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World view, Interests, Threats, Ends, Ways, and Means in Russia's Security Documents, 2008 – 2012
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- 5. 2. 1 2008 Foreign Policy Concept
- 5. 2. 2 “2020 National Security Strategy” 74
- 5. 2. 3 2010 Military Doctrine
- 5. 2. 4 Conclusions
- 5. 3 Towards Arms control and Disarmament
- 5. 3. 2 “New START” Treaty
5. 2 World view, Interests, Threats, Ends, Ways, and Means in Russia's Security Documents, 2008 – 2012President Medvedev proved to be active in introducing new security documents as well as in plans for military reform and modernization of Russia's armed forces70. He released three major theoretical documents – 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, and National Security Strategy until 2020 with long-term objectives, and 2010 Military Doctrine. Table 16: Chronology of leading policy documents of the RF and statements on security issues (2008 – 2012)
Source: Haas 2010: 83; Fyedyeral'niy zakon “O byezopasnosti” 2010; Arms Control Association 2010 5. 2. 1 2008 Foreign Policy ConceptShort after Medvedev took his office, he introduced a new 2008 Foreign Policy Concept73 and National Security Strategy until 2020. Among the basic objectives, Medvedev's FPC (2008) mentions the following: safeguarding the security of the country, strengthening its sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its position as “one of the influential centers in the world”; creating good conditions for Russia's modernization, raising standards of living, consolidating society and securing the competitiveness of the country; promoting a “just and democratic world order” based on international law; creating good relations with neighbors and reducing conflict potential the in adjoining regions and other parts of the world; seeking consensus with other states and international bodies; the reiteration of defending the “rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad” and promoting Russian culture abroad; creating “an objective perception of Russian Federation in the world as a democratic state” with an independent foreign policy. The above goals are repeated in the National Security Strategy, though, internal security was given more space, especially, in proposals for a new security system. According to Oldberg (2010: 31), the Concept is mainly concerned with Russia's state interests and its status in the world. The calls for democratic order or multipolarity are directed against the dominating position of the United States. External security is placed before economic development, which is largely perceived as means to an end. There is a risk of conflict between promotion of the primary goal of strengthening Russia as one of the power centers in the world and defending the Russians abroad on the one hand, and territorial integrity and the seeking of consensus with other states on the other. Russia is claimed “sovereign democracy”, that must be respected abroad; as an alternative opposing the Western value system. The 2008 Concept continues the bridging character of Russia with political interests stretching across the Eurasian continent. Russia is ready to take a common action on both regional and global level. No surprisingly, priority is given to the adhering regions (excluding Baltic region), and further NATO enlargement is described as a “serious threat” to Russian security (Kontsyeptsiya vnyeshnyey politiki Rossiyskoy Fyedyeratsii 2008). In this period, a shift from Euro-Atlanticism of the early nineties to the neo-Eurasianist realpolitik reflected in strategic documents can clearly be observed. After the conflict with Georgia in summer 2008, Medvedev added new five leading principles: (1) primacy of international law; (2) multipolar world (directed against the US primacy); (3) friendly relations with other states (the states in Russia's friendly organizations and regimes); (4) protection of Russians everywhere; and (5) marking some regions as “regions of privileged interests” where the rights of Russians should be defended primarily (regions adjacent to Russia's borders) (Oldberg 2010: 31–32). 5. 2. 2 “2020 National Security Strategy” 74Compared to the 2008 National Security Concept, the National Security Strategy until 2020 is concerned with a longer-term outlook. 2020 Strategy, for example, newly echoes the recently emerged security environment and threats as cyber-crime and “illicit activity in the sphere of high technology”75. Russia's priorities are a secure state, promotion of Russia's interests abroad, economic development, and newly, social security. The stress is also on the energy sources, and in this regard, the stratetic regions. Otherwise the 2020 Strategy reiterates the interests and threats already mentioned in 2008 Concept. In the long term, the Russian Federation will seek to construct international relations based on the principles of international law, and on the institution of reliable and equal security of nation-states. For the defense of its national interests, Russia, while remaining within the boundaries of international law, will implement a rational and pragmatic foreign policy, one which excludes expensive confrontation, including a new arms race (Paragraph 13, National Security Strategy until 2020 2009). Obviously, with the world