Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war Situation: Geo Strategic- political



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The Gorkhas, who occupied it from 1790 did little improvement to the town except re-building the Lalmandi fort, improving the Gannath temple and turning the are of Sitoli into a fortress. This has now been taken over as an establishment of Ministry of Defence. On capture on Almora in April 1815, the British re-designated Lal Mandi as Fort Moira and made it as the Headquarters of Kumaon Commissionary from where they began to control both Kumaon and Garhwal. Owing to the topographical similarities, cultural consonance, and political expediency, the idea of an integrated state of Uttrakhand demonstrates the historical feelings of the people of the region of Garhwal and kumaon.114
Without dwelving further into history we move to re-capitulate the plan of offensive against Gorkhas by the British in 1814. The 1st Division under Major General Marley had been given the task of seizing the pass at Makwanpur and advance on Kathmandu; the 2nd Division under Major General Wood was to move into Nepal through Butwal and cooperate with the 1st Division; the 3rd Division under Major General Gillespie was to initially capture Dun and thence to operate against Srinagar or Nahan; and finally, the 4th Division under Ochterlony was to operate against the Gorkhas east of the Sutlaj and south of Bilaspur.
The indications of political agents working against the Gorkha citadels of Kumaon were that they lacked strength both in numbers and will power, could be subdued through determined advance and skirmish by the Irregualrs. As Gillespie's 3rd Division was expected to turn the flank of Kumaon by operating in Garhwal, the success could be further facilitated. William Gardner and Hearsey,115 116both energetic Eurasians had shown great degree of enthusiasm in intelligence collection and understanding the terrain of Kumaon. And both volunteered to raise and lead a corps of Irregulars against the defence of Bam Shah in Kumaon while Gillespie reduced the Gorkha defences in Dun and elsewhere.
Moira saw a good opportunity to work on the plan which formulated into a two-pronged advance to Almora. The column for Almora was placed under Gardner, who by now had been given an acting rank of Lieut Colonel and on the east Hearsey, being given an acting rank of Lieut Colonel and on the east Hearsey, being made a Captain, was to command the Irregulars through the Kali Kumaon. Hearsey was to eventually converge at Almora. Both had full local support from Harsh Dev Joshi- the so called Duke of Warwickshire of Kumaon-the man who earlier invited the Gorkhas but was now siding with the British in their over-throw.117
The Gorkhas had been in occupation of Kumaon fro almost a quarter century and their Governor Bam Shah had brought about considerable stability –if not prosperity-in Kumaon. Though an able administrator, he was distinctly a vacillating military commander. His own rapport with Kathamandu was poor and he was under relentless pressure from the British stratagems of dissension and subversion to support them in surrendering the province of Kumaon or even as a bad case, defect to them. But under him their were very able military commanders which included his own brother Hasti Dal, then Governor of Doti province of Nepal, Captain Angad, Chamu Bhandari, Subedar Zabar Adhikari, Jasmardan Thapa, a Rohilla by name of Rengelu and his own son Nar Shah.
Two main factors assisted Moira to take the calculated risk of launching Irregulars into Almora. Firstly, the attitude to Bam Shah to British overtures for reconciliation, negotiation and even territorial adjustments including the other proclivity mentioned above. Secondly, the paucity of Gorkha regular troops in Kumaon since most of them had been diverted in from of reinforcements to Kalunga, Jaithak and the Punjab Hill States. Although Bam Shah was relying on Hastidal to defend the Kali Kumaon, and he had been assured by the Zamindars of Rudrapur of support in the Terrai, his denuding of troops, nonetheless became a temptation to Moira to let it be captured by Irregulars. In addition, the local Kumaoni had been weaned away by Harsh Dev Joshi who had unequivocally assured Gardner of more support and rebellion in the country side118 Accordingly, Moira agreed to the large scale employment of Rohillas, Pathans and the Kumanonis, Garhwali volunteers. And as Rohillas had knowledge of the country (through earlier invasions and trade), they were thought to be the better lots. The Pathans were expected to join for temptations of large sum of contractual money that the British were prepared to dole out. But they were neither trained nor blooded in battle.
