Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
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| The euphemism of the Bravest of the Braves had been used by Napoleon for Marshal Ney, whose bravery during the retreat from Moscow in 1812 was one of the highest. "Brave les brave,' said Napoleon of him. The British then used this citation for the Gorkhas during and after the Anglo Gorkha war. Such was the bravery shown by this 74 year old Bhakti Thapa that the next legend of the Bravest of the Braves had been created on this day- 16 April 1815 at Malaun and it became the forerunner to the coming generation of the Gorkhas.
Ochterlony's concentration of force at Raila an Deonthal was commendable. Although it was Deonthal that took the brunt of Gorkha's counter-attack, Raila served as a lay back for Deonthal. As at Kalunga, it was artillery that saved the day for the British. Had the 6 pounders not been in position, it was certain that the entire force of Ochtherlony on the Rajgarh Ridge would have been thrown back as also happened on the two ledges of Jaithak. The credit from the British side must go to the artillery to save the day, in the battle. Amar Singh was now hamstrung and isolated. He made a mincemeat of the column of 1/9 NI under Showers but his own flexibility was reduced to nil. Gradually the defenders of the outer perimeters gave in to bribery and temptation of service with the British. They now had a free and unscrupuless (though not wholly immoral) methods to plant disinformation, bombard the Malaun fort not only with shells but false propaganda, and drumming of the fallibility of a man called Amar Singh. The propaganda was disseminated through the Gorkha deserters and the British stratagems of Sam, Dam, Dand, Bhed were working marvelously. It was Kautily's best. All this time the role of the Irregulars became very prominent. Lieut Ross at the head of 3,000 Irregular including Bilaspurians, Patials Sikhs, about 300 Gorkhas came to 'eat' into the loyalty of the Gorkhas deployed all round the Malaun Fort. They acted as important agent-du-provocateurs inciting active desertion. One such example which must be quoted is the letter of Ross to Ochterlony produced at PRNW PP 604. Narainkot, 3 May. I have already reported the proposal I made to three Sardars, Randhoj Thapa, Narbir Thapa, Uri Mardan Thapa. Yesterday after noon I sent messenger to the height if they were inclined to acquiesce to those terms. Randhoj alongwith two Jemadars would desert during the night. I have told them I was about to ascend the height and that they should not fire on our troops. I ascended the summit without opposition. By this time the Grenadiers battalion was coming and other partiers of the enemy similarly called on and accepted our invitation (not offer resistance) and we gained their principal watering place. People at Narainkot showed inclination to join us and we gained the height." It was not all. Disgustingly, the Gorkhas had already been brought into the battle against their own kinsmen and commanders, to whom they once owed full allegiance. Nonetheless, records must be allowed to speak for themselves. Enclosed in Vol II of PRNW at pp 590-92 Ochterlony's report of 17 April 1815, on the day after Deonthal, reads: "on the night of 14 April, two companies of Light Infantry under command Lieuts Fleming and Grant of 1/9 NI, 300 of Hindur Rajas household troops, 300 of Nusseeree Grokhas and about 300 of Mani Majra auxiliaries marched from the village of Pungul and at about 1 O'clock gained the post they were intended to occupy between Doab and Deonthal without opposition. " Later Moira also referred to it in his letter of 2 August 1815 (PRNW, pp 704): "It may be proper to state in this place that the Goorka troops who deserted in the course of perations of Maj Gen Ochterlony were taken into our pay and formed an attached and useful corps". He puts the number of all such deserters at 4463. Amar Singh hanged three (Jemadar Ajit Malla, Bhim Singh and one Kot Havildar) for abetting the British. But effect of his authority was on the decline (PRNW 587). Deonthal remained with the British. It moved the fire power base of the British next to the fort. A road (which is still available on the ground) by which 18 