A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950, pp. 339-344. For a brief outline, see Acheson to Bruce, October 27, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:410-412. On the Schuman Plan, see Gerbet, "Les origines du plan Schuman," pp. 199-222, Klaus Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), and William Hitchcock, "France, the Western Alliance, and the Origins of the Schuman Plan, 1948-1950," Diplomatic History 21 (1997): 603-630.
367. British military attaché report, October 30, 1950, and Harvey to Dixon, November 3, 1950, DBPO II, 3:240n, 244. 368. On the EDC, see Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (London: Macmillan, 1980) and Hans-Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler, eds., Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft: Stand und Probleme der Forschung (Boppard: Boldt, 1985). 369. Acheson to Bruce, November 3, 1950, Spofford to Acheson, December 14, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:428-9, 574; Guillen, "Les Chefs militaires français," esp. pp. 8-11; Hermann-Josef Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991), p. 113. 371. Harvey to Dixon, October 31, 1950, DBPO II, 3:240. Note also the views of French diplomats in London quoted in ibid., p. 220. See also Massigli, Une Comédie des erreurs, p. 257. 372. Defence Minister to Bevin and Attlee, October 28, 1950, DBPO II, 3:227. 373. For the reference to "tipping the balance," see COS(50)194th meeting, confidential annex, Defe 4/38, PRO, quoted in DBPO II, 3:328n. For various documents reflecting similar concerns, see DBPO II, 3:314, 327-328, 331, 331n., 337-338, 344n., 352 (calendar 133i), 358. Note also Attlee's views in the February 8, 1951, cabinet meeting, Cab 128/19, PRO. 375. See McCloy to Acheson, June 13, 1950, PSF/178/Germany. Folder 2/HSTL; "Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany," NIE 4, January 29, 1951, and "Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany," NIE 17, December 27, 1950, both in PSF/253/HSTL. For the CIA's estimate at the beginning of 1951 that there was a better than 50-50 chance that German rearmament would lead to war with the Soviets, see the summary of the January 25, 1951, NSC meeting, p. 4, National Security Council: Minutes of Meetings (mic.), reel 1. As for the Russian threats, the most important declaration was a Soviet warning of October 19, 1950, which was frequently cited in the documents; for the text, see Beate Ruhn von Oppen, Documents on Germany under Occupation (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 520-521, and for references which show how seriously it was taken, see Clubb to Rusk, December 18, 1950, FRUS 1950, 1:479n; Strang in a meeting with Bevin and other top officials, December 5, 1950, and Bevin memorandum, December 12, 1950, in DBPO II, 3:331, 358. There were also warnings conveyed through more private channels. A Soviet diplomat in London, for example, told a Swiss diplomat toward the end of 1950 that the rearmament of Germany "would be an error similar to the crossing of the 38th parallel by U.N. forces"--an event which, of course, led to Chinese involvement and a transformation of the conflict into a great power war. And a TASS correspondent in Washington told a French diplomat about the same time that if Germany began to rearm, "Russia would strike." Massigli to Foreign Ministry, December 18, 1950, and Bonnet to Foreign Ministry, December 29, 1950, Europe 1949-50/Allemagne/300/FFMA. 376. Omar Bradley, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 519. 377. On this arrangement, the "Spofford compromise," see FRUS 1950, 3:457-595 passim, esp. pp. 457-458, 531-547, 583-595. 378. This point is made in a draft of a dissertation by Norrin Ripsman. To support the point, Ripsman cites a note from the Direction d'Europe of December 5, 1950, in Europe 1944-60/Allemagne/189/FFMA. 379. On the "hardening of the German line," see, for example, the report of the High Commission's December 1, 1950, meeting with Adenauer, calendar 120i, DBPO II, 3:309. See also the Adenauer paper quoted in McCloy to Acheson, November 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:780-781, and McCloy to Acheson, January 16, 1951, reporting conversation with Blankenhorn and Adenauer's Bielefeld speech of January 14, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1452, 1452n. Adenauer's earlier views were laid out in his memorandum on the security question of August 29, 1950, published in Klaus von Schubert, ed., Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumentation 1945-1977, part I (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft, 1978), pp. 79-83, and also in his presentations to the allied High Commission; see especially his remarks in the August 17, 1950, meeting, Akten zur auswäritgen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [AAPBD], 1:222-226. For his acceptance of the general European idea in late 1950 that the real need was to work out some kind of formula that would allow the Americans to begin building up "a strong Atlantic Army in Europe," and that the German defense contribution was not the "important question," see DBPO II, 3:210n. Even in October, Armand Bérard, François-Poncet's deputy, was struck by a certain parallelism between French and German policy: both countries were "preoccupied" by the need to avoid provoking the Soviets before the general power of the West had been built up. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/70/FFMA.For U.S. acceptance of the idea that everything--the question of a German military contribution and the issue of Germany's political relationship to the western powers--had to be worked out in one all-encompassing plan, see Acheson to Embassy in the U.K., December 14, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:801-802. 380. Acheson-Lovett telephone conversation, December 15, 1950, and Acheson to McCloy, December 16, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:579. 381. In December 1950, Acheson briefly considered relinquishing the supreme authority the allies had assumed in 1945, but he quickly drew back from that idea. From that point on, the references were always to "substantial" political equality or to a "large degree of sovereignty." Acheson to McCloy, December 12 and December 28, 1950, Spofford to Acheson, December 13, 1950, Acheson to Embassy in the U.K., December 14, 1950, Acheson in western foreign ministers' meeting, December 19, 1950; in FRUS 1950, 4:797, 799, 801-802, 809, 818. For various other references to the idea of "substantial" sovereignty and similar concepts, see FRUS 1951, 3:814, 840, 849, 850, 1166. 382. Hickerson-Inverchapel meeting, January 21, 1948, FRUS 1948, 3:11. 383. Acheson to Schuman, November 29, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:497. See also Eisenhower's remarks at White House meeting, January 31, 1951, and at North Atlantic Council, November 27, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:450-451, 734. 384. Note especially the U.S. views laid out in an Anglo-American meeting, April 25, 1950, DBPO II, 2:124, and also the PPS discussions, January 18 and 24, 1950, PPS 1947-53, box 32, RG 59, USNA. 385. On the "three circles" concept, see Winston Churchill, "United Europe," November 29, 1951, C(51)32, Cab 129/44, PRO, and also David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 195, 202. Note also Bevin's reference to the Commonwealth, western Europe and the United States as "the three main pillars of our policy," in his May 7, 1950, brief for Cabinet Meeting, DBPO II, 2:261, calendar 74i. For the reference to Britain losing her status and being pushed "back again in the European Queue," see Oliver Franks memorandum, September 27, 1950, and Brook minute of December 16, 1950, DBPO II, 3:114, 383n. On the shift in British defense strategy, see Elliot memorandum, October 19, 1950, DBPO II, 3:178; see also DBPO II, 2:164, 164n. 386. See chapter three, pp. xxx-yyy, above. 387. Bevin memorandum, November 24, 1950, DBPO II, 3:294. 388. Bevin memorandum, November 24, 1950, and Bevin to Franks, November 29, 1950, DBPO II, 3:293, 306. 389. Bevin to Nichols, November 23, 1950, DBPO II, 3:290. 390. Bevin-Spofford meeting, August 23, 1950, DBPO II, 3:4. 391. Cabinet Defence Committee meeting, November 27, 1950, DBPO II, 3:302. 392. Bruce to Acheson, August 1, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:171. 393. On the issue of an eventual German secession, see Schuman to Acheson, January 29, 1952; Bruce to Acheson, February 1, 1952; Churchill-Acheson meeting, February 14, 1952; western foreign ministers' meeting, February 14, 1952; Anglo-American meeting, February 16, 1952; Acheson to Truman, February 16 and May 26, 1952; and Tripartite Declaration, May 27, 1952; in FRUS 1952-54, 5:10, 12-13, 39, 41-43, 46-47, 78-79, 682, 687. 394. Acheson to Truman, FRUS 1952-54, 5:79. 395. For the reluctance of the U.S. military leadership to make a full commitment, see JCS History, 2:385, 392-393; see also Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, vol. 1 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1982), pp. 244-245. The American military authorities made it clear that they wanted U.S. forces to be able to act, if necessary, on a national basis, and indeed it was for this reason that the U.S. European Command was eventually created. Eisenhower in 1951 had resisted that kind of policy, not because the establishment of an American command made any practical difference, but rather because of the symbolism involved: it suggested that the Americans were trying to keep their distance from the integrated NATO system. General Ridgway, who succeeded him as SACEUR, was of a more nationalistic bent, and the JCS view on this narrow issue eventually prevailed. But Eisenhower had been able to make sure that SACEUR would report directly to the president, and that he, and not the JCS, would have direct control over American forces in Europe. See H.H. Lumpkin, "The SACEUR/USCINCEUR Concept" (U.S. European Command, August 1957; Defense Department FOIA release), with the following attached documents: Eisenhower to JCS, October 3, 1951; JCS to Eisenhower, October 