Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political



Download 0.54 Mb.
Page6/13
Date16.01.2018
Size0.54 Mb.
#36541
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   13

In the larger analysis, it was system failure on two accounts: the failure of the C-in-C to pickup the right type of the commander out of those available rather than assign important responsibility purely by the merit of seniority; and secondly, lack of confidence which Marley had in his command was really an endemic problem of that time. In the first case, mediocrity rather than meritocracy was the rule and in the second, the General Officers were picked up at the last minute to command division, of which they knew nothing but which they would soon lead into war. It was a total confusion worst confounded. Some of them who succeeded, had either served these formations earlier or were just plucky and even lucky.
The Meandering George Wood

Major General George Wood who took over (from Marley), did not consider it suitable to take unnecessary risks. The miserable state of the force, its morale shaken, the coming summer, and the monsoon, the malaria to which local Tharus of the Terai alone were immune and not his troops, served his purpose of procrastination.

But in order to cover himself, he began to interpret the new order Moira had passed to him for being speedily executed: "advance to Makwanpur". Not sure of himself, he queried Moira, "in view of advanced malarial weather, the objective should be, clearing the Gorkhas from Terai". This brought Moira's fury, as expected. Major General George Wood, humorously known to the British officers as "Tigher", was proving a jackal, if not a lamb. Moira's letter castigated him squarely as he fired his salvo from Calcutta: "When you were substituted for Major General Marley professedly that you might repair the mischief entailed by his inactivity I should have thought an unworthy impeachment of your character …" He told him of a recent success of the Irregular Cavalry; and by diverting HM's 17th Foot, into his Division, his hands had already been strengthened. And he should act quickly. " I should have lamented that you saw cause to forego what appeared a most advantageous opportunity…nothing of this sort is even the most remotely intimated by you … Do not deceive yourself. You neglecting to give me, your C-in-C, satisfaction on that point was no venial oversight. It was substantially culpable .. My selection of you for the command manifested, my opinion of your character and my personal dispositions towards you. I must not, however suffer my partialities of betray me into a parley with insubordination. I desire you as a soldier to say conscientiously how as you General ought to act in the case which I have detailed to you".98
It spurred George Wood to move at last. He struck down his camp at Binjara Pokhara on 3 march, 1815, moved to Baragarhi which Colonel Randhir Singh of the Gorkhas, fighting his mobile defence, had vacated in favour of the defence of Hetaura. Roughedge destroyed the post. From here George's juggernaut moved to Saran by 9 March and thence to Janakpur. It was a combing operation of which he said, he had swept the eastern Gorkha territory.
And then he moved back to Bettiah and called off the campaign, as it was no more clinically possible to maintain the health of the troops engaged in operation. The impression he gave of himself to his command was that Cornet Hearsey of the Gardner's Horse called, " disagreeable and incapable old General".99
In no further mood to forgive their Divisional Commanders, HM's 24th (or 24th /41st Royal Regiment of Wales) recorded their opinion of the two Generals, Bennet Marley and George Wood which its history recorded: "The 24th had the misfortune to be posted to the easternmost Division commanded by General Marley (and George Wood) who were not noted either for energy or initive ..". The Battalion blamed its own indifferent contribution to the war squarely on its Generals' incompetence. On George wood, they wrote specifically: "Having led his 24th, and Indian battalions on a hundred-mile trudge to no purpose other than burning a few abandoned Gurkha stockades, he retried to a camp near Bettiah".100
It was the total disgust of the troops, who are silent yet are the best judge of their commander and Generals. The British troops did not mince their words. Nor did the contemporary historian Penderal Moon who remarked mildly "Marley was unnerved by reports of the Gorkhas fighting qualities and by wild estimates of their numbers. Then of February 10 oppressed by sense of his incompetence, he suddenly, without warning and without handing over to any of subordinate, rode out of camp and left his army to look after itself."101
George Wood, the 'Tiger' in hibernation at Bettiah remained in command. He was to deploy his troops in the Terai providing David Ochterlony a larger firm base for his second invasion of Nepal.
John Sullivan Wood Goes Pegging
The Division under command Major General John Sulivan Wood was to advance to Butwal-Palpa with a view "to recover the Terraie of Bootwul and Sheoraj and afterwards to menace the enemy's frontier, creating a diversion in favour of the division advancing on Catmandoo, and of penetrating, if practicable, the hills, so as to occupy Palpa and Tonsein, the principal station and depot of the Goorkha in that quarter… After securing these objects, the further movements of this division is to be regulated by circumstances."
George Sullivan Wood's Division, as seen, was given as difficult a task as indeed to Marley operating further east. To enable him to carry out his task General Wood was allotted a fairly balanced force, that comprised : 8th Native Cavalry (Gardner's Horse); 5th Company 2nd Battalion and 3rd Company 3rd battalion Artillery with of Pioneers along with a large number of followers and logistics commissariat. The combatants themselves mad about 5,000. Their details:

