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Russian Attitude towards Arms Control and Disarmament under President Putin (2012 –)
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- 6. 1 Domestic Influences
- 6. 1. 2 Economic Situation
- 6. 2 Arms-Control and Proliferation Profile
6 Russian Attitude towards Arms Control and Disarmament under President Putin (2012 –)The recent date of presidential elections in Russia does not allow a thorough analysis of Putin's next presidency. The course of policy set earlier by Putin and then by his close cooperator Medvedev is most likely to be continued in the upcoming years. There are already some evidences of being so. The last chapter of this work should be though rather revelation of the main trends in the Russia's arms control policy, which are likely to go on, than any expert future prediction of a new course. This October during a state visit in Dushanbe, Vladimir Putin described NATO as a throwback to the Cold War era, and said it should be transformed into a political organization as soon as possible. “It is incomprehensible why it’s still around,” Putin said, making clear that Russia would like NATO to stay within the bounds of its statutory activity and not strive for global status. Russia has been and will continue to be concerned by NATO expansion, Putin explained. Talk is one thing, but the deployment of some attack systems or missile defense systems near our borders is quite a different matter, [...] this poses genuine threats to our territory. Needless to say, in that case we will have to build our defense policy accordingly so as to neutralize these threats (RIA Novosti 2012a).
6. 1 Domestic Influences6. 1. 1 Political Situation, Civil-Military Relations and the Role of Military-Industrial ComplexAccording to the rising numbers of corruption crimes, corruption in Russia tripled between the years 2010 and 2011, the annual report of Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika states. Prosecutor General's Office opened in 2011 around 1,900 corruption cases compared to 600 in 2010 (RAPSI 2012). When Putin first came to power 12 years ago, many Russians were grateful for the stability and prosperity he brought with him. The political chaos, economic crisis and massive drop in incomes throughout the 1990s had soured their belief in democracy and encouraged them to focus on individual economic well-being. At that time, Putin rode high in the polls. In words of a magazine The Economist (2012) Russia looked to the rest of the world “like a cynical society where people were interested only in personal wealth and national muscle”. Russia has been continuously changing since then. A wealthier and more vocal middle class has grown – the one that views Russia's political system as an “ill-governed kleptocracy”. That became clear in September 2011, when Putin announced his plan to run in presidential elections and swap positions with Medvedev, who was formally president even though Putin retained control. Public discontent began to mount at this time. The most likely manipulated parliamentary poll in December 2011 was echoed by protests in Russian cities. A demonstration in Moscow in this February got 100 000 people out in a temperature of -22°C. The protests continued and people kept rallying even after Putin's election victory (The Economist 2012). According to the latest survey for the Russian Development Index (Valdai Index)82 that was held in August and September 2012, positive changes in certain areas, such as the development of innovative industries and the financial services market, the strengthening of the defense potential and foreign policy activity, have been set off by negative estimates in other spheres. This means that the overall minor recessive trend indicated in previous years' surveys has remained dominant (Valdai Club 2012). 6. 1. 2 Economic SituationIn 2012, Russia is threatened by its own ambitious plans on new armaments. In the beginning of the first Putin's presidency, there were enough resources from energy and raw material exports to make extensive reserves in foreign currency. This time has already passed. Nowadays, the border of comfortable coverage of current expenses of RF ranges up to about $ 122 for one barrel of oil. Although the price of oil at the present time is quite high it is still very hard to reach or maintain this border. However, Moscow has recently proclaimed the largest and the most complex program of armament since the 30's of 20th century. Such an ambitious program can eventually lead to the serious economic troubles, and consequently, it can be a cause of collapse of a state (Dolejší 2012). The nuclear experts have long cited Russian Federation as a key supplier of nuclear- and missile-related goods and technology to a variety of countries, including states of high proliferation concern such as Iran and Syria. In response, the sanctions on Russian entities believed to be involved in such proliferation activities have been frequently posed by the US and the international community. Beginning in the mid-2000s, however, the number of sanctions on Russia has declined, possibly as a result of increasing Russian commitment to controlling sensitive exports. Moreover, in recent years, the US officials have also cited Russian cooperation addressing proliferation concerns, in particular Iran. In spite of this mild cooperation, Russia still remains a significant source of illicit sensitive technology, particularly in regard to missile proliferation (Arms Control Association 2010). According to the 2010 State Department Report, Russian entities “have [in recent years] continued to supply sensitive missile-related items, technology, and expertise to several programs of concern”. 6. 2 Arms-Control and Proliferation ProfileIn spite of all the arms-control treaties and regimes, the world's combined nuclear stockpile remains more than a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War at a very high level. Of these, some 2,000 Russian warheads are on high alert, ready for use on short notice (FAS 2012). Despite the promise of a more transparent data exchange after Russia's ratification of New START in January 2011, the international community's ability to monitor Russia's nuclear forces has become more difficult because Moscow does not release full aggregate treaty numbers of the country's strategic nuclear forces and the US has agreed not to make the information available as it did during START I (Kristensen – Norris 2012). Table 17: Status of Strategic Nuclear Forces in Russia and the US (9/2012)
