Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
The British Organisation and Tactics
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- The Concept of Irregulars-Mercenaries
- British Leadership before War
- British Tactics 39
- Strategic Imperatives
- The Gorkhas
- The Gorkha Defensive Deployment
- Preparation forward
- Plan of Operations
- A Simple Comparison of Forces
The British Organisation and Tactics The British have been a sea-faring and fighting nation. That was the tune all Europe played. They were quick to learn lessons of failures from the American War (1812-14) as also successes elsewhere. But the larger lessons of tactics and understanding of strategy came to them from Continental wars they fought and the introduction in 1803-1805 of a Light Brigade by Sir John Moore. Earlier, important changes had taken place in the organization in 1796. Certain improvements in tactical drills had been brought about by Colonel David Dundas who advocated the Infantry drills in extended formations. Juibert give them the tactical idea of fire and movement and thus introduced the application of tactics, on a sounder footing. As a result of organizational changes, the command, control and logistics of the field formations was also separated from policy planning. Of relevance to us is the allocation of threee battalions of artillery along with lascars (or Lascars) to the Bengal Army and European Infantry battalions (HM's Infantry) and Four regular battalions of Indian (Native) Cavalry. It was here that the single infantry battalion regiments were formed into two battalion regiments of which the Bangal Army had twelve. Each European Artillery had three battalions of five companies; the European Infantry each of the three regiments had ten companies; the Regular Native Cavalry had four regiments of six troops each and Native Infantry had 12 regiments of two battalions each. Every Native Infantry regiment had an establishment of 45 British officers, 2 British Sergeants, 40 Native officers, 200 NCOs, 40 Drummers and Fifers and 1600 Sepoys. The native battalion had two Grenadiers companies 33 One Light company and Seven Battalion companies. The battalion staff of the Native Infantry included Adjutant, Quartermaster and Regimental Sergeant Major and Quarter Master Sergeant, as the Senior NCOs. The European Artillery battalion had five companies each and mounted Rocket Artillery Troop. The Native Artillery had four troops and its officer commanding was a Major. The Corps of Pioneers had eight companies integral of the Bengal Army. Local Battalions, which were irregular battalions were also raised. Of interest were the Eastern (Rangpur) and local Battalions at, Ramgarh, Mizapur Champaran; Local Infantry Provincial Battalions at Burdwan, Chittagong, Dhaka, Murshidabad, Patna, Purea. The Hill Rangers were at Bhagalpur. Two Light Battalions were also available under command of Majors with 12 more officers and two Ensigns. They were designed to work as outflanking columns . The First battalion worked with Martindell's Division and the Second with Ochtetrlony's. Irregular Cavalry under J skinner and Gardner were located at Hansi and Khasganj. An Impressive Organisation by all Accounts. This organization was flexible and gave them the necessary punch. Brigades and divisions were formed out of the operational needs and their grouping was flexible. But the staff was milked from the units and in the absence of dedicated staff and permanent headquarters, command deficiency became evident as the war progressed. The officers picked up for ad-hoc headquarters were junior officers who could not influence the operational decisions of their commanders. Expansion of the Bengal Army took place form 1814 when the strength of the Native Infantry regiments moved up to 30 and later two more were added. During the period, the HM's regiments were 8th (King's Royal Irish) Light Dragoons, 24th Regiment of Light Dragoons, 14th, 17th , 53rd, 67th, 69th and 78th Regiments of the Foot. The Concept of Irregulars-Mercenaries The Europeans learnt that all regulars could not make up the requirement of troops. Besides, the regulars were expensive to train and maintain. The British caught on this idea of creating Irregulars from 1793-much later than the pajani system in Nepal. A Corps of Uhlans was the result. Such Irregulars could be equipped with Fusils rather than expensive Muskets.34 The Irregulars could be under the battle field control, and their light companies could be attached to be the regular battalions. Irregulars drew foreign emigrants, prisoners wanting to see adventure venture and deserters seeking clemency besides those who could plunder in uniform. Irregulars were created both by the Gorkhas (Rohillas, local men of occupied areas) and by the British. So comprising the riff-raffs they had on both sides Sikhs, Rohillas, Pindaris- any one, every