Masarykova univerzita

Content

Kateřina Kukrechtová

Abbreviations
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSCE/OSCE Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

EU European Union

FPC Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation

FSC Foreign Security Concept of Russian Federation

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle

MOD Ministry of Defense

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC National Security Concept of Russian Federation

NSS National Security Strategy of Russian Federation

RF Russian Federation

SALWs Small Arms and Light Weapons

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SLBM Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile

START I, II Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, II

UN United Nations

USA/US United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VD Vienna Document

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization

List of Tables

Table 1: Presidents of the Russian Federation

Table 2: Soviet defense spending, 1989 – 1990

Table 3: Framework of security documents

Table 4: National security strategy framework

Table 5: Military expenditures of Russian Federation in constant US $ m. (1992 – 1999)

Table 6: Exports from Russian Federation from 1992 to 1999

Table 7: Chronology of leading policy documents of the RF on security issues (1991 - 1999)

Table 8: CFE arms reductions for Warsaw Pact from July 1988 to November 1990

Table 9: START aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms, April 1, 2009

Table 10: Overview of Russian/Soviet strategic nuclear forces from 1990 to 2002

Table 11: Military expenditures of Russia from 2000 to 2008 in constant (2010) US $ m.

Table 12: Arms exports from Russian Federation from 2000 to 2008

Table 13: Chronology of leading policy documents of the RF and statements on security issues (2000 – 2008)

Table 14: Arms exports from Russian Federation from 2008 to 2011in US$ m.

Table 15: Military expenditures of Russia from 1992 to 2011

Table 16: Chronology of leading policy documents of the RF and statements on security issues (2008 – 2012)

Table 17: Status of strategic nuclear forces in Russia and the US (September 2012)

Table 18: Overview of Russian/Soviet Strategic nuclear forces from 1990 to 2012

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank sincerely to my thesis adviser, Mr. PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D., for his support and patient guidance through every step of my thesis. I am grateful for his responsible attitude and accurate remarks. I am happy for the opportunity to work under his guidance.

3. 1 Introduction

Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney declared on March, 27^th 2012 Russia “without question, our No. 1 geopolitical foe” (Joyner 2012). Is Russia still such a threat for the US and the West as in the times of Cold War? Russia has repeatedly announced its peaceful intentions. There is also an ongoing process of incremental disarmament between the old superpower rivals. At the first sight, Russia is a valuable and cooperative partner for West. At the second sight, there are many unanswered questions about Russian attitude towards the arms control and disarmament. The goal of this work is to trace the continuity and change in Russia's policy of arms control and disarmament.

The factors that shape policy of arms control or disarmament are multiple. Some are internal, such as the government and its political elites, the culture, economy, or geography of a country. Others are external, such as foreign military, political or economic threats, political vacuums, and changes in balance of power. The factors influencing the arms-control policy are manifold, changing in substance and weight, thus, the process of arms-control policy-making is dynamic. Nevertheless, there can be traced continuity from Soviet times is some aspects of Russian political thinking on matters of arms control. Looking through the realist lenses, since the time of tsars, Russia has pursued balance-of-power policies. In principle, balance-of-power policies are the measures taken by governments whose security or interests are at stake, to enhance their power by whatever means are available (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 4). Such a mobilization of power to countervail the power of a political adversary could be observed in the Soviet period when the Warsaw Pact served as a military counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or in the post-Soviet era when Russia vigorously opposed the NATO enlargement. In general, the enduring goals pursued by Russia through its arms-control policy have placed the greatest emphasis on ensuring national security, promoting the economic well-being of the country, and enhancing national prestige. In 1990, the whole world experienced the unprecedented shift from bipolarity to mutlipolarity with indisputable hegemony of the United States. Although this was a bitter pill for a former Soviet empire, the relationships between the West and the Russian federation have improved considerably since then. This improvement has gone hand in hand with the progress in arms-control process, both in terms of its extent and boldness.

Arms-control policy has roots in both domestic and foreign forces. Russia operates from the premise that states are sovereign and independent entities, however, in a contemporary international system where the main units – states, have become in some respects interdependent. Of the many interests pursued by state, none is more important than its survival: maintaining territorial integrity and political independence, and the way to ensure this goal is to use the tools of statecraft – diplomacy, armaments, and political and military alignments for self-protection. The international environment sets the broad parameters of state's policy behavior, but certainly it cannot explain all specific political outcomes that determine the behavior of state in the realm of international politics. Thus, I look also at the intra-state level to reveal the Russia's motives for the particular way of conduct of international policy of arms control or disarmament.

First internal variable is the political change which Russia has undergone since the dissolution of the USSR. From a state commanded by one party it has become what is now called a “sovereign democracy”. This concept is based on assumption of a strong state where the actions of government must be accepted by the citizens, not unlike the rule of former Soviet Communist Party.

Militarily, the Russian Federation compared to the Soviet Union is another story. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, Soviet and then Russian military capability steadily declined. The Chechen campaign in 1994 – 1996 provided irrefutable evidence when Chechen army defeated the armed forces of a country enormously larger and richer. The sinking of submarine Kursk in 2000 was of the similar nature (Donaldson – Nogee 2010: 8). President Yeltsin was concerned with military reform based on substantial reductions with ultimate goal of the creation of professional army but had to face to the stark economic conditions and opposition in military which desired the increase in military budget. Putin, though he increased spending, made building a smaller but more effective army his high priority.

Another variable is Russia's transition from a command economy to a market economy. Although this process was accompanied by many economic turbulences (such as Russia's economic crisis in 1998) and political and societal downsides, there is a general consensus that the old system has been definitely replaced by the new one. Related to the economic transformation is the growing linkage of Russia's economy to the global economic system.

To capture the main changes in Russia's attitude towards arms control and disarmament I choose to evaluate a main research premise: the less RF perceives NATO as a threat the less (of lesser significance) arms-control treaties evolve (Umbach 2005: 111). I analyze the four major eras marked by a rule of Russia's powerful presidents: Boris Yeltsin (elected twice), Vladimir Putin (two terms in the office), Dmitry Medvedev, and again, Vladimir Putin. To embrace the possible continuity and change in Russia's arms-control policy, I include the developments of the late Soviet era. Russia's presidents and their political bodies were in their decision-making as well as by the external factors influenced by the internal ones. The external factors stem from the international environment, the internal ones come from Russia itself. The impacts of foreign developments can best traced by looking at Russian major security documents that define the Russia's interests, threats to Russian Federation, and the ways and means which Russia is willing to employ to secure its interests. A better picture is obtained by looking simultaneously at the major international agreements on the field of arms control and disarmament. I focus on the two processes: in the field of nuclear weapons and heavy conventional armament. Both categories of weapons are reflected in two outstanding arms-control processes: START process (namely treaties START I, II; complementary Moscow Treaty; and “New START”) and CFE treaty process (CFE Treaty and its adaptations).

In describing of domestic factors, I intend to go down to the core of political situation in the country, civil-military relations, and the role of military-industrial complex. Although the economic conditions of a country stay somewhere in between the external and domestic influences I put them under the heading of internal factors. All these factors play an important role in analyzing the attitude of the country towards arms control and disarmament. The question is, which sort of factors play the crucial part. Finally, by comparing the particular periods, a colorful picture of Russia's attitude towards arms control and disarmament emerges.