Russian Attitude towards Arms Control and Disarmament under President Putin (2000 – 2008)

4 Russian Attitude towards Arms Control and Disarmament under President Putin (2000 – 2008)

At the beginning of the new millennium, the Russian Federation was, in general, considered one of the great powers in the world again, and has been, as such, of a key importance to European security environment. Russian foreign policy under President Putin could be described in one word: pragmatic. Its head-goal continuously aims to increase Russia's standing as a great power. Russia's foreign policy became visibly more self-confident, assertive and ambitious due to its growing economic importance and concentration of political power. Simultaneously, the deep changes in the international environment offered a wide range of opportunities that Russians could exploit. There, however, by now remains a gap between Russian ambitions and results (Oldberg 2010: 30).

Since at least 1999, when Putin first came to power, much of the arms control analysts have cautioned that the US plans to develop and deploy national missile defense would drive another wedge between Russia and the US (to say nothing of the nonproliferation regimes). The Russians have repeated over and over the mantra that the ABM Treaty was “the cornerstone of strategic stability” and, if the United States abandoned it, the entire system of arms control would fall apart. Russian President Vladimir Putin, like his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, warned his American counterparts that the unilateral action on the ABM Treaty would get an “adequate response” from the Russian side – a warning that various analysts interpreted as including a variety of measures, such as withdrawing from the START regime; putting MIRVed warheads on the Topol-M ICBMs; strengthening ties with China or Iran; and withdrawing from cooperative threat reduction programs to secure Russian weapons and fissile materials. For example, Russia tested a new intercontinental ballistic missile, which can be armed with up to 10 warheads in June 2007. On the following press conference (BBC 2007), Putin defended Russia's actions, insisting they were not the “initiators of this new round of the arms race”.

Our American partners have left the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. [...] We have warned them then that we will come out with a response to maintain the strategic balance in the world.

The final reaction from the Russians was, surprisingly, much more open-minded. With the ABM Treaty dead and NATO inviting the Baltic states to join its next round of enlargement, Russian-West relations have become comparatively better than any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin made it clear that the priority is improving mutual relations with NATO and the US and supporting the counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. To understand the response of the Putin administration to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty we must take into account the attacks of September 11, changing Russian foreign policy priorities, the post-Cold War structure of the international system, and Putin's domestic and foreign political context (Haas 2010; Kuchins 2002).

There is also an increasing tendency in Russia to view the West, notably the United States, as a key security partner in Eurasia. This was most vividly demonstrated by the strong coincidence of interests between Russia and the United States in overthrowing Taliban and destroying the bases and training camps of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There are real dangers and threats emanating from Russia’s southern periphery including terrorism, religious extremism, and drug trafficking. Russia recognizes that it shares an interest with the United States in addressing these threats in Central Asia, including Afghanistan and the Caucasus, and it realizes that alone it does not have the resources to guarantee security and stability there. Concomitant with these developments is the view that the West is no longer a direct threat to Russia. The mentality of the Russian military leadership was shaped and trained in an environment when the West was the primary threat, and security documents approved in 2000 (2000 editions of the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept) in the wake of the Kosovo conflict still identified the hegemonic and unbridled power of the USA as a major threat to Russian interests. But increasingly, the formative military experiences of the Russian military leadership have been conflicts in the south, beginning with Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya (Kuchins 2002).

Putin’s foremost preoccupation is the economic recovery and modernization of Russia, and he clearly understands that the West is an essential partner for success in this task. Not only will continuous and stable economic growth be essential for his own political future, but Putin knows that only through strengthening its global economic position Russia can fully restore its place as a respected power in the international system⁵¹. The closer economic (and energetic) and, thus, political ties with the EU could possibly weaken the relationship between Europe and USA (in terms of “divide and rule” political strategy). The development in 2003 Iraqi coalition promoted the Russian foreign policy principle of multipolarity as the foundation of international politics, reinforcing Russia's status as a great power (Haas 2010: 156 – 157).

Russian acquiescence on the ABM Treaty withdrawal and a suboptimal strategic reductions treaty reflects Russia’s increasingly pro-Western foreign policy. If the West is not a potential adversary in any foreseeable future, there is no need for Russia to maintain an anachronistic nuclear posture that emphasizes the ability to destroy the United States (which brings us to the Colin Gray's arms-control paradox). In accepting ABM Treaty withdrawal and signing a new arms-control agreement, Putin has effectively agreed with the Bush team’s assertion that nuclear issues, offensive and defensive, are now a relatively smaller piece of a broader and deeper Russian-US relationship. A concise explanation of why Putin had agreed with the nuclear arms reduction treaty was offered by Russian newspaper “Izvestia” commentator Georgy Bovt (2002):

By signing such a treaty, Putin does not simply bow to the necessity of taking into account the new realities and limited financial capabilities of the country but tries to literally push Russia into a new relationship level with the United States and the entire world […]. The real threats to Russia these days are coming not from the West but from the South […]⁵².