In January 1815, Gardner and Hearsey combine were then sprung into action to concentrate their force in two separate areas i.e. Kashipur and Pilibhit. The forces that finally joined up were:
Gardner : 3,000 Irregulars.

2.6 Pounders
Hearsey : 2,000 Pathans and 200 Kumaonis and two regular companies. He also had some Gorkhas.119
Lieut Colonel Gardner made steady progress. He left Kashipur on 11 February, arrived at Dhikuli, up the course of the Kosi. Bam Shah's early warning troops kept falling back. On 19 February, 1500 strong detachment of Gardner occupied Kath-ki-Nau feature, while another column was sent to Kotagarhi, Ukhaldhunga south of Bujan. It caused Sardar Angad's forward troops on Bujan to fall back to Kumpur, south of Chaubatia by 28 February.
Gardner kept up his movement along the Kosi, reaching Binakot, and occupied the twin features of Chamuna Devi and Kapina-ka-Danda (also known as Kathal-Lekh). In order to give a fight now, Sardar Angad, occupied the feature of Point 5983. But Gardner fully supported and accompanied by Joshi, found out from him that the 7,186 feet Syahi Devi feature was unoccupied and its occupation would help unseat Angad from forward positions. It worked. For, as Gardner placed a strong detachment with difficulty on the snow covered peak of Syahi Devi by 22 March and he himself occupied the large Katarmal feature (Sun God Temple located here), the Gorkhas were left with no option but to pull back to their main defences of Kalimath, Sitoli, Almora, Gannath and Sintola.
It is interesting to note how Colonel Gardner, an Eurasian incharge of Irregulars moved up along the kosi in the west and another Eurasian Hyder Hearsey from the east. Both were to converge at Almora to bring about a military defeat on Bam Shah. The sketch shows schematically the progress of Gardner's advance to Katamal. It was a true see-saw, stalking game. First the early warning troops of Bam Shah fell back until they blocked Gardner's advance through the Ranikhet route first by occupying Bujan and later Kumpur and Temple Hill (Point 5983). Gardner switched his axis to Binakot and occupiued Chamua Devi and later Syahi Devi. This made Angad Sardar to reel back to Sitoli and the main complex. Gardner then firmed in at Katrmal doing his reconnaissance and subversion before arrival on 12 April of Lieut Colonel Nicolls with artillery and regular battalions.120
We leave Nicolls at Katarmal and move to the Kali Kumaon to see the progress to Hearsey's column.
Hearsey's 2,000 Irregulars under Kalu Khan with two regular companies marched up audaciously along the western bank of the famous River Kali. Trudging along the jungle trail, they crossed the Timla Pass before descending into the 'man-eater' country of Champawat.121 The Gorkhas had deployed a thin screen of troops along the trail. Before Hearsey's column could snake its way up to the Lohaghat-Pithoragarh track, the Gorkha defences at Kautalgarh and Khilapati had to be overpowered. Hearsey occupied them and then based on the local intelligence, placed detachments on the three crossing places on the Kali. He had been tasked to demolish these bridge too.
The news of Hearsey's burly Pathans reached Hasti Dal, the Governor of Doti and the younger brother of Bam Shah. He decided to confront Hearsey. In a sharp attack on the morning of 2 April he overpowered the Pathans and the Kumaonis at Khilapati and captured Hearsey, by then wounded. An enraged Gorkha soldier was about to kill him when Hasti Dal intervened. He was made prisoner and his Irregulars ran away. He was then escorted to Almora. Before depatching him, Hasti dal told Hearsey that, " hired men do not give their lives for a cause".
Was it to repay the gratitude that Hasti Dal owed him when he spared the life of Hearsey, is difficult to say. But according to a "family story" Hearsey had earlier saved Hasti Dal from being killed by a wild bear. According to Hearsey's biography, in 1808 Moorcroft and Hearsey having traveled to Tibet were returning through Garhwal when they were intercepted by the Gorkhas at Srinagar and were accused of espionage. It was Hasti Dal who helped him to be released from the Gorkhas. It was thus a strange acquaintance-cum-friendship of Hasit Dal with Hearsey that was being enacted at Khilapati.