Source: Russian strategic nuclear forces 2012a84  Table 18: Overview of Russian/Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces from 1990 to 2012 Sources: Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT 2012; Russian strategic nuclear forces 2012b85 Contrary to the USSR which conducted 715 nuclear tests, Russia has not conducted any tests since it inherited the Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpile following the Soviet breakup. Russia has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. However, as with Russia’s warheads' stockpile, there is a great deal of uncertainty about its holdings of fissile material86. The vast former Soviet biological87, chemical, and nuclear weapons complexes, including their former scientists, are also seen as a potential source of arms, materials, and know-how for other regimes or non-state actors. The US and other countries have various programs dedicated to mitigating this danger by supporting Russia, as well as other former Soviet states, to secure or destroy facilities, materials, and weapon systems, as well as gainfully employ former scientists in non-arms related work. Nonetheless, due to high corruption levels, military-industrial relations, and the overall political attitude of Russia's leadership to the arms sales, the risk of proliferation remains at stake. Russia also continues to support creation of and has repeatedly offered to host an international nuclear fuel bank to help persuade countries to forgo development of their own national nuclear fuel production capabilities, which also could be used to produce nuclear-bomb material (Arms Control Association 2010). On May 3, 2012, General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and First Deputy Minister of Defense, warned NATO that if it proceeded with its missile defense system in Europe, Moscow would use force against it even pre-emptively (Barry – Kramer 2012). “The deployment of new strike weapons in Russia’s south and north west – including Iskander systems in Kaliningrad - is one of our possible options for destroying the system’s European infrastructure,” said Makarov at a conference in Moscow on anti-ballistic missile policy. According to him, Russia might respond to the NATO anti-missile shield installation by deployment of the short-range Iskander missiles in the Russian Kaliningrad exclave, perhaps the only location belonging to Russia from where its Iskander missiles might in case of need neutralize the US planned missile shield which will include interceptor missiles based in Poland and Romania, a radar system in Turkey, and the missile-defense capable warships at sea (Valvo 2012). Regarding Russia's conventional arsenal, RIA Novosti on October 15 released a statement of Alexander Grushko, Russia's envoy to NATO, that Russia is ready to start in-depth discussions on a new Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). If the focus is on arms control, not some political problems, there are chances that a substantive discussion could begin on what kind of arms control is needed today. […] The ball is now in the European court. We are waiting for signals from our European partners showing their interest in this matter. [...] The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) is by far the most appropriate platform for that discussion (RIA Novosti 2012b). Grushko referred to the EU and NATO demands on Moscow to recognize Georgia's sovereignty over its pre-2008 borders as a precondition for talks (RIA Novosti 2012b). However, the chance to re-start the CFE process remains very low. In practice, Russia has since the beginning of Helsinki process seen the Conference / Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as an useful instrument of political trade. In exchange for some political concessions, Russia has expected to have bigger say in European affairs. After the breakup of Soviet Union the OSCE should have become the main Euro-Asian forum for mutual cooperation under Russia's leadership, presenting a counterweight to NATO where the main actor is the US. Contrary to NATO, OSCE offers a platform where Russia's calls can be better heard since there are many Russia's allies from Central Asia and Europe. Russia has always tried to grasp this organization as a tool for asserting its power and national interests over often divided members of the EU and NATO. After the cessation of CFE process, the ambitious mission to bridge the Euro-Asian interests has lost the drive. However, OSCE still remains particularly useful and effective in agenda setting, foremost, in the field of human rights (especially the elections observation is widely recognized contribution of this organization) and in some fields of military monitoring and information exchange (for example, VD or Open Skies Treaty). In 2008, a first deputy prime minister of RF announced the intention to more than double production of conventional weaponry by 2015. “By 2010, we are planning to increase production [of conventional weapons] by 30%, and by 2015, we expect it to increase 120%,” Sergei Ivanov said at a government meeting attended by President Putin. The Russian government's Military-Industrial Commission pursued a government armament program for the period up to 2015, which envisions the procurement of weaponry for all branches of the Armed Forces88. Ivanov also added that the share of civilian products manufactured by defense companies must reach 59% by 2015 (RIA Novosti 2008). “Russia will expand the role of private contractors in its defense sector, including in the production of strategic nuclear missiles”, said Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin on November 12 this year (RIA Novosti 2012c). The data suggest that the old Soviet dilemma butter versus guns it still actual. The recent political trend in Russia that has been set by Putin already in his first presidential term speaks in favor of the latter. Then it seemed to be wishful thinking, now it is taking clearer shapes. There, however, still remain many obstacles to the modernization which would bring the desired results. Putin's most recently proposed military reforms89, which are being orchestrated by the Minister of Defense, Anatoliy Serdyukov, are “impossible” from a technical standpoint, said Alexander Konavolov, one of the independent analysts. “The military-industrial estate is living too much off of the ruins of the Soviet era, and is therefore incapable of producing a modern army,” he explained. Another problem poses an enormous corruption or the old fashioned strategic thinking (Quénelle 2012). Recent events have showed that also the topic of international military espionage which could seem to be a relic of Cold War is still actual. It is believed, because the official numbers were never published, that in the hey-days of Soviet Union the stolen Western know-how made up around two-thirds of Soviet success in development of new technologies (cp. Odom 1998). On October 4, 2012, the American authorities detained a group of people allegedly transferring the state-of-art military technology for Russia's military and secret services. Moscow refused all the accusations with stating that the charges were exceptionally of criminal character. Vice-Premier of Russia Dmitry Rogozin the next day vociferously rejected the connection to the detained criminal network90.
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