Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
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| The problem of keeping families in occupied areas by the Gorkhas precipitated their position. Amar Singh was complled, partilly, to abandon the Fort of Arki in order to ensure security of his families, his other strategic considerations, notwithstanding.189
As expected, Ochterlony adopted an operational plan which promised to be audacious. He changed his main thrust of attack to the Rajgarh Ridge; he adopted a containing and slower operation against Ramgarh; and he set a battalion of Irregulars under Lieut Ross to cut off Amar Singh's line of communications with Bilaspur, while the Raja of Bilaspur himself was set to be bought, through bribe and coercion. The battle that remained to be fought at Ramgarh became a set piece affair for Colonel Cooper who became responsible for consolidating his position with 2, 18 pounders in support. The History of Bengal Artillery narrates it briefly though not without serious flaw.: "Colonel Cooper ascended the Ramgarh ridge. Captain Webb, with his company, or a part of it, accompanied this detachment. The 18 pounders under Lieutenant Tennant were brought up with incredible labour, and a battery was opened upon Ramgarh which soon surrendered. Jorjoru capitulated at the same time. Taragarh (a second place of that name) on the llth, and Chamba on the 16th of March, were breached and taken. All were stone forts. The posts on this ridge having been thus successively reduced 'the detachment took up the position which had been assigned it before Malaon, on the 1st of April".190 The Gorkhas faced a situation where the defenders at Ramgarh had been gradually isolated. Lieut Lawtie had built the track of west of Jorjoru by 12 February and as the British line extended upto Tubu (see sketch), the post of Jorjoru was isolated, yet they refused to give up. Then between 12 and 16 February, Ramgarh Fort was subjected to battrerings by 2, 18 pounders which destroyed the eastern part of Fort (The fort has not since been repaired). The British now did the incredulous. They surreptitiously conveyed to the Gorkha commander that as situation was bad, they would be allowed to join Amar Singh's force with all their arms and ammunition. Similar offer was given to the Jorjoru post. The British version is quoted by Pemble with a twist: "The garrison of Ramgarh was permitted to march (out) to Malaun with all arms, colours, musical instruments, public and private property including cannons .. Jorjorau capitulated the same day".191 All the heavy equipment mentioned had already been taken to Malaun in mid-December after the build up of Ochterlony at Nehr. Amar Singh knew, having made the British deploy, they would attack in thin air while he built up on the Malaun ridge. What was left behind was a screen of the Gorkha troops, most of them being Irregulars and locals. The near correct version is given by Hamilton, who wrote : "The detachment left at Ramgarh secured the surrender of the fort, without opposition on 16 February by bringing the heavy guns on to the ridge above, at close range, and during the next month three other fortified forts along the range, the furthest from Ramgarh, surrendered in succession, the majority of the garrisons enlisting into our service.".192 Subversion was thus playing a larger part. Earlier when Thompson managed to stick up at Mangu on December 28-29 against Gorkha counter-attack, another attempt was made to buy off Amar Singh. Hamilton records it : "After this success Ochtterlony communicated to Amar Singh Thapa an offer of the Governor General to confirm him and his family in their lands, worth about Rs 30,000 per annum, and to settle on him and his family Rs 24,000 more on condition that he surrendered his army and territory. In reply, Amar Singh Thapa declared his intention of resist to the last extremity."193 We move to Malaun, or Rajgarh. Malaun became a Plassey or Buxor for the British. It became a Waterloo fro the Gorkha. It turned history and created geography, that removed barriers. Walter Hamilton descried Malaun as a stronghold located at 4,488ft., consisting of a line of fortified posts upon a very difficult and lofty ridge which projects itself in to River Sutlej.194 The author's field study suggests the fort still intact with the eastern parapets in deterioration. The two battering guns were still located inside the fort.195 It has beauty and grandeur seldom surpassed by other forts. The other forts and stockades including Rattangarh are gradually decaying. The Gorkha village of Malaun is intact as, indeed, the track laid by the Pioneers. Malaun or Rajgarh The Second Story of the Bravest of the Braves The battle for Malaun servers as the finest example in the whole of