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World view, Interests, Threats, Ends, Ways, and Means in Russia's Security Documents, 2000 – 2008
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- 4. 2. 1 2000 National Security Concept
- 4. 2. 2 2000 Military Doctrine
- 4. 2. 3 Foreign Policy Concept 2000
- 4. 2. 4 Conclusions
- 4. 3 Towards Arms Control and Disarmament 64
- 4. 3. 1 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
4. 2 World view, Interests, Threats, Ends, Ways, and Means in Russia's Security Documents, 2000 – 2008Vladimir Putin released new editions of the three key security documents – National Security Concept, Military Doctrine, and Foreign Policy Concept in the beginning of his first term in office. In addition, Putin was genuinely keen on military reform that is reflected in his various initiatives. In 2003 a defense white paper was brought out by Ministry of Defense. Shortly after the publication of the National Security Concept in January 2000, the subordinate top security documents, the Military Doctrine (April 2000) and Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000) were also revisited. The order of the release and the generally similar points of view in the documents gave proof of a well-coordinated and comprehensive approach to the foreign and security policies. Therefore, the year 2000 could be considered as the year of completion of the process towards an integrated Russian security policy, after the “roaring” 1990s (Haas 2010: 15 – 16).
Source: Haas 2003: 1, Haas 2010: 15; IDSA 2012 4. 2. 1 2000 National Security ConceptThe results of large military exercise “Zapad-99”61 propelled Russian leadership to adapt a new defense concept - Russia's 2000 National Security Concept (Kipp 2001). The 2000 Security Concept was produced by the Security Council of Russian Federation and was ratified by a presidential decree on January, 10, 2000. 2000 Security Concept62 provides an overall view of Russian security policy, applying all means available to the state. Compared to the 1997 Security Concept the perception of threats changes radically. 1997 Security Concept takes a generally positive outlook on international development and is concerned mainly with internal problems to Russia's security63. In the 1999 draft of Security Concept, a rise in military threats is clearly displayed, namely: the striving of particular states and intergovernmental associations to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE; the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world; the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion; possible appearance of foreign military bases and large troop contingents in direct proximity to Russia’s borders; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles; a weakening of the integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States; and outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States; and territorial claims against Russia (The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2000). Moscow changes the emphasis from international cooperation at the global level to stress on cooperation and integration within CIS and with the other Asian partners. Russia's rebuffing attitude towards NATO's new Strategic Concept (1999) and to its military intervention in Kosovo meant that Western security policy course was now considered to be a threat (Haas 2010: 16). A new Concept (2000) is also seriously concerned with economic issues, and not only regaining but already maintaining of the great power status. Concerning arms control, one of the goals of foreign policy is “achieving progress in nuclear arms control, and maintaining strategic stability in the world on the basis of states’ compliance with their international obligations in this sphere”. Overall tone of 2000 NSC sets more assertive course of Russia's policy. 4. 2. 2 2000 Military DoctrineThe doctrine, which Russia says is “defensive in nature”, claims that it is designed for the “transitional period” in both the Russian politics and international relations. The revised 2000 Doctrine reflects the consequences of the second Chechen conflict and the positions against the West. Putin through this doctrine strengthened political and military cooperation with Belarus and secured the stronger position of the Security Council at the expense of MoD and the General Staff (Haas 2010: 16 – 17). The military doctrine deals with military means of state. The new doctrine appears to lower the threshold for Russia's use of nuclear weapons below what was stated in the 1997 National Security Concept. Whereas the 1997 Concept allowed the first use of nuclear arms only “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation,” the new doctrine allows nuclear weapons use “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” It also explicitly states for the first time that RF “reserves the right” to use nuclear weapons to respond to all “weapons of mass destruction” attacks. Furthermore, the doctrine reiterates Russia's negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states and reaffirms Russia's extension of its nuclear umbrella to its allies (Military Doctrine 2000, Section 8). 4. 2. 3 Foreign Policy Concept 2000The Foreign Policy Concept employs the political and diplomatic means to the Russia's ends. The new Concept states that certain negative tendencies in international politics, in contrast with the expectation of intensified international cooperation listed in 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, compelled Russia to review its foreign and security policies. In 2000 Concept, Russia is a great power and its cooperation with partners from Asia should be enhanced. In contrast, the Western security policies are described with a strong aversion: “NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them”, and Russia “retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO”. However, the problems of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of WMDs can be according to the Concept resolved only in cooperation with the US (The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation 2000). 4. 2. 