World view, Interests, Threats, Ends, Ways, and Means in Russia's Security Documents, 1991 - 1999

3 .2 World view, Interests, Threats, Ends, Ways, and Means in Russia's Security Documents, 1991 - 1999

After the unexpected breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1991, the Russian Federation became its legal successor state. The Russian military and political representatives believed that the newly borne Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)²⁴ would develop towards an organization similar to that of the Soviet Union, naturally, under Russian leadership. It did not take a long time and the CIS states decided differently – they started to create their own armed forces and independent security policies. Thus, Russia was forced to act similarly. In spring 1992 Russia started to form its own army and Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation. After the abandonment of former dictate of the Marxist-Leninist ideology Russia got in need of basic security and strategic documents for its security policy (Haas 2010: 4).

Since the time of Peter the Great Russia has eyed Europe with some measure of envy, at once as an ally and enemy. In words of director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin, Russia's geopolitical omnipresence goes hand in hand with a profound political solitude (quoted in Brannon 2009: 25). In early 90s, the initial cooperation with West gave way to mistrust and confrontation. Instability in several former Soviet republics triggered the alarm among Russian security professionals. Many have seen the threat stemming from Russia's southern boundaries; others frightened the threat coming from NATO expansion which would eventually shift Western military forces and infrastructure into territory that had been Soviet. There has also been a related trend of growing Russian nationalism which sees the main threat in uncontrolled migration both from and into Russia, and a serious threat of terrorist attacks within Russian borders. Strategically, an attitude towards the outside world based on a strong perception of threat has been consistent since before the Soviet Union collapsed, and continues today (Brannon 2009: 25 – 26).

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, in a December 1992 conversation with his Norwegian counterpart, Johan Jørgen Holst, listed Russia's main security concerns, in order of priority, ballistic missile proliferation, Islamic fundamentalism on Russia's southern flank (not unrelated issues), ethnic tensions, and fourth narcotics smuggling. Traditional arms-control approaches and procedures offered little if anything towards sorting out any of these problems (Walker 1994: 5).

For decades NATO relied on nuclear arsenal to offset Soviet and WTO superiority in conventional forces. Now the situation has changed. The USA in particular and the West in general, have an overwhelming superiority in conventional forces that could be balanced by even a few nuclear weapons. Russian defenders of the old security thinking deemed nuclear deterrence as the only way to prevent the USA from taking every sort of advantage of this period of Russia's instability and weakness (Walker 1994: 15 – 17).

In the 90s, Russian military branches have launched a long process of transition. In its beginning, they had to define their new identities, although the conflicts over a new mission and responsibilities as well as internal power struggles continued to be a distraction. Regardless of the many efforts to change the old Soviet structures, this had not happened. Years of cuts in funding and resources took finally their toll, and the decade of 90s saw Russia's military forces decimated almost in every measurable category. Despite the fact that most of Russia's forces was not fully operational and was barely capable to conduct offensive tasks they remained a formidable defensive asset (Brannon 2009: 25 – 27). Therefore, both the ways and means of reasonable conduct in security area were through the overwhelming chaos, power struggles, and bad economic conditions quite limited. In general, during the 90s there were many serious discussions about Russia's new strategic environment, its interests, perceived threats, ways to solve them, and means at its disposal. The documents which evolved from these debates reflected the uncertainty and confusion that was characteristic of the period.

1. 3. 4. 1 1993 Foreign-Policy Concept

According to the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), Russia is a great power with following foreign policy priorities:

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  ensuring national security through diplomacy;
  
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  protecting the sovereignty and unity of the state, with special emphasis on border stability; protecting the rights of Russians abroad;
  
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  providing favorable external conditions for internal democratic reforms;
  
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  mobilizing international assistance for the establishment of a Russian market economy and assisting Russian exporters;
  
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  furthering integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States
  
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  pursuing beneficial relations with other nearby foreign states, including those in Central Europe;
  
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  continuing to build relations with countries that have resolved problems similar to those that Russia faces;
  
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  ensuring Russia an active role as a great power (Curtis 1996: 436; Kortoonov 2008).
  

The Concept also called for enhanced cooperation with Asian Pacific countries to balance relations with the West. Beginning in 1993, public statements about foreign policy gradually put greater emphasis on the protection of Russia's vital interests and conversely less emphasis on openly pro-Western policies. The 1993 Foreign-Policy Concept called for strengthening a “unified military strategic space” in the CIS and protecting Russia's major interests there. The status of relations with the near abroad embodied in CIS was strengthened after the December 1993 Russian legislative elections, in that nationalist factions expanded their power base. For the conservatives, to maintain Russian dominance was necessary to secure southern borders and to ensure continued access to the waterways, ports, and natural resources of the newly independent states. Some conservatives asserted that Russia's military security required a line of defense along the borders of the former Soviet Union (and even, according to some, to include Central-European countries). A related position called for Russia to counter efforts by countries such as Turkey and Iran to gain power in the new states (Curtis 1996: 436).