one looking for quick money and adventure. It is right to say their deaths were as mysterious as their births. Their loyalties too varied according to the circumstance of success or the volume of plunder. Some Anglo Indian Soldiers of fortune like Hearsey, Gradner, Skinner, Hosdson Walter Reinhardt, Benoit La Borgne, Martine, Birch et at, took to raising these Irregulars, who through training, loyalty and camaraderie induced a very high sense of sacrifice in some of them. They, later were to become as effective units as the regulars. The Rangpur Irregular Battalion did extremely well in its operations under Captain Barre Latter, during the Anglo-Gorkha War. So did the Irregulars under Gardner, Nicolls and Ross. In Europe, the Irregulars Cavalry were called as chasseurs-a-Cheval, and the Infantry as Fusiliers (or Fusiliers).35 British Leadership before War This book endeavors to examine the leadership aspect later in reasonable details. Though their analysis is aptly done in the campaign specifically, however, certain knowledge on the British leadership of that time becomes necessary, even at this stage. Their leadership was generally poor, which affected not only operational efficiency of the units and formation but also the essential camaraderie between the Europeans and the Indians. As the British began to achieve results of consolidation, the discrimination of white men for the Indians grew. Such overtures were counter-productive to cohesiveness in units and coherence in the Army. The Commanders- in – Chief became responsible to bring about this degeneration which constantly reflected on the results achieved by the British whenever they faced stiff opposition, such as at Bharatpur (1805) and the Gorkha War. The old officers attributed this to lack of rapport between the senior and the junior British officers. One of the officers lamented in the Select Committee proceedings when he wrote; " Almost everyone in the Madras Army can talk of Lawrence, Clive or Coote but not one in a thousand can say who the C-in-C was." This leadership was equally bad in the European units. John Pemble and Byron Farwell have poor opinion of them simply. They consider them as "wretched in quality".36 The Service conditions were equllly responsible for this rotten quality, where a soldier in the Company's service and the officers lingered on their ranks for unduly long period. It took an Ensign to become a Lieutenant six years; a Lieutenant to Captain, fifteen years; Captain to Major, twelve years; Major to Lieutenant Colonel, six years; from Lieutenant to Colonel, thirteen years. Thus it took 52 years for an Ensign to be a Colonel. It is no wonder that all their officers were old when they fought the War. Some of them had even gone infirm and senile, especially at the higher level of command. The age or overage was not the only factor that affected efficiency but also the poor pay that the junior officers got. By 1809 the British officers caused White Mutiny,37 the cause of which was the abolition of the tent contract, by Sir George Barlow, the Governor of Madras, where these officers ofter made hefty profits through Hawalas. The moral side of the British conduct also effected the quality of the officers' leadership. Prizes and plundered at money became a distinct feature of any operation. For example, the wealth plundered at Tipu Sultan's palce at Seringpatam in 1799 was estimated at more than two million pounds which was given as prize money. The same have been the cases everywhere. Commenting on this aspect, Colonel Ferryman wrote: "Reference to prize money and plunder added zest to the soldiers' live .It was quiet in order and regulated by the government. However, private plunder, though carried out, were regarded as relic of barbarism and genrally denounced but was openly winked at."38 British Tactics39 Tactics is derived from Greek word Taktoc meaning distribution of thisgs arranged mechanically but as part of higher principles of war. This ill defined word has naturally undergone change over a period of time and now connotes the deployment of troops against the enemy with a view to defeat him. It takes into account the ground, the fire support and the manoeuvre. In Eurpoe, the British were exposed to war of movements and attrition but in India it turned out to be luxury, laxity and a boastful sense of superiority over the natives who failed to stand up to the British show of military power and invariably succumbed to subversion and intimidation. Little wonder, Kazi Amar Singh remarked in his 2 March 1815 letter that thus far the British had not been seriously opposed by any one in India. Notwithstanding the condition in India, the British had followed the tactics of skirmish and battering. The former was carried out by the Infantry and Cavalry, the latter was done by Artillery.40 David Dundas, as mentioned earlier, had evolved