Eighth Regiment Native Cavalry - 114

(Later Gardner's Horse).
Artillery, European and Native - 457 2,18 pdrs

8/6 pdrs
5th company 2nd Battalion later 3rd company - 3,4 2/5

3rd Battalion added. in mors

2,4 2/4

in Hows
European Infantry (His Majesty's Seventeenth) – 958

Native Infantry - 2,875

Pioneers (8th Company Bengal Pioneers). - 90

Total - 4,494
It is necessary to clarify that the language of Directive led to ambiguities and interpretations that became partly responsible for the failure of the operations. When the going got tough, the Generals found the ambiguities of orders as excuse for the achievement-short-falls. There is little of a divisional size operations in this sector except that Wood had a skirmish at Jitgarh, that dominated the western flank of Butwal-Sheoraj areas and over them, the axis leading to Palpa. And as failure came too easy, the operation became one of wild-goose chase by the General. First to look for another avenue of advance the subsequently, reacting to the Gorkha actions and rumours.
The chronological development of events of November 1814 February 1815, when constant, though disparagingly show movements took place are below:


  • The advanced guard troops under Captain Heathcote and Lieutenant Anderson commenced on 15 November, established the firm base by capturing the areas of Mynri (Myanri), Lotan and Nichaul-Pali. It was a good going and gave a flexible and suitable area for the main division to take off.

  • Under the then reliable guidance of the former Prime Minister of Palpa Kanaknidhi Tewari, Wood planned to march to Siura-Jitgarh-Niakot- with a view to bypass Butwal defence and brushing aside the minor opposition on this axis and assault Palpa from a lesser guarded flank.


Kanaknidhi, beside having remained a Prime Minister of Palpa, was a scholar and had helped Francis Hamilton Buchnan compile An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal and of the Territories Annexed To This Dominion By The House of Gorkhas (Published 1819). He was credited with good knowledge of the ground and because he had avowed to avenge the death of the Raja of Palpa Killed by Bhim Sen Thapa in 1806, he had joined the camp of the Firingis invading Nepal. He was, in a small measure, a 'Harsh Dev' of Nepal.
Like Harsh Dev Joshi in Kumon, Raja of Nalagarh and other who helped Ochterlony, Tewari agreed to lead the main force up the hill train, he had recommended to Wood and which the latter had accepted. Moving at a snail's pace, Wood's force of about 10,000 including the followers and porters, snaked up the road to Siura where it encamped. HM's 17th Foot under Colonel Hardyman, led the advance, on 15 December when it moved cross-country. As the force arrived at Siura on 1 January Randhir Singh's column commanders Shamsher Rana and Sarbjit Thapa opposed them.102
By 3 January Kanaknidhi led the King's troops opposite Jitgarh Fort, its magnificently camouflaged and almost concealed stockade from view. It is here the HM's 17th and other in the advance, bore the brunt of the Gorkha ferocity. They, in fact, ran into a well laid gauntlet of fire. Within hours, Captain Hiat, the Brigade major was wounded, and Lieut Morrison having been wounded, succumbed to his injuries. Other casualties included 19 killed and 100 wounded. It also included a shell grazing to General wood. The enemy was thought to have almost three times casualties, though it was not even one tenth. But defenders of the stockade retreated to the Fort after inflicting casualties. Kanaknidhi too was killed in the melee, whose body was disposed off by Birbhanjan, before he allowed the British to collect their.103
The Fort commander, according to the Nepalese sources, was Birbhanjan Pande; though the British were told it was Wazir Singh.
What actually happened here, notwithstanding the British claim to having and overpowered the stockade, was the taste of a Khukri charge by Birbhanjan Pande against the HM's 17th and others. This pinned down Wood's attacking force.
One of the most dreaded fall-outs of Kalaunga, Jaithak and Ramgarh in the west was the terror of the Khukri wielding Gorkhas in full cry as pack of wolves. That reputation was, until then, intact and showing its full effect in the east. Wood was shaken-up through he still called it a reconnaissance. But he passed the blame for failure at the stockade quickly to Tewari's treachery in misleading him. Prinsep remarked with the advantage of hindsight and tutoring by the Governor General: "The manoeuvre produced no result though attended with several casualties". 104

