Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
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- In the meanwhile, the change of command of 3 rd
- Though the Fort has been razed to the ground, the silhouettes of defences suggest their possible layout. An eye sketch of the same is enclosed as also the lithograph from William Frasers Book.
- Rajgarh of Malaun: The Decisive Battle.
In this operation, Colonel Carpenter did not fail to praise the difficult work done by his commanders and troops, as he wrote: "The men of this detachment have suffered much from the nature of service and difficulty of procuring supplies since we left Calsie; I am happy to say they have borne every privation with great patience and the conduct of the whole detachment has been to merit my probation." In the meanwhile, the change of command of 3rd Division brought Major General Gabriel Martindell who took over the formation on 20 December 1814, when it was still in the process of concentrating at Nahan. The Gokhas had moved to the fortress of Jaithak just in time. Walter Hamilton described the fortress of Jaithak being 3 miles to the north of Nahan with a height of 3,600 feet, (IA) which are factually wrong as the height of Nahan itself is 3,092 feet as against Jaithak's height being 4,770 feet. It is also nearly 8 miles (13 Kilometres) from Nahan. From the Jaikhak heights, Nahan looks like a soccer or a dried-up lake. Conversely, Jaithak looks like an alongated peak on the horizon from Nahan. Its rims on both side are full of green deciduous forest. In 1814 the area must have been very dense, with just a few jungle trails, more water, wild-life and sparser number of villages. Nahan is nearly 26 miles, 43 kilometres from Paonta Sahib and Dehra Dun. The track alignment has been developed into a two-way National highway, Stretching from left to right, its silhouette looks as illustrated. Though the Fort has been razed to the ground, the silhouettes of defences suggest their possible layout. An eye sketch of the same is enclosed as also the lithograph from William Fraser's Book. Ranjore Singh's strategy like his father's on Nalagarh-Subathu axis or Bal Bhadra's in Nalapani (Kalunga), was based on two tactical considerations: first, until contact was made, full use of static defences, facilities of palaces, towns etc. were to be made; and second, attrition and delay, as preliminary to their eventual defeat, had to be caused on the British from forts and stockades built on tactically defensive pieced of ground. As a result of these considerations, Ranjore Singh had already made his defences on Jaikthak. This fort, with its tentacles of defences in stockadet built on tactically defensive pieces of ground. As a result of these considerations, Ranjore Singh had already made his defences on Jaithak. This frot, with its tentacles of defences in stockades stretching from Nauni/Jumpta to the Peacock Hill guarded the two major prominent axes leading to the main defences. He had taken adequate precautions to obtain the early warning on the move of British troops along the Jalal (also referred to as Giri) River or through the dense Barman Jungle. His troops had been deployed as far as Rampur on the Sutlej River, Kotguru, Bampta, Chaupal and Shai. The readers will recall Moira's comments of June 1815 about the Gorkha defensive tactics. He wrote: "Their principal advantages consisted in the natural strength of country, their aptiuded for the special warfare and in the choice of position which they occupied and knowledge of country about to became the scene of war, enabled them to make with judgement." (18) True, the Gorkha's choice of defences and use of potential of the ground, combined with courage, made the difference everywhere. The defences they occupied showed tactical brilliance. Major Ludlow, had observed the "Dog Kennels, holes or caves like bears, beasts to retire into from effects of shells". Their defences, showed ability to think big and act tactically big and survive. And as they lacked modern rifles, they used their few flint match-locks ans cannons frugally and with dexterity, until they managed to acquire some of the British in the battle field. General Martindell had been directed to capture Sirmur which involved clearing the Gorkhas from Jaithak and other places. His Division had been further authorized to raise an Irregular battalion, preferably under William Fraser, which could help to crumble the main defences speedily by operating in Jubal State. Thereater his Division was to advance to Srinagar Garhwal. He planned to drive to Jaithank and clear the areas of the Gorkhas.155 Martindell himself was the typical of second generation of the Company officers: old, cautious, fighting the Gorkhas with the lessons from the battles with the old