5, 1951; Ridgway to Handy, May 31, 1952; Ridgway to JCS, June 11, 1952. The first of these documents was also published in the Eisenhower Papers, 12:592-593; an editorial note (p. 594 n.5) explained Eisenhower's conflict with the JCS and cited some additional documentation. The JCS was quoted there as contending that the U.S. war plan had to be "based upon national considerations alone." The immediate issue had to do with whether the U.S. would be able to plan, on a national basis, for a retreat from western Europe. This issue was resolved by having both a SHAPE plan (which did not provide for troop withdrawals in the event of a war) and a U.S. plan (which did, and to which the European officers at SHAPE were not privy). See ibid., p. 805 n. 2; and JCS History, 4:308. 396. Acheson to Bruce, June 28, 1951, and Acheson memorandum, July 6, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:802, 804, 816. 397. Acheson to Bruce, June 28, 1951; Bruce to Acheson, July 3, 1951; Acheson memorandum, July 6, 1951; Spofford to Acheson, July 8, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:803-804, 806, 814, 818, 822. 398. Acheson to Bruce, July 16, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:835. 399. The Americans now decided to use the term "European defense forces," and not "Army," to underscore the idea that they were now talking about a "military field organization only," rather than a force with a strong political personality. See MacArthur to Perkins and Byroade, July 7, 1951, and Bruce to Acheson, July 15, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:820, 837n. 400. Schuman himself stressed this point in his Strasbourg speech of November 24, 1950; for the text, see L'Année Politique, 1950, p. 381. 401. See Georges-Henri Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996 (Paris: Fayard, 1996), p. 21. 402. It is interesting to note that the military authorities took the lead in arguing that this problem, the absence of a true supra-national political authority to control the European force, was the central flaw in the whole EDC concept. The French military leaders, for example, thought that a European army made sense only in the context of a politically unified Europe, and that if one was to do this at all, one had to begin by creating common political structures. See Guillen, "Les Chefs militaires français, le réarmament de l'Allemagne et la CED," pp. 10, 25, and especially the extract from the notes of the French Chiefs of Staff meetings, February 6 and November 15, 1951, quoted in Doise and Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire, 1871-1969, p. 422. This was also the view of the American military leaders. Eisenhower thought in March 1951 that to set up a European army before there was a real pooling of sovereignty amounted to "putting the cart before the horse," and the JCS was arguing along these lines even in 1950. See Cyrus Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 615, and (for the JCS) Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1:355 (n. 23). 403. Interim report of EDC conference, July 24, 1951, and Acheson and Lovett to Truman, July 30, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:845, 851. For a similar British view, see Spofford to Acting Secretary, November 7, 1951, ibid., p. 913. 404. Tripartite Declaration, May 27, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 5:687; Acheson-Eden meeting, February 16, 1952, ibid., p. 46. 405. For Eisenhower' comment: Bermuda conference, December 5, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1783. See the Annotated Order of Business at Bermuda, c. December 1953, Dulles State Papers [DSP], reel 12, frame 16320, ML, and also Dulles-Mendès meeting, September 27, 1954, p. 4, State Department Conference Files, CF 370, RG 59, USNA, for the U.S. view that the EDC was important for political far more than for military reasons. On the issue of a withdrawal of American troops, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 163-164, 167-168, 185. This issue will be treated in greater detail in the next chapter. 406. NSC meetings, February 26 and March 4, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:1230 and 5:886-890. The assurances were transmitted to the EDC countries on April 15; see DOSB, April 26, 1954, pp. 619-620. 407. See Appendix Three, "The United States, France and the German Question, 1953-54" [IS]. 408. As early as January 1953, Dulles was talking about the importance of frightening the French by raising the specter of a retreat to the peripheral strategy. See State-JCS meeting, January 28, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:712-713. For the threat of an "agonizing reappraisal," see his speech to the NATO Council of December 14, 1953; it was reiterated at a press conference later that day. See FRUS 1952-54, 5:463, 468. See also Dulles-Mendès meeting, July 13, 1954, ibid., p. 1020; NSC minutes, July 16, 1954 (for the quotation in the text), DDRS 1986/1561; and Bonnet to Mendès, August 24, August 27, and September 16, 1954, DDF 1954, pp. 228, 228n., 378. 