Masarykova univerzita

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1The dates refer to presidential inaugurations.

2In Russia, only two major military reforms had occurred between the eras of Peter the Great and the end of the empire, and only two reforms in the Soviet times – in 1920s and in 1938–1940 (Odom 1998: 108).

3This concept was first dropped by Stalin as World War II approached. From the 1950s until Gorbachev's time the Soviet leadership repeatedly reiterated it. Although military strategy is tied to conduct of war, it also involves peacetime uses of military power for political purposes, as well as arms control negotiations. In Soviet terms, the “peaceful coexistence” meant “a specific form of the international class struggle” ending with the final victory of socialist camp over the imperialists, and thus, with peace in the Marxist-Leninist sense (Brannon 2009: 21; Odom 1998: 2 – 15, 65).

4'Perestroika' (rebuilding) and 'glasnost' (public voicing) are late Soviet policy programs launched in Gorbachev's era. The first of these was applied primarily to the economy, but it was meant to refer to society in general (Curtis 1996: 102 – 106).

5One of the Gorbachev's closest advisers, Anatoly Chernyaev, described Gorbachev's personality in his 1985 diary: “It [arms control] is also the result (and, probably, chiefly) of a personal factor — Gorbachev’s moral aversion to a nuclear threat to all humanity” (Chenyaev 1985: 175).

6For example, in his speech at the United Nations' 43rd General Assembly Session, December 7, 1988 where he called for a total unilateral disarmament (National Security Archive 2008).

7In original: Военно-промышленная комиссия при Правительстве Российской Федерации.

8Moreover, Gorbachev believed that military and VPK deceived him about activities such as unauthorized arms transfers (for example, to Cuba, Libya and Eastern Europe), weapon upgrades in Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe, and development of bacteriological weapons (Odom 1998: 229). For further information see Lyakhovskii's description of “mechanism” of arms transfers to the third-world countries in Odom 1998: 229 – 230.

9The rubble prices for weapons were artificially low and in no way comparable to the figures in Western military figures (Odom 1998: 232).

10Georgia joined CIS two years later to leave again after couple of years.

11Officially the Soviet military continued to exist for another week but its nuclear forces were subordinated to the Russian president already on twenty-fifth (Odom 1998: 373).

12For more details on this shift in Russia's geopolitical thinking see Smith 1999, or Tsygankov 2003.

13 Compare the definition of interests to: Kříž 2002: 62 – 68.

14 Compare the definition of threats to: Zeman 2002: 85 – 94.

15In Western diplomatic and academic circles, there were opinions that it is possible that having respond to Western arms control proposals could help civilian security officials in Russia get a handle on military policy which at that time seemed to be made by military itself, without guidance from the country's political establishment. According to some, negotiated agreements might have helped Russian officials get better control over the weapon sales that seem to be conducted by individual Russian commanders – but only if Western states were willing to put serious ceilings on their conventional arms sales (Walker 1994: 35).

16As a Gorbachev's potential challenger, Yeltsin was in 1987 dismissed from his posts. He returned to the political scene two years later, when he in March 1989 won more than 80% of the vote in the Russia's first democratic elections and was named Soviet people's deputy. In 1990, he was elected chairman of the Russian Supreme Council and that same year declared that he was leaving the Communist Party. On 12 June, 1991, in a national election, gaining more than 50% of the vote in the first round, Boris Yeltsin became the first president of the Russian Federation (Kremlin Archive 2012).

17Russia's Constitution 1993 remains, with various changes from years 1996 and 2001, valid. Original: Конституция Российской Федерации от 25.12.1993, с изменениями от 09.01.1996, 10.02.1996, 09.06.2001.

18The Security Council had concurrent Defense Council (1996), and a Foreign Policy Council (1995) which caused persisting coordination problems (Donaldson – Nogee 2009: 129).

19On December 31, the new president of Russia Putin signed his first decree giving Yeltsin, “the members of his family”, and “those living with him” “legal and social guarantees”. They would, hence, retain most of the benefits and privileges attached to the presidential position. Above all and this is what really matters for “The Family”, they are granted legal immunity from “arrest, searches of house or person and questioning” for the rest of their lives (The Spark 2000).

20Most outstandingly, the 14^th army in Transdnestria in Moldova and local air force and army personnel in Abkhazia and Georgia acted independently of the Yeltsin administration, constituting fait accomplis on the ground (Hopf 2006: 702).

