Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
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2/3 NI; Light Battalion formed to Light Companies of Division. 3rd and 4th Companies of Pioneers. Artillery, Initially, the artillery, consisted of : 2,18 pounders, 2, 5.5 inch mortars, 2,5.5 inch howitzers, 2,4.5 inch mortars, 2,5.5 inch howitzers. Ochterlony, as we mentioned earlier had orders to be placed under Gillespie as and when he cleared his line of operations. In actual fact, Gillespie had created much of history by advancing every bit of direction before Ochterlony could cross his start line for operations, Gillespie had traversed over the Shivaliks, across the Dun Valley, gone attacking the Bal Bhadra's Gorkhas and got killed. Octhterlony had a different scenario to face when he began his advance on 1 November 1814 : he had indirectly the taste of the Gorkha prowess and he did not want to go the Gillepie way. NO cavalier style; no taking for granted the Gorkhas he once described, as "ill-disciplined, ill-equipped and with self- overestimation". Though he had move than the needed information on the "going" map of the terrain to Nalagarh, Ramgarh, Arki through hi agents including the Zamindars and the rulers of the states over powered by Amar Singh and Bhakti Thapa, as also by the Surgeon who treated Amar Singh's younger son Ram Das, he still made much of this deficiency. He blamed other intelligence gatherers like Moorcroft, Hearsey and Dr Rutherford for lack of it. We have devote a separate chapter to logistic that the commissariat undertook to support all the four division, and the Half Scale of Rations the Sepoy of the Native troops were given. (It was to be half-a.ration free instead of full ration on payment). For Ochterlony, the two essential commodities of logistics were the Banjara bullocks (5,000), ponies and elephants. These animals were besides 9,000 followers, coolies and so on, whose strength continued to increase. The elephants did a remarkable job in hauling up the battering guns (18 pounders) over the tracks. The 3rd and 4th Pioneer companies made tracks all the way from Nalagarh to Ramgarh and Malaun. These tracks are still intact and one realizes the elephantine jobs the Pioneers did for enabling the move of skilful elephants which negotiated sharp bends and steep gradients not only in this area but to Jaitkhak and up the slope of Nepalese borders. These tracks must serve as sample of logistical planning and their durablility.173 The memoirs of John Shipp give us a vignette of the Herculean effort that was made to move the guns, crates of liquor, their tentage and the Mughale-Azam, the British re-created in the early stages of the war,-until the Gorkhas played havoc into their psyche of superiority and mood of out-on- a hunting mission. Caputure of Taragarh Fort Amar Singh had appreciated that Ochterlony might either follow a direct route over the country to Arki, his headquarters or the conventional axis Nalagarh,-Ramgarh,-Subathu. It meant the choice of axes as shown in the sketch attached. So, after the three day battering exercise by Ochterlony's guns on Taragarh Fort on 4 November 1814, 84 Gorkhas-half of them the local Hindureans-gave up thesesistance.174 On 5 November they were moved as prisoners to Ropar, to be brainwashed and converted into 'guides and scouts', another aphorism for spies and turncoats. Colonel WJ Hamilton quoting correspondence on the subject wrote: "The Gurkha prisoners were offered and accepted service with Ochterlony's force but in doing so discrimination was made between Gokha proper and hillmen in their service. The former were marched to Ludhiana as prisoners under escort of a troop of Cavalry, while the latter were enlisted and formed the original nucleus, gradually augmented by subsequent surrenders of the Gorkha element in the Indian Army."175 This is far from being true as the Gorkha prisoners were seduced to join the British forces operating against Amar Singh. Fagan, the Adjutant General wrote from Bamrauli Camp on 21 November: " The C-in-C approves your having assured the Subedar and the Gurkha prisoners of service at the rate of pay received from their own government."176 He asked Ochterlony to entertain Gorkhas and, encourage them to join the British in fighting against Amar Singh's Gorkhas. Excited at the fall of Nalagarh and the fort of Taragarh on 5 November when Gillespie had died attempting the capture of Kalunga on 31 October, Ochterlony wrote to Fagan: "our progress will be slow but I trust it will be certain. I may not be harried into hurry… There will be tedious advance in the Alpine country." He offered his advice on change required in the British strategy after failures at Kalunga and said : "The character and the operations of war should be changed and instead of small detachments being