Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- 2NC/1NR AT 3—US-China Meet Regularly
- Recently, China has been blocking US diplomatic outreach
- 2NC/1NR AT 4—Reforms Cause Collapse
- Reforms prevent country collapse
- Xi must be strong and follow through on his reforms otherwise China will collapse and go to war
2NC/1NR AT #2—Case Outweighs
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 2NC/1NR AT #3—US-China Meet RegularlyThey say The US and China meet regularly and our DA should have happened, but [GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME] It’s much better than their Lieberthal and Jisi evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME] [CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]: (it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts) (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument) ( ) (their evidence supports our argument) [WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW] This matters because: our link still make sense—Xi loses political capital and our DA impact is accessed.
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader”] Aside from developing stronger ties with other states, an important element of Xi’s multifaceted strategy has been to energetically create and participate in multilateral institutions. Some of these, such as AIIB, will be useful for dispensing geoeconomically oriented loans to neighbors. Even though AIIB is a multilateral lending institution rather than a Chinese government agency, such organizations can still be used for geoeconomic statecraft, especially given that Beijing will retain significant influence in AIIB’s management and operation as well as a veto. For example, China sought to use the Asian Development Bank to deny loans to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state claimed by China. The misguided refusal of the United States to participate in the AIIB’s creation, and Washington’s failed attempt to persuade friends and allies not to join, denied the United States an opportunity to influence the bank’s rules, development trajectory, and China’s potential use of the bank as a geopolitical instrument. Other organizations in which China has been dominant have served to exclude the United States from regional discussions or provided China a forum that parallels and circumvents global institutions, allowing it to pursue its national interests and attempt to reshape global governance. China’s elevation of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence- Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a forum that does not include the United States, gave Xi the opportunity to advocate an “Asia for Asians” and amplify long-standing criticism of U.S. bilateral alliances. Its creation of the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—Development Bank) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) parallels the World Bank and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and offers it the ability to wield geoeconomic influence over others. Although many of these initiatives were conceived under Hu, they were given life by Xi. Because China has historically been hesitant to create and lead multilateral initiatives, this self-assured and multidirectional Chinese behavior is yet another example of increased activism related to Xi’s rise. Xi’s decisive leadership style, his unmatched power within the political system, and his strong desire for vigorous Chinese diplomacy have produced a foreign policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversified across the instruments and targets of statecraft 2NC/1NR AT #4—Reforms Cause CollapseThey say the reforms cause country collapse, but [GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME] It’s much better than their evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME] [CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]: (it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts) (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument) ( ) (their evidence supports our argument) [WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW] and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tao, March 2016 [Xie, Writer for The Diplomat, professor of political science at the School of English and International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University, 3/20, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-do-people-keep-predicting-chinas-collapse/] Gordon Chang may be dismissed as an opportunist who tries to make a fortune — political and/or economic — out of sensational rhetoric about China. But not so with David Shambaugh, a well-respected China scholar at George Washington University who heretofore has been rather cautious in his assessment of China. In a March 6 Wall Street Journal article, he portrayed the Chinese party-state as struggling for its last breath. “The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it has progressed further than many think,” he wrote. “We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase.” Shambaugh’s article was nothing less than a supersize bombshell in the China field, especially in light of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping’s leadership seems to be revitalizing itself through a series of important measures. And these measures — particularly the anti-corruption campaign and the drive for the rule of law — appear to have significantly bolstered popular support for the new leadership. Shambaugh actually published a book in 2008 that offers a rather favorable assessment of the party-state’s abilities to adapt to new challenges in the first decade of the 21st century. It is unclear what caused Shambaugh’s sudden about-face. Some speculate that he was merely trying to get a foreign policy position in the post-Barack Obama administration. Others contend that he is the Chinese version of a “mugged” liberal converted to a conservative, that Shambaugh is deeply upset by Chinese leaders’ intransigence on fundamental reforms. Whatever the motives behind Shambaugh’s nirvana, there is no denying that China is facing myriad daunting challenges. China is sick — but so is every other country in the world, though each country is sick with different symptoms, for different reasons, and of different degrees. Take the United State as an example. The world’s oldest democracy may also strike one as terminally ill: appalling inequality, dilapidated infrastructure, declining public education, astronomical deficits, rising political apathy, and a government that can hardly get anything done. In his bestseller Political Order and Political Decay, Francis Fukuyama described the American body politic as being repatrimonialized, ruled by courts and political parties, and gridlocked by too many veto points. Across the Atlantic, many European democracies are facing similar problems, particularly financial insolvency. Yet nobody has declared the coming collapse of American democracy or European democracy. Why? Because many Western analysts (dating back at least to Seymour Martin Lipset) subscribe to the view that as long as political institutions are viewed as legitimate, a crisis in effectiveness (e.g., economic performance) does not pose fatal threat to a regime. Thus even in the darkest days of the Great Depression, according to this view, America’s democratic institutions remained unchallenged. By contrast, if a regime is already deficient in political legitimacy, a crisis of effectiveness (such as an economic slowdown, rising inequality, or rampant corruption) would only exacerbate the legitimacy crisis. China is widely believed to be a prominent case that fits into this line argument. China might be facing a performance crisis, but whether it is also facing a legitimacy crisis is debatable. Beauty is in the eyes of beholder; so is legitimacy. If the Chinese party-state could survive the riotous years of the Cultural Revolution and the existential crisis of 1989, why couldn’t it manage to survival another crisis? In fact, a more important question for Western observers is why the Chinese Communist Party has managed to stay in power for so long and to produce an indisputably impressive record of economic development. In 2003, Andrew Nathan from Columbia University put forward a theory of authoritarian resilience to explain why the Chinese Communist Party didn’t follow in the steps of the former Soviet Union. In a January 2015 article, he argued that instead of showing signs of an embattled regime, Beijing is actually on a path of authoritarian resurgence, supporting similar regimes and seeking to roll back democratic changes both at home and abroad. One of his central messages is that authoritarian resurgence reflects democratic decline. “Because the appeal of authoritarianism grows when the prestige of democracy declines,” he wrote, “the most important answer to China’s challenge is for the democracies to do a better job of managing themselves than they are doing today.” “All societies, authoritarian and democratic, are subject to decay over time,” wrote Francis Fukuyama. “The real issue is their ability to adapt and eventually fix themselves.” The Chinese party-state is certainly undergoing policy decay — just like most Western democracies — but it is too early to call the Chinese patient terminally ill.
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader", February] This Council Special Report by Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, two experienced practitioners and long-time observers of American foreign policy, is based on a straightforward premise: Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, one who has taken a number of steps to limit collective leadership and the political clout of the army. But the authors also argue that this same concentration of power is a double-edged sword, one that leaves President Xi exposed and potentially vulnerable to internal political challenge. The vulnerability comes from several sources, but none is more critical than a slowing economy. The trajectory of the Chinese economy is the subject of active debate among outside experts, but there is consensus that China is experiencing a substantial slowdown and will not be able to regain the high rates of growth that characterized the last several decades. The report suggests the possibility of greater political repression at home if there are signs the economic slowdown is triggering political instability. But the authors go on to note that Xi may as well be tempted to turn to foreign policy to redirect domestic attention away from a lagging economy, in the process burnishing his nationalist credentials. They anticipate continued Chinese pressure on neighbors in the East and South China Seas and are skeptical China will use the leverage it has over North Korea or assume more than a limited role in global governance. They do, however, expect China to continue to engage in selective institution building. Overall, they foresee a Chinese foreign policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversified, one that constitutes a significant challenge to U.S. interests. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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