enemies in the Indian plains. He was keen to also appy the matrix of his personal experiences of a war he fought in Bundel Khanda against the turbulent locals and Kalanjar in 1812; though his operations against the Raja of Rewa, a year later, brought him hardly any credit. By 1814 at 54, he was a civilian and living in Kanpur. But Moira coaxed him to rejoin active service as as relief of late Gillespie, there being available no suitable senior-officer-substitute, Paradoxically, Moira also wanted to give him another chance to prove himself. By mid-December, Martindell planned to launch his tow pronged attack on Jaithak with fairly balanced columns under tow experienced Majors i.e., Major William Richard and Major John Ludlow. Richard's column consisted of a part of HM's 53rd, Light Infantry, 1/3 NI, Pioneers and detachment of guns; whereas Ludlow had full of 1/6 NI, part of HM's 53rd, 1, 6 pounder and 1,5.5 inch Howitzer and the Pioneers. 156 The tasks given to these two veterans were: to cut off water supply, and intercept communication; to shell the fort and inch forward to provide a firm base for the rest of the Division to build up form an attack on Jaithak. Ludlow's Baptisation of fire The advance of the columna began on night 26/27 December. Ludllow reached Jumpta Hill and was attacked by the Gorkhas. The Gunner's history records this actions in detail: "The difficult paths they had followed, and the pace kept up by the Infantry, caused the guns to be left in the rear; but the Grenadiers of the 53rd anxious, to atone for the failures at Kalunga, pushed forward before the native Infantry, could form up. When, close under the stockade, they were received with a sharp fire on both flanks and in rear, their ardour received a sudden check; and the Gurkhas issuing forth from their position in front, with shield, sword and kurki, they gave way before the dreaded charge of these brave mountaineers. The native Infantry, seeing the disorderly retreat of the Europeans, caught the contagion; their officers were too few to hold them in check and present a firm front and the panic spreading, as it ever does, rapidly carried the whole lot back to camp, losing 40 to Gorkhas as prisoners and several getting lost in the fout that followed."157 The sprightly counter attack had been launched by Jaspau Thapa, from his stockade at Jumpta and he drove Ludlow's men from all grounds they had gained. Prinsep narrated the scene with equal ardour as he wrote: Jaspau Thapa, Ranjore's best officer was the Gorkha commandant here: the greater part of force at Jaithak had, on the first alarm, been collected within or behind the stockade out of sight of the assailants. Jaspau allowed the British to come close under the stockade, and then from either side, a little down the ridge, he pushed out parties round both flanks, who opened a fire on the Grenadiers from all quarters at once. Not having expected such a reception, the men were confounded and drew back; whereupon the Gorkhas, seizing the opportunity, charged them Khuris in hand… 158 There was stampede and before Ludlow could realize some of his troops had already arrived in Nahan. He followed, blaming and cursing them and also " burning himself with shame" for which he blamed his General for lack of European officers and unwillingness of his 'ragamuffin Sepoys' to face the Gorkha attack by Khukris. His blame fell squarely on 1/6 NI, though the 53rd faired as bas as they had done at Kalunga. 1/6 NI had been reduced into a totally ineffective battalion after this operation and in the words of Moira, the failure was due to "Ludlow's irretrievable error of attacking the stockade before he had formed his men."159 An obvious case of fault-line in Ludlow's character to morally except it as the principal cause of the failure. Ranjore and his Gorkha chuckled with a glee and joked as they collected this 'gift' of arms and ammunition from the British. These 300 muskets offered them in their resolve to beat the enemy. Richard's dilemma Richard's column moved over a 25 kilometre detour deliberately, up the slope from the right and was on the Peacock Hill immediately after the first light.160 he was attacked. In the words of Prinsep: "While the troops were speculating (on the likely action by the Gorkhas deployed near Peacock Hill) Ranjore Singh' drums beat to arms was hard; and at about One O'clock he paraded his whole force under the walls of Jythuk, preparatory to an attack. The mountaineers advanced boldly at first, but not being able to face a steady volley, they separated; and availing themselves with wonderful dexterity of every jutting tock or the like that afforded cover, kept up a continued irregular fire, charging every now and then, when there was any advantage to gain".161 Richards managed to hold on to