pounders could be transported on elephants was constructed and batteries raised against Malaun. The occupation of Kumaon by the British by now had cut off all hopes of Amar Singh to defeat them. The British propaganda and subversion had wrecked the nerves of those under incessant attack, while Amar Singh got isolated. The final coup de grace was effected by the battering of the fort by 18 pounders and by eventual resigning by Amar Singh to his fate.203 He crird bitterly like a child and told his wife: "Distiny my dear, is batter than the man." In the overall analysis a few aspects need to be commented upon : The British arm that finally caused the defeat of the Gorkha valour; the Generalship; the stage management of the battle. It was the artillery that staked the claim to be called, the major war winning arm. While it may not necessarily be given the unique honour of winning the whole war, it certainly emerged as a corps d' elite. But for these guns no success could have been possible. The best boquet that the artillery received in this war, in a fitful manner is contained in the History of Artillery (pp 20-21) which records : "His Excellency has to offer the tribute of his applause to the intrepid gallantry of Lieut Fireworker Cartwright, who when the desperate perseverance of the enemy had left him with only one man unwounded, with that one man secured his gun; the other being manned with equal zeal and valour by Lieuts Armstrong and Hutchinson, and two Sergeants of the pioneers". He deserved a Victoria Cross. The Infantry continued to show poor spirit most of whom were mortally afraid of the Gorkhas and their Khukris. They remained and Achilles Heel for the British. They behaved more like the Irregulars who panicked and fled at the sight of a Gorkha with unsheathed Khukri. The author of the Military Sketches of the Goorka War narrates how Lieut Lawtie, in the course of his reconnaissance, came suddenly on a post. He carried it; but the Gorkhas turned upon him; and his Sepoys, after firing away the upper layer of their cartridges abandoned the post and fled. Lieut Williams, who was moving to support was similarly abandoned by his men who were panic-struck, and fled without exerting themselves, Distrust further grew of the Indian Sepoys and European Infantry when news came of failures at Kalunga and Jaithak. In the end when fortune unfurled through heaven for the British at Rajgarh and almora, magnanimity of the senior officers tended to forget their infantry's marked weakness. Who were responsible for failures of Infantry to show its traditional élan? The best Infantry in the world is so because of its officers; so is the worst. For, there is no other arm where leadership is at such a high stake as in Infantry. The failure of the British Infantry was thus a leadership failure of the British Army. A whole chapter is devoted at the end to the analysis of leadership, where some of these leaders come up for scrutiny. At the outset, it may be said that for the British it was a Subaltern's war. The subalterns helped Ochterlony in every thing including providing technical guidance and tactical advice. The grea commodity of luck, no doubt showered fortune on the 61 year old General, to take the credit. But the actual contributor to the success of this war had been the junior officers. But where Ochterlony's credit must rest-and it is irrefutable is in the art of stage-management for war. He proved excellent in it. Even when the fog of war-a common occurrence at higher levels attempted to over whelm him, he managed to pull the chest-nut out of the fire just before it burst. In the Convention of 15 May 1815, rhetorics like "Amar Singh Thapa's high rank, character, bravery and fidelity", and Rajnore's gallant conduct at Jaithak", have been used liberally for permitting them to move out of their forts and vacating the rest of the territories. Amar Singh must, therefore, be remembered for his tenacity, personal bravery and impressing his enemy with so much awe that the latter honored him with "marching off with colours". It was, "the world turned upside down", of course, Lord Moira, who having himself been accorded such a nicety in the American war of independence though it a good parting gesture to a brave enemy