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Medium Risk
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NOTABLE DATES
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President Roch Marc Christian Kabore appoints Oumarou Sadou as new Burkinabe army’s Chief of Staff
28
  DECEMBER
3
16
Armed assailants kill two in attack on town of Soboule, Sahel Region, 40 km from Djibo
12 soldiers killed in attack by approximately 40 unidentified gunmen on military checkpoint in Nasoumbou, Sahel Region
Criminality, militancy persists in volatile Sahel Region
Burkina Faso’s Sahel Region continued to represent a focal point for insecurity in the country over the past month, with the incident of December 16 constituting a particularly notable attack within the spectrum of violence normally witnessed in this restive area. Both the number of assailants alleged by the Burkinabe army to have been involved in the assault, and the consequent death toll are unusually high, and thus point to a larger, more coordinated attack than is typical for the area. With that said, the figure has not been independently corroborated, and could reflect an attempt by the Burkinabe military to overemphasize the scale of the attack in order to better frame the high casualty count. Nevertheless, said casualty count, amid a broad trend of militant activity, is sufficient to underscore the threat posed by militant forces in the tri-border area. The replacement of the military chief of staff closely following the attack, underscores the perception within the country of a need to refresh the ranks given the recent attacks. Interestingly, and despite the apparent success of the attack, the incident has not been claimed by any particular militant group as of the time of writing. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have been the most active group in the area over recent months, and therefore represent the most likely perpetrators, but al-Mourabitoun and Ansar Dine’s Macina Brigade are also possible suspects, given the proximity of their respective areas of operations. There is currently no significant evidence of an established militant presence within Burkina Faso, rather, attacks in the Sahel Region are launched from Malian territory. A coordinated solution is therefore necessary in order to effectively counter the militant threat, yet cooperation between the Malian and Burkinabe governments is distinctly lacking in this regard. Reports citing Malian President Ibrahim Keita indicate that a motion to allow Burkinabe forces to pursue suspected militants across the border is under consideration, however, it remains unclear if and when this will be passed. Moreover, it only addresses a small part of the issue. The drivers for militant activity within Mali remain largely unaddressed, and counterinsurgency operations within the country have done little to diminish the overall impunity with which militant groups are able to operate. At the same time, the Mali-Burkina Faso border itself continues to be highly porous, and security infrastructure within the Sahel Region itself is limited. Furthermore, attacks are likely infrequent and outlying enough that there is insufficient political pressure to necessitate undertaking an expensive deployment of forces to the area. Thus, the threat emanating from Mali, and the accompanying potential for attacks within the Sahel Region, is liable to persist for the foreseeable future.
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| CAMEROON |
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Medium Risk
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NOTABLE DATES
| Current Situation
DECEMBER
5
21
8-9
Mass protests, police crackdowns in Anglophone cities of Buea, Kumba, and Bamenda
Four dead in Bamenda protest crackdown; pro-Anglophone protest resumes in Kumba
PM Philemon Yang forms committee to address ongoing strike by Anglophone lawyers
Assessments & Forecast
English-speaking cities in Northwest and Southwest regions witness widespread unrest, violent crackdowns
Long-standing discontent and feelings of marginalization among Cameroon’s Anglophone minority, concentrated in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions, gave rise to protests in the cities of Buea, Kumba, and Bamenda on December 5. The following day, as confrontations between youths and police forces continued in parts of Bamenda, a group of lawyers, teachers, and union leaders formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) in protest against the perceived marginalization of Cameroon’s English-speaking community. Fresh protests on December 8 in Bamenda provoked a violent police response that resulted in the deaths of four demonstrators, followed the next day by another demonstration in Kumba.
The negative sentiment within the Cameroonian Anglophone community that led to the demonstrations observed over the past month is not an entirely new development. Indeed, English-speaking lawyers of Cameroon have been on strike in the country’s Northwest and Southwest regions for the past two months, leading to reported disruptions in the day-to-day operations of local courts. Additionally, a late September meeting in Bamenda of the secessionist Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) was dispersed by police. What is notable, however, is the geographic scale and level of possible coordination between the various protests recorded in early December. Perhaps even more notable is the violent, and at times deadly, reaction of police forces to the demonstrations in Bamenda. This response is unlikely to quell the underlying discontent that led to the protests. Indeed, teachers in Bamenda who have been on strike since late November over the Cameroonian government’s alleged attempts to impose the French language in the region’s schools and courts reportedly walked out of negotiations with the central government on December 27, presaging continued confrontation between Yaounde and regional functionaries, as well as potential public unrest, over the coming weeks in the Northwest and Southwest regions.
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