employed 'our force should be concentrated on certain points, however tardy their progress, no one should move with out guns (however large the difficulties of move)." It is Ochterlony who suggested change of axis fro Mawbey's force. He suggested that "the whole force from Kalunga be employed at Kyarda Valley , (after Dun secured and siege laid on Nahan) and make an attempt on Jaithak, a measure which at least be far more cooperative (complementary) as to compell him (Amar Singh) to weaken his ground or central point by dending out reinforcements to both to the east and west". It was obviously personal interest , that mattered. such actions facilitated his operations. Moira agreed to it. But Ochterlony had a 'siege within himself' when things went bad at Ramgarh. Battle fro Ramgarh_Ochterlony's Turning Point Amar Singh appreciated the rot it would set in Ramgarh, the next objective of Ochterlony, if similar stance was adopted by the defenders as shamefully done by those at Nalagarh. He moved to his tactical headquarters and redeployed defences at Ramgarh. He moved his strength from Subathu and Arki and maintained only small early warning detachments at Manju and Arki. Amar Singh's strategy for fighting his old enemy Ochterlony took a specific shape : he decided to build up strength fro a decisive battle at Ramgarh, the hill ranges between the Gambar River and Gamrola River in coordination with his ally, Bilaspur and then plan his contingencies even for withdrawal to Subathu and line north east of it. The Rajas who had been dethroned by him during the period of consolidation had begun to change their colours and alliance with British. However, because of Shiv Datt Rai he was hopeful that the Raja of Bilaspur would continue to support him throughout the campaign.177 With these considerations, Amar Singh re-deployed adequate strength on the Ramgarh Ridge, (the fort, the eastern ridge i.e., Manju, Tibu, Jorjoru). Early warning elements were thrown up at Nehr and Ramshahr. ON the Rajgarh Ridge, the height and the forts/stockades were strengthened at Surajgarh, Jainagar, Malaun, Rattangarh and the other dominating areas. To ensure the safety of his communications with Bilaspur, adequate strength had been deployed to prevent the British infiltration. On assurance by Shiv Datta Rai, this responsibility was passed to Bilaspur who occupied defences from RAttangarh on wards. He had barely 1,500 troops and with difficulty he managed to deploy 650 in Ramgarh area and the balance on the Rajarh ridge. The British estimate had placed his strength at about 4,000. The troops which defended Ramgarh complex were regarded by the British as " flower of the Gorkha Army" i.e., their corps d' elite.178 The Gorkhas had begun to experience an acute deficiency in manpower and weapons reserve. Bhim Sen Thapa promised to make available about 27 companies of the 40 that had been mobilized from the old soldiers. But only half of them would have their weapons. Some of them reached and some still enroute Kumaon had to join the retreating columns of Bam Shah and Amar Singh in May. The mutual aid and reinforcement plan was nevertheless, put into effect and Amar Singh even managed to locate a mobile reserve of four companies under his younger son Ranbir, called Amar Virgati (The Squad of Martyrs ) which consisted of Amardal, Virdal and other two companies.179 Ochterlony planned his attack based on the intelligence and advice of the Raja of Nalagarh. He advanced to Goela, a low plateau at 2,700 feet, totally dominated by Ramgarh which was at least 1,000 feet higher. The road then –and-now follows the alignment of Goela-base of Ramgarh i.e., the present town of Ramshahr and then hugging the base of the fort, turns to a low defile made by Jorjoru feature on the left and Tibu-Mangu-Taragarh peak on the right. In between lies the plainer yet undulating Nehr plain that had good fields and several villages and now a school near which the grave of Lieut William exists. The defences of Amar Singh were based on this ridge which aligned itself generally in a north west-south easterly direction. Ochterlony was quick to realize the tactical mistake he had made by starting to take jump from a pt with no place to manoeuvre or acquire the needed momentum. He first moved to a ridge the thought, would place him on " an equal footing", vis-s-vis the objective i.e., Ramgarh. But he landed in a position that placed him in a quandary. For, lack of maps and detailed terrain intelligence, he ordered Colonel Thompson to take a group to eastablish a firm base on the feature Kahnani, the northern most tip of which Kot was located. While ordering him to occupy it, he told him : "Gain the position by day reaching within musket disteance but final judgement is yours". Later during the conduct of this operation Ochterlony behaved more