Towards Arms Control and Disarmament

3. 3 Towards Arms Control and Disarmament

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a need to shape the traditional concept of arms control to meet the very different security challenges. Arms control has gained a new form of promoting positive political change in forums for sustained discussion and cooperation on security issues and projects that get military men from across the Europe and the US working together on shared security problems rather than the old setting the limits on the military forces or activities of potential adversary. For example, the US Congress has earmarked some Defense Department funding for 'safety, security, and dismantlement' of the nuclear weapons of the USSR. In practice that meant help in transporting, storing and destroying weapons, and helping former Soviet nuclear scientists to find other work. A program of buying out the former Soviet nuclear arsenal – helping to pay for weapon destruction or for secure storage of some of the residue and buying fissile material for transformation into commercial fuel, designed by the Bush Administration, earlier unthinkable, could serve as an example of such attitude (Walker 1994: 12, 21). However, there have been critics of the extent of such programs. Considering the financial framework and human resources, some have found these efforts both inefficient and insufficient. Cooperation with the US in arms control offered however more than economic benefits. Yeltsin was, for instance, appealed by the idea introduced by president Bush for a scheme known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). He saw in this cooperation potential for RF to be not only a supplicant but a genuine partner to the US. Thanks to the strong opposition in both states, this defense against limited ballistic strikes never came true. In Russia, there were fears, particularly within the military, that GPALS might endanger the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and become a “stalking horse” for the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 220).

1. 3. 3. 1 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)

The negotiating parties met in 1989 to solve what NATO states considered Europe's major security problem: the Warsaw Pact's³⁶ supposed ability to launch a surprise attack aimed at the conquest of Western Europe with its dominant conventional forces (Hartmann 2009: 52 – 53) (raising, therefore, a question of potential nuclear retaliation). The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a complex instrument compounded from two concentric circles of European security architecture. First circle establishes a military balance between the two groups of twenty-two States of the “West” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and “East” (Warsaw Treaty Organization) by providing equal ceilings for five major conventional weapons and equipment systems, namely for each group in the whole area from the Atlantic to the Urals. The second one brings about a system of confidence- and security building measures in the context of CSCE, later OSCE (since 1995) embodied in the politically binding Vienna Document (VD) concerning a wide range of measures on military security in the entire OSCE area, including the exchange of information on force strengths and defense planning, a consultation mechanism in case of unusual military activity, the prior notification of large-scale military activities, and a verification regime (Hartmann 2009: 54).

According to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: the State Parties³⁷ are committed to the objective of ensuring that the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application of this Treaty do not exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters, […] Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect adversely the security interests of any State, Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional arms control process including negotiations, taking into account future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe, [...].

The main weakness of the Treaty would have been in case of continuing bloc division of Europe the absence of qualitative limits on conventional weaponry, however, the end of NATO – WTO confrontation never made this happen. Respectfully, the limits were on both sides reached partially by elimination of outdated equipment. The treaty as such did not contribute to the reduction of confronting potential; the process of change in Soviet Union did (Kříž 2005: 219). The huge deal of work has been done by the treaty in the area of building mutual trust and cooperative partnership between the former Soviet Union and western states, even if the truly friendly relations remain a distant future.

The Soviet interest in CFE treaty was mainly based upon a need to restrain military spending and to respond to wakening “glasnost” in Soviet society. The reputation of Soviet military in public was sharply deteriorating. The cases of wide-spread hazing and corruption found their way on the pages of newspapers. The strengthening calls for reform of military from public as well as from side of military officials and liberals in Soviet legislative were to be heard. The arms reduction process, as a matter of fact, gave the hand to the Soviet leadership. The Gorbachev's “New Model of Security”, as it soon became known, should have been carried through the unilateral reductions, the cut in the budget and arms procurement, and converting military industries to civilian production (Odom 1998: 183). Hence, the Soviet enthusiasm for hasty negotiation of radical cuts in military was motivated both economically, and socially³⁸.

After the dissolution of Warsaw Treaty Organization, the group ceilings were subsequently translated into national limits for each individual participating state (PS) in the Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, also known as the “Tashkent Agreement”. It also establishes special sub-regions and flank areas where both groups are allowed to keep equal numbers of the mentioned weapons systems, with further provisions on how many items can be kept in active units. Furthermore, the Treaty limited the proportion of armaments to be held by a single country to one third of the total numbers, according to the so-called “sufficiency rule” (the most of European countries today hold armaments well below the original limits). It also established a thorough system of notifications and verifications including on-site inspections for the notified holdings, challenge inspections, and the monitoring of destruction of treaty-limited items. Finally, the Treaty established a body composed of all Treaty members, the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna, as a forum for further consultations (FAS 2011).