The main defences of the Fort on this day (3 January 1815) were intact. After consultation with Hardyman and others, Wood quickly appreciated, he would need much larger a force to tackle them and he became "determined to stop the fruitless waste of lives by sounding the retreat". Unfortunately like Marley and later George Wood, Sullivan Wood had neither good advisers nor could he himself remain "determined" to fulfil his mission, failures and blockages, notwithstanding. In case of both the Woods and Marley it was failure to "maintain the aim", as the Twentieth Centure military doctrine finally came to accept as the first and foremost principle of war.
As he vacillated, Wood, in an attempt to reconnoiter another avenue moved to Surajpur but stopped short of Tulsipur, on the western flank. He then retreated, changed his axis 180 degree out of phase and arrived at Bansi by 3 February. The pressure having been released from the Gorkhas, it was their turn to make bolder moves into Terai. They swooped to Tulsipur, Myanri, Siura, Pali, and down to Nichlaul in the east. Even Lotan was forced to be vacated, under the Gorkha Juggernaut.
Wood now made a north-easternly move to Sheoraj- the aweful place as he called it- to follow the tricks of a Ghenghis Khan and Nadir Shah. He destroyed the crops. encouraged his troops to pillage the hamlets and within 12 days he claimed to have destroyed 200 villages. The megalomaniac in John Sullivan Wood satisfied, he then thought of doing the same at Butwal but the extra-caution in him stopped when a small attacking force was caught crossing the Tenavi. He called off the whole operation.
General Wood's attacking force was back at Gorakhpur, form where it had started two months earlier. The image of the superior force "determined to chastise the Gorkhas" was fissured. Wood was sacked by the Governor General without remorse or fanfare. He in fact offered his resignation, but was sent to England, where, like Marley he too died a full General, the last of his honour being the Governor of Tower of London, an appointment that is customarily given to Generals whose services are immaculate, distinguished, and rewardable.

