Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political
Kalunga: The Battlefield of Bal Bhadra Singh and Robert Rollo Gillespie
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Kalunga: The Battlefield of Bal Bhadra Singh and Robert Rollo Gillespie Such is the fame and terror of our swords and Khukris that Bal Bhadra with a nominal force of 600 destroyed an army of 3,000 to 4,000 English .. we are here in Rajgarh eager to meet the enemy. In his famous letter of 2 March, 1815 Kazi Amar Singh Thapa. Preamble Kalinga or Kalunga have been associated with epoch making battles of India. There are two such known names though not identical one in Orissa and another in the Dehra Dun Valley. In the former, Ashoka, (or Asoka BC320-230) is known to have defeated his adversary and caused such widespread slaughter that he wept for months after the battle. It metamorphosized his life and turned him into arighteous Buddhist King and his deeds justly added a cognomen of 'Great' to his name. Kalunga of Dun, created the legend of the Bravest of Braves for Bal Bhadra, a Gorkha defender of this non descript fort. In the case of Kalunga of the Dun Valley, it was a different kind of scenario, yet strategically as important a landmark as the Ashokan Kalinga, It became a battlefield between two foreign invaders of India the Gorkhas of Nepal who had been in occupation of this area for the past decade and the Englishmen of East India Company on a mission of expansion into the Himalayas. History can never forgive Indians of That period who reduced themselves to that state of impotence which allowed the foreigners such a free hand, while they helplessly watched such developments. Some of them even joined one of the belligerents in total disregard to thir feelings or dignity or nationalism. There were two distinct effects of Kalunga: it set the British to rethink about their own strength and tactics and led accordingly to defeat the Gorkhas more by deceit than by raw bravery and they developed a grudging admiration for the Gorkha johnies which eventually led to the Gorkhas joining the Indian Army. The Gorkhas in occupation of the Kumaon Hills since 1790 and Garhwal from 1804 and the Punjab Hill States thereafter, had entrenched themselves in various area. In the Dun Valley it was in the areas of Kalunga and Mohand Pass on the Sivalik That they took firm control. After a decade of the Gorkha invasion, the descendants of late Raja Pradyuman Shah (Sudarshan Shah) living in a state of poverty in Saharanpur and Faizabad invited the British to dislodge them from the areas occupied. Similar request went from the Chands now in asylum in Bareilly and the Oudh. Much effort had also been made by Harsh Dev Joshi, that enigmatic character who historians see both as a quisling and a replica of Duke of Warwickshire i.e., both a patriot and a pretender. He must have released his march of folly when he initially invited the Gorkhas to help him obtain the throne of Chands and he lost weatever he could have received otherwise. Notwithstanding his fear of the British, he thought them to be a better Devil than the Gorkhas. But there is no doubt that he became responsible for causing an historical disaster in Uttarakhand which spilled into Kohistan and brought about subjugation of the area. Kalunga came to be seen by various writers and observers according to their own perceptions. Edward Bishop called it a "rickety wood and stone stockade".50 Walton Hamilton described it more aptly as he wrote: " A fortress in Garhwal, 26miles north of Haridwar. Latitude 30 degrees 20 minutes north; longitude 78 degrees 6 minutes east. A little to the north east of Kalunga are manu caves inhabited by a race of people nearly in a state of nature. These caves are low, narrow and are very dark having no aperture but entrance. The food of these troglodytes is rice of large gain." His earlier description was: "About 2.5 miles north east of Deyrha, 75 miles from Srinagar. Height 3,268 feet. A small miserable stone castle occupied by a Goorkha garrison. Celebrity only due to two bloody repulses experienced by the British in 1814".51 The history of HM's 53rd Regiment, however described Kalunga fort as of "excellent stone masonry, more formidable than it had been represented to be and not taken without a cannon". This Battalion had fought in the battle of Kalunga and suffered frightfully. Its description, therefore, could not be too far wrong. Colonel W Shakespear who visited the area in 1913 described it as follows: "Having consisted of irregular pentagon in shape crowning the highest point of the hill, a large stockade at the north end of the ride overlooking the village of Lakhund, while another line of stockades covered east side of the ground towards the village side of Kalunga (non existent). This side being less steep and more easy to attack. On a small knoll the Nepalse had a small stockade. The walls of the main fort were of no great height and were at this time in an unfinished state. The entrance was through a wicket gate on the north east side."52 The importance of occupying defences over this feature is highlighted again by Colonel Shakespear: "The Nalapani fort of Kalunga guarded the chief route at that time from Dehra Dun to Tehri. It stood on a low lying hill overlooking Nalapani and the Song Valley, 3 miles east of Dehra". There