Russia took the deepest cuts in its armaments, both because of its share of the reductions necessary to bring the numbers of weapons of the WTO down to the equal NATO-WTO ceilings at very slightly below NATO levels, and later, as the Soviet Union's share of WTO ceilings was in terms of Tashkent Agreement divided among former Soviet republics. Implementation of the CFE Treaty cost Russia, for instance, nearly 70 % of the tanks that it had had in the former European USSR (Walker 1994: 30).

After the signing of the CFE Treaty in November 1990 negotiations were continued on the basis of the CFE mandate in order to deal with the issue of personnel strength. This led to the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A Agreement)³⁹. It was signed in Helsinki on July 6, 1992 on the occasion of the third CSCE Summit. Contrary to the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A was not a legally-binding treaty but rather a political commitment. Both the CFE Treaty and the CFE-1A agreement came into force on July 17, 1992. For the CFE Treaty, as well as the CFE-1A agreement, the limits envisaged were to be legally reached by November 16, 1995. Some 700,000 soldiers were withdrawn from the host countries, accompanied by the removal of some 60,000 pieces of treaty-limited equipment. These actions averted another conventional arms race and brought a high level of security stability (Hartmann 2009: 54). Due to the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, there are currently 30 states parties to the CFE Treaty and CFE-1A agreement (FAS 2011).

In fact, the negotiations among members of the CSCE are not called “arms control” at all. Alternatively, since Helsinki they carry the broader title of the Forum for Security and Cooperation (FSC)⁴⁰. Forum for Security and Cooperation is the successor to the negotiations that produced the 1990 CFE Treaty. The Forum's threefold mandate comprehends not only “a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and-security-building”, but also to intensify “regular consultation and to enhance cooperation among member states on matters related to security” and “to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict” (Helsinki Document 1992, Article V, 8). Furthermore, most delegations to the FSC also represent their capitals at the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) and are therefore involved in the CSCE's ambitious efforts at conflict prevention and mediation. This way of confusing dual structure of FSC and CPC in fact reflects the modern outlook on arms control as part of the process of conflict prevention and crisis management which, to succeed, should: begin with building democratic systems within the Central and East European countries, including civilian control of military; continue the cooperation between the military forces of recently adversarial neighbors; address the military's role in internal conflicts; and should set the role of potential collective military action (Walker 1994: 27 – 28).

On Russia's urging, the original flank rule was first modified in May 1996 consequently to the war in Chechnya and to what Russia saw as a threat to its core interests – further extension of the NATO sphere. Later, the Russian Federation achieved agreement with the Western states on a new process of negotiations on the CFE Treaty. Finally, after some delays in negotiations caused by events in Chechnya and Kosovo, 30 heads of government of PS' signed the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (ACFE) in Istanbul on November 19, 1999. ACFE brought a wide range of modernizing measures; in particular, the national ceilings replaced maximum levels for holdings, and thus, made it possible for former WTO members to join NATO without any violation of the Treaty. Further, the territorial ceilings for combat-critical ground-based weapon systems limited the possibility of concentration of force more strictly and also performed a crisis management role. The further change to the flank rule was a cause of relief for Russia and Ukraine.⁴¹ The stationing of foreign troops became explicitly tied to “host nation consent” (which was crucial, for example, in case of Georgia). The verification regime was also strengthened and other states between the Atlantic and Urals could now join the Treaty.

The AFCE has not entered in force to this day, as it still has not been ratified by the bulk of PS'. The old, obsolete treaty has remained in force, and the necessary changes have not yet taken effect. The longer this situation has continued, the more danger there has been of the entire CFE regime being completely eroded (Hartmann 2009: 55). NATO allies have strongly asserted that the Adapted CFE Treaty should have been brought into force, but have linked its ratification to the resolution of Russia's unfulfilled political commitments made officially at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul as a part of package deal reached in conjunction with the ACFE signature. Foremost, Russia has failed in two of its commitments: a withdrawal of its troops from Moldova, and a closure of its military bases in Georgia (Witkowski, Garnett, McCausland, 2010: 2)⁴².

2. 3. 3. 2 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I)

A few months before signing START I, technical characteristic exhibitions of strategic ballistic missiles and exhibitions of heavy bombers began in September 1991 and were completed in March 1992. The US and Russia also launched eliminating their intercontinental ballistic missiles and launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and launchers, and heavy bombers well in advance of treaty's anticipated date of coming in force. Through the special Lisbon Protocol (1992) to the START I, Treaty signed on May 23, 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine became Parties to the START I Treaty as legal successors to the Soviet Union. Thus, their nuclear weapons were involved in treaty commitments.