drills for close column and a system of echeloning involving two basic fighting units and Infantry battalion normally of eight companies and a horse cavalry regiment. The successful conclusion of a battle was to be achieved by a integrated volume of fire. This very tactics was adapted by the Indian units in form of attack being developed on the firing line and Reserve. The Firing Line again divided itself into skirmishers and supporters. This is illustrated. This tactics failed to a large extent in the Anglo-Gorkha War. It had to be repeatedly modified, as we will see in the campaign studies. Strategic Imperatives British By 1814 Moira's aims had been crystallized as three folds: show a big victory against the Gorkhas so as to indirectly convey the message of British Supremacy in India; to clear a trade corridor in the territories occupied by the Gorkhas; and, to build his own image as consolidator of the British gains in India. The victory against the Gorkhas was to act as a spring-board for compaign against the Marathas and probably against Ranjit Singh, beside improving trade in the north. Some historians, such as Majumdar had described Moira's objective as ' to impose a limit on the military expansion of the Nepalese.'41 That does not stand the scrutiny of history. For, if it were so, all that Moira should have done was to capture Sheoraj and Butwal, combined with other insignificant enclaves of dispute. But for Moira the larger issue was trade and the corridor for its expansion to north. His aim, therefore, was: to defeat the Gorkhas in the areas of occupation including Sikkim and impose such terms on them as suited the British interest; and to chastise and humiliate the Durbar through military defeats on them. In concept, therefore, Moira's strategy was to capture territories and impose British will on the Nepalese. Of this larger strategic aim, emerged the military strategy and the doctrine. The choice of the areas were focused on the corridor for trade, the Valleyrs of Dun and Kyarda Dun. Further, adequate show of force was to be made against the Kathamandu Valley. And while the military operations were ensuing, the probable allies of the Gorkhas had to be weaned away and rebellions had to be caused in the hinter-land to the Gorkha occupied areas. It could be aided by the Rulers whose states were in possession of Gorkhas and so no. On the question of campaigning season, it had to be a dry season, immediately after the monsoons. In so far the question of a board front vis-à-vis a narrow front had to be decided for an area of 1600 Kilometers frontage. Objectives which were separated had to be handled by independent and strong forces. Alternatively, a concentration of force with impressive superiority had to be arranged . Militarily, it was seen that while the forme r would divide the Nepalese efforts, it would also result in lack of superiority at critical points and critical times. The effect of operations on the time schedule of the campaigning season also had to be considered. Out of the deliberations, the British evolved the plan which we disus subsequently. Psychological operations of winning over the people of the occupied areas through various stratagems had to be dovetailed into the plan.42 In effect it implied that: Whole of Kumaon and Garhwal, Basahar in Punjab hill states adjoining Tibet to be captured.43 Other areas to be freed of the Gorkha control. Military operations against Nepal to be progressed with a view to reach as far as the Kathmandu Valley. Sikhs and Marathas were to be contained through alliance. The Chinese were also to be assured that there was no permanent territorial interest of the British in Nepal and the manoeuvre was temporary. Moira was fairly candid – and even boastful in his final report on stratagems of subversions and political expediency. In his 2 August 1815 report he wrote: " 114 with the operations of the troops it was my determination to combine a system of political arrangement, calculated to promote and secure the objects of the war. The basis of this system was to engage in our cause the expelled Chiefs of the ancient hill principalities reduced by the Goorkas and thereby to draw over to us their former subjects. The general tenor of my information led me to belive that the detestation in which the Goorkas were held by the inhabitants of the conquered territory, would induce them to avail themselves of so favorable an opportunity as would be presented, through the invasion of the Goorka dominions by a British army, to rise against their oppressors and exert their utmost efforts for the subversion of their power. It was my intention to employ the influence of their feelings in aid of our cause by engaging to exclude forever the poor of the Goorkas and to re-establish the ancient line of Princes under the guarantee of the British Government on no other conditions than