Hasti Dal retook the fort of Kutalgarh by defeating Hearsey's Adjutant Mr Martindale, another free lance British seeking adventure. Martindale, however managed to escape with his Pathans and Kumaonis, who time and again, proved no match to the Gorkhas. The casualties suffered were 31 killed and 53 wounded.
A third and subsidiary force was also arranged to move in the centre of these two main forces. Its strength was 500 and its objective was to link up with Gardner's force. It reached Bhim Tal and then the Gorkhas never allowed it to move or link up.
What was admirable with the British logistics was the mail that moved to and from the field formations to Moira's roving headquarters. He had just been to Moradabad and thence Saharanpur. It is a Moradabad that he received the letters from Gardner and others which gave out the situation. Post-haste he appreciated the landslide that he would have to cross. If Kumaon was to be got, Gorkhas were to be chastised and if he were to keep his job as Governor General and C-in_C, he had to move fast. He saw Gardner going slow and being uncertain of tackling Bam Shah (If he offered full resistance). Gardner having known the prowess of the Gorkhas already from the accounts of the British failures and his own judgements, chose to avoid confrontation as far as possible and naturally went slow. He took a whole month on at Kapina-ka-Danda. He was not 'appreciated' by the Governor General fro the delay. IN fact, Moira was in a panic as well as anger and he decided to pick on Colonel Jasper Nicolls (14th Foot), Quarter Maste of the King's forces and one easily available to take on the task.122
Gardner's role need not be played down as Hearsey's, who divided his force and helped it get destroyed piecemeal. For, Gardner had moved his force with skill and caution better than Generals Wood and Marley in the east. And having got it into its firm base, deployed tactically so well that it could retain operational flexibility. He had a good firm base available and his intelligence was superb. The Syahi Devi feature however looked too far for deploying either a gun or influencing the battle of Almora effectively. It nonetheless offered him no specific tactical advantage in later stages of battle; on the contrary it became a problem of logistic. It must be understood that the plan that Nicolls followed- and took the credit for success had been evolved by Gardner.123
On arrival of Nicolls the force level was increased substantially. Besides the Irregulars there built up ¼ NI (761), 2/5 NI (764), 15th NI (500), 27th NI (1,500) and 2, 12 pounders, 6, 6 pounders and 2, 4 2/5 inch mortars under Lieuts CH Bell and RB Wilson. The entire strength rose up more than 7,000.
The plan Nicolls inherited from Gardner was to go in for Sitoli and Kalimath together before expanding to Almora; or go to Gannath and then roll down on Almora. The Gorkhas were now disposed off generally on Kalimath (150), Sitoli (200) under Sirdar Angad, Almora ( 250 distributed in pockets at Lal Mandi, Nanda Devi, Deep Chand Temple area and Haridungri- the site of present day cemetery), and Gannath (200) with a small reinforcement having moved from Doti under Hasti Dal on 6 April when he brought Hearsey to Nanda Devi fort. There were no guns with the Gorkhas and their overall condition is best narrated in the words of Bam Shah: "We holding Sitoli and Almora, inspite of some reinforcements brought by Hasti Dal, we are very much fewer in numbers. We are hard up for supplies, and having received no pay, men are tempting to go out and alienate the people." Bam Shah himself had decided to sell some of his jewellery to raise money to buy supplies and keep the Gorkhas from open rebellion and desertion. The overall morale of the Gorkhas was low.
Nicolls was hoping that Bam Shah would come around, and handover Almora and Kumaon to him without a fight . A fortnight was now spent in negotiations, which led to nothing, till on the 22nd April, according to the British version, "crisis was produced by hasti Dal taking a strong detachment, and marching northward from Almora."