and his son. It was afterall, in gratitude of a miracle by two Gs-the Gorkhas and God-that this campaign, in Prinsep's word, "which in January, promised nothing but disaster, finished in May by having in possession of the British, the whole tract of hills from Gogra to Sutlttj. It was all courtesy, the Gorkhas of Nepal whose band still sent playing Aey Gorkhali Sar Uchali and fired a volley of their muskets, they had captured at Nehr. While the small caravan trooped out of the Rajgarh there stood near the water point all those who had joined the Firingis waving at it. Some even said: Pheri Bhentuala (shall meet again). " In the battlefield", retorted one of Amar Singh's aides. Such was the face of the battle and of those who fought it. The gains for the British, being several, as it is, also was to result in something they had been looking for. In the words of General Sir George Chesney: "Lord Hastings administration was also signaled by the gain of tract of a country in the Himalayas from the Nepalsese ceded in 1815… a country more extensive than production but precious to English in India from its beauty and healthfulness." out of this territory came the hill stations of Mussoorie,' Lansdowne, Almora, Nainital, Ranikhet, Pithoragarh, and subsequently in 1830's, Darjeeling, Shillong etc. After Bam Shah gave up Almora-much as a result of the British deceit and cunning-Nicolls and Gardner persuaded him to write to Amar Singh to agree to the same. The number of few deserter, including Gorkhas from the outer permeters of Malaun, were magnified several times. At the behest of Ochterlony began a disinformation campaign from 16 April till 14 May that every one had joined the British. The fifth columnists and the dictated letter of Bam Shah added to Amar Singh's anxiety and indecisiveness. There were rumours. Deftly conveyed through some of the vacillating Gorkha commanders from the perimeter defences, that the goings at Jaithak were no good and that several seniors had become casualties. Though such news did not immediatedl set despondency in Amar Singh , it did. nonetheless, create a scene of gloom among the already suffering and wounded families, now herded in the western stronghold of the Fort. Amar Singh's insoluble problem was a 'blindness' that had engulfed him. Interception of his letters, orders and communications clipped his wings. He was not certain how Bam Shah gave in at Almora and why he had asked him to do likewise. Finally, he seemed to absolve himself by inserting a remark: Signing the Convention on directions of chautaria. He was not sure of the fate of Ranjore Singh. The British canard made him dead to dying and his garrison having abandoned the fort of Jaithak. The new from Garhwal despite Bakhatwar Singh informing him of his having readjusted his defence across the Bhagirathi on Chandrbadna feature was blank. Instead he was being fed the planted news that Garhwalis had already recaptured the Gorkha forts. And although the Durbar had mobilized and sent him some 27 companies of the total 40, he was unaware of such a gesture. But while the British creating a fog of war about Amar Singh is understandable as part of enemy's stratagem, the desertion of his own people in one or the other form is simply inexcusable. We know if Amar Singh had his way he would have thrown them over the Rajgarh cliff ! By the 'Black' 13 May, Amar Singh, now reduced to mere 50 fighting men and about 150 women and children, was conveyed the message from Ochterlony that all honour will be given to him by the British, his safety ensured, if he signed the Convention. With tears flowing, Amar Singh signed the ignominious Convention of the 15th. It inter-alia included the provision for enlistment of the Gorkhas into the Indian Army. The para 5 reads : "All the troops in the 'service of Nepaul, with the exception of those granted to the personal honour of the Kajees Ummer Singh and Runjore Singh, will be at liberty to enter into the service of the British Government, if it is agreeable to themselves and the British Government, till Peace is concluded between the two States." While 15 May really became a 'Black Day' for Amar Singh and the Durbar at Kathmandu, it became, a Red letter day for Ochterlony, Moira and the British, as