brilliant history of the Grokhas in virtually all aspects of history of warfare of the Nineteenth Century that were fought not only in India but the world over. In a scale diminutive to Waterloo (15 June 1815), it has lessons and repercussions that transcend beyond the visible spectrum: Firstly, it brought out the best in tactics and strategy. Secondly, it also showed the darker side of battle and the morals of the British. Thirdly, from this single battle, its implications proliferated to strategic consequences then simply unimaginable. And in a lagre measure it proved what General Carl Von Clausewitz said and the world quotes continuously, "war is the continuation of government policy by other means."196 Fourthly, it showed the leadership at its good light at all levels. This battle also proved what Napoleon observed and Emil Ludwig quoted : "It is the political astuteness that makes military men as genius".197 And fifthly, it also gave the British a sulking, quailing neighbour Nepal; and importantly, it led to the beginning of the Gorkhas of the Indian Army, who, over a period of time, became its corps d' elite and what Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw called them as the wonder of the Indian Army.198 It is not intended to comprehensively discuss in the historical exposition the small details of movements and operations . The emphasis is on larger issues of strategy, tactics and diplomacy. As part of military plan, Moira was to use every possible measure to terminate the war on his terms. Militarily, he accelerated operations in the west further by moving Colonel Nicolls, the Quartermaster of the HM's forces in Bengal Army to replace the Eurasian, Gardner. The ground configuration of the Malaun ridge of about 5 miles with average height of 4,500 feet rising from the Gamrola and Gambar, forms a tough country side. Deeply cut nalas, sharp escarpments, steep gradients, rocky out crops when they are not covered with thick jungles, are the main characteristics of this feature. Small village dot all along. The rain leave several streams full of water till about November but from December they dry up and then only a few perennial nalas serve the needs of the troops located on the ridge. Water becomes a problem during March-May when, again preliminary pre-monsoon showers begin to solve the water problem of the defenders. Amar Singh made full use of the features and his defence stretched from Lag Hill to Rattangarh, a distance of over 6 miles (approximately 10 Kilometres). In commenting on the construction of the defence-work, Colonel Sandes said: "The Gorkhas had shown usual speed, ingenuity, their organization was perfect, their industry extraordinary and their designs well suited to the site." The design of Amar Singh's battle on the Rajgarh feature pivoted on two basis premises : one, Bhakti Thapa, who had always been his right hand man, to guard the most vulnerable flank of Surajgarh. The lesser threatened and isolated fort Rattangarh could be left with Bilaspurians. However the hub of defenses on Malaun had to be guarded as the ground of tactical importance for the entire defences. He undertook to defend it himself. Two, reactions to destroy the British gusn and attacking force had to be swift and decisive. Unfortunately, deployment of Amar Singh favored the attackers. The British records praise Lawtie, the Engineer and the surveyor who had made Ochterlony move from the ledge of Kahnani Kot to the Nehr plain. He was again pressed into service for intricate reconnaissance of the Rajgarh feature. His report showed that gaps existed in the extended Gorkha defences at Raila and Deonthal (I). He also found that the defenders of Rattangarh were a shaky lot, non-enthusiastic to fight and could perhaps be subverted. In so far the Gorkha defences around the Malaun village were concerned they were a rag-tag of people who could be exploited. Octerlony's plan for attack became one of maneuver thrount infiltration into the gaps unheld by Amar Singh. Concurent with it, multiple prongs could be developd to cut the water supply and guns could be moved into the areas on both flanks from which support could be provided to the attacking echelongs at various stages of assault. A serious attempt had also to be made to subvert the loyalty not only of the Rattangarh fort but of the Gorkha defences outside the fort. The plan broadly worked out manifested in harassing Bhakti Thapa in his fort at Surajgarh and the Tipnu Spur on the extremities; locate sufficient troops at Raila and Deonthal; harry and harass Malaun Cantonment; and in concert with the military operation try and win over as many Gorkha commanders as possible. He sent irregular under Lieut Rosss to the Bandela Heights, dominating Bilaspur and thus compelling the one time