Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
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- A Panoramic View of Battle of Kalunga
- Strength of Gorkhas in Kalunga. British
- 80 And all that the British could find in the Fort beside the dead and wounded, were 4 small brass and iron guns, 87 mounds of wheat, 109 mounds of paddy and some dal (pulses).
The Attack Gears Up The artillery pieces were brought up on elephants and deployed during the night of 30/31 October under Major Pennington, assisted by Lieut Blair, the Engineer and Captain Byers, Gillespie's Aide-De-Camp. Gillespie by nature, a restless man, moved not only the guns but whole force of Ludlow and Kelly amounting to nearly 3,000. By the fall of the night he began to toy with the idea of surprising the Gorkhas from the Table Land and by the morning he had decided to advance the timings of firing of his guns by 60 minutes. Accordingly, they began their signal firing at 8 am , 31 October. The outflanking columns either ignored the firing or did not hear it. Bal Bhadra was prepared to stake any sacrifice to neutralize these 'wretched' guns. And he ordered his detachment deployed on the knoll close by to assault them. Some 50 men crawled around and charged at the firing guns. However, it caused several casualties to the Gorkhas and the survivors managed to retreat to the Fort. Lieut PC Kennedy whose guns were attacked by the Gorkhas, thought that the retreat of the Gorkhas further encouraged Gillespie to progress the attack. The First Assault At 10 am Major John Ludlow was ordered to assault. Ludlow had under him dismounted Irish Dragoons that provided the advance guard of Carpenter and Ludlow's force. The two companies of HM's 53rd and whole of Carpenter's force, joined up the Ludlow force and organized the attack. The Dragoons60 led the attack followed by the HM's and Carpenter's force. In their élan the Dragoons pressed the attack and reached the out skirts of the fort where the Gorkhas were 'swarming' at the base of the walls. They engaged the on-coming Dragoons with their Khukris and within minutes, 88 Dragoons lay wounded with 4 dead. In his letter of 1 December 1814, Bal Bahadra wrote: "In this attack Ripu Darman was badly wounded but he still made to Srinager. Jamadar Mangal Rana killed three Gora (British) with his Khukri outside the fort. Acts of bravery of Subedar Vanu Basnait, Jang Singh Thapa, Jamadar Vijai Vir Gharti, Chandra Mani Rana saved the day. They also planned the evacuation of the fort." It is obvious that the Gorkhas would have vacated the fort even during October.61 As the assault went in, Gillespie accompanied by Lieut Colonel Westnra, Commanding Officer Dragoons, Major Stevenson, the Commisary General, William Fraser, the political agent and PC Kennedy, the gunner officer moved up to a vantage point from where they could observe the battle. The massacre of the Dragoons shook Gillespie and he tried to move the slowly crawling HM's 53rd and the Sepoys, forward. However, there was little enthusiasm from these ftoops as the walking wounded of the Dragoons returned bleeding the cursing. Not disappointed at the dithering by Ludlow's column in the first attempt, Gillespie called the balance of HM's 53rd, from the camp and pushed them on the plateau. A mixed column of about 900 men consisting of HM's 53rd (including those who had reached the camp and they were moved up post haste) formed the second wave of the Ludlow and Carpenter force. Off they were pushed by Gillespie to teach a lesson to "recalcitrant Gorkhas." The HM's troops moved up- some running, some walking through the blackened rocks. Following them moved the Sepoys. UP the slope, as they Straightened themselves into assault formantion in the area of the plainer portion whrer stood the huts of the Gorkha village, they were confronted by some 150 Gorkhas. Their Khukris glistening against the rays of the October morning sun, they engaged the British troops in their ceremonials, knapsacks and long bayoneted riffles. Before these troops could shake themselves up into an assault formation and the guns from rear could fire, the Gorkhas ran forward cruing their battle cry Ayo Gorkhali Ayo Gorkhali.. Behand them followed Bal Bhadra with his long sword and a flag stuck on a pole, bearing a massive Hanuman on a yellow cloth. Near him stood the band playing the tune of O Nepali Sar Uchali ( Ye Gorkhas keep heads high). The attacking Gorkhas swung their Khukris in high and low angles chopping heads and wounding more. Leaving the dead behind, the remaining attackers ran back. This second attack also proved disastrous and left Gillespie fuming in anger, and inwardly quailing at the loss of the good name of the Europeans, who sometime back, he had boasted to be superior to the Orientals. It was now, he felt, the Europeans were at disrepute. He told those around him that HM's 53rd had let him down. He stopped the retreating rabbles and asked Ludlow and Carpenter to reform and get a hold on the