Russian Attitude towards Arms Control and Disarmament under President Medvedev (2008 – 2012)

5 Russian Attitude towards Arms Control and Disarmament under President Medvedev (2008 – 2012)

President Dmitry Medvedev repeatedly showed anxiety over the development of strategic conventional systems and linked this to the need to recalibrate strategic conventional military capabilities into future nuclear arms treaties. Linkage was also made between the US concept of “Prompt Global Strike” with conventional strategic weapons and US options on missile defense. These anxieties, combined with the potential militarization of outer space, were demonstrated in Russia’s National Security Strategy (2009) and Military Doctrine (2010). Russian policy makers were thus forced to seek concessions that would address these perceived growing imbalances. According to Roger McDermott (2011), an expert on Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues, these developments raised skepticism about states proposing the reduction of sub-strategic nuclear weapons (SSNWs)⁶⁷, which is one area in which Moscow has been recognized to possess an advantage. Moreover, there is a controversy over the nature of “sub-strategic” or “tactical” nuclear weapons, which fall beyond the scope of strategic or intermediate range arms control; attempts to define them by range, yield or capability have failed. The 2010 Military Doctrine asserted that, despite the reduced risk of large-scale war using conventional and nuclear weapons against the Russian Federation, dangers and threats to the Russia's security were increasing. The doctrine noted that a large-scale or regional conflict fought with conventional weapons that put the existence of the Russian state at risk might involve an escalation to nuclear conflict. Nuclear weapons, according to the doctrine, would remain a vital factor in preventing nuclear and conventional conflicts. Although there has been no certainty on the precise nature of Russian nuclear policy, known fully only to the few privileged persons, it has been clear that SSNWs play a role in Russian security policy (McDermott 2011).

This and the military “wake up” after Georgian war in summer 2008 when Russia's leadership had to admit that Russia's strategy fitted more to the big conventional wars of 20^th century⁶⁸, was also reflected in the conduct of country’s operational-strategic exercises. “Zapad-2009” and “Vostok-2010” both involved the simulation of nuclear strikes on enemy forces, consistent with the concept of using nuclear weapons to deescalate a conflict. Despite official claims to the contrary, the multiple clues in the scenarios for “Vostok-2010” in Russia’s Far East likely envisaged China as the hypothetical enemy, which becomes more clear considering Russian forces rehearsing combat against enemy mechanized formations and submarines, neither of which is associated with terrorist organizations or pirates. “Vostok-2010” reportedly witnessed the simulated use of SSNW, allegedly including the use of a nuclear land mine. Furthermore, the 2010 Military Doctrine referred to the utilization of “precision weapons” in the strategic deterrence context, which is unclear, since the armed forces at the time lacked such conventional options (McDermott 2011).

1. 5. 1 Domestic Influences

   1. 5. 1. 1 Political Situation, Civil-Military Relations and the Role of Military-Industrial Complex

Medvedev convincingly won with a 70.28 %; a subtle 1.02 % lower than the total Putin had garnered in 2004. Given the effective monopoly Putin and his party United Russia enjoyed in parliament, the vote gave Medvedev virtually dictatorial powers. But surprisingly little was known of this man, who for most of his life had worked in the shadows. Born in Leningrad in 1965, he graduated in law at Leningrad State University in 1990, where he taught civil and Roman law until 1999. Medvedev shared the same educational and political background with Putin. In 2002 he was appointed chairman of the Russian giant gas monopoly, Gazprom. Three years later, in November 2005, he was appointed first deputy prime minister. Unlike Putin and many of his close advisers, he had never served in the secret police (Pipes 2008, VIPERSON 2011).

“Our country is over-centralized,” [...] “there are about a thousand only federal structures in the regions, and each of them is looking for its own occupation” Medvedev told a meeting with leaders of the State Duma parties on July 7, 2011, and pointed out decentralization of management as a major political objective (Itar-Tass 2011). Vladimir Surkov, a Russified Chechen who occupied the post of deputy chief of the presidential administration but, in fact, has been a chief ideologist of the Putin-Medvedev government as well as de facto head of Putin's United Russia, expressed a contrary view. In a speech, he delivered already in February 2006, Surkov asserted that Russia is a European country, one that shares with Europe the values of material well-being, freedom, and justice. On another occasion, however, he stressed that Russia has always been a centralized country – decentralization, in his view, is being a force that weakens democracy. To the subject of democracy in Russia itself, the Russia’s leaders have been more than ambiguous. Thus, in a speech delivered at the 2007 World Economic Forum in Davos, Medvedev asserted:

Today we are building new institutions based on the fundamental principles of full democracy. This democracy requires no additional definition. This democracy is effective and is based on the principles of the market economy, supremacy of the law, and government that is accountable to the rest of society.

Clear enough, one would think. But less than a year later, in conversation with foreign journalists, the same Medvedev made a following statement:

A parliamentary democracy — this is my personal opinion — is unacceptable in Russia either now or in the future. Probably in 200 or 300 years, when the ideas of democracy will be different [...] when everything will be different.

2. 5. 1. 2 Economic Situation

Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

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