were, indeed, bridal tracks over today's Mussoorie Chamba feature and another alternate route via Rishikesh-Chamba-Tehri. There now are only tell-tale marks. Even in 1913, Shakespear had found this site covered with thick jungles and lines of defences difficult to make out. Kalunga 180 Years After The road to Kalunga on which the author traveled is aligned through the Raipur Defence establishment to Tapowan, a small Arya Samaj temple complex on the dry nala bed. It climbs up through the old Nalapani village where the people draw water from an old cemented water reservoir. Some attributed it to have been made about the time the Gorkhas ruled the roost. Here I met a Gorkha Sadhu at Rudreswar Temple and NS Gureria who are regarded as authority on the Kalunga Battle. The Sadhu, said that as late as late as 1940 he had seen water there and the pipe lines to bungalow known as Zephyre Hall. The one time Superintendant of the Dun, F Shore and Lieut Fredrick Young had made the bungalow jointly. Like Kalunga fort, it has only the remnants left. According to Guleria, his grandfather was witness to the Kalunga scene. For our ground reconnaissance his ex-soldier son and his grandson joined me. Soon we were at the site of Kalunga. Bal Bhadra Takes A Stand The Gorkah is a natural meson and is even an architect. Here in Kalunga they (the Gorkhas) had free labour available among the locals to dig, build embankment around the perimeters, help create the lake and so on. The lake which Gorkhas called Sagar Talao has distinct remains. As late as 1940s, says Guleria, there was water in t he lake, which even served as an irrigation channel to their dry fields in Nalapani. We trekked further up to the hill top whose northern, north-western faces are fairly steep. On its west and further north-east-east it tapers gradually. The northern face has sharp gradient, knife edged spurs and steep escarpments. For defence and protection, the Gorkhas built a 'Stone and wood fort' on the highest point. Some reservoirs for water and magazines for weapons were also built up. Out of one such earthwork, which is flushed to the ground, we dug out stones and bricks cemented by quick lime. They are two centuries old, yet strong. On and around Kalunga Captain Bal Bhadra, a young man of 35 built a mini-town with lob houses, the rest house for officers, billets for men, leisure homes for local women, armoury, cook houses, cattle sheds, training areas and even play fields. Storage for grains and provisions were created. Most of his time was spent on improving a defensive wall that he built on the lower rim of the hill or on collecting revenue, rations and suppressing small resistance that the locals put up when they raised their voices to the Gorkhas taking away their mulching cows or young girls. On such a jungle there would inevitably have been problem of water. Bal Bhadra found a water spring on the northern face of the feature. In October, which is immediately after the rainy season, the area is green; its undergrowth full and movement, difficult. The lake, however, must have been full of water. Despite a lake and a water spring on the eastern slope, water remained a problem for the Gorkhas. It became their Achilles Heel everywhere from Kalunga to Malaun. In their initial assaults which invariably failed everywhere, the British succeeded only by staging a coup de grace for water points on lower heights and then laying siege to the defences of the Gorkhas. Kalunga is a helmet shaped feature with North-south wooded spread. In selecting Kalunga as a defensive position Bal Bhadra had shown not only a fine understanding of the gorund bout also of the likely threat that hel had to contend with form Tehri and from the south. Its north-western face have sharp gradients, virtually unassailable. To attack it, one had to reach the plateau either from the north or the south. The jungle clad Kalunga feature provided natural cover, all round view and domination of the area both by fire and observation. The wood provided the fuel and construction material. Captain Bal Bhadra Kanwar deployed about 1,000 Gorkhas and Garhwalis in the Dun-Kyadrah Valleys that extened from Dun to Kalsi (Below Chakrata). His defences guarded the British ingress from the axes of Mohund pass, Timli Pass and Haridwar. His troops included lightly equipped troops at Mohund, Timli, the forts of Virat and the main strength being concentrated on Kalunga. His defences had to be co-ordinated with his movements to Srinagar and Sirmur. The strength which he had on Kalunga proper was about 600 and included 200 Gorkhas, the same number of Garhwalis and balance being women and children. At Virat there were 150 and the remainder were scattered in penny-packets for collection duties, manning the stockades on the two passes and for controlling the local villages. In early 1814 Bal Bhadra had been visited by Amar Singh who had advised him to concentrate his force at Kalunga and carry out extensive improvement to the fort, ensuring that the water reservoir was protected. In his assessment, Amar Singh had asked Bal Bhadra to stock rations and provisions for a least 5 months when he thought situation should improve. A man of ingenuity and of cool courage, Bal Bhadra set about improving the fort with his full might. And by Semptember, he had, constructed the fort though not totally made shell proof; built