4 ConclusionsThe three documents released during the presidency of Vladimir Putin reflect the trends he set: growing assertiveness of Russia in the international realm, more pragmatic attitude toward West and its newly discovered Asian partners, using the energy resources as a tool of foreign policy and coercion, and the stress on possible use of military means. The 2000 National Security Concept and the 2000 Military Doctrine even newly openly permit the use of nuclear weapons to counter weapons of mass destruction attacks. Contrary to the earlier documents, which looked at the international development generally optimistically and were occupied mainly with the internal problems to Russia's security, a new Putin's edition describes a rise in external military threats, such as NATO's expansion. Although the documents admit that in the field of arms control the cooperation with West, namely with the US, is a must, the Western security policies in general are described as “sometimes contradicting” Russia's national interests. Russia is viewed as a great power and its cooperation with Asian partners should be promoted. More self-confidence and assertiveness in promoting its interests in fruits of Russia's military thinking is demonstrated. 4. 3 Towards Arms Control and Disarmament64During the first Putin's “double-term” in office, there were two main arms-control achievements: the less significant, but global UN Resolution 1540 that commits states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and to establish domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking, and encourages strong international cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation65; and the more important, though bilateral, SORT process. 4. 3. 1 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)In 2002, the United States and Russia decided to conclude the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Under SORT, the two countries are obliged to limit their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Nevertheless, the treaty expires that same day, freeing up both countries to expand their arsenals afterward if they choose so. The US completed its reductions to 2,200 strategic deployed weapons over three years early (in December 2009). Surprisingly, the SORT Treaty does not include any verification regime. Alternatively, it relies on the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’s (START I) verification measures – information exchange, regular visits, and monitoring each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. Because START expired in December 2009, in April 2010, the United States and Russia signed a new successor to the original START accord (USA Today 2011). The assessments of the US and Russian arms control communities were fairly unambiguous in respect that the Moscow Treaty left much to be desired on counting rules, the speed of reductions, and transparency and verification measures66. Because it did not call for the destruction of downloaded warheads, the agreement left Russia, which was being forced to reduce its deployed arsenal for economic reasons, facing USA that would be capable of rapidly reconstituting its forces. According to Kuchins (2002), Russia had a choice between a disadvantageous treaty or no treaty at all; put in different words, between accepting a lightweight treaty that allows maximum flexibility for both the US and Russia, or risking the complete demise of the nuclear arms reduction treaty regime. At least, this treaty’s minimalistic outline gave Russia some benefits, such as the ability to keep MIRVs in its arsenal. John Holum (2002), former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, explained Russia’s options: President Putin came to the negotiating table with virtually no leverage. He could not bargain warhead numbers down because it has long been obvious that Russia cannot afford to maintain its existing forces and, in fact, Moscow has for years been pushing for a lower number than the United States would accept. Previously, Putin’s main leverage to extract lower numbers and other concessions had been his ability to withhold amendment of the ABM Treaty, but that card evaporated in December when President Bush gave notice of U.S. withdrawal from that treaty. Kuchins (2002) quoted in his article some Russian authorities: Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov: “Neither side, neither Russia nor the United States, surrendered any national interests while drafting this agreement…. This agreement is the result of a compromise, like any other international agreement.” Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov evaluated the situation a little more honestly in simply concluding, “It was the most that we could get.” Alexei Arbatov, deputy chair of the Duma Defense Committee, reached the same conclusion, but argued that Russia had weakened its bargaining position by announcing its reductions plans and failing to proceed more rapidly in the development of the Topol-M force, a weapon that he insists is a generation ahead of the Americans’. According to him, if Russia had proceeded more aggressively with the Topol-M, the United States would have likely taken a softer stance both on the ABM Treaty and arms reduction talks. Kuchins found it doubtful. But Russian acquiescence on the ABM Treaty withdrawal and a suboptimal strategic reductions treaty represented more than just a bitter psychological pill that the Russians have been forced to swallow because of a power imbalance. It also reflected Russia’s increasingly pro-Western foreign policy, as discussed above. Three days before opening of official Russian-US in Septeber 20, 2002, consultations on the new arms-control treaty, Sergei Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a detailed interview (Intyerfaks 2009) in which he talked about details of the Russian position. Nothing particularly new, but this detail was interesting - asked about the future of the Moscow treaty, Ryabkov categorically said that this treaty cannot exist after expiration of START: “Without START, the Moscow treaty is a meaningless text.” The Moscow treaty was supposed to rely on START for verification procedures. Pavel Podvig, Russia's analyst, did not think that it was correct to say that the Moscow treaty does not exist without START. It had separate ceilings and its own counting rules of sort, the “operationally deployed nuclear warheads”. Of course, Russia never liked this concept and never accepted its US definition. This probably explains why Ryabkov was so emphatic about this issue - he was concerned that when START is gone this would be the only "legally-binding" definition that is out there. Hence, Podvig considered keeping START with its definitions and rules in force a good idea. Podvig concluded with stating that “Russia should have thought twice before rejecting the option of extending the original treaty” (Russian Strategic Forces 2009).
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