What were these negotiations about ? There are on records, instructions to Edward Gardner (brother of Leiut Colonel Gardner) the political agent, to open negotiations with Bam Shah from early 1814. Copies of Correspondence between Bam Shah and Sir E Colebrooke are also available in these records. All show an orchestrated and motivated plan to 'buy' Bam Shah. In the end Colonel Bradshaw informed Gardner that "although Bam Shah had broken negotiations, the British government will not disclose to the Nepal government his past acts". A clear case of Bam Shah's complicity, or indiscretion-or both as he was compelled to hob-nob with British agents; and also of the British attempts to blackmail him. Much of it has been explained by Gardner in his letter of 22 November 1814 placed at PNRW, PP 298-299.124
Even BD Pande called Bam Shah not only a disaffected man (which indeed, he was) but one who made " peace cheap" fro the British.125 The British temptation of offering to him the post of Governor of Doti after the ceasefire remained in the mind. The Durbar had also not had good relations with Bam Shah. Bhim Sen suspected him to not toeing his line and Bam Shah himself thought, Bhim Sen had little idea of diplomacy lesser still of statecraft as expected of a statesman Prime Minister of Nepal. What, therefore, lacked in Kathmandu, Bam Shah tried to do from Almora during the last few months of his Governorship when the war clouds hovered in 1814-1815. The British, expert in exploitative machinations, endeavored to engineer their strategies so as to make Bam Shah look suspicious in the eyes of his own people.
In response to Gardner's letters, Bam Shah finally wrote to him by dissociating himself from any future incrimination: " What you observe regarding the state of the roads and difficulties of intercourse.. You have alluded to my correspondence with Mr Rutherford.. My communications with that Gentle man were merely lamenting that the strict and ancient friendship between the two states should have been disturbed by trifling altercations between Zamindars on frontiers of Palpa and Butwal. It is probably on this subject that you required me to send you a confidential person on my part… I will depatch a trustworthy person." Inspite of the non-ambiguous nature of Bam Shah's letter, the British continued to play on the point that somewhere, somehow he would prove slippery.
The controversy is put to its end by Campbell's notes: At a later period we offered Bam Shah and his brother (Hasti Dal), our protection and guarantees, in the event of their declaring themselves independent rulers of the Province of Doti. But like Amar Singh under similar circumstances, they scorned the idea of deserting in time of need of their lawful sovereign and native cournty.126
Both from the diplomatic angle and the military side the Gorkhas had to fight at Almora under great constraints. The Kumaonis had begun to desert by hundreds and the civilians were refusing to help them with provision s and intelligence. Instead, they were siding openly with the British and no movement of the Gorkhas was hidden. Their moves were reported as promptly to Nicolls for money and they themselves volunteered to guide the British columns.
As the battle indications built up by 20th April, Gorkhas began to read just their positions. It was rightly appreciated that by capture of the Gannath heights the British would not only be able to attack Almora easily from that direction but the Gorkha line of communications to Garhwal would be automatically severed. Though Bam Shah had a small detachment on Gannath he planned to send his brother with a larger possible detachment of men to take over the defensive responsibility. Hasti Dal, in the meanwhile instructed the detachment on Gannath to also expand its defences near the temple (today's government nursery) from where the gradient commences to the Gannath Temple. The stockade, in his opinion would have the advantage of water from the temple and it could be really well defended. The work on it had carried on for some time.
Then a new move by Nicolls of a large force of more than 900 men to occupy a firm base near the stockade was learnt. (It had seven companies of 5 NI, % flank companies, 100 Irregular mostly the deserters from the Gorkha and 2, 6 pounders). This obviously was seen as danger to the small detachment of the Gorkhas in the area. Hasti Dal's move to this place was carried out when Bam Shah was told that " 2,500 men are in a stockade on the Fatehpur Hill (the general area of the Temple) and our communications with Bageshwar are threatened."127
Hasti Dal joined them on 22nd April with depleted companies of Taradal and Bhawanibaksh and was soon organizing the defence. The biggest treachery against the Gorkhas was done by the priest of local temple of Gannath who briefed Major Patton, the force commander that "the time of evening meal was most favourable for attack". The Gorkhas were taken by surprise and the contest was soon decided. After a short sharp fight, the Gorkhas suffered a loss of an officer and 32 men killed on the spot, while many were wounded including their leader Hasti Dal, who succumbed to his injuries before reaching Almora. The British suffered two killed and 26 wounded. Loss of Gannath dashed Bam Shah's hope to fight a protracted war.