a perimeter of walls and created sufficient confidence among his force through training and indoctrination. The latter was done by him through religious service and drumming into his people that no one could defeat the Gorkhas. If the British were trying to wean away the locals, so eree the Gorkhas, specially in the valley where most of the Zamindars of Garhwal and Mahant decided to help him. He built up his intelligaence by employing the Sadhus and locals as much as possible. His concern in intelligence were largely the European Infantry, Cavalry and the large caliber guns which the British would employ against him. He also learnt the British technique of assault by personally visiting Bharatpur and understanding their technique of breaching the fort and Charging through the beach. Funneling through a breach was critical for an attacker, as it was for the defenders. He realized that he would have to plug it to prevent the attackers from 'flooding' the fort. Secretly, he began to build a moat inside the fort, to surprise the British. Along with it also came the idea of Panjis and Wicket Gates over which he could mount the guns in more destructive and lethal manner. All along he placed the musketeers who could fire their muskets upto 150 yards, then archers could shoot their arrows at the enemy between 35 and 75 yards. And if the enemy draw closer, there were small hard pieces of rocks to be hurled at them, with wooden catapults and by hands. For those who still got closer, the ultimate Gorkha weapon, the helavy weighted Khukris, the personal weapon of each Gorkha- man, woman and child- was there to finally contest the enemy at the close quarters. The women joined the men in defence as actively as combatants. The western modern army who employed female folks as stretcher bearers or musicians, must have viewed these brave women with awe. The small caliber artillery he had, were to be located on the ramparts where their solid and grape shots could engage at ranges upto 500 yards. He tried to move he larger caliber guns form Sringar but he had to contend with 2, 3 pounders and 6 smaller guns. He anticipated the local might desert and those who did not, might serve as a boon but they had to be watched and then only employed in sensitive points. He expected uprising in the Valley and his supplies being disrupted. But to Amar Singh he as sured that he will fight till his end or when orderd otherwise. Armar Singh promised him that reinforcements, to the extent possible, will be sent to him. Rollo Gillespie Rolls into Dun Situation had crystallized by May 1814. The war clouds had become darker and the possibility of it precipitating became imminent as the British provoked Gorkha retaliation on a police post soudth of Palpa in mid-May. The final mail was driven into the coffin of the Anglo-Gorkha peace immediately after this incident, when Lord Moira recorded his views: "The British Government has long borne the conduct of the Nepalese with unexampled patience.. But forbearance and moderation must have their limits .. the British Government having been compelled to take up arms in defence of its rights, its interests and honour ….. "To this Bhim Sen Thapa countered by having said in April 1814 –" How will English be able to penetrate into our hills … our hills and fastness are formed by the hands of God and are impregnable." "His Father at Palpa also told everyone that the battalions he had raised were better than the Europeans'. A verbal propaganda and counter propaganda was at its pitch.53 We concentrate on Rollo Gillespie's 3rd Division (Div), leaving others on their march elsewhere, But first Gillespie himself. Gillespie had joined the King's Army and served in East India Company in Java and India. He had turned every expedition including the Caribbean venture as interesting examples both for notoriety and military virtue of those times. He fought with every man whose face he hated and he sepnt more than he earned living off the loans from the regimental contractors or even through false claims and other means which appeared fair only to him. But it must be said in praise of his military balour that he was brave like a tiger. In the Caribbean, as in Java and later in he Vellore Mutiny (1806), the British successes were mostly due to his bold leadership and resoluteness. He turned every situation to the advantage of the British. He was rebellious, a small despot in so far military discipline was concerned and he could steal the affection of any brother officer's wife with almost impunity. Whenever in difficulty with the establishment, he saved himself by opting out of the present appointment for more adventurous assignments. But the British needed young officers like him on the model of Robert Clive or else what they achieved, would have taken them an other century or perhaps never.54 Promotions came in his way and by the time the drum beating of the Anglo-Gorkha war was on, he had two crossed swords and a Subalten's pips on his shoulders making him a Major General. As a King's Officer though younger he superseded the Company's officers, David Ochterlony included. David was still a Colonel with almost double the Gillespie's service. So here was Gillespie, General Officers Commanding 3 Div assigned to capture the Gorkha defences in the Dun. But as soon as this assignment was given to him he grew