on this day a new historical development had taken place: the Gorkhas of the Indian Army had found their roots.204 These however were a rag tag mostly of irregulars (Locals) and mercenaries on the service of the Gorkhas. The asli (or genuine) Gorkhas, as Bam Shah said, did not desert to join the British. The aslis returned to Nepal or sought employment with Ranjit Singh. It was 35 years hence that the real Gorkhas formed the First Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army. Lord Moira was looking at the overall strategic gain which is summed up in Para 321 of his report dated 2 August 1815: "By possession of Kumaon, the Doons of Dyra and Kyarda of Nahan, Subathoo and Malown and passage of rivers … we have in the hills from Kali to Sutleje the whole of the country beyond it. It is an advantage of no small moment to have substituted in those regions such an order of things, instead of dominion of the people with the spirit which has shown faith in the Goorkhas. But we are now not only freed from that evil but are secure from the consequences which would ensure were Runjeet Sing or any ambitious and powerful chiefs to establish himself in the hills beyond Sutleje." (By the courtesy of Chandra Bahadur Khanduri “ A rediscovered history of Gorkha” 1 Tartary denoted Northern Himalayan regions of Ladakh, and Tibet. British then had poor perception of geography. They mixed up Bhutan with Tibet and even the trade routes. 2PRNW PP 65; Pemble PP86-87 3 Selection From Records of Government of Bengal XVII pp 12. 4 Document on Treaties, Engagements & Sannads, Number XXIV. Rana Bahadur hob nobbed with the British to have himself 'reinstated to the throne'. 5 Hasrat PP 208-209. 6 Hand Book for Indian Army:Gurkha (1915) PP 42. 7 Kirkpatrick PP 204; Pol Con Sep 21,1795, No 24. 8 On threee 'ks": Moira's secret letter of 11 May 1815 addressed to Board to Directors said: " ..one of the objects of dispute which has given rise to war owes its remote origin to the consequences of Kinloch expedition, and the ulterior objectives of Kirkpatrick and Knox's missions were defeated by enemity and jealousy of party .. and its obstinacy presents only obstacles to pacification." See letter reproduced in Hasrat PP 149. 9 Ludhina Agency Records Vol II PP 395; PRNW PP 65. Pemble PP 85. Problem with China assumed frictitious shape when Chinese bagan to see British expansion in India as threat to Tibet. The Nepalese troops in European uniform were also seen by the Chinese as the British troops in Nepal. 10 History of Birtish India, VOL VIII by Mill PP 59-60. 11 In the New Cambridge History of India-Vol 2 : Bengal The British Bridgehed Eastern India (1740-1828) Orient Longman 1987. 12 Water Hamilton PP 103. Perhaps there is partial truth in it as form 1792 the Nepalese were obliged by the treaty to send 'quinquennial embassy' or tribute to China. But Nepal was never the vassal of China nor under its suzerainty. 13 Pol Con 14 Sep 1816 No. 43; Pemble PP 79 14 Ludhiana Records PP 197. The final excuse built up when 18 Policemen were killed in a Gorkha raid in a place below Palpa on May 18, 1814 . It provided the ultimate excuse of war to Moira, who was regarded as 'anxious to display his military talents'. 15 Wheeler PP 472 and Fraser pp 3. 16 Ludhiana Records PP 394-395. 17 Hasrat reproduced at PP 257, 18 BD Sanwal pp 133-141. 19 Moon, Penderal PP 378 note-8. 20 Forbes PP 346-47. 21 Memoirs of Gillespie; Psychology of Colonization by Mannoni and Calibar; Theory of Social Change by Honewood. 22 The Story of Gurkha, Bishop, PP 11. 23 See Edward Thorntons. The History of the British Empire In India Vol IV, PP 336. 24 Stiller The Rise of The House of Gorkha pp 332; and Ochterlony's letter of 13 July 1813, 25 Moon PP 378. 26 Ibid PP 378. 27 Gorkha. A History of Gurkhas, Tuker PP 78. Also see Pol Cons April 22, 1814, No. 43. Para 10; Prinsep 465-66. 28 Generals & Strategists by the author. PP 16. 29 PRNW PP 73, 142, 144-45, 207, 344, 711-712. 30 See Lieutenant Colonel Spaigt's Article Gorkha Expansion; M Scots report of 27 Dec 1814. The original Gorkha Battalions were Hanumandal. Singh Nath and Sri Nath. Also wee Sainik Itihas. 