There are versions which are at variance with the present one128 Adequate proof exists that patton's force had been guided quietly by the priest and evening when the Gorkhas were in the process of eating their meals and had been fully surprised. In Hasti Dal, who was regarded as " a jewel of the Gorkha Commander", the loss for Bam Shah was both personal and military. For, Hasti Dal was the most valuable, active and enterprising officer and a man whose character was particularly amiable. His position now became like Amar Sigh's after the loss of Bhakti Thapa. After the Gannath action, Bam Shah had been left with just about 200 men and almora became an easy walkover for the British.
Bam Shah may have been a vacillating commander and even a suspect on account of hob-nobbing with the British, but he was a Gorkha who did not surrender tamely. He decided to fight it out in his own way.
Hearing of the success of Patton's action at Gannath, Nicolls immediately proceeded to attack Almora. The battle, a sharp and swift action of five hours on night 26/27 April saw the end of the Gorkhas in Kumaon. By this time, Nicolls had also been informed that Ochterlony had made a deep wedge in Amar Singh's defences at Malaun (Rajgarh). In his effort to subtly and covertly influence negotiations and military action, he had been telling Bam Shah that the Gorkhas had already lost the war. The British propaganda proved successful and convincing communication black-out, resulted. This was further aggravated by interception of dak all over.
Nicolls advanced on Sitoli via Hawalbagh then a treeless spur (unlike now a good jungle). 4 NI and Gardner's horde moved up and captured the two stockadge that made the defences of Sitoli Ridge. Sitoli opend the routes to Almora town-five of them as Nicolls papers make them out. These were perhaps to cemetery, Hiradungi, Kalimath and three small tracks to the down, its tow forts and the Palace/Temple. Now the geography of Almora is different. But the battle and names as they appear on sketch below would serve the purpose. The Nicoll papers that are housed in the India Office Library (UK) help explain the battle to some extent. Bam Shah's letter also shows details, though this letter had, obviously been written under duress as every thing had been lost by then and some of the statements in it are in self-defence as also British-tutored. It nonetheless helps to understand the battle from the Gorkha side of the story.
Briefly Sitoli was commanded by Angad. He could not defened it, inspite of extra ammunition having been sent with Bam Shah's son, Nar Shah. Kalimath defences were commanded by Bhandari Kazi and it had counter-attacked the advancing British echelons at Hiradungi (Cemetery). It caused some damage to the British as Lieut Tepley of 2/27 NI was killed and several were wounded.
The battle of the fort was fought on night of 25th April. It was pounded with mortars from 6 pm in the evening until next morning. The Gorkha detachment at Kalimath counter-attacked inflicting some casualties on the Indian Infantry. The battle was terminated at 9 a.m. when taking council from Captain Hearsey, Bam Shah sued for peace. A strange case of an evemy's counsel being heeded.
The casualties suffered by the Nicoll's force exceeded 200 in this easy, five hour battle against an opposition that was so feeble. The casualties actually took place due to the mix-up, and confusion of the night attack and self inflicted casualties by the British. It was said that the Gorkhas dressed as Rohillas attacked them. A Mongol could never look like an Indian Pathan or Muslim even in dream or darkness. But a reson had to be found, however cloudy.
The rest of the drama of negotiations is best narrated in the words of Atkinson:
The aritillery fire was continued until 9 a.m., when the Chauntra sent a letter under a flag of truce, supported by a letter from Captain Hearsey, requesting a suspension of hostilities and offering to treat the evacuation of the province on the basis of the terms offered to the Chauntra several weeks previously by Mr Gardner …. The Convention for the evacuation and surrender of Kumaon was signed on 27th April, 1815 by E Gardner, Bam Shah, Chamu Bhandari and Jasmardan Thapa… On the 29th April Bam Shah and his Sardars paid a complimentary visit to Mr Gardner and Colonel Nicolls and were received with a salute of Nineteen guns…. The same evening Jasmardan Thapa on the part of Bam Shah came with an open letter that it might be forwarded to Amar Singh Thapa. Ranjor Singh and the other Sardars at Jaithak and Nahan advising them to endeavor to obtain for themselves similar condition and to withdraw their forces from the western hills to the east the Kali" (Emphasis by author).129

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