The conclusion one can draw from the Russian positions on the ABM Treaty and signing of the Treaty of Moscow is that Kremlin was taking a major step toward getting beyond the parity paradigm that characterized the Russian-US nuclear relationship. The Treaty of Moscow maintained the appearance of parity, which remains important for some of Putin’s domestic political constituencies such as military, but in practice it allowed both the Russians and the Americans a great deal of flexibility to pursue their own nuclear strategies. Because of financial constraints, Russia deployed fewer warheads than the United States. Nuclear parity in old-fashioned sense therefore no longer exists (Kuchins 2002).

The Putin's second term (2004 – 2008) is characteristic with much more assertive stance to the West. The most likely reasons for this change were, first, the regime changes in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and their subsequent interest in joining “western clubs”; and second, increasing oil and gas prices in Putin's second term strengthened the Russia's economy and enabled him to advance more independent (on economic ties with the west) foreign policy course. This was reflected in further cooperation with like-minded states in Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)⁵³, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)⁵⁴; and by signing a strategic partnership with China. Conversely, this more independent attitude toward West was revealed by rumbling against the UK/US invasion of Iraq in 2003, in sharp opposition against NATO extension (especially of the Baltic states in 2004 and the prospect of membership for Georgia and Ukraine), as well as against the US missile shield in Europe⁵⁵. This policy was additionally oriented on showing off the (regained) power status of Russia. These three issues have demonstrated the traditional Moscow's mindset – in figures of speech such as “encircling of Russia” (with military bases and the missile shield); in fear for the alien (the alleged threat of the shield and the refusal of western states to sign Adapted CFE Treaty); in belief in Russia's superiority (nuclear deterrent affected by the shield, introduction of “invincible” nuclear forces in retaliation); in attempts to split the West (by proclaiming the anti-missile system as a threat to Europe); and by using coercion (by threats of suspending CFE – which actually happened in 2007, threats of pointing nuclear weapons at Europe, or deploying them in Kaliningrad, and cutting energy transports to the Czech Republic after its acceptance of deployment of the shield on its territory) (Haas 2010: 157 – 158). In February 2007, at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, Putin openly criticized what he called “the United States' monopolistic dominance in global relations”, and “its almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations”. He concluded that as a result “no one feels safe! [...] Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race” (Putin 2007).

Despite growing friction between Russia and West, their relations have remained virtually untouched by it in many areas. Russia has needed the Western support and Western markets for Putin's ambitious domestic modernization project that was the priority of his second term in office. The West has still needed Russia to assist in the global campaign against terrorism and its energetic resources. Also the stability in the increasingly volatile CIS, which borders the EU and NATO, cannot be achieved without Russia's constructive cooperation with West (Strategic Survey 2003: 116).

4. 4. 1 Domestic Influences

   1. 4. 1. 1 Political Situation, Civil-Military Relations and the Role of Military-Industrial Complex

In reviewing Putin’s policies on nuclear security in his first presidential term, his motivations cannot be understood without taking into account his domestic political context. The decisions Putin made not to stand up to the actions of the Bush administration excessively loudly could be seen as an attempt to deflect attention from what might seem like political miscalculations. According to Andrew Kuchins (2002), the director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a plausible explanation is that the new and inexperienced Russian president did not feel politically powerful enough to make a bold deal with the Americans in 2000. In an environment of high anti-Americanism in influential Russian circles in the wake of the war in Kosovo, the new president’s popularity was more likely to grow if he was seen as standing tall against the Americans and not budging from defending Russia’s national interest in preserving the “cornerstone of strategic stability,” the ABM Treaty. There was no or very little domestic political advantage for Putin in making a compromise on a modified ABM Treaty that would allow for the United States to pursue a limited national missile defense.

Since September 11, terrorism has moved to the top of the agenda for the United Stated. And, certainly since the terrible events in Russia in August and September 2004 (the destruction of two civilian planes by hijackers and terrorist attack in Beslan)⁵⁹ terrorism has become one of the top issues for Russia too. Putin’s orientation after 9/11 has been well rewarded, as he could make a good argument that Russia was now getting from the West as much as it was giving. First, there was the nuclear arms treaty – SORT treaty, rather than a mere assurance. Second, there happened to be a potentially tighter institutional relationship between Russia and NATO in light of anti-terrorist cooperation. Finally, Russia has been recognized as a market economy by both the European Union and the United States that presented the important steps in accessing the World Trade Organization. And in July 2002, Russia was recognized as a G-8 full member, beginning in 2006. On domestic scene, the nuclear question is not unimportant, but it is not as important as economic recovery and prosperity for Russia. Not only has Putin realized that his personal political future depends on the latter, but so does Russia’s return as an influential major power (Kuchins 2002).

