[optional: insert company logo] Transport Security Program (tsp) for


Attachment A: Signed statement [s16(1) and r2.05]



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Attachment A: Signed statement [s16(1) and r2.05]


[Optional: Insert Organisation’s logo]

[Insert Organisation’s legal name here]:

is aware of its general responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of aviation security;

has developed an integrated, responsible and proactive approach to managing aviation security within the Organisation;

is aware of, and has the capacity to meet, the specific legislative obligations; and

has taken into account relevant features of its operation in developing activities and strategies for managing aviation security within the Organisation.

[insert Organisation’s legal name here] believes that this TSP gives effect to all of the above obligations.


Signature :




Title :




Date :

(Chief Executive Officer or authorised representative)



Attachment B: Local security risk context statement [r2.49]


Provide a statement outlining the local security risk context for the Organisation, including consideration of its location, and seasonal and operational factors. For example:


The Organisation employs [number] of staff and contractors and cargo is handled at [number] of sites in Australia and operate facilities that handle cargo at the following airports [list sites on airports].

The Organisation regularly handles the following types of cargo from [regular customers / other businesses / freight forwarders / other regulated businesses only / unknown individuals]:

[list types of cargo handled by the Organisation];



The Organisation uses [its own drivers and vehicles / contract drivers / couriers / an AACA / another regulated business] to transport cargo to [another freight forwarder / an express freight forwarder / a CTO / an airline].

The Organisation handles cargo to [Australia only / all countries / countries that might be the target of terrorism or unlawful interference with aviation].

The Organisation [conducts technological examination of cargo / clears cargo from regular customers only / does not clear cargo].

[Organisation’s name] understands that Australia’s National Terrorism Threat Advisory System (NTTAS) informs the public about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia. This system replaced the former National Terrorism Threat System and the Public Alert System in November 2015, merging them into a single, easier to understand system. Information on the new National Terrorism Threat Advisory System, including advice on the current level, is available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/threatlevel .



[Organisation’s name] acknowledges that the NTTAS should inform the development of its local security risk context statement and its security measures and procedures. We acknowledge that this threat is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, and that airports and aircraft have been the target of previous attacks.

The Organisation understands the importance of ensuring that its measures and procedures are suitable to protect its employees, contractors and the broader aviation industry. In preparing this TSP, and in establishing and implementing measures and procedures to address aviation security issues, we particularly considered the following threats of relevance (set out below) and the people, assets and infrastructure that we need to protect.

General threats and generic security risk events of relevance to the Organisation


Source of Risk

Risk Event

Improvised explosive device (IED) consigned in cargo

IED consigned as cargo by known or unknown sender.

  • IED device consigned as a piece of cargo;

  • IED device disguised as a piece of cargo (e.g. a fake laptop);

  • IED device concealed within a piece of cargo;

  • IED device concealed within an object consigned as cargo (e.g. printer cartridges);

IED inserted into cargo

IED placed into cargo for loading on an aircraft by intruder, trusted insider or visitor.

  • IED device placed in cargo item;

  • IED device placed in cargo consolidation;

  • IED device placed in cargo palette, ULD or other container;

  • IED device placed directly into aircraft cargo hold;

Computer network attack

Deliberate disruption of websites or IT systems to cause loss or compromise of information relevant to aviation security.

Hoax threats

Hoax threats used to deliberately cause disruption to services/distract emergency responders.

Theft of business assets

This could include theft of aircraft, ground handling equipment, maintenance equipment, cargo etc

  • Forced entry to terminal building may damage security systems;

  • Damage to or theft of assets may put security of travellers and aircraft at risk.

Acts of vandalism or arson

This might include deliberate damage to cargo or facilities, graffiti etc

  • Could threaten the effectiveness of security systems such as CCTV;

  • could involve consequential damage to access control systems such as fences.

Could also involve individuals with access, or unauthorised access to locations.

Trusted insider

May be an employee, contractor or visitor. Could involve any of the following:

  • Tampering with cargo;

  • facilitating or overlooking the transfer or movement of IEDs in cargo.

  • Facilitating the passage of an IEDs through examination or clearance;

  • causing loss or disruption to computers or networks;

  • inappropriate use of ID to access secure areas without authorisation, or give access to a secure area to another individual;

  • tailgating to avoid access being detected; and/or

  • tampering with security systems.

Terrorist surveillance

This may include the following techniques:

  • visual surveillance, from a distance;

  • visual surveillance, from a static location (e.g. parked vehicle) near facilities;

  • vehicle drive-by or on foot;

  • scanning websites looking for security information.

Attackers may also undertake dry runs. This may involve:

  • threat-testing response time and methods by using false suspect cargo;

  • testing security screening systems.


People, assets, infrastructure and operations that need to be protected


People

The following people are to be protected under this TSP:

Assets

Assets to be protected under this TSP include:

  • Cargo containers and handling equipment;

  • Cargo handling vehicles and cargo transport vehicles;

  • Administrative assets;

  • assets and technology used for screening and clearing purposes; and

  • assets which may be required in an emergency.

Infrastructure


Infrastructure to be protected under this TSP includes:

  • buildings under the control of the Organisation;

  • fences and other structures under the control of the Organisation; and

  • airport facilities under the control of the Organisation.




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