2. 3. 4. 2 1993 Military Doctrine

The nuclear part of doctrine included several notable innovations. Particularly, the 1982 Soviet no-first-use pledge was officially revoked. The 1993 Military Doctrine states that the Russian Federation would not employ nuclear weapons against any other state-party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that first, is not a nuclear power, second, is not an ally of a nuclear power, third, is not engaged in joint operations together with a nuclear power in aggression against the RF, its territory, its allies or its forces²⁷. To put it in a different way, Russia would feel free to use nuclear weapons against any nuclear power; any non-nuclear ally of a nuclear power; any non-nuclear non-aligned state, acting militarily together with a nuclear power; and any non-nuclear, non-aligned state, not acting together with a nuclear power, if that state is not a party to the NPT Treaty of 1968 (Arbatov 1997).

The document also states unambiguously: "The goal of Russian Federation policy regarding nuclear weapons is to remove the threat of nuclear war by deterring its initiation against the Russian Federation and its allies."²⁸ After years of, in Arbatov's words (1997), “utopian concepts about substituting deterrence with something different”, this appeared to be “a realistic point, clearing the issue and theoretically allowing a focus on real problems without confusion or wishful thinking”. Further, the strategic requirements were interpreted as “maintaining the structure and state of strategic nuclear forces at a level that will assure inflicting the designated damage on an aggressor under any circumstances.” In comparison to Soviet concepts of “massive”, “crashing”, or “maximum” retaliation, the new goals sound limited and selective, which might indicate a recognition of traditional overstated damage requirements and of the prospects of force reductions (under START-2, or even without it, because of weapons obsolescence and curtailment of modernization programs) (Arbatov 1997).

The Russian Federation's policy regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction consists of promoting the full implementation of CWC, ensuring the compliance with the regime of BTWC, and “preventing the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, storage, or proliferation of means, materials, and technologies which help create these weapons”, and maintaining readiness to counter effectively the consequences of the creation of new types of WMDs (Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 1993). The formulation of the document enshrined the first use of WMD as a legacy of Soviet theory. Apparently, this reservation is retained in response to Russia's uncertainty as to the intentions of three neighboring states Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine that were left with nuclear weapons on their territories after breakup of the USSR. Also Russia's dark suspicions about the nuclear intentions of the US and NATO survived the demise of the Soviet Union (Brannon 2009: 29). The major threats to the RF are in the 1993 MD identified as wars and armed conflicts on its borders, territory, physical attacks on former Soviet bases (“installations”) in the newly independent former Soviet republics that continued to be garrisoned by Russian troops, and a possible threat of nuclear attack by a foreign power. The primary objectives for the armed forces are set as the prevention, early termination, and containment of military conflicts through employment of peacetime standing forces. The underlying goal of document's provisions is the effort to maintain domestic and international political stability on the Russia's borders while the state was consolidating itself²⁹. The document contains no traces of international activism common to its Marxist-Leninist antecedents. It recognizes its international commitments under CIS, CSCE, and those resulting from membership in the UN (Brannon 2009: 28 – 29). In 1993 Military Doctrine, alongside pledges of allegiance to international law and disarmament agreements, there are a plenty of peculiar points. The main points identified by a Russian expert Alexei Arbatov are: (1) an emphasis on rapid deployment of interventionist forces; (2) to be used on post-Soviet territory; (3) a renewal of the traditional accent on offensive conventional operations; (4) legalization of stationing Russian forces abroad (in the CIS), and (5) - what is, according to Arbatov, most striking - of their potential employment in domestic situations. Furthermore, not a single word mentions civilian or Parliamentary control over the armed forces and military policy (the President is the sole chief), military reform, or concrete reductions of force levels (Arbatov 2000).

The military doctrine's treatment of the military of the military-technical and economic foundations of armed forces is the aspect that shows the greatest gap between political intentions and reality. The document describes a policy of preserving a military-industrial base capable of producing modern military equipment in quantity. It also outlines a 10-15 year research, development, and testing and evaluation cycle for the new types of weapons. In the mid-1990s, only fragmentary achievements were visible. Defense policy on the hardware acquisition was thus delayed until a future military doctrine (Brannon 2009: 29).

The “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine” determine the strictly defensive orientation of activity to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies [...] determine ways and means of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation in the transitional period of its development, will be supplemented, adjusted, and improved as Russian statehood is established and a new system of international relations is formed (Conclusion, Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 1993).