his ground through-out the whole day and requested Martindell for reinforcement of men and ammunition. If Ludlow ignored to take his guns with his columns, Richard's chose to not even carry its full ammunition. His column had left with just the punch ammunition and rear column was tasked to bring the balance of 60,000 rounds. The rear column was ambushed by a Gorkha marauding column. This rear column was routed and forty of its personnel were taken as prisoners on the Giri. Such a large haul of ammunition and arms from the British strengthened Ranajore's defences. While Richards precariously held to the ground he had occupied, he conveyed to his commanding General that he was no more in a position to hold it against more deliberate attack at night without supply of ammunition. Nor was he in a position to skirt around the feature from the right or left to move to a more vantage us point. Martindell could observe much of the movements of Richards columns and he was also being fed information through the men trickling back to the camp who had escaped and were being regarded as missing. When some one from Richards' column gave him the news about the difficult position that Richards had been put at the Peacock Hill, he decided to order this column back, rather reinforce it . This became a grave tactical error, responsible for loss of this toe- hold on the Jaithak hill. It cost him the whole operation. By 4 p.m. orders to retire were received by Richards. In this rearward movement Lieut Thackeray acted as rear guard commander for the safety of the main force, though Ensigns Wilson and Stalkart died. (6A) It was a status quo ante as far as Martindell was concerned. Both the columns had large casualties with 32 killed, 105 wounded and 229 missing-almost one fourth of the force of the two columns with Richards launching strength being 16 officers and 677 Other Ranks and Ludlow's being 20 officers and 1,053 Other Ranks. An infuriated Moira admonished Martindell as he magnified his frustration: " Did you fell the nature of your command embarrassing to you, it would be incumbent on you to express it.. You are pledged to your country to aim with your utmost energy at the fulfillment of its objective."162 In vindication, Martindell wrote to Fagan from Nahan: "Taking into the difficulties of the country, the strength of the enemy's position and the obstinate manner they defended them I must reluctantly confess that I should not deem warranted to adopt further offensive measures until reinforced."163 And he further added that he had planned " with a double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position and cutting off his water supply". He however, ascribed failure of the operation to day-attacks by the two column. But consoled himself that the failure had "not tarnished the British arms". There was, a distinct fear psychosis among the British by now which percolated from the General to the Sepoy and was acknowledged by Moira when he said: "Still however something more decisive was wanting to restore complete confidence and many circumstance contributed at this particular juncture to lead to an exaggerated estimate of military character of the Gorkha nation."164 Later Penderal Moon summed up the feelings: "The British toops at tempting to storm one of the stockades that blocked the approach to it (Jaithak) were put to ignominious flight when the Gorkhas fell upon them with their Khukris: and the Sepoys coming up in support seeing the British troops, took to their hells and did not halt until Nahan. Martindell's force had lost by now one third of his number and further offensives were abandoned."165 The Gorkhas were now invincible and it took more prodding and goading of Martindell by Moira to act. Moira, on his part reacted fast. By 31 December 1814 he placed six flank companies located at Dun at Martindell's disposal and also moved four companies of 1/27 NI located at Hansi. Martindell's Inertia Martindell now tried to redue the fort by blockade but no such ground offered that advantage. Moira accused him of employing, ' tardy means' and even threatening him to be replaced by Ochterlony. However, Moira's threats could not materialize as Ochterlony himself was moving at a snail's pace near Ramgarh and the two other Generals, Marley and Wood, entrusted to invade Nepal, were doing no better. Martindell's condition became pitiable as by now Ranjore Singh had established virtually a moral ascendance over him. Bal Bhadra had also joined Ranjore Singh with about 300 Gorkhas including the 84 survivors and others. This beefed up his strength and boosted his morale sky-high. Besides he managed to move a pair of guns from Srinagar and deployed them at Jumpta. His detachment at Chumalgarh, on the Jumana had captured Lieut Fredrick Young as