troops. They were to be pushed forward and told to try the left side of the fort where the slope was gentle. They moved up but soon ran into the perimeter walls of the so called Gorkha village. Ladders were laid and men exhorted to climb up. When hesitation appeared on the men's faces Lieut Ellis climbed on one of the ladders.62 That got him a sniper's shot. He fell down and lay dying. Some men attempted to climb the two other ladders and having reached the wall, they saw Panjis and inner moat. They retracted, retreated with all others as the Gorkhas appeared from their right and left. They ran and did not stop until the water reservoir. "They are damned barbarians … bloody Goorkaas", said they, amidst the shouts of cursing and grumbling Most had thrown their muskets away. Gillespie bit his lips and ground his teeth. By now Mawbey had joined him. Lieut Kennedy who was nearby with his horsed guns was told to take a dash forward, as far as possible, closer to the fort and take a direct shoot at the gate . The breach it would cause would enable the assaulting echelons to funnel into the Fort. He was also told to take on a Gorkha gun that was coughing sharpnels into the attackers. Kennedy, in a fine dash, moved the horses forward to about 100 yards of the outwork protecting the gateway and to enfilade the wall upon that side. It was now 11.15 am and the marching columns had not yet got close by and were not visible. Getting mad about failure, as 21 had ben killed and 190 wounded, and nothing had been achieved, Gillespie decided to set in an unprecedented example of leadership by personally leading the assault wave. While we pause for breath, as Gillespie did, we look for the first hand account of the final stage of the battle, most of its being taken from Kennedy's statement in the enquiry that met in Meerut, later:63 "An enfilade gun placed at an open wicket of the fort swept down many. Ensign was killed, Lieut Elliot was badly wounded, the troops then retreated. Ladders which were left among the huts which were the fire about this time. Nothing was heard of the other columns. Gillespie, on receiving the report of the failure ordered forward three companies of the 53rd, which had just arrived and a battery under Captain Coultman with tow horse artillery guns under kennedy to blow open the gate … (it) reached within sixty or eighty yards of the bastion and a sharp musketry fire was opened on them. The Teneral accompanied by Colonel of Dragoons and his staff came up here and they went forward leaving Lieut Campbell to cover their advance. Passing through the village, the huts still burning and much impeded by the dead and wounded of the preceding columns, they came to a turn in the road in the full sight of the gate of the Fort, some fifty or sixty yards off. Lieuts Kennedy and Blane ran forward to select the position brought64 to 30 to 40 feet. But those who should have gone forward, wavered and the fire of the matchlocks and arrows told with effect upon the leading sub-divisions. In vain did the General respect his orders for the men to charge. The wooden bar across the entrance were broken by the fire of the gun and a party of stout Gorkhas rushed out. General Gillespie was frantic. Major Luidlow appeared at this juncture with several officers and Sepoys and was desired to attack to the right, where there was supposed to be an entrance; the horse artillery men were ordered to arm themselves with muskets to the dead. The supply was not a scanty one. And when this was done, the General with his sword in hand and a double-barrelled pistol in the other turned to Lieut Kennedy and the rest, exclaiming; Come on my lads, and now Charles (Kennedy), for the honour of the county Down.65 Only a pace or two forward he fell with a bullet though heart. So here was the eye-witness account of the charge of Gillespie, the brave, against a more braver people who in the words of Field Marshal SHFJ Menekswaw are the only "unafraid (fearless) brave people."66 With Gillespie also went Byre and Ludlow's Adjutant, O' Hara, who was wounded. Lieut Young and Kennedy rushed forward to retrieve Gillespie. Young's biography narrates that Gillespie died in his arms. The Dragoons' History records that the attack was abandoned and the remanents of the force retreated under Capt Campbell, who had arrived from his out flanking move by now. The history of 53rd HM's describes the battle in their own way: "The two companies lost several men and Lieuts Young and Anstic severely wounded; three of the columns had not advanced and the messengers never reached their destinations … The ladders had been burnt alongwith the Gorkha huts and the storming party lost 15 killed and 75 wounded". There is a foot note to the narrative which suggests the state of morale of 53rd. "Gillespie had harangued the 53rd for turning up late and the tradition of the men were discontented and while holding the ground, would not advance … also these failures were because of feeling between the officers of two battalions that led to duels." 