serious in tone as stories of Gorkha bravery and determination of their commander, traveled to him at Meerut and Saharanpur. He know it would be a grim battle. As he began traveling up, he wrote to a friend: "The summits are narrow .. Valleys extremely confined .. not a spot to be seen to afford room for one thousand men in the tents … neither yielding shelter to birds or air … not the bwast of the fields". The Dun Valley was approachable via Timli, Mohand and Rishikesh/ Haridwar. In Gillespie's appreciation, he saw "The country… every yard a post and Gorkhalis are very warlike active people". He deduced he will have to move in several columns and he also had a premonition of a bad beginning and feared disaster. But like a good commander he kept on visualizing the battle for himself. His letter to a friend which he wrote, gives out his feelings besides the plan as it would take shape: "My force is rapidly collecting at Saharanpur. I expect to make them on Dun by about 23rd/24th October or 1st November in order to support Ochterlony's attempt against Nalagarh and his eventual proceeding against Amar Singh. Lord Hastings (Moira) has in a great measure left movements of the Div to Myself. I am inclined to think he will find permanent undertaking more arduous and difficult than he imagines …."55 Gillespie's force was really strong. It had a British Infantry and Cavalry regiment each with a squadron of native cavalry, 16 pieces of artillery (later increased to 20) two Pioneer companies and 10 Native Infantry regiments (20 Battalions). The actual orbat ran : 8th Royal Irish Dragoons (Gillespie's won regiment). 7th Native Cavalry; Skinners Horse (One squadron). HM's 53rd, Foot (Lieutenant Colonel Setbright Mawbey). 1st , 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 16th, 17th 26th 27th Native Infantry. Artillery. Two troops of Horsed Artillery (1st and 3rd) were allotted from Meerut to join the Div. Pioneers. 5 and 6 companies with officers from Engineers. In addition there were 6,668 Irregulars, whose strength continued to increase as the operations advanced.56 In terms of relative strength, mobility, fire power and logistic capability, the ratio of force levels of the British when compared with Bal Bhadra's reckons at least 30 times. A true case of a Goliath versus David. The Div having assembled at Saharanpur by 18 October 1814. Gillespie's plan for forward concentration and operation took shape. Based on intelligence, he sent elements to carry out reconnaissance's in force to Timli Pass, Kasumri (Kheri) and Mohand Pass as they looked into Kydra Dun and Dun Valleys. On capture of these passes, the force was to advance and capture crossing places, ferries and fords on the Jamuna and the Ganges at Rampur Mandi and Rishikesh. Along with a troop of the Dragoons three companies of light Infantry were to move to Badshahibagh (Towards Paonta Sahib) to maintain surveillance over the crossing on the Jamuna and also act as a firm base for further movement of troops. The rest of the Div divided itself into two large columns i.e., an advance group under Colones Mawbey and another under Colonel Carpenter, Mawbey's column consisted of 1,300 Infantry, 300 Cavalry and 5 guns which traveled over the path form Saharanpur to Kaumri over to Kheri Pass on the Shivalik and then descend into the Dun Valley and headed for Kalunga/Rishikesh. HM's 53rd with the exception of three companies formed part of column. The second column under Carpenter comprising 17NI, Horsed Artillery moved aong the Mohund to the areas of modern Clement Town and thence to Nalapani. Gillespie followed the column to Timli and was in Badshaibagh to carry out his operational reconnaissance for the axis of Virat. While the main force moved to the Valley a mixed force of Cavalry and Horsed Artillery was sent to Pinjore, the stronghold of the Gorkhas there being Mustgarh. This was to act as deception for both Gillespie and Ochterlony. See sketch giving out developments schematically. Considering the overall merit of the plan, it looked a brilliantly conceived military plan which could offer several courses of action to beat the enemy decisively. Mawbey was in Dun by October 22 and he set himself on carrying out reconnaissance. It soon ran into Bal Bhadra's early warning detachments near Nalapani, enroute Rishikesh and was driven back. Having achieved that, Bal Bhadra's men withdrew to the fort of Kalunga. Mawbey's reaction to the interruption of his early warning detachment assigned to move to Rishikesh near Nalapani by Bal Bhadra's marauding Gorkhas, was spontaneous and bold. The following morning leaving a rear party in the main camp which he established on the sahasradhara Road, he took a large force to the Table Top to intimidate Bal Bhadra.He deployed his five guns within 1,000 yards of the post and began to engage it without any effect. when a continuous gun firing produced no effect on the fort, he, according to the Dragoon's History " Summoned the Gorkhas to surrender". The message delivered at mid-night, received a courteous but firm reply from Bal Bhadra that it was not in his habit to carry on carry on correspondence at such an "unreasonable hour".57 The Dragoons who later suffered at hands of Gorkhas, had put it mildly. In fact, Bal Bhadra was angry at this misdemeanour and he conveyed so. A Gorkha when furious, behaves like Hindu