The stigmas Marley and John Sullivan Wood received from their pusillanimous acts in evading the main tasks assigned to them, were perhaps washed away by Moira's own not too clean a record of this operation and more-. In 1823 he had to resign for financial bungling he had done in Hyderabad. The British system of justice had finally caught up with his misdemeanour and similar swindling off the Wizir of Oudh, whom he asked to finance his Anglo-Gorkha as a loan !
As Moira's leadership suffered, the British prestige at its nadir, emboldened not only Bhim Sen Thapa and his grinning Gorkhas but he would tell Moira that the Convention which he forced on Bam Shah and Amar Singh, were fraudulent which he will contest, politically and militarily. Had there been an organization like the United Nations, perhaps Bhim Sen would have sought it's help !
Nearer home, no one was impressed with either the British modern army or their ability to defeat a brave enemy like the Gorkhas. The subversion and fraud they used in Kumaon and the Punjab Hill States could not take them far into the Nepalese main land. It was this frustration Moira reflacted in his remarks to Colonel Nicholls, the Hero of Almora, through a General Order of the day:105
The success of Colonel Nicolls under the complicated difficulties presented by the country, the fortification by which the natural strength was assisted, and the obstinate resistance of a courageous enemy, should prove the superiority conferred by military science and a certainty that strenuous application of its principle must entail honourable distinction on a commander… It is only in unusual situations demanding readiness of resource and animated efforts that the difference between officer and officer can be displayed. And it ought to be always present to the mind of ever military man that he who tries and fails had to plead those chances from which no operation in war can be secured; while he who contedts himself with urging difficulties, registers his own inefficiency (author's emphasis).
As happens in war, the Gorkhas symbolized third battle of Jitgarh-small and insignificant as it was as their important battle that prevented the British in 1815 from aggression against the main land. It was, in fact, an overall failure for Lord Moira; and the Gorkhas turned their border as de-facto Laxman Rekha, proving their hills impenetrable.
Effects of the First Campaign: An Analysis
"It is often outside the power of the General to act as he would have liked owing to lack of adequate resources and I think military history seldom brings this out. In fact, it is almost impossible without a detailed study which is often unavailable. For instance, if Hannibal had another twenty elephants, it might have altered his whole strategy against Italy."

-Lord AP Wavell in a letter in a letter to BH Liddel hart, 1942.

It is intended to discuss the implication of the aftermath of the first campaign, briefly. Moira never expected Gorkhas to capitulate so quickly after situation turned so dismal in November-December 1814 and continued to remain so, on the fronts of three fourth of his force.
The avalanche of the Gorkha defeat and the landslide of the British victories at Almora and Malaun turned the British extra generous, magnanimous to a limit that they let Gorkhas march off with honour. They realized their folly, when the Durbar began to refuse to ratify and Convention which Amar Singh and Bam Shah had signed in April-May. A second campaign thus became necessary to accept the ratification of the Convention. The government of the day in London and later the historians blamed Moira for showing extra generosity to the Gorkhas. Philip Mason, for example, wrote: "With the advantage of hindsight the Gorkha war was prolonged because we released Amar Singh Thapa when he surrendered".106 It is doubtful if the Durbar at Kathmandu could have made efforts to retrieve Amar Singh and his force, if the British took them as prisoners. Even if it were to be so, the line of defences extending from Jaithak into Garhwal was still intact and it could have taken the British, the best part of the following year to carry on the struggle. In any case, the failure in the east justified Moira's action. Besides, he constantly feared that the strategic support from the Chinese and Nepalese alliance with the Marathas and Sikha could well have sprung another surprise for the British.
Abandoning an empire of 45,000 square miles of the occupied territory by the Nepalese was the matter of great pain to Amar Singh who rightly called it as having been built "over four generations of acquisition, dignity and dominion".107 The British too reasised that rubbing the Gorkhas beyond a point was not in their interest. Moira made the point clear when he wrote: "The procrastination of the Gorkhas in concluding a treaty is not to be wondered at. The subscribing to the loss of half their empire is a painful submission of a proud people." 108 Commenting on the situation HH Dodwell thought that the series of defeats of the British at the hands of the Gorkhas "Spread widely in the country and offered no small encouragement to the Peshwas. Ochterlony alnoe restored the lost prestige of his nation". 109 Similar was the observation of Moira who wrote in his diary "Ameer Khan (of the Pindari) has in his camp 30,000 fighting men, 125 pieced of cannons. it is clear that he is waiting in the hope of untoward events occurring to us in the Nepalese war; an expectation founded on the extravagant opinion, they entertain of the Gorkha power and the reverses we have already suffered in the context."110
Penderal Moon saw it in winder perspective and with an objectivity, rarely visible among the British historians except Edward Bishop. "The overall setback of the British and their defeats at Kalunga and Jaithak, the timidity of General Wood and desertion of General Marley had shaken the British self-confidence and gave rise to their enemies, wide hopes of strengthening their arms to drive them out. The Marathas, Scindias, Holkars and Peshwas, Amir Khan, the Nizam and Ranjit singh were unanimous in their design-though not united to do so. The Gorkha bravery and resistance sent waves of jubilation all over India nad indeed, sensation."111