financial crisis and the decrease of prices of oil, the Strategy (2009) states a goal of transforming the Russian Federation into a world power, “whose activity is directed at supporting the strategic stability and mutually beneficial partner relationships within the multipolar world”. Contrary to the earlier documents, Russia is not anymore “maintaining its power status” but striving for it again. On a different place the Strategy states that “during the period of realization of this Strategy Russia will undertake all necessary efforts, with minimum expenditure, to maintain parity with the United States of America in the area of strategic offensive arms, given a situation in which the USA is unfolding a global missile defense system and implementing a global “lightning strike” concept using nuclear- and non-nuclear-equipped strategic bombers”, and rejects any further eastern enlargement of NATO. Russia also openly admits “the position of adherence to arms control and rational sufficiency in military construction” which is an unpleasant result of economic constraints. Again, there is an emphasis on economic development and fight against terrorism and proliferation of WMDs which is a common interest with the West. The general strategic direction of 2020 Strategy is, however, towards the East. Albeit, the doubts about development in the West are also expressed: “Negative influences on the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies are aggravated by the departure from international agreements pertaining to arms limitation and reduction […]” which is refers to the demise of ABM treaty. 5. 2. 3 2010 Military DoctrineSigned by President Medvedev in February 2010, this document is more focused on the military aspects of security (the means) and army reform than the broader National Security Strategy. The Doctrine opens by stating that although a major war has become less likely, Russia's security situation has not improved, given a significant number of external military dangers. According to Chirkova (2008), of the 11 threats listed, 5 are related to NATO and the US76. The text points to the opportunities for cooperation and attaches a special importance to military cooperation with Belarus and the CSTO. A number of threats are said to require cooperation with western countries, including terrorism, the situation in Afghanistan, the proliferation of WMDs and frozen conflicts in the Russian neighborhood. Russia seems open to cooperation on arms control, missile defense and peacekeeping operations led by the UN. Contrary to its predeccessors, the 2010 Military Doctrine increases the number of circumstances that are said to justify deploying Russian troops abroad77. Furthermore, under Russia’s standing Military Doctrine, “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to aggression against the Russian Federation that utilizes conventional weapons that threatens the very existence of the state” (Article II, paragraph 16 of Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Fyedyeratsii 2010). 5. 2. 4 ConclusionsIn the most recent strategic documents, there are two most striking changes as a consequence of conflict in Georgia, economic crisis, and other developments in the international environment: first, the documents were accordingly adapted to the new international challenges; and second, there is a shift from Euro-Atlanticism of the to the neo-Eurasianism. The conduct of war is now to be tightened to a reform in military thinking toward more effective and less costly military campaigns. The nuclear backup, however, remains in place. The Russia's leadership is aware of the weaknesses of its military; thus, they induce new scale of responses to the threat of terrorism, proliferation of WMDs and threats emanating from unstable regions adjacent to Russia's borders, including the NATO's extension in what Russia still sees as its sphere of influence. Regarding terrorism and WMDs proliferation, Russia seeks to cooperate with West. Otherwise, NATO is viewed as a competitor in striving for Russia's territorial security and better international status. Therefore, Russia seeks the partners for security cooperation in Asia. The only difference in general tone of security documents between current and the Putin's editions is that Russia now demonstrates that it is even more willing to use its military means, including the nuclear weapons and WMDs, to face the threats to its national interests. 5. 3 Towards Arms control and Disarmament5. 3. 1 CFE in DeadlockOn July 13, 2007, Russian president Vladimir Putin announced that his country was going to suspend78 CFE Treaty as of December 12 of the same year (Hartmann 2009: 52). This step, together with Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Osetia as independent states in the follow-up of the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, cast a long shadow over the future of the CFE Treaty (Witkowski, Garnett, McCausland, 2010: 1). Consequently, the Russian government officially suspended implementation of the Treaty on December 12, 2008 (Arms Control Association 2010). As a result, the frequently updated Vienna Document has remained as the only vehicle of conventional arms control, verification and confidence-building measures, which, compared to the CFE Treaty regime, is relatively weak and inefficient. Moscow