like a political agent than a General, and wrote : " I directed Colonel Thompson to proceed to the right village of Kandree (Kahnani) .. Judging by the eyes and information of the country people, this attempt seem to promise success but I felt great anxiety and sent for Raja of Palsee. His informantion seemed to be so accurate and so conclusive as to induce me to postpone the attack." The author's field survey in 1994, showed the ground difficulties. The 2 mile break in the ground between Ramgarh and Kot was sufficient to make and one believe that Ochterlony was planning a fool's errand and it must have caused sufficient laughter in the Gorkhali Camp at Ramgarh. Thompson had insisted-without carrying out proper forward reconnaissance-on getting his guns up. So between 13 November and 20 November 7000 coolies and followers were employed to make the track and move the guns. And when the guns were fired from Kot, its shells landed in the nala below the fort. The sharp fall could not have been negotiated for forward movement. But Raja of Nalagarh and some of the local Zamindars came to Ochterlony's rescue. They offered him the choice of an achieveable plan and asked him to switch axis to Nehr. He also reacted fast and put the Sapper, Lieut Peter Lawtie on reconnaissance and survey. The Sapper did an excellent job. The History of Engineers places Lawtie on record : "The moving spirit of the British Army was quite a young officer-Lieut Peter Lawtie, Ochterlony's field engineer and Aide-de-Camp. No praise is too high for this Bengal Engineer. He carried out most daring reconnaissance, acted as the eyes of the force and was the right hand man of General in every way. Lawtie survived the massacre by the Gorkhas … Twice Ochtherlony issued orders for the assault on Ramgarh and twice he countermanded them on the strength of Lawties reports about the ground and enemy defences".180 Ochterlony's force concertrated in the Nehr plain by 24 November. Described as a 'turning movement' by the British historians, he was in great hurry to launch the attack. Preparations for it began in earnestness. By 26 November, a battery was moved up and was in the process of being constructed near Mangu under Lawtie with Ensign Symes, some Pioneers and 100 Sepoys. While this was in progess, the Gorkhas decided to eliminate it. A column with drums, trumpets and colours bore down on this party. The first taste of defeat came to Ochterlony here as the Gorkhas charge the breast-work with Khukris and swept the Sepoys down, mowing down three-forth of the strength. A 70 percent casualties where Lawtie saved himself by bolting out, the fastest, was frightening to Ochterlony. Lawtie blamed himself, for not opening the cartridge boxes which could not be opened as the Khurki wielding Gorkhas like death god swarmed before them. Reinforcement was sent under Williams but it reached too late. And Williams himself was killed. Such was the shock wave and demoralization that the 41 killed and 34 wounded had been left at the breast work and could not be immediately retrieved. Both for the Gorkhas and the British it was Kalunga repeated in bravery and magnanimity. The Gorkhas seem to imstil the same God's fear among Ochterlony and his force as they had done to Mawbey's and Martindell's. They showed sililar magnanimity to their foe and allowed the casualties to be removed a day later.181 But the arms and ammunition left behind became the Gorkha possession. In 1995 while on another set of field studies at Nehr, Ramgarh etc. the author went in search of William's grave. The grave covered by foliage is located under a bayan tree. A group of little boys of the local school joined him in clearing the tomb stone of Williams off the foliae and mud. Then they pointed out to the author a young woman who slept near the tomb stone. She behaved as if she were deaf and dumb. For, no amount of noises could stir her out of deep slumber. Then a youngster touched her eardrum with a grass blade; she opened her eyes and began to look up alternately at the tomb and the author. She surprised him beyond imagination as she said in chaste Hindi "Mein to Gora William ki atma hun (I am the soul of Englishman Williams)." Greatly unexplained phenomenon this set him thinking could there be truth in it.182 27 November was unlucky for the Governor General and the Commader-in-Chief , Lord Moira, as the handful of the surviving Gorkhas (on this date, just about) sent the three thousand strong Mawbey's attacker at Kalunga reeling back for the third and the last time. So was is here in the Nehr plain. There was gloom in the British camp; some faint and expectant smiles among the indifferent rulers and allies of the Gorkhas: and rejoicingly high morale among the Gorkhas in India and Nepal. A mightly British power was being tamed by a puny race, the Gorkhas of