67 It vindicates the state of relationship that existed between the King's troops and the Company's troops. Not that it was a lcal problem but endemic. Sir George Nugent had warned the Government that " a secious deterioration in discipline and morale of the Army was being caused by severe over-taxation of its patience and resources". 68 The memory of White Mutiny, lingered on even in battle fields. What the readers need to also appreciate is the excellent fire control Gorkhas had and their marksmanship and their cool courage. And yet after the battle got over, the survivors laughed, had their taut of drink and were back to their defences. Some even followed the retreating Mawbey's force and gave big smiles as if they had won a game from the British. They were such happy breed of men. Gillespie's death was 'regretted' by Moira and the failure of Kalunga was regarded to deeply augment the loss which the Service and the Country had sustained by the "distinguished gallant officer who personally conducted It and whose conspicuous military talent must place him in the ranks of those officers whose exploits have done (pride) to the British name in India". Mawbey called Gillespie's death as "melancholy".69 It is here the British also got to know the Gorkha as an admirable soldier, individual and human being. Bal bhadra allowed them to collect their deads and wounded without mutilating them. It generated good feelings and gave a vent to chivalry, besides the gallantry. Bal Bhadra was, indeed, generous to his enemy but he was not naïve to return their weapons. As the British retreated carrying away the body of Gillespie Campbell managed to retrive Kennedy's guns. But the dead and the seriously wounded lay in the battlefield. Bal Bhadra collected every bit of their arms, ammunition and even flages, The Gorkhas had been reequipped with better rifles along with the 150 reinforcement that trickled in, and were determined to fight with better resolve with the British muskets-against the British. The Second Assault Colonel Mawbey, according to Colonol Sandes, "sat down to bombard the Frot while Engineers and Pioneers cut the water channel which supplied water to the Gorkha camp. He demanded reinforcement of additional troops and battering guns before an attack could go in"70 He, however laid a cordon around the Gorkha defence, His 20 pieces of artillery continued to bombard the Gorkha positions. The constant harassing fire caused casualties nd fatigue. The re-inforcements of some 200-300 men which sat on the Saknyana Hill, tired to move in and about half the number infiltrated into the Frot. Mawbey had fired 1,200 rounds of guns and mortars by 26 November.71 As to the actual attack on the Gorkhas, Mawbey dithered, despite more than 4000 combatants. In support of his non-activity he had been referring to Adjuant General's letter of 1 October which advised caution in the event of lack of wherewithal. Gillespie's death had shaken him, as all the others. By 20 November 1/3 NI located at Moradabad was moved to Nalapani and so were the battering guns consisting of 4, 18 pounders under Captain William Battine and Captain Car Michael, the Engineer officer. By 24 th Mawbey's plan of attack of the second time began to take shape. On the same day, Bal Bhadra counter attacked the battery, which was beaten back . Mawbey's plan was a simple one which is excerpted from Field Orders of 27 November (PRNW pp 466) reads: "Storming party consisting of Grenadiers companies, one company 53rd, new Light Company, under Major Ingleby, The force to move with firelocks unloaded and carry the breach with the bayonet." The British view of the battle is recorded better though 'peppered', in the history of 1/13 NI by Lieut General William Richards: Bal Bhadra had made a counter-attack on the morning of 24 Movember. The advance of the force including 1/13 NI began until the gate of the breach where a deep trench with bamboo Panjis and offers of reconciliation stopped the battalion. The Gorkhas hurled every thing at the attacking column. Like trapped injured lion, they would not let any one come close by. 1/13 th was routed after two hours of contest. The attacking force was reduced to 70 from its attacking strength of 600. Moira was furious at the failure as it tarnished the image of the great fighters. Repeatedly reduced from aweful fire of artillery, greatly reduced in number for want of water and food, Bal Bhadra abandoned the fort and joined the reinforcement awaiting on Saknyana. Amplifying on the battle principally, the history of 1/13 NI called the "Beach practicable, in fact, as a chronicled failure", For, only Lieut Harrington of 53rd ascended the breach and was killed. It grounded the operations. More guns were then brought up. Lieut Edward hall built up a 12 pounder and Lieut John Luxford a 5.5 inch howitzer, which he tried to drag to the breach and was mortally wounded. The Gorkhas also lost heavily but gave no sign of