21It possessed a labor force of 334,000 by the end of 1998, and in the first 8 months of 1999 the sector increased employment by 2,800. Subordinate entities included 74 research institutes and design bureaus, and 63 batch-producing enterprises. Some were quite famous, including Izhmash, the Kirov Works, the famous LOMO, and the instrument-making design bureau in Tula. To advance the products of RCAA enterprises to the domestic market there are 14 regional marketing centers. The international Telecommunication Marketing Center was used for advancing the products of the RCAA enterprises to the foreign market (Global Security 2012).

22For a SIPRI definition of military expenditure check “The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”. Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices (SIPRI 2012).

23Particular sales, such as that of Kilo-class submarines to Iran and advanced combat aircraft to China, have ignited sharp diplomatic exchanges with the US. Russia's refusal to limit its sales to these countries remains an irritant in bilateral US-Russia relations (Larsen 2002: 168).

24Commonwealth of Independent States In December 1991 the founding members Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine declared their interaction on the basis of sovereign equality. At present the CIS unites Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine (International Statistical Committee of the CIS 2012).

25The complete original 1993 (Основные положения концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации) was not available to the author at the time of writing, although, luckily, some of its parts can be found in Curtis 1996 and Kortoonov 2008.

26In original: Основные положения военной доктрины Российской Федерации.

27There was more confusion, because from the text of the Military Doctrine 1993 was not clear whether this highly permissive formula meant first-use strike or second, retaliatory strike. However, further elaborations from the highest officials of the MoD and Security Council explained that it was exactly a first strike (not first use), that was the subject of this doctrinal part (Arbatov 1997).

28Another translation: “The aim of the Russian Federation's policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring the launching of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies” (Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 1993).

29The only departure from this self-centered interest was a stated willingness to participate in the international peacekeeping. Russia's participation in the Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1996 was justified right by this clause (Brannon 2009: 28).

30The geopolitical position of Russia should be one of the “one of the emerging multipolar world's influential centers”. By the late 1990s, Russian geopolitics was shifting away from so-called Euro-Atlanticism toward Neo-Eurasian Realpolitik. The 1997 Concept reflects the debate which emerged with this shift of thinking (Brannon 2009: 31).

31For details see original: Концепция Национальной Безопасности Российской Федерации 1997.

32In parallel with the mandate for the negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSMBs).

33According to the RAND Corporation conventional stability exists when “there is a balance of conventional capabilities such that both sides believe that neither side can launch a successful attack against the other, and either side can successfully repel any attack launched by the other” (Rohn 1990: 1).

34Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1973–1989, were launched by Nixon administration because it was pressured by Congress to reduce its forces in Europe and it felt that a reciprocal reductions would be better policy than unilateral action. In fact, MBFR Talks were part of a two-pronged diplomatic effort: the American-instigated MBFR and the Soviet-inspired CSCE process. The imbalance between the much numerous Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and the US and NATO forces meant that Moscow was reluctant to offer concessions. Under these circumstances, a CSCE measure adopted in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 that called for providing advance notice of major military exercises to aver risk of a surprise attack was more easily achieved than arms limitations. Although no substantial outcome was achieved during MBFR Talks, many participants believed that the Talks set the stage for later agreement on conventional forces in Europe (Burns 2009: 40).

35In contrast to the latter CFE provisions, the MBFR area of implementation was restricted only to Central Europe (Hartmann 2009: 53).

36The Warsaw Pact (WP), formally Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, (May 14, 1955 – July 1, 1991) is a treaty establishing a mutual-defense organization (Warsaw Treaty Organization) composed of the Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The treaty provided for a unified military command and for the maintenance of Soviet military units on the territories of the other participating states (Britannica 2011).

37The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

38For example, removing the civil defense troops and construction troops to non-military status allowed the ministry of defense to lower total numbers from which reductions would be mandated by the treaty (Odom 1998: 192).

39The CFE-1A Agreement sets limits on the manpower of certain kinds of forces, excluding sea-based naval forces, internal security forces, and forces serving under UN mandate. The agreement, also, contains provisions for information exchange, notification and verification. Ceilings declared by each State take effect 40 months after entry into force (FAS 2011).