God Lord Shiv, at his death dance. "That night", wrothe Francis Tuker, "a message offering terms came from British Command. Bal Bhadra remarking that he did not accept letter at that hour, tore it up." 58 The letter Tanta mounted to "summon to surrender", as Colonel Shakespeare calls it. When Bal Bhadra did not follow it with any other response, Mawbey sent a courier to Gillespie at Badshahibagh, for futher directions. Gillespie had by then marched through the Timli Pass, got closer to Kalsi and Virat and on receiving the courier form Mawbey headed Kalsi and Virat and on receiving the courier from Mawbey headed straight to the main force. His plan earlier was to reconnoiter the axis Kalsi, Rumtum and Virat. But Mawbey's message changed the complex of the battle. In total fury, he moved along with detachments, to the area of Kalunga, putting Captain Campbell on his earlier task. He was good at writing. He wrote from the camp (Where now stands his memorial) to a friend, his last letter: "Me Voici-in the far farmed Dhoon- the Temple of Asia and the most beautiful valley it is; the climate exceeding everything, I have hitherto experienced in India. I received report that Mawbey failed …. You may imagine this check completely changed my plans and here I am with as stiff and strong opposition as ever I saw, garrisoned by men who are fighting pro arise et focis in my front and who have decidedly formed the resolution to dispute the fort as long as a main alive". Gillespie, the hero of Vellore and Java was for the first time, seeing an enemy who would give not a quarter without taking adequate blood for it. So he wrote in the same letter to his friend: "The fort stands on the summit of an almost impossible mountain and covered with impenetrable jungle; the only approaches commanded and stiffly stockaded. It will be a tough job to take it but by first proximo I think I shall have it, Sub Auspice Deo." It was like Insha Allah of Mohammed at Battle of Badr ! By 24 October, Mawbey's guns began to fire on the Kalunga fort. Shells fell short or went overhead; a few landed on the 'Sagar Talao' and caused breaches. The lake began to drain out. The Englishman did not know of the damage then. Water began to dry but the spring at the north east had still good water supply to feed the garrison. Then there was no worthwhile artillery with the defenders to reply and neutralize the British guns. In the meanwhile, Gillespie evolved his operational plan for a multidirectional attack on Kalunga on 30/31 October 1814. The columns were assigned task and organized:59 Column 1. under Colonel Carpenter. His force comprised four companies each of HM's 53rd and 15th NI and Light Companies 6th NI, whole of 7th NI under Major Wilson. Detachment of Pioneers were to Carry ladders. Golandaz and Laskars were grouped to provide gun support. Its objective was to attack frontally from the Table Land. It was to depart at 3.30 pm on 30 October. Column 2. Under Captain John Fast. His force had three companies of 17th NI, one Light Company, whole of 27th NI, 16th Pioneers and Golandazs. It was to attack Kalunga from north after concentrating at Karsiali (Kursiali). Time to depart at 2 a.m. on 31 October. Column 3. With a strength of 529 under Major Kelly that had components from 7th NI, Light Companies of 1st NI and 5th NI and 20th Pioneers. It moved at 2 a.m. on 31 October. It was to develop its axis of attack from Lakhund. Column 4. Under Captain John Campbell. With tow Granaders companies of 6th NI, one light company and 16th NI. Its task involved an assault from the Asthal axis. Like other outflanking columns it also moved at 2 a.m. on 31 October. Reserves under Major Ludlow with four companies of 8th NI, detachments of 9th NI, balance of 6th NI with two Light Companies, and all the Cavalry. The interesting aspects of the plan were the coordination of the assault and certain orders which Gillespie emphasized to his assaulting commanders (see foot notes). He wanted strict fire control, use of bayonet rather than fire, observance of strict silence on halting to fire or releasing when the assault began and all attacks to be simultaneous. Purely from tactical aspects the plan he evolved is easily a modern tactical concept of multi directional attack, attempting to crack a nut with a hammer. Good terrain intelligence and guidance by locals enabled Gillespie to plan it. Nonetheless, the plan had discrepancies and it warranted a minute to minute coordination in the context of the battle as the final and most vital aspects of the plan were governed by one clause: As part of the plan five guns were to fire at 9 am 31 October and the attack by the three columns was to proceed after 120 minutes i.e. at 11 am. This timings had to be sacrosanct for both the commander controlling the whole operations that is Gillespie – and the outflanking columns of adhere to the plan of movement. It became vitally important as the columns moved out and thereafter there could be no control on their operations. The other flaw which he failed to take into account was the imponderables of war such as the weather, the terrain demanding more time for movement, the human factor of fatigue, the echoing effect on the acoustics of the gun due to the hilly terrain, besides the unpredictable reactions of the Gorkhas. 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