January 2017 Executive Summary

The broader Equatorias Region remains a flashpoint for conflict between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) rebels. Yei River State and its eponymous capital are especially emblematic of these, with a coordinated SPLA offensive early in the month seeing warplanes, artillery and ground forces. The gravity of this maneuver was illuminated by contemporaneous reports of 4,000 pro-SPLA militia deployed in Central Equatoria, as well as accounts of systematic and widespread atrocities against non-Dinka civilians. Against a backdrop of continued insecurity, the prevalence of weapons, and criminal networks and given the onset of the dry season, considered optimal for military offensives, going into January, hostilities are likely to persist, with this volatility underpinned by the presence of increasingly polarized Dinka, Kakwa and Azande communities, respective elements of whom are liable to exploit the instability to settle grievances or otherwise secure their interests.

Kiir’s announcement of the as-of-yet unscheduled dialogue represents his efforts at cultivating domestic legitimacy. That said, the apparent absence of SPLA-IO members from the committee signals the president’s efforts to create a broader political framework while Riek Machar and the SPLA-IO grow increasingly irrelevant. Such efforts have been mirrored regionally, notably by the South African government’s “house arrest” of Machar. Going into January, while it remains unclear if the dialogue will make any tangible progress, it may garner support from African states diplomatically involved in the South Sudanese crisis. Domestically, the dialogue’s impact will likely be limited, with Kiir’s political reach broadened, nationwide insecurity persisting. We further assess that the dialogue may spur the SPLA-IO to intensify operations to undermine the dialogue.