their weakening defences. Of their determination, Colonel Shakespear wrote: "This was our first stiff fight with the Nepalse, who here showed their grit and not only the men but their women too. For there was a number of the latter in the fort, and these true to the best traditions of their sex, helped man nobly, for they were seen at the asssults on the walls throwing heavy stones on our men".72 They were heard saying "Timiharu Sita Yudh Garne, Aru Ke Ho (Will fight you… and what else)". A similar story is given by William Fraser, where he says: "The defence was so desperate that I saw women actually throwing stones from the walls. I was hit in five place with stones besides the arrow wound across the throat." The second major failure at Kaunga led Mawbey back to his camp but he continued to fire his guns unabated. The casualties continued to increase. Earlier, Bal Bhadra had been planning to finally vacate the Fort but delayed it to the second assault by 27 November when the British had 755 casualties including 75 killed, 680 wounded. The Gorkhas had been reduced form their original strength of 600 to a mere 90 that he planned an abandonment which, we will discuss subsequently. But they had carried on the struggle as spiritedly as ever. Preferring death to surrender as observed by sundar Lal he decided to fight his way out through the besieging force.73 On 30th November, the gun fire and the flight of arrows from the fort ceased and when the British began to wonder about its cause and most cautiously walked into the fort. They found it abandoned except bodies of 180 killed, those dying and a few toddlers. Major Kelley, the officer incharge found the whole area of fort a slaughter house strewn with the bodies of dead and wounded and served limbs of those who had been torn into pieces by the bursting of shells. Those who yet lived piteously, called out for water. The stench of the place was dreadful and many of the bodies of those who had been killed, had been insufficiently interred. Penderal Moon saw "those two fruitless attacks costing casualties exceeding the total number of defenders a stigma to the British bravery."74 Even Lord Moira recognized the Gorkhas both as brave soldiers and humane enemy, who were entitled to being treated well. As to his consolation he thought, it will be some trifling consolation of the families and friends of brave heroes who have fallen before Kalunga that no man ever fought so bravely or fell more regrettedly than the whole lot of them did.75 A Panoramic View of Battle of Kalunga "The bravery with which the Gorkhas fought here and routed the English is worth writing with a pen of gold. Gorkhas are unrivalled fighters. Had they been wise rulers, it would have been excellence in something already creditable", so wrote BD Pande.76 In 1994, I had spent almost a month in researching in Nepal, where most of the part was spent in dusting off the old documents in the Royal Nepalese Archive and in persuading the Royal Nepalese Army Headquarters (Singh Durbar) to let me peruse their documents on this war. It was to see the other side of the hill and as Machiavelli felt, to, "encompass the vantage points of the Generals on both sides of the hill." I ran into a set of letters written by Bal Bhadra and others in their own hand which give the Nepalese side of story. While they can not obviously be fully reproduced for reason of space, the necessary aspects that give the Gorkha version are given below:77 Attack by Gillespie. The Gorkhas could observe the movement of the outflanking columns for attack on 30/31 October. Incredibly, it resembles every detail of the build up, movement and deployment for attack. The Gorkhas put British casualties at 8 Gora Sahibs including one General. The actual casualties were: Officers-killed 5, wounded 18; Others- killed 30, wounded 210. Among the senior Gorkha casualties included Subedar Chandravir Thapa, Nathu Ram, Daljit Kumar and Jamadar Daljit Shahi. They also included hundreds of men and their families and the Garhwalis. Attack on 27-28. Extremely accurate information on build up to artillery, manpower and deployment are given in these letters. They say Mush or columns built up across Nagal, Dandagaon, Lashvan, Asthal, Nalapani and water source. The guns were deployed on Table Land (near wart source) and north end of the Fort. The attack developed along the Table Land from where the battering guns breached the fort wall. They also give details of British casualties including 40 killed and 348 wounded. Evacuation of Fort of kalunga. The authentic story of this evacuation emerges from these letters. The evacuation of 84 men in fit condition was carried out between the night of 27 November and 29 November in three lots. ON night 27 November, 20 men with standards and treasury moved out. This party was in charge of Ripudaraman Thapa. He had four boxes full of jewellery and treasures to cart. He ahd some walking wounded also placed under his charge for move to Srinagar. He