The 1993 FPC and 1993 MD were to be parts of a new all-inclusive Russian National Security Concept. In April 1996, the Yeltsin administration released a draft National Security Concept. That document included the renunciation of strategic and military parity with the US, reaffirmation of collective security within the CIS, and continuing support for reductions in nuclear arsenals and domestic military reforms. Ratification of the new National Security Concept was subject to the internal political events of mid-1996, including the presidential election (Curtis 1996: 436).

3. 3. 4. 3 1997 National Security Concept

Russia's influence on international affairs was by that time diminished. Some prerequisites had been created for demilitarization of international relations enhancing the role of law in conflict resolution, and the danger of direct aggression against Russia was not recognized. The country was however suffering by myriad debilitating domestic problems, thus, the greatest potential danger was then internal.

The document (1997) distinguished three levels of national interests: the individual level; level of society; and the threats both on internal and external level of political, economic, social, military, technological, ecological, information, and other character. According to the NSC, there were prospects of integration of Russia into the world economy, including Western economic and financial regimes. At that time, Russia shared common security interests with many states in areas such as nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution, combating international terrorism, and environmental problems (Brannon 2009: 30 – 31). Regarding military policy, the 1997 Concept³¹ served as a justification for downsizing the armed forces, and for the continued future restructuring. By emphasizing domestic rather than foreign threats, it seemed to justify the country's internal security forces relative to regular army. The document also highlighted the importance of strategic forces and again disavowed the no-first-use principle with respect to nuclear weapons. With regard to conventional forces, the concept proclaimed a policy of “realistic deterrence” – leaving any efforts to maintain parity with the conventional armed forces of the world's leading countries. It emphasized the importance of Russian participation in international peacekeeping missions, however, primarily as a mean of maintaining Russia's influence abroad. The document further stated that in preventing conflicts RF would prefer to employ political, economic, and other non-military means. A general program on restructuring the defense industry with the aim of its significant reduction and modernization was also outlined. Nonetheless, defending the national interests would, according to the concept, still require considerable military might.

In framework of domestic institutions, the document reinforces the Russian Security Council as the country's top agency in the formulating and implementing national security policies. The 1997 Concept also underpinned the cooperation between executive and legislative branch (Federation Council and the State Duma), which had complained about its isolation from national security affairs (Brannon 2009: 31 – 33).

The 1997 Concept declared that RF neither had intention of entering into confrontation with any state or alliance, nor did it pursue hegemonic or expansionist objectives (Brannon 2009: 33). Nevertheless, it reiterated the firm opposition to NATO enlargement. The document called for multilateral cooperation in the framework UN and OSCE, as well as for strengthened multilateral efforts in Asia-Pacific region – all ideally under Russia's auspices. The concept thus officially stated what Russia had long been doing in practice. Namely, that Russia would be best served by aggressive diplomacy aimed at winning membership, or increasing influence, in various international organizations, while simultaneously pursuing to make Russia a player of global importance.

4. 3. 4. 4 Conclusions

Since 1993, public statements about foreign policy has gradually put less emphasis on openly pro-Western policies, and conversely, added stress on securing the Russia's great power role in world. The 1993 FPC has launched the trend of looking eastward as it called for cooperation with Asian countries and strengthening in the CIS and protecting Russia's major interests there. The protection of Russian borders and the interests of ethnic Russians and facilities within the borders of former Soviet satellites were taken into account.

The paramount interest of Russia expressed in 1993 Doctrine was to protect Russia from attack in the weakened condition in which it found itself in the early 1990s. The principal threats to the RF were identified as wars and armed conflicts on its borders, territory, or physical attacks on Russian property and “installations” in the newly independent former Soviet republics, and a nuclear attack by a foreign power. Although the RF remained cautious to the US and NATO, the main concern was about the nuclear facilities in the former Soviet republics. The primary objectives was to contain armed conflicts through peacetime standing forces (Brannon 2009: 29). In the 1993 Doctrine, the Soviet no-first-use pledge was officially revoked which was later reiterated in 1997 Concept.

The 1993 Concept and 1993 Military Doctrine were parts of a new all-inclusive Russian National Security Concept. 1997 NSC was concerned with the renunciation of strategic and military parity with the US, reaffirmation of collective security within the CIS, continuing support for reductions in nuclear arsenals, and domestic military reforms (Curtis 1996: 436).

In practice, Russia should have employed aggressive diplomacy aimed at increasing influence in various international organizations, in pursuit of regaining the great power status. The means to face the external military challenges were to be nuclear weapons, while internal threats were to be responded by modernized military. Disarmament and arms control were the means to an end of enabling and smoothing the process of rebuilding the old Soviet system and its adaptation to the new international conditions.

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