that the exertions of the people and their Chiefs should be contributed in the way by which they could best promote the objects of the war. Either from habitual dread of the Goorkas, or diffidence of our success, occasioned by our failures in the early operations, this expectation was not generally realized." The Gorkhas The Gorkhas evolved primarily a defensive overture. In the occupied areas the troops were to fight through dissuasive operational art. At the home front, the enemy was to be kept at bay; and not allowed to cross the border. Adequate forces were to be concentrated at the expected points of convergence of the enemy. The border of Nepal thus became a Laxman Rekha or the limit of penetration for defense of Nepal, while flexible response was to be adopted in the occupied areas. As commanders in situ were regarded the best judge of the terrain, the positions they chose to defend and abandon was their prerogative. But the overall strategies were worked out on two principles. Firstly, in occupied areas, space was to be traded for time and a mobile defence with lines of limit of resistance were to be selected. There was no control on battles from Kathmandu, though reinforcements were planned. Secondly, the defence of Nepal, was to be based on accepted border from where the enemy was to be raided, attacked and finally destroyed. In both contingencies operational art was to be based on fighting battles around the well defended forts. Withdrawal from them to another set of defences was subject to the progress of the battle. Diplomacy was to be used for achieving a negotiated settlement of the entire dispute with the British. The efforts at defusing tension and combat had to be explored through all means. Search for allies on the concept of an 'Asian Solidarity' had to be worked out constantly. Even the old enemies and doubtful friends had to be won over. He pleaded to the Tibetans Marathas, Rohillas, Sikhs, the Chinese for succour.44 It was a desperate effort in alliance, as except the Marathas, others were strange bed fellows. Ranjit Singh as we saw had been tied on to the British through the Treaty of Amritsar and he himself was watching the progess of the battle. Until the end of the campaign he seems to have regarded the Gorkhas as alien as the British, if not worse. There are rare people who draw chestnuts out of fire for others. Ranjit Singh and the others of the Indian states who still existed, were least venturing to do that for Amar Singh in India. But even jumping the gun prematurely in this matter of alliance, one cannot resist quoting Pemble's observation that "had the Sikhs (of Ranjit Singh) and Marathas joined their strength to that of the Gorkhas, it is hardly debatable that the British would have been expelled from northern India".45 It would have definitely been for good. But the Indians lacked strategic foresight and consequently were nibbled at, and finally individually chewed-up. A golden opportunity was thus lost by India in defeating an invasion and consolidating under one banner. Back home, Bhim Sen Thapa tried to raise the morale of his people and told them that the The British have taken Hindustan because no one had opposed them. And their power and resources had geatly increased and they intended to capture our territory. We shall have 22 lakhs people to expel them.46 The Gorkha Defensive Deployment The Gorkhas streamlined their overall command in occupied territories.47 They occupied in varyig strengths the forts of Bhylee (Arki) subathu, Murni, Jaithak, Jagatgarh, Kalunga, Virat, Rowain, Tasksal, Taragarh (Nalagarh), Mustgarh, RAmgarh chain of forts, Rajgarh chain of forts including Malaun and forts in Almora and Garhwal. The Gorkhas were thus compelled to occupy larger number of forts and areas with lesser strength which seriously threatened their defensive capability. They needed to follow a pragmatic strategy of offering graduated and flexible response (stronger in the areas of British advance and thinner in depth). But wrong assumptions perhaps led them to following a uniform display of strength everywhere. Preparation forward Both sides began to work feverishly for the war from early 1814. The British, in fact, began their intelligence collection from the time Moira landed as Governor General and Commander-in-Chief. In that twin capacity he did not have to refer his preparations for war to any one. Along with intelligence began the psychological operations. The Gorkhas too were not inactive; they collected their vital information through various means and sources. However, they placed their reliance more on their 'valour' than the 'British discretion'. The British employed with finnese, the Kautilyan stratagem of Sam, Dam, Dand and Bhed.48 By 10 June 1814 instructions were issued to Rutherford to terminate all diplomatic transitions with Nepal. So was the nominal trade. The war had