a prisoner along with several others. As situation developed, Martindell remained obsessed with two considerations to defeat the Gorkhas at Jaithak: One, to build up heavy guns on either of the flanks in order to batter the defences into submission or evacuation, as happened at Kalunga, eventually. Time was not the consideration for him. Of the two flanks, he saw better chance of develping th final attack on Jaithak from the left, that is from the direction of Nauni. He began building up a track to move his guns fomr the left and concurrently move some Irregulars to the heights of Nauni, on which some regulars could also be built up. The track building was a laborious task but by 31 Janurary 1815 he had, at Nauni, under Lieut Col Kelley a force of 1,200 men. The weather however became foul and Kelley was taken sick and was forced to be relieved by Ludlow, a week later. Under Ludlow this force slowly and at a snail's pace, had reached Balck Hill on the north of Jumpta. Willam Fraser, the Political Agent was directly reporting the situation to Moira and commenting on Martindell;s indecisiveness and incompetence. By February, Matindell was happy to see William Fraser raise and move an Irregular battalion to Jubal. He regarded it a good riddance! The Irregulars who were at Nauni also volunteered to accompany his force. It is here that some Gorkhas showed willingness to join the British Forces, after negotiations and peace. To support further inching forward of the assaulting troops and fight a decisive battle, a mule track was progressed to move the British Corps d; elite, the 18 inch gun0 the last of the British secret weapon, that brought the Gorkhas out to see what tricks the British were upto. Prinsep recorded it : "The operation excited the astonishment of the enemy, who came out everywhere to see the wonder but made no attempt to prevent it". To the Gorkhas it was same spectacle every where- Kalunga, Ramgarh, Rajgarh or Jaithak. They enjoyed seeing their enemy. They continued to go foraging for supplies and fighting for every day of their existence. Here in Jaithak they were certain that the guns the British moved on their elephants would turn out to be their 'white elephant' . They waited to see their effect and then hoped to tumble them down the hill in a khukri charge! Though the battle continued to rage, the stories of traditional Gorkha humanity and valour were agog. When conducting the withdrawal of Richards' column 40 men with a Subedar had been taken prisoner by Ranjore Singh's men. They were treated well and even tempted to enlist in Ranjore Sing's force. So the Gorkhas too were prepared to have their mercenaries !166 There were to be more wonders of the Gorkhas bravery and it was to leave indelible imprint on a young officer, Lieut Young, who we mentioned earlier, had been ordered to intercept the lines of communication of the Gorkhas at Chumalgarh on the Jumana.167 He had attempted to encircle a post. The Gorkhas post was of not more than 200 fighting men against more his 1,000 of his Irregulars. In Prinsep's words: "They decided to die bravely rather than surrender. Having thus prepared themselves, they advanced and delivering their fire, charged, sword (Khukri) in hand, the nearest post of the Irregulars. These unfortunately gave away immediately, and were pursued, in the utmost confusion to the next post, where the panic quickly spread; until the whole party to flight without attempting any resistance, inspite of the utmost efforts of Lieut Young to induce the to face the enemy."168 Young became their prisoner as was, Hearsey in Kumaon. It was here the Gorkha commander asked him as to why he did not run. His answer, "I have not come all this far to run" impressed the Gorkhas and won their herats, for ever as after the hostility, Young became one of the commanding officers of the Nasiri (Sirmur) Balttalions and a live long convert of the Gorkha cause. So was the effort gaining ground with William Fraser who, when told by Martindell to increase the numbers of Irregulars suggested enrolling 500 of the Gorkhas caught in the melee of the ding-dong battle that was being fought at Jaithak and areas around. By mid-march 1815 the heavy guns were moved further up near Black Hill and they began pounding the fort of Jaithak but there were only a few direct hits and the most of the shells went over the crest. Alongwith it Martindell started his encirclement operation combining his multi-directional advanceon the All Fools' Day. But of the Ludlow' force, when snow fell and temperature reduced to sub-zero with gale and sleet, the troops suffered miserably. Ludlow, nonetheless found them with "unexampled constancy". This happened when the Indian troops were on half ration, called the Free Half Rations and they were being acused