Moon based his observations only on what Amar Singh Thapa had written in his letter of 2 March 1815. "If succeed", Amar Singh had said, " and Ranjore Singh with Jaspau Thapa and his officers prevail at Jaithak, Ranjit Singh will rise against the enemy. In conjunction with Sikhs, my army will descend into the plains, recover Dun; when we reach Haridwar, Nawab of Lucknow will take part in the cause."112 But do we not see lack of unity and vision among the Indians as their prominent failure ? These two had already become the cause of their earlier subjugation to the Muslims and the oncoming one to the English.
Sir Charles Metcalfe chastised the military for failure of intelligence estimates, as he wrote, " Before we came to contest, their power of resistance was ridiculed. Their forts are said to be contemptible, their arms are described as useless. Yet we find on the trial, they can deal out death among their assailants and stand to their defences". The Gorkhas had tought a lesson to the British, which nobody had so far done. And then the British began trumpeting the Saga of the true bravery of the Gorkhas. In Metcalfe's words:
We had never met with an enemy who showed decidedly more bravery and greater streadiness than our troops possess; it is imposible to say what may be the end of such a reverse of order of things. In some instance our troops. Europeans and Native, have been repulsed by inferior numbers with sticks and stones. In others, our troops have been charged by enemy sword in hand and driven for miles like a flock of sheep. In this war, we have numbers on our side and skill and bravery on the enemy side." He made the British command see the writing on the wall as he suggested. " Our power in India rests upon our military superiority. It has no foundation in the affections of our subjects. It cannot derive support from the good will or good faith of our neighbors."
This very truth prevailed in India till 1946. The first campaign maimed, if not killed the myth of the British military superiority in India. They proved no match for the Gorkha bravery, the bravery of men of hills, who beat them in an alien land, far off form their own home land. Surrounded by allies-turned-enemy and fence-sitters, yet their bravery saw the day. It caused anxiety and fears to Moira, who agreed with Metcaffe that "to be failed in the struggle with the Gorkhas would be the first step to a speedy subversion of our power." By the end of 1815 he was all out for another confrontation-in order to reduce the lost prestige. And the stratagems he used were desperate.
I began the theme of operations in the East as "Graveyard of the British Generals". It turned out so not necessarily due to the lack of competence, mediocrity or a new battlefield milieu that the Anglo-Gorkha war offered. It was, in large sum, due to the psychological imbalance of most of the British Generals. They were not just attuned to fighting war, or even managing its complex character, which as Ochterlony realized and, called for "genius" in a man. The Gorkha commanders, on the other hand, bereft of a finesse were one who had known the face of the battle many a time and were mentally prepared to fight it out. If only resources matched their valour, they would have ruled Asia !
Psychology, has over the centuries rightly assumed important factor in selection, training and nurturing of military commanders. It took the British a century more to appreciate it.
Kumaon: A Burden Of History: Without Almora There Could Not Have Been A Malaun
Before the establishment of Almora town, the Katyuri Raja Baichaldev (whose capital was in Askot), gave it to a Gujrati Bhahmin. The development of Almora was done only by the Chands who made places for themselves and permitted habitation. They named it as Rajapur.
Towered by the mountains Kalimath, (6,414 fet), Shimtola (6,066 feet) and the massif of the Gannath, it is a beautiful town that has human life in the lap of nature.113

Download 0.54 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   13



The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message
    Main page
other side
main characteristics
main characters
major cause
only solution
governor general
british were
major objective
british began
fundamental cause