repeatedly contends that the NATO countries, led by the US, are unjustifiably delaying ratification of the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty and, thereby, endangering Russian security. In return, the NATO allies have claimed that they will not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty until Russian Federation withdraws its forces from republics Georgia and Moldova; the Russian leadership argues that these issues should never be linked. In meanwhile, Russia continues to implement the Open Skies Treaty, another European security instrument, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all participating states (Arms Control Association 2010). According to one of the most recent press releases from the White House on matters of CFE in 2011, Washington “will continue to implement the Treaty and carry out all obligations with all States Parties other than Russia” and will not exceed the pact’s numerical limits on conventional armaments. The United States would resume full CFE Treaty implementation “if Russia resume[d] implementation of its Treaty obligations”. In early 2010, the Obama administration sought to resolve the CFE dispute through suggesting a “framework” for a new round of negotiations to support and develop the CFE Treaty regime. But by mid-2011, the talks stalled as Russia did not agree with a principle of host-country consent, or to a resumption of compliance with the original CFE Treaty (Kimball 2011). Since then, no significant change has happened in the CFE process.
5. 3. 2 “New START” TreatyTreaty known as a New START (officially Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) signed up on April 8, 2010 in Prague, commits both sides to reduce their arsenals to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within the next seven years. Additionally, it restores many of the verification tools from the original START (Arms Control Association 2010). The 10-year treaty, which can be extended by another five years, entered into force when the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchanged the ratification papers with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of an international security conference in Munich on February 5, 2011 (USA Today 2011). Before signing the new START treaty in 2010, Russia had an extensive, albeit aging, force of silo- and mobile-land based intercontinental ballistic missiles79. Russian leaders were also referring about the development other missile-related systems, such as a hypersonic glide vehicle that would be capable of penetrating anti-missile systems that the US was developing and deploying. Russian Federation has abided by Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty prohibitions80, but Moscow also has suggested it might withdraw from the accord because its neighbors were acquiring types of missiles that are forbidden to Russia. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty (Arms Control Association 2010). The New START treaty is widely assessed as a first step in a process that seeks to involve other nuclear weapon states in future nuclear arms control negotiations. As such, it is important that the US and Russia continue to release detailed information on the status of their nuclear forces (Kristensen 2012). On the Russian side, there is an obvious effort to carry on in process of retiring many of its older strategic systems. The New START has also its critiques. For example, former American presidential candidate Mitt Romney finds 8 problems with the New START: (1) It accedes to Russia’s insistence that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense. (2) In signing both the 2002 Moscow Treaty and New START, the US ignores Russia’s tactical-nuclear-weapons advantage (Russian-military spokesmen have asserted that they will rely on their tactical nuclear weapons to dominate regional or local conflicts near their borders). (3) Prior to the New START negotiations, the Russian press projected that by 2012, Russia would have fewer than 500 launchers and 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons (using New START counting rules) solely because of the aging of its systems. The New START limits therefore do not require a change of course for Russia. With regard to launcher limits, Russian officials have confirmed that they will not need to make any reductions whatsoever. (4) Failing of the Treaty to count multiple warheads on bombers makes the Treaty’s announced warhead limits virtually meaningless in any case: Russia can effectively escape the limit of 1,550 by deploying long-range bombers with many nuclear weapons. (5) The absence of any mention of rail-based launchers should be remedied (if Russia again inaugurates a rail program, as some articles in the Russian press have suggested it might, rail-mobile ICBMs would count toward the treaty’s arsenal limits). (6) New START gives Russia an incentive to MIRV its weapons. (7) The New START verification program is inadequate. (8) Russia succeeds in restricting not only our strategic nuclear capacity and missile-defense program but also our strategic conventional capability. Any of American existing land- or submarine-based launchers fitted with conventional weapons counts toward New START’s launcher limits (Romney 2010)81.
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