ally and staunch supporter of Amar Singh, to the British side.It showed effect, almost instantly as the 500 strong Bilaspurian troops at Rattangarh joined him. This came as a windfall. He then pushed another regular battalion under Colonel Thompson to join Ross. The result was that the british found Rattangarh as a firm base and Amar Singh had to readjust his defences on the Malaun Ridge. But he was not unduly concerned as he was fighting a battle on the ground of own choosing. Soon the battle of encirclement, infiltration and subversion began. Gradually, Amar Singh's position became so acute that his mail was being intercepted and his famous letter of 2 March 1815, beside the letter of November,, already mentioned, became Ultra to the British, By this time according to his own version, "all the Rans. Rajas, Thakuris had joined the enemy." with the advantage of Amar Singh's letter of 2 march and his increasing number of allies.' the constant flow of deserters, knowledge of ground and Amar Singh's defence, Ochterlony framed a plan that decidedly looked bold. He did what the modern tactics calls a multi-directional attack by adopting an infiltration technique. It remains one of the finest examples of the planning on a terrain as of the Malaun Ridge, against an enemy like the Gorkhas deployed on it. His plan which fructified after reconnaissance, consultations. subversion and military preparations, for two months since he concentrated opposite Malaun, took the shape of several columns moving to the ridge concurrently, on 14-15 April 1815. They were 199 Lieutenant Fleming was assigned to move from Palta to Raila by night, and on reaching Raila, to show light as a signal to the other columns. He was to establish the firm base and act as the path finder. Lieutenant Lidlie and Captain Hamilton to move from Lag Hill and Jai Nagar with their troops and concentrate at Raila on the morning of 15 April. Major Innes, with a Grenadier battalion and two 6 pounders to move from headquarters at Battoh, on the morning of the 15th, upon Raila. Colonel Thompson with the 2/3 NI and two 6 pounders under Lieut J Cartwright, to move from Battoh, on the morning of 15th up on the Second Deonthal (II) Captain Lawrie to move at the same time from Kali, upon the same point. Captain Bowyer to leave Kali at the same time as Captain Lawrie, and, after crossing the Gamrola Rver, to diverge to the right and endeavour to penetrate the Malaun cantonment from the rear. Captain Showers to move from Arnold's post at Rattangarh at the same hour, and endeavor to penetrate the Malaun cantonment, between the Kakri stockade and the fort. Besides these, Lieut Dunbar, with a small body of regular and Irregular Sepoys, was intended to act as a support for the two last detachments. Ross's force of Irregulars (including the Gorkha deserters) to go fro Narainkot. The force that was committed to attack consisted of : Light Battalion (Grenadiers companies) 2/3 NI, 2/16 NI, with about 2,000 Irregular including 300 Gorkhas and 4,6 pounders, There were also available 2/7 NI, 1/19 NI, 2/19 NI, 1/9 NI, 2/1 NI, HM's 53rd, Skinner's Squadron and the battering guns. The dispositions are better shown on the sketch. This plan improved upon the concept of Rollo Gillespie's plan if several out flanking columns converging at one smaller objective , Kalunga over a dispersed area. Ochterlony's plan, on the other hand, aimed at concentrating several columns at different points form where they would work inward towards the main objective of the Rajgarh fort and these precluded the possibilities of a coordination – mix –up as tge columns were to act independently, if required. soon these columns snaked up the Rajgarh feature. The object if this movement, as Moira's report of 2 August 1518 made out, was " to distract Amar singh's attention, and obtain an opportunity of establishing them selves on the height in such a manner as to break the continuity of his chain of ports, and to force him to confine himself to the fort of Malaun and his immediate outposts, while the footing obtained by the British troops on the ridge should afford means of operating directly against the fort ". this movement was carried out admirably. It was fitting into a classical maneuver, resulting in shifting the fire support means to a suitable flank. With this infiltration Bhakti's position at Surajgarh had been fully isolated. Bhakti Thapa and Amar Singh's worries began to increase but they could not ascertain the actual strength until the morning of 15 April, when Amar Singh called Bhakti Thapa to Malaun fort for consulation and a counter-attack. But Captain Shower's attack on the Tiphnu Spur had been beaten back. It was a rout. The Charge of the Gorkha Brigade Bhakti had to descend a thousand feet from Surajgarh to the