Nepal. Depressed, in loss of self confidence, Ochterlony admitted failure on both the professional and personal accounts. He wrote to Lord Moira: Situated as they are I so not find myself at liberty at liberty to say that I could attack them with any certainty of success with even greater forces but without reinforcements I feel myself precluded even from making an attempt and I do not blush to acknowledge that I feel my mind inadequate to a command requiring great process of genius and so novel in its nature in all its circumstance. He goes on further to support unassailability of the post form front, from lack of reinforcement, the poor type of ammunition and carriers. He even exaggerated the Gorkhas strength by three to four times. Ochterlony cursed himself for conveying impression to Moira of volunteering to lead a force against the Gorkhas. He differed from Mawbey and Martindell and even others only in one respect-he did not openly retreat from the battle field; he only carried out adjustment but very much proved, at the moment of the mettle that martindell or Marley were made of. They all were shaken up at this moment. His earlier estimates which bordered on gross underestimation were substantially changed. He began to call them skilful and enterprising, hardy and brave, excellent in art and stratagem of mountain warfare, with defensive art of stockade. His own tactics began to border on 'turning the position', creating universal discontent'. To Ram Singh of Palsee, Sikha of Patiala etc. he began to plead for support. A desperate Ochterlony!183 In the words of Penderel Moon, "even Ochterlony who initially suggested a war earlier began to weigh it as most impolite measure we had attempted leaving aside all physical difficulties".184 Moira was in a dilemma and could not think of sacking him as hed had barely found a relief for Late Gillespie. However, when every thing was righted and set correct, Moira wrote in August 1815 "Maj Gen Ochterlony soon after projected another attack but intelligence of failure at Jevtuck which had occasioned high degree of confidence in the enemy and despondency in our troops made him widely forego the attempt"185 He moved Thompson's battalion from Kahnani and then sat at Nehr awaiting responses from Moira, reaction of the Gorkhas, and support from the allies, who had been promised restoration of their rules. 186 He cursed O'Brien, the Irish deserter in the court of Sansar Chand Katoch at Kangra, for not coming with the promised 1,000 men reinforcement. But because Ochterlony had failed Sansar Chand in his travail when under assault by the Gorkhas and under humiliation by Ranjit Singh, Katoch maintained a discrete silence. O'Brien naturally could not have antagonized his protector. 187 But all did not let him down. The Raja of Nalagarh worked assiduously and through spies articulated the winning over of Raja of Bilaspur in favour of the new and rising British power, as against the fading out Gorkhas. Soon it showed effect and the BIlaspurians suddenly began to thin out of the Rattangarh Fort. They would, of course, watch further developments before totally abandoning it. The Nalagarh Raja was feverishly working on completing an Irregular battalion for Ochterlony, whose task he was trying to finalise. Lieut Ross had already been picked up as its officer commanding and like Young and Fraser on the west and Barre Latter on the east, his force was taking shape. A past-master of intrigues and statecraft, though not much of a military commander, Ochterlony began to do what hurt the Gorkhas most: intercept their communications. In that his network of spies, including the Gorkha prisoners who knew al about the Gorkha habits and something about their deployment, played active part. He paid them handsomely and employed them in chanced attires to intercept thd dakias and harkaras of the Gorkhas by simply killing or bribing them. Interception of their letters especially of Amar Singh and Bakhatawar Singh gave him the most unadulterated intelligence. This activity was, in fact, being coordinated by Moira's headquarters and there was constant feed-back from Kumaon, the eastern side and elsewhere. From Bam Shah's letter it was learnt that he was at the tethers' end; and he and his troops were in dire need of logistical support. Similarly, the various intercepted letters of Amar Singh began to suggest to him the strategy, his immediate opponent was about to follow. The letter, he intercepted is interesting from historical analysis and we reproduce its excerpts. It had contained clear change of plan in Amar Singh's overall strategy in that he moved from Arki to Malaun and began to develop his main line of resistance against Ochterlony astride the Rajgarh ridge and occupation of Ramgarh was only an adjunct to it. Interception of the Gurkhali mail not noly