31 William Fraser, Though a political agent, was an adventurer who helped raise an Irregular battalion under Martindell which provided very useful manpower for the eventual raising of the Gorkhas. Fraser's opinion of Gorkhas is worthwhile to quote: The Goorkhalis are a famous superior race in size and discipline and determination. They are said to run a steep acclivity ….. 32 See PRNW pp 258, The author of The History of the Bengal Artillery notes at PP2 the Gorkhali words of commands in French and their dress, being British. It showed the Gorkha keenness to imbibe the changes. 33 Gorkha history by Vansitart, Fraser and Kennedy saw them fighting at Kalunga. 34 Grenadier Company consisted of soldiers of exceptionally good height who could carry more weight and fight longer. They carried about 60 pound weight of arms and ammunition, especially Grenades. 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Better to Die: The story of Gurkhas PP 17 and USI Vol XLII October 1913 51 Geographical Statistical and Historical Description. PP 641 and 71-72. 52 HM's 53rd's History PP 113; Shakespear's article in USI Journal Vol XLII October 1913. 53 Sunder Lal at PP 61 remarked that most of the locals of Garhwal were fighting for the Gorkhas. While some Khasi Zamindars like Jeevan Singh Helped the British, other were with the Gorkhas, most prominent of these being half the strength at Kalunga consisted to them. Even for battle at Kangra a large number of Kumaonis and Garhwalis were enrolled. Edund Candler, a contemporary historian mentions the particularly incredible spirit of the Garhwalis in employment of the Gorkhas at Kalunga. He wrote "without their help me Gorkhas could not have so obdurately stuck to their position against an enemy of superior strength and fire power." Similar tribute has been given in the history of Second Gorkha Regiment. It says: "It will be seen that a small force had actually been collected during November 1814 while Kalunga Fort was still defying and these were largely Garhwalis from Srinagar." 54 Campbell Sketch reproduced by Hasrat PP 184 and PRNW 144. 55 For details see Chapter on Leadership (Reflections). 56 Memoirs of Sir Gillespie for TE Egerton (1816). 57 The Official Strength of Gillespie's Div was 17,000. 58 History of the Royal Irish Hussars (1693-1927) PP 370 and Tuker's Gorkha: A history of the Gorkhas; Shakespear PP 372. Of interest, the queen's Royal Irish Hussars, the descendent of the Royal Irish Hussars had Lieut Winston Churchill before the Boer war. He was to be come the world famous War time leader of Great Britain. 59 See PP 38-39 History of Bengal Artillery, giving out Excerpts fro the Orders of Gillespie given at the end of notes. 60 8th Light Dragoon was formed in 1693 as Irish Protestants. Changed to Light Dragoons in 1775. In Indai saw service at Agra. Laswari, Deeg. It also fought War in Afghanistan, Crim. See British Army Regimental Records, Badges, Devices etc. by Major JH Lawerence Archer. 61 From Original Letters. 62 Nepal ko Sainik Itihas PP 392. 63 History of Bengal Artillery PP 5; and reproduced in Nepal and East India Company, by BD Sanwal, PP 158-159. 64 A near similar situation came in the Anglo-Sikh War 1845-46. Henry Smith's Brigade was surrounded by Sikhs near Mudki but failed to exploit advantage due to Lal Singh's "cowardice and incapacity". See history of Sikhs by JD Cunningham (1919) and Short History of Sikhs by Ch Pyne (1915); Dictionary of English History PP 979. Brig Sir Henry Smith had exhorted the Indian and British troops to unkeep the honour or the British arms. He had said. A British Army mustnot be foiled and failed this Army shall not be. It was 'victorious or die' for General Sir Hughes too. Sheer determination won the day. But not at Kalung. 65 At the First Field Marsha Cariappa lecture at the Vigyan Bhavan on 26 October 1995, Sam had referred to the Gorkhas as being the most brave people. 66 See History of King's Shropshire Light Infantry Regiment by Cannon Richard and Colonel W Rogerson. The 53rd now known as 53rd and 85th Foot. It also served in St Helena, while Napoleon Bonaparte was in exile there. 67 See Imperial Gazetteer Vol IV and Cambridge History Vol VI. White Mutiny was caused in 1809, due to discontentment among the European officers and troops. Detailed notes elsewhere. 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