Gamoral nala, traverse on a concealed goat-trail for miles to bypass the areas now humming with the enemy troops. It took his force thebest part of the day to do so. When he arrived at the Rajgarh it was late evening. The red ball of the sun was, nonetheless still on the horizon and post haste he was taken to a machan from where he could see Deonthal and the Tipnu Spur. Some men and animals could be seen on the Deonthal despite all measures taken by Thompson to conceal his build-up. Back to the kazi's headquarters where stood an anxious but not in panic, Amar Singh. Bhakti was briefed quickly how the enemy had infiltrated into the gaps and alas, how the Gorkhas themselves vacillated in preventing them from arriving at those spots. There had been, he told Bhakti-the grandsire laxity in surveillance, actions and a callous disregard to prompt reporting. He was furious at some of the Subedars who, he thought, were either tired or faltering in their duties. The Bhardars who were also present for consultation and decision even suggested that the enemy's agents having been active, had perhaps managed to subvert the loyalty of a few. The Kazi was annoyed at that and rejected such allegations. " No Gorkha worth his name can ever do that", he told the gathering. He was however, unware of the undercurrents already eating into the vitals. Bhakti intervened and asked the Kazi to decide on an early counter-attack preferably on both the sides, though the one for Deonthal must be launched without loss of time. He suggested a mid-night attack. The others thought a first-light attack would be better as it could be driven in with precision. Amar Singh was in agreement with Bhakti but then other difficulties propped up: the withdrawal of the troops to form the counter attack force would take time; the conveyance of the 3 pounders would need care; and finally, other matters such as the briefing of the troops, the final prayers in the temple of Lord shiv and Goddess Durga could not be forgotten. The H-Hour time was then agreed upon 4 a.m., April 16. While others dispersed to get the arrangements going, the Kazi and the Grand-sire sat to think over the finer points of attack. They made contingency plans to go headlong or scoop astride the slopes from two or more directions. Bhakti wanted the Kazi to man the Fort and leave the counter-attack to him. The Kazi told him to leave that decision fro the moment. By 2 a.m., the fort was scampering with activities. Some 400 men had assembled. There were also the band and the flagbeares of the Kazi. The women and the children were awake and helping the men draw their ammunition from the silos of the fort. Some girls and boys had dressed themselves in mens attire and were ready to march off with the attackers. They were, instead, told to get to the perimeter defences and be prepared to rush to the battle field to evacuate and treat the wounded. A batch of them fetched the water and found some Firingis nearby but they still managed to draw the water. The slinging in of the guns had to be attended to. The Kazi himself saw them before they were ready. Soon the prayers began on an austere note and the Pandit, a Sarma from Nepal, put the holy Tika on all the commanders and men. The senior wife of the Kazi added another on the Kazi and Bhakti. The Kazi had decided by then to lead the counter-attack though the commander still would be Bhakti. For the garrison, it was time to also listen to the final words of the Kazi and the Grand sire. the Kazi spoke calling 16 April as the day of the promises to be fulfilled to the motherland, Nepal, "We must win or die in winning the battle" he told them. He sought a promise on that which resounded with Hun-Chha (Yes) from all. The grandsire, never too good at lecture, told the Kazi that he and others of the 400 had-lived only for this day'. It will be victory or death. He then asked the Kazi's wife, calling her a sister, to look after his son. She promised to look after hi as her own Ranjore. (Bhakti had lost his wife a few months back). It was 3.15 a.m. when the 400 marched out of the fort, to a slow but steady beat of a drum. Deonthal is a flattish narrow rock-strewn extension of the Rajgarh, for nearly one and half miles. Pines and shrubs cover it well even now. A very prominent knoll still marks its ground feature. The British column under Thompson had taken position here on its reverse slopes. The battery of 6 pounters properly concealed, was located on the far-end of the feature. With two India Battalions (23NI and 26 NI), the Grenadiers companies of the Light Battalions and some 1000 Irregulars including the prisoners and the deserters, the British strength swelled up to about 3,500 troops and weapons. And, against it ,was marching a puny force of 400 Gorkhas with just about 