of letting their British officers down. Lodlow, nonetheless found time to write his battle field letters' to his wife. The damages done by the guns were being constantly repaired and the Gorkhas were re-constructing their defences, getting more reinforcements and above all, Bal Bhadra, the hero of Kalunga, continued to raise their morale. The British soon inched forward and occupied the Black Hill and the Peacock Hill. Richards, who had earlier moved up to Peacock Hill, made it in good time on 1 April and skirting around the feature moved to Panchul Punjab Ka Tibba, which in today's geography amouns to the feature marked as point 924 (4,050 feet), in the Survey of India maps. The battle continued without any wiorthwhile efforts by the British to capture the fort through an assault and as Amer Singh Thapa gave up the contest at Rajgarh in mid-may, the Convention also applied to the Withdrawal of Gorkhas from Jaithak and areas around. The five month campaign by Martindell's Division of 17,000 strength against an ill-armed, ill-equipeed and starving Gorkha garrison of not more than 1,000 men, women and children including 200 locals, demonstrated the total bankruptcy of the British Generalsihip here.169 For Martindell marked his time and hoped against best of his hopes that his Corps d' elite'. guns, would compell Ranjore Singh to raise the while flag or abandon the fort. He did neither. It is his elders Bam Shah, his father, Amar Singh, who unfortunately became instrumental in it. But for Martindell it was truly an Olympian patience. War Memorial At Nahan "VV m Mc Murdo Wilson, Ensign 2/26 NI. Killed on 27 December 1814 While crossing the retreat of Major Richards' Column On height of Jeytuck, when Lieut Thackery and 57 men Were killed and wounded by a strong overpowering column of Ranjore Singh Thapa" To this memorial the following perhaps be added: "For glory lights the soldier's tomb, And beauty weeps the brave." -Joseph Rodman Drake on War grave in America. To the credit of Jaithak and its brave defenders a few more lines must be added. Even if Martindell ventured assaulting Jaithak, with two live wire leaders-Ranjore Singh and Bal Bhadra-it can be said with firm conviction that a second Kalunga would have been created at Jaithak. Here itself the battle could have been moved to 1816 and the entire face of the campaign would have been changed.170 Rajgarh of Malaun: The Decisive Battle. General Situation The Gorkhas with their strategy of westward expansion to Kasmhmir had in fact, done wonders and would have turned a miracle if their venture at the Kangara Fort had not been aborted by Ranjit Singh in August 1809. They still had domination upto Jutogh, Bakloh in the north and north east and Pinjore-Kalka on the southern tip. Their forts at Jutogh, Taragarh (Bakloh), Mustgarh (Pinjore) and Taksal (Kalka) made an outer perimeter in the Punjab Hill States. The inner line was equally fortified. Along the axis Ochterlony's operations progressed, the Forts of Nalagarh, Ramgarh, Tibu, Mangu, Rajgarh (Malaun) and its complex and so on, offered opposition at virtually every ten miles (16 Kilometres). The terrain was jungle covered, with rocky outcrops which, though not difficult, was new to the British. To Gorkhas, it was, nonetheless an ideal mountain country to fight in. To recapitulate the tasks given to the force of Moira were: -1st Division at Danapur strength varying from 6,000 to 13,000 men, Objective: Kathmandu. 2nd Division at Banaras- Strength about 3,000 to cooperate with 1st Division against Kathmandu. 3rd Division at Meerut-Strength 3,000 to 3,500. First objective Dun, afterwards to operate against Garhwal or against Nahan, or on the flank of the Gorkhas, should they retire before the advance of the 4th Division and in general to co-operate with that Division. 4th Division at Ludhiana. Strength 6,000 to 7,000. objective: overpowering the Gorkha forces who held the Punjab Hill States. The principal task, according to Moira's own account to Ochterlony's Division, was the "reduction or dispersion of the Gorkha army commanded by Kazi Amar Singh Thapa and the expulsion of the Gorkhas from their conquests between the Sutlej and the Jamuna.171
Second Regiment Native Cavalry and one Rissala of Captain Skinner's Corps. 2/1 NI; 1/19 NI; 2/19 NI (Six Companies ) commanded by Colonel Arnold. Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. What is a Register Of Merit docs -> Protecting the rights of the child in the context of migration docs -> United Nations E/C. 12/Esp/5 docs -> 9th May 1950 the schuman declaration docs -> Getting To Outcomes® in Services for Homeless Veterans 10 Steps for Achieving Accountability Download 0.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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