40The FSC was opened in Vienna in September 1992 (Walker 1994: 27)

41ACFE addressed Russia's call for additional military flexibility in the flank regions principally by increasing Russia's limit for armored combat vehicles on its territory in the flank zone (Witkowski, Garnett, McCausland, 2010: 6).

42I continue analyzing the CFE process in chapter 5.

43“Treaty between the United States of America and the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (START I).

44For details of limits posed by START I, see original (START I 1992).

45The third phase should have been reached in 84 months after entry into force of START I (Paragraph 2, Article III, START I, 1992).

46 Accordingly, a US START portal was designated at a former Peacekeeper missile final assembly plant Thiokol Corporation facility in Promontory, Utah. In the former USSR, the United States was permitted to monitor at a plant in Votkinsk, Russia (an SS-25 ICBM assembly site) and at a plant in Pavlohrad, Ukraine (an SS-24 ICBM assembly site). Since START's entry into force, Russia has not exercised its treaty right to conduct portal monitoring at the US Thiokol facility. Peacekeeper missile components at Promontory ceased well before START entered into force. The US has conducted monitoring at Votkinsk and Pavlohrad. However, on May 31, 1995, by agreement with the Republic of Ukraine, the US ceased perimeter and portal monitoring at the Pavlohrad Machine Plant (FAS 2001).

47The data in table comes from the aggregate MOU data exchanged by the Parties no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following entry into force of the START Treaty. The data under the "Total, Former USSR Parties" heading was compiled by the US Department of State from the individual totals submitted by these Parties (Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (2009).

48Previously, the United States was required to download its Minuteman IIIs within seven years of START I's entry into force in 2001. In a September 26 background briefing, a senior Clinton administration official said the Joint Agreed Statement provides for desired reciprocity because now the downloading of both Minuteman IIIs and Russian SS 19s under START II does not have to be completed until the end of 2007 (Cerniello 1997).

49Alexei Mitrofanov, chairman of the Geopolitics Committee, said, “This agreement [START II] was reached on the crest of a political wave when Russia was making concessions on everything. Now we have to bite back.” Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the powerful Communist Party, said, “Today we were not convinced that START II should be ratified.” Likewise, Lev Rokhlin, chairman of the Defense Committee, claimed that START II ratification “will complete the ruin of the Russian army” (Cerniello 1997).

50Compare to, for example, Fedorov 2005.

51In fact, Russia’s continued interaction with Iran and Iraq, could be either seen as a strategic rebuff to the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, or could also be seen in a purely economic light. Russia has been making money from selling arms and civilian nuclear technology to Iran in order to reclaim its Soviet-era debt from Baghdad (Kuchins 2002).

52Translated by the author.

53The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was signed on May 15, 1992 for five-year term, with the possibility of further prolongation. The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan became the parties to the CST. On October 7, 2002 the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Agreement on legal status of the CSTO were signed by Heads of all Member States in Kishinev. These documents came into force on September 18, 2003 (CSTO 2012).

54The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a permanent intergovernmental international organization; creation of which was proclaimed on June 15, 2001 in Shanghai (China) by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Its prototype is the Shanghai Five mechanism (SCO 2012).

55According to some, Russia’s choice on missile defense was either to withdraw from the ABM Treaty jointly or to watch the United States withdraw unilaterally. Not surprisingly, Putin chose the latter since the former offered neither domestic nor foreign political benefits for him (Kuchins 2002).

56There are many more or less plausible theories about preparing these “terrorist” attacks by former KGB, now FSB, itself to win the popularity in consequent “hard response” of state for Putin. See, for example, Lucas 2008: 42 – 43.

57After graduation in law in Leningrad, Putin launched work in the KGB (Russian secret services). From 1985 to 1990, he worked in East Germany. We know very little about what he was concerned with in Germany. In June 1991, he became chairman of the City Council’s International Relations Committee in St. Petersburg and, starting in 1994, he combined this post with the position of First Deputy Chairman of the St. Petersburg City Government (First Deputy Mayor) (Kremlin Archive 2012).

58Yeltsin said that he chose Putin in belief that he was dedicated to the idea of democracy in Russia and market reform (Yeltsin 2000: 327).

59Together with the previous wave of terrorist attacks and the war in Chechnya, they were reflected in major Russian security documents with emphasizing the Russia's fight against terrorism.

60To compare, in the Czech Republic, there is a flat income tax of 15 % since 2007 (Gola 2012).