served as an excellent mean of intelligence but in facilitating the evolution of plans to defeat Amar Singh Thapa's strategy. This letter of 27 November 1814 addressed to the King in Nepal made him change his plan for diverting his major offensive to Malaun. Fro, it contains most of the Gorkha manoeuvre and plans. It gave concentration of Amar Singh's force, move of families to Rajgarch and his reinforcement pattern. For any commander to be provided the full facts of the Other side of the Hill, as Duke of Wellington used to say, the battle is already won. Its translation in English reads: By remaining in command of Raj Gurh (Rajgarh), our authority will be maintained, and our subjects prevented from forming conspiracies. On this account, after having made arrangement for battle in this quarter, I shall send him (Bhakti Thapa) back to Raj Gurh. I have written to Ranjore Singh and Jaspau to remain at Nahan, and not to send any more troops to my assistance, as the garrison of Nahan has already been greatly weakened by the detachment of the four companies above mentioned. In this place I have made every necessary arrangement. The armed population of Bhujjee, Kyoonthol, Bogul, and Khotee (Bhaji, Keonthal, Baghal, Koti) have been assembled and stationed at Byzhuttee, and the soldiers of Bhughat (Bagahat) have been posted at sulghaka thanah, in the room of the two companies Mow Buksh and Indur Dub (probably) Mabaksh and Indra Dev companies) recalled . I have written to Bal soonda Thapa to retain at Thummur the company of Pureth Kajee, and proceed himself to Mustgarh with four companies of Ummerul Byr Ghattee (Amardal, and Virgati) and the two of Bhugtee Thapa, By this arrangement, Timmul and Kooneear (Kunear) will be near. On the Ranpore (Rampur) mountain, my fortification is already constructed. The northern road will also be obstructed to the enemy to the south. The army of the enemy is posted in three division, and their supplies are derived from Pulasee: whether the latter will reach their army will depend upon the favour of Providence and your fortune. Fro myself, I am using every endeavor to obstruct their road and intercept their convoys of provisions, and shall hereafter report to you what may happen. The readers will appreciate that Amar Singh had created a mobile reserve which was to be his force du frappe, consisting of four companies including Amar Dal and Virgati along with two more from Bhakti Thapa. It was to provide a force of about 1,000 men which cluld act as a decisive force under Amar Singh's youngest son Ranbir Thapa, who was to be assited by Kurbir Khatri. The changed thrust of Ochterlony's operations to the Rajgarh ridge (Malaun) while the battle for Ramgarh was still carrying on, did not originate as a result of the so called strategic brilliance of Ochterlony, as contested by the British historicans and John Pemble eulogizing him with, "rich reserves of talent which were released by adversity and stimulated by solicitous attention of his superiors". It does not apparently take cognizance of the then- Ultra-device Ochterlony's mail interception offered him on a planter. In a similar contemporary corollary, much of the strategic planning for offensive against the Afirka Korps at El-Alamein by General Montgommery had been impelled through the intelligence revelations of the Ultra Cipher Machine. The same can be said of the Russian Counter Offensive at Kursk, Russia, July 1943 as also the Americal Destruction of the Japanese Navy in 1944. Ochterlony was now given additional troops as reinforcements, adequate to make him awake from his depressions and put him on cheerful note so as to feel adequate to his command. The reinforcements included: HM's 53rd Infantry (less Grenadiers companies still working with Martindell); a squadron of Skinner's Horse;188 additional artillery i.e., 2 18 pounders, 2,8 inch mortars and 4, 4.5 Inch Howitzers. His beatings' helped and the force level rose almost double the original at 10, 422. He was spurred into activity. Amar Singh Thapa, conscious of his limitations, based his defence on the basic principles of offensive defence, attrition of the enemy at every stage, and delaying the enemy's main offensive to the months of April-May (Chait0Vaisakh)- a period considered auspicious by the astrologers and for natural reason as the summer rains would commence and affect the operations of the British. Consequently, he thinned out his force from the Ramgarh Fort, strengthened Rajgarh complex and prepared to fight till the end to success. Amar Singh had hoped that Shiv Dutt Rai would keep the Raj of Bilaspur as a lasting ally. The latter having been restored to his rule by him was expected to remain loyal and help him adjust his position in the depth, in case situation so demanded. 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