “House of Cards” – irrelevance of arms control, is based on five paradoxes, although one of them is of the overwhelming importance. Gray's central argument is that “if arms control is needed in a strategic relationship because the states involved might go to war, it will be impractical for that very reason of need, whereas, if arms control prove to be available, it will be irrelevant. Thus, the arms-control regimes are achievable paradoxically only between states that do not need them. The theory of futility of arms control revolves around four arguments. First, there is a oversimplified view on international relations where the stakes are relatively clear cut, and there can be made a clear distinction between states committed to order and those committed to revisionism. Gray postulates that the calculation of interests is the key for arms control questions. According to Gray, the opposite of arms control is defense planning. The arms-control regimes can thus fail easily under the political pressures. In Gray's view, it is politics that leads state to war, not weapons. The criticized perspective also omits the dynamics of security constellations where time to time the revisionist powers swap their place with the “good guys”, as the case of Soviet Union during and after the Second World War shows. Second, the assumption that the domestic political culture is central in affecting the state's strategy, and by extension, state's arms-control policy is wrong because the external influences are of the high importance too. Third, the general view on history of arms control is reduced only to the 20^th century, therefore, it concerns only the better part of the arms control history. The nature of states' system and the states' perceptions on security matters ensure that the arms must inevitably fail. Gray uses an example of SALT and START processes that, in fact, licensed an increased number of weapons, they did not eliminated “destabilizing weapons” (with exception of strategic defenses), and they did not provide increased predictability – they only reflected the state of world when they were signed. Finally, the fourth flawed view confuses diplomatic activity, theory and definition of arms control. Gray is in favor of defining the arms control in a very narrow way. He claims that above all else, arms control is about helping to prevent the outbreak of war (Croft 1996: 5 – 9).

“If peace breaks out, can arms control be far behind?” According to Gray, this question precisely described events of the 1920s just as well as it did those of the 1990s. The post-cold war era has seen a flurry of arms-control agreements lessening the hostility between the superpowers, however, the progress has been slow and the results arguable. Indeed, the historical evidence seems to support the view that differences over arms control more often than not exacerbated the problem which exited. Increasingly, the desirability and utility of arms control has been perceived to have declined in the changed international environment which emerged, in particular, after 9/11 (Baylis – Smith 2010: 233 – 234).

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