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2NC Dutch disease answers2. Oil profits solve dutch disease Carlos Pascual President and Director for Foreign Policy Brookings Institution February 2008, “Vice, The Geopolitics of Energy: From Security to Survival” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/01_energy_pascual/01_energy_pascual.pdf) Russia currently ranks 8th in the world in terms of proven petroleum reserves, at 60 billion barrels. It ranks second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of oil production, at 9.4 billion barrels per day. Russia’s $147.6 billion Stabilisation Fund,10 in which revenues from export duties on oil and taxes on oil mining operations accumulate when the price for Urals oil exceeds the set cut-off price – which is intentionally kept relatively low in order to ensure that the bulk of oil-generated revenues accrue to the Fund – was established in 2004 as a means of hedging against “Dutch Disease” and paying off debt. The 2007 and 2008 budgets were based on a cut-off price of $27/bbl, although this price may be revised in light of rising oil prices. Russia has also accumulated $425 billion in hard currency and gold reserves. 3. Russia USES oil funds to diversify its economy Darya Korsunskaya Reuters 1/25/2008. “Russia investment fund seeks $4 bln/year from 2011”. Factiva Russia, flush with windfall oil revenues, runs a strong budget surplus but has substantially loosened its fiscal policy to accommodate pension and wage hikes as well as infrastructure and industrial investment needs. The fund, which aims to introduce a concept of private-public partnership in Russia, has so far approved 20 projects worth 1 trillion roubles with the share of state budget financing at about 30 percent. The budget investment fund is one of several vehicles created in Russia in recent years aimed at channelling oil wealth into improving infrastructure, diversifying the economy and boosting economic growth. Cash assigned to the Development Bank and other state-run institutions has so far only been used to support banking sector liquidity. Analysts see government spending as key for maintaining high growth rates in 2008. 4. Russian economic diversification depends on oil revenues Andrew Kuchins senior fellow and director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program December 2007 “Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017” what gets louder as it get smaller? A baby in a trash compactor http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071214-russia_2017-web.pdf But while diversification of the Russian economy is taking place, much still depends on the trickle-down effect of petro-dollars. In recent years, an avalanche of money from oil and gas exports has hit the Russian economy, bringing about a virtual macroeconomic revolution. Since Putin became president seven years ago, Russian foreign currency reserves have increased by a factor of 20 to more than $430 billion, or approximately 40 percent of GDP. An oil stabilization fund, modeled on Norway’s, was established in 2004, and it has reached a level of more than $130 billion or 10 percent of GDP (although there are questions about oversight of the funds). Budget surpluses are riding at more than 7 percent of GDP. GDP has been growing at 7 percent per year, but if you account for ruble appreciation and calculate in nominal dollar figures, the annual rate of GDP growth is closer to 25 percent. This extraordinary pace will slow as the ruble reaches full value, but if nominal dollar GDP growth continues at a 15 percent rate over the next 10 years, we will be looking at an economy of nearly $5 trillion in 2017. It is not only entirely possible, but likely, that Russia will be the largest economy in Europe by 2017. A2: Authoritarianism2NC Authoritarianism answers1. Putin was authoritarian, there was no nuke war Michael A. McFaul professor of political science and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University 2008 “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Foreign Affairs, Putin's rollback of democracy started with independent media outlets. When he came to power, three television networks had the national reach to really count in Russian politics -- RTR, ORT, and NTV. Putin tamed all three. RTR was already fully state-owned, so reining it in was easy. He acquired control of ORT, which had the biggest national audience, by running its owner, the billionaire Boris Berezovsky, out of the country. Vladimir Gusinsky, the owner of NTV, tried to fight Putin's effective takeover of his channel, but he ended up losing not only NTV but also the newspaper Segodnya and the magazine Itogi when prosecutors pressed spurious charges against him. In 2005, Anatoly Chubais, the CEO of RAO UES (Unified Energy Systems of Russia) and a leader in the liberal party SPS (Union of Right Forces), was compelled to hand over another, smaller private television company, REN-TV, to Kremlin-friendly oligarchs. Today, the Kremlin controls all the major national television networks. More recently, the Kremlin has extended its reach to print and online media, which it had previously left alone. Most major Russian national newspapers have been sold in the last several years to individuals or companies loyal to the Kremlin, leaving the Moscow weekly, Novaya Gazeta, the last truly independent national newspaper. On the radio, the station Ekho Moskvy remains an independent source of news, but even its future is questionable. Meanwhile, Russia now ranks as the third-most-dangerous place in the world to be a journalist, behind only Iraq and Colombia. Reporters Without Borders has counted 21 journalists murdered in Russia since 2000, including Anna Politkovskaya, the country's most courageous investigative journalist, in October 2006. Putin has also reduced the autonomy of regional governments. He established seven supraregional districts headed primarily by former generals and KGB officers. These seven new super governors were assigned the task of taking control of all the federal agencies in their jurisdictions, many of which had developed affinities with the regional governments during the Yeltsin era. They also began investigating regional leaders as a way of undermining their autonomy and threatening them into subjugation. 2. Economic decline will result in authoritarianism Henry E Hale assistant professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, December 2007, Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071214-russia_2017-web.pdf) A sharp drop in presidential popularity. If sustained, this signals the likely onset of either the Revenge of the Chekists or Building Volatility. The former 46 Appendix is more likely if it is Putin whose power drops and if he stays in power after his second term (these two possibilities could well be linked), or if his successor abandons patronal presidentialism and institutes a full-fledged dictatorship. The latter is more likely if it happens on the watch of Putin’s successor before any attempts by that successor to introduce full-fledged dictatorship. Sharp drop in economic growth or clear inability to diversify the economy and spread wealth. This would be likely to reduce presidential popularity and thus signals the probability of developments just mentioned. 2NC authoritarian answers3. Putin has already dismantled democratic institutions Michael A. McFaul professor of political science and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University 2008 “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Foreign Affairs Putin has also made real progress in weakening the autonomy of the parliament. Starting with the December 2003 parliamentary elections, he has taken advantage of his control of other political resources (such as NTV and the regional governorships) to give the Kremlin's party, United Russia, a strong majority in the Duma: United Russia and its allies now control two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Putin's own popularity may be United Russia's greatest electoral asset, but constant positive coverage of United Russia leaders (and negative coverage of Communist Party officials) on Russia's national television stations, overwhelming financial support from Russia's oligarchs, and near-unanimous endorsement by Russia's regional leaders have also helped. After the December 2003 elections, for the first time ever the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe issued a critical report on Russia's parliamentary elections, which stressed, "The State Duma elections failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments for democratic elections." In 2007, the Russian government refused to allow the OSCE to field an observer mission large enough to monitor the December parliamentary elections effectively. Political parties not aligned with the Kremlin have also suffered. The independent liberal parties, Yabloko and the SPS, as well as the largest independent party on the left, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, are all much weaker today and work in a much more constrained political environment than in the 1990s. Other independent parties -- including the Republican Party and the Popular Democratic Union, as well as those of the Other Russia coalition -- have not even been allowed to register for elections. Several independent parties and candidates have been disqualified from participating in local elections for blatantly political reasons. Potential backers of independent parties have been threatened with sanctions. The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, previously Russia's wealthiest man and owner of the oil company Yukos, sent a powerful message to other businesspeople about the costs of being involved in opposition politics. Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin parties -- including United Russia, the largest party in the Duma, and A Just Russia, a Kremlin invention -- have enjoyed frequent television coverage and access to generous resources. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 9.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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