The entry into force of START I had been nearly three and half years delayed until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, ratified the treaty and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states. On December 5, 1994, the parties exchanged instruments of ratification at the summit in Budapest. START I should had duration fifteen years and could have been extended for successive five-year periods by agreement among the Parties (FAS 2001a). All nuclear warheads have been consequently removed from Lisbon Protocol states Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Belarus and Kazakhstan almost instantly have eliminated all their strategic offensive arms, while Ukraine was continuing to eliminate its accountably strategic offensive arms for a longer time in dependence on her negotiations with the US and Russia in order to gain financial help and security assurance (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 221 – 222; Kuchyňková 2005: 65).

The treaty sets the limits on ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted accordingly to paragraph 1, Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed 1600 for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and 6000 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers (Paragraph 1, Article III, START I, 1992)⁴⁴. Paragraph 2 of Article III of START I treaty set the time plan of reductions in three phases (Paragraph 2, Article III, START I, 1992)⁴⁵. Paragraph 3 stipulates that the aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons (Paragraph 3, Article III, START I, 1992). The rest of 19 Articles are devoted to clearance of various technical aspects of treaty provisions.

The treaty's requirements have influenced the trends in arms control and modernization processes in Russia. Of the utmost importance was the dramatic cut in numbers of existing carriers, warheads, and their throw-weight; and the ban on development of new heavy ICBMs. Russian forces were committed to reduce the overall throw-weight to 54% of level of September, 1990. In the late 1990s thus continued the reduction of SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs that were later a subject of Russia's unilateral initiative. However, such Russia's steps were in the 1990s interpreted as a reaction on financial straits in Russia's military that required further reductions of outdated technology and investment in maintenance and modernization of perspective systems (Kuchyňková 2005: 66 – 67).

3. 3. 3. 3 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)

The START II Treaty signed on January 3, 1993, codifies the Joint Understanding signed by the two Presidents at the Washington Summit on June 17, 1992. START II eliminates virtually all heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and all other multiple-warhead ICBMS (for the United States the MX ICBM and for Russia its SS 18 and SS 24 ICBMs) by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps. It also reduces the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries, by two-thirds below pre-START levels. START II implements two main phases: by the end of the first one, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800 – 4,250. By the end of the second phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMS, including heavy ICBMS; only ICBMs carrying a single-warhead would be allowed. No more than 1,700 – 1,750 deployed warheads may have been placed on SLBMS, which may have been MIRVed (START II, Article I, Paragraphs 1 – 4).

At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, the United States and Russia agreed in principle to delay the START II deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007. “The Protocol on Early Deactivation” of September 26, 1997, which must have been ratified by each side before entering into force, preserved the accord's original 10 year reduction period, but instead of occurring from 1993 to 2003, the sides now had from 1997 to 2007 to complete the required reductions. It also extends the date by which the interim limitations must be conducted from seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty (December 5, 2001) to December 31, 2004. In addition, the United States and Russia issued a “Joint Agreed Statement” in New York that enables the United States to “download” (remove warheads from) Minuteman III ICBMs under START II “at any time before December 31, 2007”⁴⁸ (Cerniello 1997; FAS 2001b).

In weeks before the final signing ceremony in January 1993, held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, the Yeltsin administration had accelerated its efforts to achieve Duma's support for START II. Yeltsin had carefully involved the Ministry of Defense in the START II negotiations, and, notwithstanding some criticism from right, was able to secure a degree of political coherence with the endorsement of START II by his Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev (1992 – 1996) and Chief of General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov. In return, Yeltsin eventually supported, under the press from military, the revision of the CFE treaty and export of arms (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 224). On September 15, 1997, Yeltsin instructed Primakov and Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev (1997 – 2001) to launch the process of convincing the skeptical lower house of parliament that START II is in Russia's national security interest. During the meeting, Yeltsin reportedly said, “We are secure with 1,000 warheads, let alone with” and “We must prove to the legislators that START II is advantageous and necessary for us.” The next day, Primakov and Sergeyev briefed influential members of the Duma on the foreign policy and military impacts of START II for Russia. Various press reports stated that their ideas had not been not well received.⁴⁹ In contrary to the other high-ranked officials, Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the International Affairs Committee, put emphasis on practical aspects of START II rather than on the emotional background in Russian leadership. He soberly stated that “We do not want to be engaged in politics now. Instead, we must listen very carefully to the top experts in the country on these issues.” The US Senate gave its consent to ratification of the START II Treaty on January 26, 1996, and ratification of the Treaty in the Russian Duma, pending since 1996, was finally completed on April 14, 2000 (Cerniello 1997; FAS 2001b). The broader significance of START II treaty was however overshadowed by a “Moscow Treaty” signed in May 2002 (Kuchyňková 2005: 73).

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