halted at Gopi Chand Ka Tippa during the nights of 28 and 29 November, 44 including Bal Bhadra finally vacated the fort. The withdrawal took them to Srinagar and Nahan through the reinforcement companies on the top and the Kiryali. But the withdrawl of Bal Bhadra was throuth the village of Duwara to Chamba (or Chamuya) to Jauntgarh-Jaithak (Nahan). The veracity of the statement is further confirmed from the British side as on 30 Npvember, on a tip off from locals, Ludlow moved and attacked Bal Bhara's party. Besides killing a Gorkha officer and wounding another Ludlow saw a Gorkha for the first time. The fear Gorkhas had created amongst the British was what Japanese had done to them in 1941-43. Besides they had only seen a Gorkha wounded soldier who walked up to them for treatment to his fractured jaw. It partially fits into the story produced by Edwin T Atkinson in the Gazetteer of the Himalayan Districts (pp 639-640): "The seventy (in fact 84) who escaped from the Fort were soon after joined by some 300 others who had been hovering about the neighborhood endeavoring to find a way into the fort …" Re-inforcement The letters also give the arrival of three companies from Nahan under Subba Chandra Vir thapa. These included Jwala Dal, Ran Jang companies. They concentrated on the high ground area of Kyarlie (Kiayali) village and managed to infiltrate about half the strength into the Fort. The letters give impression that Mlechha and Kalanal companies had moved out with their standards. They were perhaps the part of the troops who vacated the fort between 27 and 29 November. Strength of Gorkhas in Kalunga. British records showed different version of Gorkha strength at Kalunga which varies between 1,000 and 1,500. The actual strength, (though confirmed by Amar Singh Thapa) can be worked out. Mawbey cremated 97 men and women on 1 December, he counted 90 already buried. The strength that vacated the fort was 84, Re inforcement of 150 was built up. Even if an additional number of 100 is given to it the strength does not go beyond 600. It must be remembered that of this, atleast 200 were Garhwali fighters and about 175 were the women and children. Departing Scene. one of the letters of Bal Bhadra gives out his painful departure and leaving behind the wounded. But he had told them that the abandonment of the Fort by men who were fit to fight another day, compelled him to vacate the Fort and leave them behind. Concluding Lines Mc Muun compares Kalunga with Chittor when he writes, " After evacuation of the fort by Bal Bhadra it was like the scene of desolution of Chittor in 1533 when 32,000 Rajputs including 13,000 in their flower of Youth and beauty lay dead, through Jauhar and fight." The difference lay only in one thing. Whereas the Rajputs sacrificed themselves more due to fear of indignity, the Muslims would afflict to them, here in Kalungas Gorkhas had inflicted defeat on their mighty foe and yet came out dignified. They transcended the Rajput bravery.78 In the same context William Fraser passed the buck for failure on " The heat, impatience and impetuosity of poor General Gillespie as the principal cause of our defeat", But to the Gorkhas he was fair and said of them in the same vein: "The Gorkhas fought most bravely and resolutely and if they fight as well in the field, we shall have tough campaign".79 To Gillespie's blessed memory there is the tomb in Meerut, still in good shape. The Indian Army takes pride in maintaining it. The marble slab reads : "Vellore. Cornelles. Palumboung- Sir RR Gillespie. Djoc-Joc-arta. 31 October 1814 Kalunga." Out of Kalunga emerged the image of the Gorkha which is well assessed by General Fredrick Young (also one who fought there), who in his biography (pp44) wrote: "We may credit the tradition which says that, on abandoning his stronghold Bulbudhur, the Ghoorkha Leonid triumphantly exclaimed in the loud voice: To capture the Fort was a thing forbidden but now I leave of my own accord. Kalunga was never captured . It was entered when evacuated and then razed to the ground". 80 And all that the British could find in the Fort beside the dead and wounded, were 4 small brass and iron guns, 87 mounds of wheat, 109 mounds of paddy and some dal (pulses).81 Directory: docs docs -> Application for acem docs -> Observational Assessment of Teaching Practices Teaching Assessment Initiative Proposal Submitted to The Teachers for a New Era project docs -> Traditional British values docs -> From Warfighters to Crimefighters: The Origins of Domestic Police Militarization docs -> Borzoi Club of America Register of Merit Program I. What is a Register Of Merit docs -> Protecting the rights of the child in the context of migration docs -> United Nations E/C. 12/Esp/5 docs -> 9th May 1950 the schuman declaration docs -> Getting To Outcomes® in Services for Homeless Veterans 10 Steps for Achieving Accountability Download 0.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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