200 flint-locks and toy guns of 3 pounders. It was around past 4 a.m., when Thompson was told that a faint drumbeat, perhaps of the enemy, could be hard some distance away. The British scrambled to a sort of a stand-to, clutching at their weapons and limbering up thir guns. Andrelin ran high in Thompon's veins and his heart beat could be heard by him. Others perspired in their positions, and prayed. Gradually, as the radiance of the rising sun began to glow, showing the ground in silhouettes, the approaching lines of the Gorkhas too could be seen. So was the flag of the Kazi- the traditional yellow, carrying a black Hanuman. The drum-beat had died but the rustling files drew closer. Thompson waited. Soon it was brighter and the Gorkha were hastily forming up. There was delay; and the longer they waited the better they would be seen. Amar Singh could be seen pushing the first wave forward. As the band played and the long crved brass pipes blowing the charge of Ayo Gorkhalsi could be hard. The first wave moved along the spine of the features almost into the guns. they cut their way through to the guns now belching sharpnels and shots into them. The Gorkhas killed and wounded in scores but only one man reached the gun to be killed at its breach. Their own 3 pounders were little use. Ere long the second wave followed, the disappeared first. It touched only the fringes of the Thompson perimeter. Now the entire force of the British were firing in all sorts of directions and even killing their own colleagues. The wave pressed forward but gradually like the fury of flood over a rock, struck it to fall silent. Bhakti who led the third and the final wave of the balance of the 400 changed his axis. He divided them into two columns through the slopes on either side of the feature and then scooped up to attack simultaneously. They were met by many of the Thompson's Granadiers who had taken defences on the midwaist lines of the feature. The Gorkhas cut through them to the guns but were mowed down as they charged in to the monsters vomiting sharpnels. Bhakti with his Khukri bristling in the sun made a desperate yet titanic surge at Cartwright's gun but a shot saw the hero's end. The Kazi saw Bhakti go down as he and others charged the British. The Kazi wanted to also do the same with guard of ten men but was stopped from the Harakiri. They escorted him back to the fort. The famous counter attack by Bhakti Thapa was recorded from a vantage point of history by RP Ochterlony's the author of Sketches Of The Goorka War. " A body of Gorkhas advancing to charge bears no resemblesce to a European column. Several huge trumpets putting up a harsh but stirring noise, set the multitude in motion who, except some carry shields, grasping each a matchlock in his left hand and a broad sword in his right, rush on, disregarding all regularity, very like a pack of hounds in full cry." The purpose of history will also be served with a nuance, of course, if the version of Hamilton is reproduced : " At the first break of dawn 16th April, a desperate attack was made on the main, or central column, by 2,000 of the enemy headed by Bhagti Thapa, a leader distinguished for his headlong valour. And for two hours the fight raged at close quarters, Amar Singh Thapa being observed in person, with a stand of colour, encouraging his men within musket shot range. On our side equal bravery was displayed. Lieutenant Fireworker Cartwright of the Artillery fought one gun with the help of the one unwounded man of his detachment, while the other gun was manned by two lieutenants and two Sergeants of Pioneers. In spite of the impetuous courage of the enemy, they were at length repulsed, Bhagti Thapa and a host of men being slain. On our side 4 officers and 213 men were killed and wounded in this column during the 15th and 16th wounded, besides certain Irregulars, whose casualties are unrecorded."200 It was the Khukri charge and the battle cry of Ayo Gorkhali201, their last roar, that must have shaken their enemies. What a tremendous scene that would have turned lambs into lions ! The Gorkhas proved their valour before Deonthal whose slopes were covered with dead and dying. It was the charge of the Gorkha Brigade-perhaps the first one-with all its fury. As Bhakti was killed and Amar Singh with a dozen walking wounded struggled into the Fort, the standard of Hanuman fluttering on, shaken but still holding the standard of the Nepalese Army. He had on this fateful day lost his right hand man and each one of the Gorkhas, who had stood with him from the day he crossed River Kali in October 1790. All these brave men had laid their lives for his cause and the cause of their country.202 Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. 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