After the reelection in March 2004 Putin felt much more comfortable in his presidential chair. Already in his first term, Russia has been following a path of reforms aimed at restraint of democratic institutions, such as freedom of the press, autonomy of business, multiparty system, existence of opposition, and even regional elections (McFaul 2004). These increasingly undemocratic trends and reforms, have contributed to a shift in the view of Putin among the Russian liberal elite – from a more favorable to a more hostile perception, and a rise of a public criticism of Putin's government (Aslund – Lipman 2004). The list of Putin’s attacks on democracy is strikingly long – inhumane war in Chechnya; control of all national television networks; emasculated power of the Federation Council; tamed regional barons who once served as a powerful balance to Yeltsin’s presidential rule; use of law to jail or chase away political foes; removed candidates from electoral ballots; harassed and arrested NGO leaders; and weakened Russia’s independent political parties. International election observers came to conclusion that the parliamentary vote in 2003 and the presidential vote in 2004 were not democratic. Russia’s parliament, which happened to be completely in Putin’s pocket, has floated several anti-democratic pieces of legislation, for example, a very restrictive law to limit public demonstrations and a bill that would make it nearly impossible to hold national referenda (McFaul 2004). The new rulers talked of democracy and the rule of law only because these are fashionable slogans, but in effect, they have never accepted them as utterly unsuited for Russia. When they are feeling cocky, as Putin was during a dinner he gave in 2007 for foreign journalists, they do not hesitate to mock such Western concepts in public.

Of course, I am a pure and absolute democrat. The tragedy is that I am alone. I am the only such pure democrat. There are no such other democrats in the world. Let us see what is happening in North America: just horrible torture. The homeless. Guantanamo. Detentions without normal court proceedings. After the death of Mahatma Gandhi, I have nobody to talk to.
Putin's crew have believed that Russia is a great country that had fallen on hard times, but that they would raise it again to its proper rank as a global power and the rest of the world had better pay attention. To this end, they would defend it from all challengers, domestic or foreign (Pipes 2008: 36).

Thanks to the better economic situation, the military-industrial complex continued to increase its output. Putin has set the trend of further centralization of sector and moving the sector's control under the auspices of state. The functions and responsibilities of some of the most important military agencies and enterprises were consequently transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Energy under the authority of the Federal Industry Agency (FAP) (Global Strategy 2012).

2. 4. 1. 2 Economic Situation

Since entering the office in 2000, Vladimir Putin has pushed forward a strong agenda of economic reform. Many of Putin’s economic reforms have been impressive. Since becoming president, Putin and “his Duma” have passed into law a series of fundamental reforms, including a flat income tax of 13%⁶⁰, a reduced profits tax, and new land and legal codes. Under Putin, the Russian government balanced the budget several years in a row and has no longer been relying on loans for support from West. In parallel with these reforms, Russia’s economy boomed. Sparked by the devaluation of the ruble in 1998 and then rising oil prices, the economy grew every year from 1999 until the time of world economic crisis. In 2003, foreign direct investment hit an all-time high, hard currency reserves piled, inflation was modest and real per capita incomes have grown by more than a third in years 2000 and 2004 (McFaul 2004). According to some, the threshold for any reform of military or change in military-industrial complex structure has been directly tied to the price of oil (Brannon 2009: 26; cp. Dolejší 2012). As the table below shows, the military expenditures experienced a steady rise from 2000, after Putin became a president, to 2008, as Russia's economy was boosting.

Despite the booming prices of oil at the time of Putin's presidency, compared to its western competitors, Russia has remained a relatively poor country. For example, World Bank calculations for 1999 have showed that the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was in 2002 as more than 20 times the size of that of Russia; even adjusted for purchasing power parity, the U.S. GDP is 9 times that of Russia (Kuchins 2002). However, Russia has become, right after the US, the second supplier of conventional arms abroad. From 2002 to 2009, Russia committed to selling $ 74 billion in weapons to other states. The top long-term purchasers of Russian weapons are India and China. Additionally, in 2006 Algeria and Venezuela sealed multi-billion dollar weapons contracts with Russia. Consequently, Russian arms sales to Venezuela further increased in 2009, after Russia had agreed to loan $ 2,2 billion to Venezuela for the purchase of heavy weaponry (tanks and advanced anti-aircraft missiles). Western governments and media have often criticized Russia for not being discriminating enough in its arms transactions, bringing up the dramatic increase in sales to Venezuela and transfers to such countries as Iran and Sudan (Arms Control Association 2010). A following table show the steady trend of arms exports from RF (increasing at the beginning with the improvement of economic situation) in years 2000 – 2008.

Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (SIPRI 2012)

This trend reflects the conviction of the ruling political-military-industrial circles that arms sales are a good way to assure the Russia's incomes and a position in the world's affairs. In times of Cold War, Soviets were often using export of arms as a tool of strengthening ties with their allies or friends from number of states and non-state groups, and nothing much has changed in this old Soviet strategy in modern Russia.

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