already begun on this date.49 The actual declaration of war against the Gorkhas is recorded as 1November 1814, though a decision had been taken eight months back and the war began from mid-October. As part of the overall strategy, four divisions of the Bengal Army were concentrated on four different axes stretched between Danapur (Patna) in the east to Banaras to Bilaspur to Meerut, on the west. ON both the flanks, two groups of Irregular forces operated in support of the main operations. ON the east, leading form the Jalpaiguri-Siliguri corridor to the fort of Nagri in Sikkim and on the west in Kumaon another group of Irregular forces operated. These forces worked under Major Barre Latter of the Rangpur Battalion with a force of 2400 men and Colonel Gardner (later Colonel Nicolls), respectively. Latter had Irregulars from Bihar and Oudh alongwith some local Gorkha settlers and a few Sikkimese. Under Gardner there were some Regulars mixed with Irregulars. Hearsey's force, comprised local Rohillas, Kumaonis, collected at Pilibhit for operations in the Kali Kumaon. Plan of Operations The strategic objectives of Moira finally worked out as : 1st Division (Div) under Major General Bannet Marley at Danapur, to seize pass at Makwanpur, preliminary to advance to Kathamandu. 2nd Div under Major General John Sulivan Wood having concentrated a Benaras was to secure Butal, thence Palpa and advance to Kathmandu where it was to link up with the 1st Div. 3rd Div under Major General Rollo Gillespie was to advance to Dehra Dun via Saharanpur and thence to Srinagar (Garhwal). He was to operationally control Ochterlonyu as he advanced upto line Nahan-Subathu. 4th Div under Colonel David Ochterlony to advance through Bilaspur to Ramgarh, Arki/Malaun-Subathu- Jaithak and to link with Gillespie's forces (where he would cease to be independent) for final march to Srinagar. Thus began, what Sir George Nugent one time C-in-C, described. "petty warfare on the frontiers of the British territories which rarely lasted more than one campaign and which always ended successfully". It was also epected that Moira's foray into Kathmandu Valley would be over by the Christmas. Both of them were in for shock. A Simple Comparison of Forces Before we proceed to analyse the operations as they developed, it is necessary to compare the two forces as objectively as possible, in terms of their strength, fire power, mobility, ability to reinforce, morale and fighting techniques. Based on the British intelligence and assessment (which were generally over-estimated), the Gorkhas' strength was as given below: (a) Strength : 5,000-7000 in India. 10,000 in Nepal. (b) 5,200 muskets (fusils) were reported to be distributed at Nahan (1,600) Hindur (300) Basahar (500) Kumarsein (200) Subathu (500) Arki (2,000) miscellaneous (100). It does not include weapons and strength at Sringar and Kalunga. While the number of weapons did not exceed this figure, they were distributed all over. One among those Gorkhas carried a fusil; the others were armed with bow and arrows, Khukris, and swords, Weapons captured during war were to be used to the best advantage. (c) Aritillery: 3 pounders-30-40 in India and Nepal. 4 pounders-Arki, Rajgarh and Jaithak. 1.5 pounders to 2 pounders-100 in India. (d) The above strength of manpower, weapons and guns proved excessive and inaccurate. The British estimates were based on hear say more than correct assessments. However, these will still present a picture of the Gorkha strength. The strength given by Francis Hamilton in Nepal was also sketchy. He listed strength as: Palpa 1,200; Chisapani 200; Bonat 1,200. The initial British strength, on the other hand, is correctly tabulated as follows: (a) Cavalry-664. (b) Infantry- 4,061 (Europeans). 31,0008 (Natives).- final figure:52,180 17,111 (Irregulars). (c) Dromderry – 200. Corps
(d) Pioneers -843 . (e) Artillery – 3,628. (f) Private followers – 1,50,00 (Ochterlony's force had and logistic support. 42,134 followers alone. (g) Artillery Pieces – 106, Field guns – 47, Howitzers – 20, Siege guns – 14, Mortars – 23. In comparison with Gorkhas, the British had an absolute superiority in Cavalry, Pioneers and at least, the superiority of 10 times in Infantry and 100 times in Artillery. The Gorkhas, however, excelled in morale, fighting technique, mobility, degree of tenacity, offensive spirit and above all, their ability to sacrifice themselves for their cause. Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. What is a Register Of Merit docs -> Protecting the rights of the child in the context of migration docs -> United Nations E/C. 12/Esp/5 docs -> 9th May 1950 the schuman declaration docs -> Getting To Outcomes® in Services for Homeless Veterans 10 Steps for Achieving Accountability Download 0.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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