61In June 1999 the Russian army carried out “Zapad-99” (West-99), a large-scale exercise with a scenario whereby NATO imposes an air/sea blockade of Kaliningrad and then launches an offensive with bombers and cruise missiles. According to the scenario, the Russian conventional defense is breached and, to resolve the situation, Russia launches a preventive nuclear attack using four long-range cruise missiles carried by strategic bombers. Two nuclear warheads hit targets in Western Europe and two in the US. The option to use air-launched nuclear cruise missiles is preferable, because even a limited launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles could trigger an immediate retaliation of US ICBMs (Valvo 2012).

62For a full version of document translated to English see: The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000.

63Cp. Haas 2010: 16.

64To keep better continuity, the CFE treaty is analyzed in the next chapter, although its suspension was announced already in 2007 under President Putin.

65For details of UN Resolution 1540 see: 1540 Committee 2012; (Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 26 October 2004; and UN Charter.

66Compare to Kuchyňková 2005: 75 – 82.

67The official Russian Defense Ministry definition of these weapons in Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ states: Nuclear Weapons (NW), [...] Divided into strategic and non-strategic NW. Strategic NW have nuclear warheads with a capacity of up to several megatons and capability to reach every continent. They can rapidly demolish administrative centers, industrial and military targets deep in the rear, destroy main groupings of troops (forces), cause massive fires, floods and radioactive contamination. It forms the basis of strategic forces. Non-strategic NW have nuclear ammunition with a capacity of up to several hundred kilotons, and are intended to engage targets at operational and tactical depth of the location of the enemy’s troops (forces). This type of NW includes operational-tactical and tactical weapons of respective configuration and equipment: ground-based missile systems, cannon artillery, aerial bombs, ship-borne missile systems, torpedoes, anti-missile systems, controlled and naval mines (McDermott 2011).

68More to the war in Georgia and its impact on Russia's military thinking see McDermott 2010.

69Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices.

70The process of organizational change in the Russian ground forces is based upon the whole post-Soviet military reform debate. This debate was dominated, on the one hand, by those seeking to make the armed forces more professional and flexible, and thus better suited to the security demands of a major 21st-century, and, on the other hand, by senior military figures wedded to the concepts of mass and a conscript-based military. After the war with Georgia in 2008 military opposition was weakened for the first time, and change within the ground forces could begin in earnest – new command tiers were established, divisions became brigades, and the idea of absorbing professional soldiers into the ground forces was accepted. A military expert Rod Thornton suggests that the new Russian ground forces are being created that will be more suitable for use against small-scale opponents than against NATO or China, although the use of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out in any future engagement between Russian and Chinese forces. On the other hand, the problems of generating a suitable corps of non-commissioned officers, well-trained officers, and marrying equipment to the strategic needs remain. Ground force units will be very much weakened by the fact that twice a year they lose almost 50 percent of their personnel. In Thornton's opinion, even though the changes being introduced in the ground forces look dramatic, the road towards a real change in Russia’s ground forces is a long one. To put it simply, there are two conditions for accomplishing a fundamental change: time and investments. As things currently stand, the personnel strength of the military is 1.1 million men in the region. The ground forces strength is probably between 350,000 and 400,000 (Thornton 2011: 44–47).

71On September 18, 2008 an Arctic Strategy was approved. The Strategy comprises the main goals for implementing Russia's policy in Arctic region, such as claiming the Arctic zone as a base helping to resolve social-economic development problems of Russia, using the Northern Sea route as the exclusive RF transport route in the Arctic, etc. For further details see Haas 2010: 126 – 127; Zysk 2010.

722010 Federal “Law on Security” (in original Федеральный закон o безопасности) replaces the law of the Russian Federation No. 2446-1 On Security dated March 5, 1992 and reflects the emergence of fundamentally new threats and challenges in relations with foreign states, alliances and non-state actors. The Federal Law defines the basic security principles and sets out the powers of the President, the Federal Assembly, the Government of the Russian Federation, and other federal executive government bodies. Until 2009, the principles of Russian national security policy were spelled out in Putin's 2000 revision of the 1997 'National Security Conception'. Since 2009, however, the global scene has changed considerably thus making this revision outdated too (Chirkova 2012: 6).

73The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации) was approved by Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, on July 12, 2008 (Foreign Policy Concept 2008; IDSA 2012).

74Original: Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года 2008. For an English version see Rustrans 2009.