409. Mendès France to Massigli, August 14, 1954, Mendès France Papers, Box "Accords de Paris," folder "Correspondance avec nos ambassadeurs," Institut Mendès France, Paris. See also a remark of Mendès to this effect, quoted by René Girault, in François Bédarida and Jean-Pierre Rioux, eds., Pierre Mendès France et le mendésisme (Paris: Fayard, 1985), p. 527. 410. NSC meeting, September 24, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1266. 411. See Mendès to Bourgès-Maunoury, August 26, 1954, in Pierre Mendès France, Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, Gouverner, c'est choisir (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p. 249. For Dulles's misunderstanding of Mendès's policy: see Dulles to Dillon, August 12, 1954, and Dillon to Dulles, August 13, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1030, 1032; Mendès to Bonnet, August 13, 1954, and Lagarde to Mendès, November 26, 1954, DDF 1954, pp. 142, 799-800; and Pierre Guillen, "La France et l'intégration de la R.F.A. dans l'OTAN," Guerre mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 159 (July 1990), pp. 78-79. 412. Aline Coutrot, "La Politique atomique sous le gouvernement de Mendès France," in Bédarida and Rioux, Mendès France, pp. 309-316; Georges-Henri Soutou, "La Politique nucléaire de Pierre Mendès France," Relations internationales, no. 59 (Fall 1989); Georges-Henri Soutou, "La France, l'Allemagne et les accords de Paris," Relations internationales, no. 52 (Winter 1987), p. 468. 413. Top Secret Staff Summary, February 5, 1953, DSP/82-83/73328/ML. 414. See his remarks in the National Assembly, December 23, 1954, in his Oeuvres complètes, 3:614. 415. For Mendès's basic thinking, see Massigli to Mendès, August 12, 1954, and Mendès to Massigli, August 14, 1954, Accords de Paris (first box), folder "Correspondance avec nos ambassadeurs," Mendès France Papers, Institut Mendès France, Paris. See also Mendès to Massigli, April 1, 1969 (particularly important for its account of the Chartwell meeting with British leaders on August 25), in Accords de Paris (second box), folder "Polémique Spaak/PMF," Mendès France Papers, and Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs, chapters 11 and 12. 416. Churchill to Eisenhower, September 18, 1954, Eisenhower Papers, 15:1299n. 417. Mendès-Eden-Churchill meeting, August 23, 1954, and Mendès to main French ambassadors, September 18, 1954, Mendès France, Oeuvres complètes, 3:246-247, 317-321; Massigli to Mendès, September 9, 1954, and Parodi to Massigli, September 9, 1954, with Mendès draft proposal, DDF 1954, pp. 308-310, 312-315. For the British view of the EDC, see especially Dulles to Eisenhower, September 18, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1227. Churchill, Dulles reported, had said he was glad the "EDC tomfoolery" was over, that "he had only supported it because" Eisenhower had wanted it, but that he "had never had faith in it." And indeed all along he sought to keep the door open for the simpler solution of admitting Germany directly to NATO. 418. Dulles meeting with State Department officials, August 25, 1954, Dulles-Bonnet meeting, September 14, 1954, Dulles-Adenauer meeting, September 16, 1954, p. 6, DSP/64, frames 62973, 63054 and 63071, ML. Note also the grudging tone of Dulles's remarks at the conference at which the NATO solution was worked out, and also in the NSC meeting of October 6, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1357-61, 1379-82. 419. For the key documents, see FRUS 1952-54, 5:1345-66, 1435-57. One very important document, the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, is not printed here in its final form, although the original May 1952 version appears in FRUS 1952-54, 7:112-118, and the October 1954 amendments are given in FRUS 1952-54, 5:1341-42. For the final text, see Paul Stares, Allied Rights and Legal Constraints on German Military Power (Washington: Brookings, 1990), pp. 91-96. 420. Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, pp. 60-63.There was a good deal of attention paid at the time to polling data, much of it disquieting, tracking the Germans' feelings about the Nazi period. See, for example, "Germans Continue to Like Nazism," Top Secret Staff Summary, January 16, 1953, DSP/82-83/73244-73245/ML. For official U.S. polling data from the period of the military government, see Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970). 421. McCloy to Acheson, August 18, 1951; Acheson-Schuman meetings, September 11 and September 13, 1951; FRUS 1951, 3:1175-76, 1251, 1273. 422. Convention on relations, May 26, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 7:115; McCloy's view cited in High Commission report, August 9, 1951, and Schuman in foreign ministers' meeting, September 13, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1273, 1505. Kidd memorandum, September 10, 1954, and working party report, October 2, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1169, 1341; Ruhm von Oppen, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? 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