75Cp. Zysk 2009.

76For example: "Стремление наделить силовой потенциал Организации Североатлантического договора (НАТО) глобальными функциями, реализуемыми в нарушение норм международного права, приблизить военную инфраструктуру стран – членов НАТО к границам Российской Федерации, в том числе путем расширения блока" (Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Fyedyeratsii).

77For example, forces may be sent abroad following resolutions from the CIS or in order to protect Russian citizens abroad (Chirkova 2012: 8).

78There is not a word about suspension or withdrawal in the original provisions of the CFE Treaty.

79 In July 2010, Russian Federation had 369 ICBMs of four different types capable of carrying a total of up to 1,247 warheads. Russia also kept 160 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that date back to the Soviet era. These missiles could carry up to 576 nuclear warheads. Moscow, however, has been working to develop a new SLBM called the Bulava. The Russian military has also been possessing three types of air-launched cruise missiles and two submarine-launched cruise missile systems (Arms Control Association 2010). As of September 2012, the data showed that Russia has 491 deployed delivery systems and 1,499 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Experts estimate that Russia will continue to reduce its forces to approximately 400 delivery systems and 1,100 warheads by 2020 – well below New START limits. Russia is, thus, in the process of retiring many of its older strategic systems (Arms Control Association 2012).

80Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia is restrained from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (Arms Control Association 2010).

81Compare to critique of, for example, Stephen Rademaker (2010).

82Valdai Index presents international expert community’s assessment of Russia’s institutional development trends.

83Alternatively, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists from March 2012, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris found 538 deployed launchers, and 2430 operationally deployed warheads, with notion that only about 1,560 of these warheads are counted by the New START Treaty because bombers do not carry nuclear weapons under normal circumstances and some SSBNs are in overhaul at any given time. In total the authors counted 4,400 warheads (Kristensen – Norris 2012: 87, 89 – 90).

84Estimates of Russia’s total nuclear forces, including tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, vary greatly. According to the 2010 estimate of Federation of American Scientists, Russia currently possesses roughly 2,600 deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 2,050 tactical weapons, plus another 8,000 or so warheads in reserve (Arms Control Association 2010).

85Various authors provide different numbers. Check, for example, (Kristensen – Norris 2012: 89 – 90).

86Arms Control Association estimates that Russia had in 2009 roughly 750 metric tons of HEU, though it notes that this figure could be wrong by as much as 300 metric tons due to lack of information. Additionally, Russia had an estimated 120 to 170 metric tons of plutonium stockpiled for weapons (Arms Control Association 2010).

87Despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Soviet Union apparently maintained an extensive offensive germ weapons program, including research into plague, anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, glanders, and hemorrhagic fever. In a 2005 report, the US Department of State stated that the US “was concerned that Russia maintains a mature offensive [biological weapons] program.” The report noted that “a substantial amount of dual-use research conducted in recent years has legitimate biodefense applicability, but also could be used to further an offensive program.” Russia has rejected all the allegations. In its 2010 report, the State Department said that it had no further indications that Russian activities “were conducted for purposes inconsistent with the BWC.” However, it also asserted that it could not confirm that Russia had fulfilled its obligations under the BWC (Arms Control Association 2010).

88For instance, the Russian Air Force was supposed to receive 116 new and 408 upgraded aircraft for forward-deployed units and 156 new and 372 modernized helicopters over the next eight years (RIA Novosti 2008).

89Modernizing is now a priority for the entire army. Some 23,000 billion rubles (nearly 600 billion Euros) should be spent over 10 years in the Russian military-industrial complex. More than 10% of this sum will be devoted to the first and only attempt at a major overhaul of its factories. The head of the Kremlin has certainly set his ambitions high: by 2020, he is aiming to transform 1 million underpaid, under-equipped and demotivated men into a professional army of 145,000 soldiers. Some 400 modern ballistic missiles should be delivered, as well as eight strategic submarines, 20 multipurpose submarines, 50 surface vessels, over a 100 pieces of military spacecraft equipment, 600 modern planes, 1,000 helicopters and 28 new anti-aircraft missiles (Quénelle 2012).

90“Мне ничего об этом (незаконных поставках) не известно, но мы сразу заинтересовались, что это за люди, что за компании. По крайней мере, нам никто из них ничего не поставлял, может - кому-то еще” (RBK 2012).